Reframing Singapore: memory - identity - trans-regionalism by Heng, Derek & Aljunied, Syed Muhd Khairudin
www.ssoar.info
Reframing Singapore: memory - identity - trans-
regionalism
Heng, Derek (Ed.); Aljunied, Syed Muhd Khairudin (Ed.)
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerk / collection
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
OAPEN (Open Access Publishing in European Networks)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Heng, D., & Aljunied, S. M. K. (Eds.). (2009). Reframing Singapore: memory - identity - trans-regionalism (ICAS
Publications Series, 6). Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-271540
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Memory – Identity – 
Trans-Regionalism
Memory – Identity – 
Trans-Regionalism
Derek Heng is Assistant Professor at the History 
Department, Ohio State University. He specialises in 
pre-modern Sino-Southeast Asian economic interaction 
and early Southeast Asian state formation.
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied is Assistant Professor 
at the Malay Studies Department, National University 
of Singapore. His research encompasses colonial 
history, the history of ideas and social identities.
Edited by 
Derek Heng and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied
R
efram
ing Singapore Reframing Singapore
Memory – Identity – 
Trans-Regionalism
H
eng | A
ljunied (eds.)
Singapore, over the last two decades, has advanced 
rapidly towards being a global city-state and key nodal 
point in the international economic sphere. These 
developments have necessitated the reassessment of 
the manner in which this country may be understood, 
including its history, population and geography, as well 
as its transregional and transnational experiences with 
the external world.
Reframing Singapore: Memory – Identity – Trans-
Regionalism, consisting of fourteen papers, spans 
several disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, 
and draws upon various theoretical approaches and 
methodological processes to provide a more refined 
understanding of Singapore. The papers take on a 
multi-disciplinary approach, seeking to reassess the 
accepted notions and held discourses on Singapore’s 
past, and to reconceptualise our understanding of the 
challenges that the country and its people face in the 
present.
Publications Series 
Edited Volumes 6
www.aup.nl ISBN  978 90 8964 094 9
9 789089 640949
Reframing Singapore
Publications Series
General Editor
Paul van der Velde
Publications Officer
Martina van den Haak
Editorial Board
Wim Boot (Leiden University); Jennifer Holdaway (Social Science Research Coun-
cil); Christopher A. Reed (Ohio State Faculty); Anand A. Yang (Director of the
Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and Chair of International Stu-
dies at the University of Washington); Guobin Yang (Barnard College, Columbia
University)
The ICAS Publications Series consists of Monographs and Edited Volumes. The
Series takes a multidisciplinary approach to issues of interregional and multilat-
eral importance for Asia in a global context. The Series aims to stimulate dialogue
amongst scholars and civil society groups at the local, regional and international
levels.
The International Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS) was founded in 1997. Its main
goals are to transcend the boundaries between disciplines, between nations stu-
died, and between the geographic origins of the Asia scholars involved. ICAS has
grown into the largest biennial Asia studies event covering all subjects of Asia stu-
dies. So far five editions of ICAS have been held respectively in Leiden (1998),
Berlin (2001), Singapore (2003), Shanghai (2005) and Kuala Lumpur (2007).
ICAS 6 will be held in Daejeon (South Korea) from 6-9 August 2009.
In 2001 the ICAS secretariat was founded which guarantees the continuity of the
ICAS process. In 2004 the ICAS Book Prize (IBP) was established in order to cre-
ate by way of a global competition both an international focus for publications on
Asia while at the same time increasing their visibility worldwide. Also in 2005 the
ICAS Publications Series were established.
For more information: www.icassecretariat.org
Reframing Singapore
Memory – Identity –
Trans-Regionalism
Edited by
Derek Heng and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied
Publications Series
Edited Volumes 6
Cover design: JB&A raster grafisch ontwerp, Westland
Layout: The DocWorkers, Almere
ISBN 978 90 8964 094 9
e-ISBN 978 90 4850 821 1
NUR 761
© ICAS / Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2009
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright re-
served above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or in-
troduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any
means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise)
without the written permission of both the copyright owners and the
authors of the book.
Table of Contents
List of Tables 7
Foreword 9
1 Introduction 11
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied and Derek Heng
REFRAMING THE HISTORICAL NARRATIVE
2 From Political Rhetoric to National History:
Bi-Culturalism and Hybridisation in the Construction of
Singapore’s Historical Narrative 21
Derek Heng Thiam Soon
3 Gateway and Panopticon:
Singapore and Surviving Regime Change
in the Nineteenth-Century Malay World 39
Koh Keng We
4 Beyond the Rhetoric of Communalism:
Violence and the Process of Reconciliation
in 1950s Singapore 69
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied
5 The Politics of Fires in Post-1950s Singapore and the
Making of the Modernist Nation-State 89
Loh Kah Seng
6 Gender and Discipline in ‘The Singapore Story’:
The Female Chinese Factory Workers in Perspective,
c. 1980-c. 1990 109
Ernest Koh
LOCATING IDENTITIES ACROSS BORDERS
7 Textualising the Baba Identity:
Insights into the Making of a Bibliography 133
Bonny Tan
8 Negotiating Identities, Affiliations and Interests: The
Many Lives of Han Wai Toon, an Overseas Chinese 155
Sharon Wong Wai Yee
9 Singaporean First: Challenging the Concept
of Transnational Malay Masculinity 175
Lenore Lyons and Michele Ford
10 Trans-National Biographies and Trans-National Habiti:
The Case of Chinese-Singaporeans in Hong Kong 195
Caroline Plüss
SINGAPORE AS TRANS-REGIONAL CONDUIT
11 Indian Media and the Lure of ‘Uniquely Singapore’ 213
Faizal bin Yahya and Arunajeet Kaur
12 Localising the Global and Globalising the Local:
The Global Households of Filipina Trans-Migrant Workers
and Their Singapore Employers 229
Janet M. Arnado
13 Raffles Hotel Singapore:
Advertising, Consumption and Romance 247
Chris Hudson
14 The Role of Recruitment Agencies for Japanese Working
Women in Singapore 269
Yoshimichi Yui
About the Authors 283
Bibliography 289
6 REFRAMING SINGAPORE
List of Tables
Table 11.1 Number of Indian Tourists Visiting Singapore,
2002-2006 215
Table 14.1 Recruitment Agencies in Singapore Offering Services
to Japanese Companies and Japanese Workers 277

Foreword
For a small country like Singapore, serving as a key ship-stop to help
British imperial expansion for more than a century and only an inde-
pendent island-state since 1965, there have certainly been a lot of books
published about it. That number has grown more quickly of late, in part
because Singapore is a success story that seems to fit an era of capitalist
globalization most comfortably. But there are also other reasons why
there are so many books and essays written. The island-city acts like a
migrant multicultural state in a region that has discovered the idea of
native nations. It is a one-team regime that has won every election since
1965 and marginalized an increasingly feeble opposition. It rose from a
rowdy imperial entrepot to become a major transport hub for the world
and its communities have become purposeful and competitive at higher
levels than anyone could have imagined four decades ago. As many
have noted, it has continued to fight above its weight in large and tough
arenas. And there are more reasons that one can list, including some-
thing unlikely only a dozen years ago. It attracts attention in a large
numbers of scholarly fields, not only in the engineering, physical and
health sciences but also in the arts and social sciences.
One measure of that was the very successful conference its younger
scholars organized in Singapore six years ago, the Third International
Convention of Asia Scholars, where some 940 papers about various as-
pects of Asian studies were presented. Four years after that, at the Fifth
convention held in Kuala Lumpur in 2007, there continued to be keen
interest in Singapore. Thirteen of the papers selected for this collection
were first presented there. Of the fifteen authors, five are from Singa-
pore and four from Australia, one each from Europe, Japan, Philippines
and Hong Kong and two are now in the United States. They work in
academic disciplines ranging from history and political science to geo-
graphy, sociology and economics and represent a good sample of recent
efforts to present alternative perspectives to the dominant Singapore
government discourse.
The choice of book title, Reframing Singapore, reflects the trends of
the past ten years since the publication of The Singapore Story by the for-
mer Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. From the publication of the edited
volume, Lee’s Lieutenants, which appeared soon after that (1999) till the
most recent collection of papers, Paths Not Taken (2008), many histor-
ians and others have come out to fill in the gaps in the official narrative,
including accounts of events and people that have not found a place
there.
The introduction to this book by the editors, Dr Heng and Dr Alju-
nied, captures the current trends well. It gives an outline of how Singa-
pore’s history has been written since the new nation was established.
Those familiar with the first decades after its independence may recall
that there was a period when the state was shy about any close examina-
tion of its history, when young people were discouraged from asking
probing questions about its past. That policy has now been reversed
and there is greater attention paid to the multiple forces that made Sin-
gapore what it is today. But it has been difficult to change people’s
mindset about the uses of the past and a great deal still needs to be
done to enable new generations of Singaporeans to recognize the di-
mensions of what their country has achieved as well as what opportu-
nities have been lost. The introduction and several of the papers in-
cluded here provide provocative thoughts about some neglected topics.
They also examine some of the different ways new and little known
sources for a more comprehensive history one day might now be gath-
ered, preserved and used.
The editors have highlighted something worth emphasizing. Al-
though the Singapore story is work in progress, the scholarly world
should not wait for more to be tested or achieved. A great deal more is
now known about earlier periods of history that form the background to
the modern state’s successes. Much more has also happened since the
end of the Second Word War that, if examined carefully, would enable
us to better understand the small country’s trajectories of social and
economic growth. Heng and Khairudin point out that the conditions for
a systematic rediscovery of Singapore’s diversity could do with improve-
ment. More work is needed by a new generation of scholars like those
represented here to lift the level of discourse to one that can satisfy the
demands of the twenty-first century. And, most important of all, for a
place like Singapore, it is not more documents and writings with a loy-
alist national perspective that are called for, but research and thinking
that reflect the global outlook that has enabled the island-state to
achieve its present eminence. This volume of essays seeks to build on
that condition and I congratulate the editors and their colleagues for ur-
ging us to head in that direction.
Wang Gungwu
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
National University of Singapore
22 January 2009
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1 Introduction
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied and Derek Heng
Any tourist who strolls along the Singapore River will find picturesque
cityscapes that evoke paradoxical mental images in the mind. Skyscra-
pers are juxtaposed with shop houses that have been synthetically pre-
served so as to suggest memories of the island’s past. Painted black and
raised high on a concrete pedestal, the statue of the colony’s British
‘founder’, Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, stares at the modern, durian-
shaped Esplanade Theatres on the Bay. Colonialism was here, and so
were the Japanese. A tour of the Asian Civilizations Museum adds to
the sense of confusion and ambivalence. Impressed by high-tech dis-
plays of the tapestry of cultures that evolved over the last two centuries
and the migration of men and women from far-off lands, the tourist
wonders why Chinese, Malays, Indians and ‘Others’ are the only cate-
gories, which have been accorded demographic significance. She would
be informed later of the authoritarianism and the technocracy. But the
orderliness, security and comfort she has enjoyed thus far tend to dis-
guise the assertions of injustice. The hotel manager says he is from
Chennai, India. The chambermaid who changes the bed sheets proudly
affirms that she is a Filipina. The Chinese men talking amongst them-
selves along the sidewalks of a nearby shopping centre sound like they
are from Guangzhou. What is this place? What has kept it going? Who
are its indigenous inhabitants? When did its history begin?
Indeed, no single word could better describe Singapore to a visitor
than ‘paradox’. Placed uneasily at the centre of the Malay-dominated re-
gion of Southeast Asia, almost all of the island’s population came from
somewhere else. So much so that the claim to indigenousness is often
contradicted by evidence that the island was, in essence, a no man’s
land or, at the very least, a haven for wild beasts and pirates. Records
show that the man responsible for naming the island was Sang Nila
Utama, a thirteenth-century Sumatran prince. Having survived a ship-
wreck, he was impressed when he saw what he thought was a strange
animal. Unaware that the creature was actually a Malayan tiger, he sur-
mised that it was a lion (or singa). Singapura, or ‘Lion City’, thus be-
came the new name of a place previously known as Temasek, and it
was during Sang Nila Utama’s time that Singapore first gained fame as
a centre of trade, migration, and commerce, attracting people from near
and far. He was responsible for transforming Singapore into a cosmo-
politan port and the seat of a Malay kingdom (Heng 1999). Yet his con-
tributions have been paradoxically consigned to the margins of history
as myths and legends of old. Seizing his rightful place was a Briton
who landed on the island in 1819. He transformed the small island into
part of a larger imperial project. An enigma, a schemer, an orientalist, a
genius and not particularly sane, Thomas Stamford Raffles is the embo-
diment of all of Singapore’s paradoxes, as well as serving as the Eur-
opean icon of a quintessentially Asian Singapore.
The contradictory and paradoxical nature of Singapore since Sang
Nila Utama’s time is due largely to its internal and external geography.
Internally, the absence of a substantial hinterland and an agrarian base
has led rulers, administrators and politicians on the island to integrate
Singapore into the global economy as much as possible. Raffles was not
exaggerating when he noted that no trade on the island could be carried
out without the support of the Arabs, Jews and Chinese, who domi-
nated the seas in the nineteenth century (Aljunied 2005: 24). Since Sin-
gapore was almost uninhabited when he arrived here, Raffles decided
that the most effective way to meet the demand for labour was to tap
into external sources of manpower. Indians from other areas of the Brit-
ish Empire were thus brought into the port city in successive waves.
Meanwhile Europeans, Eurasians, Armenians and Jews settled at sites
where commercial activities predominated. The Malays were provided
with land adjacent to the Sultan Hussein’s residence. While their hopes,
successes and failures have been memorialised in museum exhibits
and succeeding generations of their descendants have contributed to
the hybrid cultural mosaic of modern Singapore, the policy of attracting
‘foreign talent’ to stimulate a trans-regional trading framework con-
tinues to this day (Faizal 2008).
The external geography of Singapore poses yet another paradox. Lo-
cated at the southern end of the Straits of Melaka, the waters around
Singapore have long served as a maritime passageway between the
South China Sea, the Java Sea and the Indian Ocean. It has been the lo-
cus of trade wars between European powers, namely the Portuguese,
Dutch, Spanish and British, and a precious jewel for the Acheh, Johore
and Melakan sultanates in their quest for total dominance in the region
(Borschberg 2004b). And yet, to the extent that this geographical im-
perative has proved beneficial for the island, it has also placed Singa-
pore in a vulnerable position. The island has, from time to time, been
threatened by pirates and contending warships that navigated these
waterways. The 2004 tsunami that claimed more than one hundred
thousand lives across the Indian Ocean points to the fact that Singapore
is vulnerable to the forces of nature. That said, however, it is the conflu-
ence of such internal and external factors that has shaped the ebb and
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flow of the economy and politics of Singapore since the thirteenth cen-
tury. It has, without a doubt, determined the nature of migration flows,
the structures of everyday life, the creation of hybrid identities, and,
more importantly, the construction of memory and history.
Nowhere have the concerns with geographical imperatives, the mak-
ing of identities and the rendering of Singapore’s past been more
clearly manifested than at the International Convention of Asia Scholars
5, held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in early August 2007. Most of the
scholars who presented papers on Singapore at that significant gather-
ing were unequivocal in their conclusion that, having attained indepen-
dence in 1965 and having undergone a protracted project of construct-
ing the nation-state over the last forty years, the same issues that have
characterised Singapore’s experiences since Sang Nila Utama’s era per-
sist till this very moment. In this regard, the years 1819 and 1965 are
perceived as the reference points for many of the papers that were deliv-
ered at the convention. This introduction will not address the question
of whether or not the use of such dates – with the accompanying pro-
blems and latent conclusions – is a useful or valid point of departure
for scholarly discussions. However, it is clear that these two dates ap-
pear to allow for the nuances pertaining to the issues dealt with by the
various scholarly fields to be highlighted in greater contrast than would
otherwise have been perceivable or possible. The amplifications of 1819
and 1965 serve as key threads that bind together the diverse fields of
scholarly work on Singapore produced in the present decade.
The present volume attempts to address some of the long-standing
questions and problems considered by the present scholarship on Sin-
gapore by bringing into focus the period between 1819 and 1965, whilst
not neglecting the years beyond this crucial time frame. Drawing upon
various theories, concepts and methodologies developed in the huma-
nities and social sciences, each of these papers reflects the trends in
Singapore and Singapore-related studies emanating from academic tra-
ditions in Australia, Singapore, the United States and Great Britain. At
first glance, these traditions seem to be at odds with one another; but,
when viewed as the product of what may be regarded as an emerging
or ‘new school of Singapore studies’, three underlying themes link the
current scholarship to the papers in this volume. These three themes
are memory and history, identity, and trans-regionalism.
‘[T]he struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory
against forgetting’, says Milan Kundera, a Czech author and critic
whose deep love for his homeland led, paradoxically, to his exile to
France in 1975 (Kundera 1982: 3). The struggle against the hegemony
of state-sponsored renderings of Singapore’s past, together with the re-
covery of forgotten memories, characterise the first part of this volume.
Derek Heng argues that the nationalist historiographical project, though
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compelling, has been tenuous and, at times, unable to keep pace with
the rapid changes which the city-state experienced over the years follow-
ing its independence. This has resulted in a constant revision of histor-
iographical conceptions, shifting from the affirmation of a shared ‘na-
tional past’ to the celebration of differences. Still, the rhetoric of unity
in diversity that the present government has successfully fostered de-
picts the past as a foreign country. Singapore’s attainment of a globally
renowned cosmopolitan outlook has been primarily attributed to the
postcolonial project of capitalist modernity. Koh Keng We takes these
notions to task by elucidating the intimate relations between three Ma-
lay elite families based in different locations in the Riau Islands, Singa-
pore and Johor, during the time of Anglo-Dutch imperialism in Singa-
pore and beyond. These elites adopted strategies of survival, including
the refashioning of their image, the forging of new networks with old
powers, and the reform of aspects of their rule, which provided persua-
sive evidence for their agency in modernising the region.
Following the same lines of argument, Syed Muhd Khairudin Alju-
nied brings into vivid focus the masking of Singapore’s past through a
progressive national narrative. He disputes the idea that, during the im-
mediate post-World War Two period, Singapore was, in essence, a tu-
multuous site that was rife with hostility and violence arising from colo-
nial neglect. Rather, the mutual co-operation between different commu-
nities on the island, combined with the aid given by the colonial state
during the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots in 1950, demonstrates
that communalism, insofar as it existed, was counteracted by cosmopo-
litanism on the part of all of the parties concerned. Building upon these
insights, Loh Kah Seng, elucidates the politics of housing and fires in
the same era, whilst maintaining that the PAP government’s approach
to disaster management was in no way a major departure from that of
the British. Not only were the PAP’s modernist high-rise housing
schemes a derivative of imperialism, but its strategies to outdo local op-
position parties and personalities were also an extension of colonial
practice. Coming closer to the present and bringing women back into
history, Ernest Koh examines the disciplining processes that took place
in factories as Singapore entered the industrialisation phase of its devel-
opment. The forgotten voices of women who struggled to make ends
meet by enduring the long hours and penalties meted out by their male
managers should, according to Ernest Koh, be unearthed because it re-
veals how the subaltern classes have often paid the price for govern-
mental efforts to create a globalised economy.
It has often been said that Singapore is a place without an identity,
and that Singaporeans do not possess any real sense of belonging to
their homeland. This, as some scholars would argue, is due primarily
to the seemingly endless redevelopment projects. Old neighbourhoods
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have been demolished to make way for new towns, vernacular street
names have been anglicised and, even if millions of dollars have been
spent to preserve selected heritage sites, dramatic changes in the land-
scape surrounding these sites conjure up an uncanny feeling of ana-
chronism (Ooi and Shaw 2004: 127-130). The chapters that constitute
the second part of this volume challenge this viewpoint. Bonny Tan’s
survey of a wealth of literature devoted to the socio-political life of Babas
in Singapore informs us that there has been a concerted attempt by the
members of this creole community to reassert their unique sense of
being, which straddles the divide between Singapore and Peninsular
Malaysia. The same degree of concern for one’s own identity is found
in the life and activism of Han Wai Toon, who, as Wong Wai Yee has lu-
cidly explained, belonged to both China and Singapore. More interest-
ingly, Han Wai Toon’s research on and preservation of Chinese porce-
lains coincided with the period that saw the flowering of the Baba iden-
tity under the auspices of British imperial rule, as highlighted by Bonny
Tan. Colonialism was thus more than a system of exploitation; it pro-
vided the impetus for cultural change and revival. This process has con-
tinued in the context of postcolonial Singapore.
Lenore Lyons and Michele Ford’s study of national rhetoric and racial
diatribes propounded by state agencies in Singapore illustrates that a
sense of superiority arising from these modalities has been inculcated
among Singaporean Malay men, vis-à-vis non-Singaporean Malays. This
was clearly manifested in the Singaporean Malay men’s assertions of
‘Malaysian-Malay backwardness’ and ‘Indonesian corruption’. To the ex-
tent that Singaporean Malay men remain conscious of their margina-
lised status, they are willing to put their Singaporean identity above
their ethnic roots when they travel outside of Singapore. Caroline Pluss’
chapter on Chinese-Singaporeans in Hong Kong corroborates and ex-
tends such findings. In explicating the ways in which these expatriates
develop their own trans-national habiti, she found that, whilst they had
assigned primacy to their having been born and raised in Singapore,
Chinese-Singaporeans in Hong Kong had incorporated new cultural ele-
ments in order to gain access to new social networks, and to gain bene-
fits from these networks.
Scholarly discussions surrounding identity politics and personal lin-
kages across national and regional boundaries have often been framed
within the context of outward flows, from the local or internal to the ex-
ternal. The focus has also been on venture capitalists congregating in
Singapore to leverage the networks tied to communities on the island.
However, in recent years, developments in other, unfamiliar terrains
have become apparent, such as the influx of cultural capitalism, which
forms the crux of the discussions in the remaining four chapters of the
present volume. Faisal bin Yahya and Arunajeet Kaur’s chapter seeks to
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show that the influx of wealth from the Indian Subcontinent to Singa-
pore is due partly to the linkages established by the waves of Indian mi-
gration during the British colonial era. By exploiting a new mass cultur-
al capital – the Indian cinema – to popularise Singapore, state agencies
have been successful in generating tourist spending and tapping into
an increasingly globalised and technologically savvy South Asian econo-
my. Such efforts at popularising Singapore as a cultural destination, gi-
ven that the island seems to have very little to offer in the way of a rich
historical heritage, is further supported and reinforced by the develop-
ment of corporate brands that conjure up an imaginary sense of tradi-
tion. Chris Hudson’s chapter on the branding of Raffles Hotel in Singa-
pore and its subsidiary hotels around the world suggests that aggressive
marketing strategies and the popularisation of imaginary cultural ex-
periences have not only been exploited to stimulate Singapore’s tourist
industry; it has, moreover, been repackaged and exported as corporate
capital, to advance Singapore’s image abroad.
To be sure, globalisation, until very recently in the late twentieth cen-
tury, has been seen as having a great impact upon state economies, par-
ticularly for Singapore, since its existence is contingent upon foreign in-
vestment (Stigliltz 2002). However, the advancement of information
technology over the last ten years has opened up a social dimension in
the study of the impact of globalisation and its implications upon the is-
land’s trans-regional experiences. Yoshimichi Yui’s paper on the role of
recruitment agencies for Japanese workingwomen in Singapore sug-
gests that information technology has had a levelling effect upon em-
ployer-employee relations, influencing the dynamics of foreign employ-
ment. Employment no longer occurs along the traditional lines of ex-
patriate assignments, but increasingly along the lines of local demands
and remuneration terms. Along with these changes come social factors
that motivate foreign individuals to seek employment in Singapore.
This includes the desire to experience life abroad, the decline of early
marriages in Japan and the need to establish some form of economic
security for oneself. In other words, social conditions that exist in an-
other country have a direct impact on the nature of the Singaporean
economy, including the development of the Singapore labour market.
Similarly, information technology has led not only to the reduction of
the obstacles imposed by physical space between geographical locations
but even to the eradication of these obstacles altogether. Janet Arnado’s
chapter develops the argument that the presence and role of Filipina
women in the domestic settings of Singaporean households, their social
links and obligations to their families in the Philippines, and the new
trans-national and oftentimes trans-regional social and familial linkages
that they form, calls for a radical redefinition of the parameters of kin-
ship and family units. Whereas these social units have traditionally
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been defined by certain imperatives, such as geographical location, the
ability to engage in mutual communication and interaction, and the im-
portance of the respective roles played by the members of these social
units, such as Filipina domestic workers, suggest otherwise. The Inter-
net, mobile phones and Short Messaging Services (SMS) have revolutio-
nised what it means to be part of a ‘family’.
These social trends that are emerging within trans-regional spheres,
the ambiguities of identity occurring in the face of decades of social en-
gineering projects and the trend toward recovering the island’s history
through the lenses of the common man amid the tide of globalisation,
constitute the ‘paradoxes’ that characterise any study of Singapore. It is
obvious that even as Singapore traverses rapidly along its twenty-first-
century trajectory of becoming a globalised city-state, it will have to deal
with the same challenges and issues that have characterised its history
of the past seven hundred years. Viewed in that light, the contributors
of this volume unambiguously agree that there is an urgent need to re-
assess the accepted notions and discourses on Singapore’s past, as well
as the need to reconceptualise our understanding of the challenges
faced at present. Granted that this concerted project of ‘reframing Sin-
gapore’, initiated by a new generation of academics from a variety of
specialisations, locations and backgrounds, is neither novel nor new.
However, if the pages of this volume have spurred its readers to rethink
commonplace assumptions and truisms about Singapore and, in the
process, foster the beginnings of new fields of enquiry, then it has ful-
filled its humble purpose.
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REFRAMING THE HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

2 From Political Rhetoric to National History:
Bi-Culturalism and Hybridisation in the
Construction of Singapore’s Historical Narrative
Derek Heng Thiam Soon
Introduction
Singapore’s national historical narrative has been employed by the rela-
tively young nation-state as a means to justifying its existence. The goal
has been to establish a relevance of the past in the present, and even
the perceived future, at the level of state, society and sub-groups. The
historiography of Singapore’s past, since its independence in 1965, has
thus been an intertwined interaction between two key elements – the
political imperatives and rhetoric of the state, and the discourse that
Singapore society is engaged in.
The formulation of the national narrative has not taken place in a va-
cuum, but has consistently been partnered with academic developments
in the field of history. Here, professional historians have been deeply
committed to presenting relevant approaches and frameworks, as well
as building up critical masses of scholarly output. This academic output
therefore forms the basis upon which the national narrative would be
produced. This synchrony in academic and national history does not
seem to have been the result of any direct dialogue between the state
and the academic community. What is apparent, however, is the degree
to which the academic community seems to be attuned to the impera-
tives identified and promulgated by the rhetoric of the state. The aca-
demic output then establishes the academic foundation and credibility,
upon which the national narrative is then constructed.
This process of the formulation of the national historical narrative is
of particular relevance in the present time, given that the twenty-first
century poses significant challenges to Singapore’s economy, society
and politics. The country is at the threshold of significant transforma-
tions, a culmination of the regionalising and internationalising policies
put in place by the Singapore government. While such policy changes
have been in effect since the early 1990s up until the first years of the
twenty-first century, the national historical narrative has only recently
appeared to be on the brink of a fundamental change in form to achieve
several long-term objectives: to put forth to the people of Singapore the
historical justifications for the promulgation of the policies and their ef-
fects, as well as to socialise the mindset of the population towards being
predisposed to being an internationalised society.
It is in this context that the present paper attempts to appraise the
state of scholarship, both academic and national, on the history of Sin-
gapore, in relation to the issues that are currently at the forefront of so-
cial and political discussions in the country – bi-culturalism and hybri-
disation. The paper will begin by tracing the interaction between politi-
cal rhetoric, academic scholarship and the national narrative since 1965.
It will then attempt to hypothesise the trajectory and possibilities of in-
corporating bi-culturalism and hybridisation into the historical narrative
of Singapore at this critical juncture.
Political Rhetoric and the Evolving Historical Narrative of
Singapore
The rhetoric emanating from Singapore’s political leadership, from as
early as the 1960s, has played an integral role in the formulation of the
content and form of the national narrative. This is apparent in the na-
tional narratives that have been developed since 1965 to the present.
Two key historical issues have been at the centre of the debates
among Singapore’s political leaders since 1965. The first was the fact
that Singapore was naturally an integral part of the Malay Peninsula,
with the geography and economy of the former being indivisibly tied to
the latter, links that were further enmeshed by social links, such as kin-
ship ties. This argument came to the fore, and became a protracted to-
pic of discussion that preoccupied the political discourse of Singapore,
after Malaysia was accorded its independence from British rule in 1957.
The apparently intrinsic ties between Singapore and the Malay Peninsu-
la became the platform that was used in the rhetoric for independence
by the early 1960s, particularly by the People’s Action Party and Labour
Front Government.
The political players of Singapore did not necessarily universally
share this view. The so-called ‘communist’ political leaders, including
those in the PAP, such as Fong Swee Swan and Lim Chin Siong, were
opposed to Singapore becoming a part of an independent Malaysia (Lee
1998: 446-452). With the detentions of these leaders by the British and
Malayan governments in 1963, and the English-educated PAP leaders
emerging as the political victors in 1963, the inseparability of Singapore
from Malaysia became the dominant political rhetoric. This continued
to be expounded after 1965, when Singapore broke away from Malaysia
and became independent (Lee 1998: 653, 654).
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The second issue pertains to national consciousness that was to be
based on the newly constructed nation-state of Malaya, as opposed to
ethnic-based nationalism. This recent and modern social-consciousness
called for the acknowledgement of the place of people who arrived in
Malaya and Singapore from places like China, India and Southeast Asia,
as well as people of mixed descent, all of whom were the products of
the legacy of British rule in the Malay Peninsula. The Malayan con-
sciousness therefore entailed a modern, albeit artificial, sense of being
and identity in line with the creation of a new state that historically
never existed before.
While these issues arose in the pre-1965 period, they continued to be
expounded in the years after 1965, not least because the Singapore lea-
ders who put forth these issues in the political rhetoric continued to be
the political leaders of Singapore after independence in 1965. They con-
tinued to believe in the concept of Malayanism (the equality of all citi-
zens within the nation-state of Malaysia), and saw Singapore as an un-
natural occurrence that unfortunately had no other choice but to be suc-
cessful. These two issues continued to appear in the political rhetoric
into the early 1970s. These were framed as part of the imperative in the
construction of a national consciousness amongst Singaporeans, albeit
‘Singaporeanism’ in place of ‘Malayanism’.
The first national historical narrative, which began to emerge in the
late 1970s, was therefore a narrative that depicted Singapore’s historical
experiences in the context of colonialism, nationalism and state-forma-
tion in the nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. The narrative essen-
tially attempted to frame Singapore’s past as the build up of the inevit-
ability of nationalism that resulted from the Second World War and the
Japanese occupation of Singapore between 1942 and 1945. These cata-
clysmic events apparently shattered the myth of the superior white
man, convincing the population of Singapore that the colonial powers
had no right to rule them and the land that they were inhabiting, and
urged them to repossess the land and the right to self-government. This
narrative is no different from the earlier debates, which also framed
these historical developments within the context of Singapore as a part
of the Malay Peninsula.
The narrative acknowledged that Singapore’s population was com-
prised almost entirely of migrants that this port-city that had only
emerged in 1819 following British intervention in Maritime Southeast
Asia, and that no significant settlement had existed on the island prior
to that time. Up until at least the 1950s, emotional linkages amongst
the migrant population of Singapore, in particular the Indians and
Chinese, were said to be traced directly back to the land from which
these migrants came. Nonetheless, nationalism was assumed to have
emerged as a result of the trauma of WWII and the Japanese occupa-
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tion. The trauma of these shared common experiences were portrayed
as synonymous among the various ethnic groups present in Singapore
and the Malay Peninsula. These experiences formed the basis upon
which the social consciousness – based on the nation-state as a modern
creation, and which had not existed before in history – was constructed.
The national narrative therefore argued for the inevitability of Singa-
pore’s independence by 1963, as part of Malaysia, in light of the nation-
alism developing in Asia and the decline of European colonialism, and
the inevitability of its secession from Malaysia in 1965 as a fundamental
shock, in light of the inseparability of Singapore from its hinterland –
the Malay Peninsula. This first national narrative was presented to the
country in 1984, with the publication of the pamphlet 25 Years of Na-
tion-Building, 1959-1984: A Time to Celebrate, a Time to Stand Up for Sin-
gapore: Information Kit (National Celebration Steering Committee 1984).
However, even as the first national narrative was being formulated
during the late 1970s, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, Singapore’s
political rhetoric had undergone a rapid change. Following the success-
ful development of its economic base and armed forces, as well as the
elevation of its regional and international standing, Singapore's official
rhetoric had progressed from assuaging the competing dialectic forces
that were located along ethnic lines, and expounding on the inseparabil-
ity of Singapore from the Malay Peninsula hinterland, to furthering the
possibility of building and sustaining a viable city-state that was devoid
of a hinterland, as well as the construction of a national consciousness
based on the English model of a social contract between the state and
its citizenry.
The roots of this rhetoric of a hinterland-less city-state could be found
in a speech delivered by the then-foreign minister of Singapore, S. Ra-
jaratnam to the Singapore Press Club in 1972 (Rajaratnam 1987: 225).
In that speech, he compared Singapore’s prospects to that of an ecume-
nical city that was linked economically and culturally to the rest of the
world through the advancement of communications technology, a con-
cept first forwarded by the urban historian Anthony Toynbee (Toynbee
1970). In real terms, this was marked by the success of the Jurong In-
dustrial Estate project, which had been initiated in the early 1960s. The
project only took off after Singapore gained full control of its economy
from 1965 onwards, with Singapore’s export-oriented economy only de-
veloping since the 1970s.
More importantly, the success of the export-oriented economy also
paved the way for the political rhetoric to foster the need to increase the
workforce’s value-added productivity, the move towards higher value-
added secondary economic activities, and the development of a coherent
state-driven education program to cater to the needs of the current and
planned future economic goals. In other words, the population was to
24 DEREK HENG THIAM SOON
be engineered into a solitary, highly efficient and productive workforce.
Thus, we can say that there was a need to streamline the categorisation
of the citizenry into four racial groups – Chinese, Malays, Indians and
Others. These four categories were to be subsumed under the singular
social grouping called Singaporeans. Ethnic streamlining included gov-
ernmental policies that aimed to emphasise the identity and capabilities
of these four racial groups, while, at the same time, subtly dismantling
the features that fostered more diverse social groupings that had hither-
to been inherent to Singapore’s society.
The success of the economic, defence and foreign policy aspects of the
country led three of the key political leaders of Singapore – Lee Kuan
Yew, S. Rajaratnam and Goh Keng Swee – to consistently explain, de-
fend and rhetorically safeguard that which the whole world in 1965 had
deemed as the virtually inconceivable and impossible achievement of
sustaining a city-state with no natural resources. In the process, the
rhetoric took on a first-person voice, expressing the thoughts and deci-
sions that the political leaders of Singapore had to make during the cri-
tical years after 1965, decisions which led to the success of Singapore of
the late 1970s and early 1980s (Chan and Obaid 1987; Goh 1977; Goh
and Low 1995; Lee 1998; Lee 2000).
These shifts in the political rhetoric led to a change in the national
historical narrative. By the late 1980s, the national narrative had begun
to shift from the justification of Singapore’s independence and exis-
tence as a sovereign nation-state, to framing the country’s key historical
events circa 1965 and after independence as they had been experienced
and witnessed by the key leaders and founding fathers of the country.
This narrative was a significant departure from the earlier narrative in
its chronological approach. The period before 1965, and in particular
the colonial period prior to 1942, continued to be regarded as important
in that it provided the context for the formation of the national popula-
tion base with its diverse cultural elements, while the historical narra-
tive was firmly centred in the post-1965 era, with the process of nation-
building in the areas of economy, society, foreign policy and defence as
the centrepiece of the narrative. This narrative was complimented by a
secondary narrative, in which the predominance of communalist ten-
dencies during the late-colonial period in the post-WWII years, and into
the two-year period when Singapore was a part of Malaysia (1963-1965),
was eventually eclipsed by the development of a cohesive and ordered
society in tandem with the economic and political developments that
had taken place since Singapore’s independence in 1965.
At the same time, the narrative assumed that there could only be one
source of reliable information pertaining to the historical experience of
the period in question – the national leaders of Singapore – and that all
of the other sources lacked credibility. There could, therefore, not be
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any other credible version of the past other than a Whig-dominated one
(Loh 1998: 1).
This historical narrative continued to be formulated over the course
of about twenty years, supported, during this process, by the publication
of the history of various government agencies and departments, notably
the Housing Development Board, the Ministry of Defence, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wong and Yeh 1985; Yap 1990; Liu 2005).
While these histories primarily provided the institutional experiences of
Singapore’s post-1965 history, they ultimately served to confirm the po-
litical rhetoric of the 1980s and the accounts given by the political lea-
dership, consequently according further credibility to the conservative
national narrative that had been formulated. These developments culmi-
nated in the final form of the second national narrative, depicted in two
important state-sponsored histories – The Singapore story [electronic re-
source]: overcoming the odds / a national education project by the Ministry
of Information and the Arts (MITA 1999), produced by the Ministry of
Information and the Arts; and Singapore: Journey to Nationhood (Lee et.
al. 1999), published by the National Archives of Singapore, a govern-
ment statutory board under the purview of the Ministry of Information
and the Arts.
While the second historical narrative was being completed, the rheto-
ric emanating from Singapore’s political leadership had begun to
change once again. By the early 1990s, Singapore’s political leadership
was undergoing a generational change. A new breed of technocrats had
already assumed the political leadership of the country. Their individual
reputations and legacies did not hinge on the posthumous success of
the outcome of Singapore’s separation and independence from Malay-
sia. Instead, their legacy would have to be determined by their success
in steering Singapore on its next trajectory of development, particularly
after the world economic recession of the mid-1980s, and in light of
the new international economic context that was already developing,
spurred on by the advances in communications technology by the
1990s, the emergence of China as a potentially important economy in
Asia and the world, and the spectacular economic growth that was
being experienced throughout much of Southeast Asia.
One of the earliest visions that emerged from this new generation of
leaders was encapsulated in the government pamphlet entitled The Next
Lap (Government of Singapore 1991). In it, the political leaders outlined
the goal for the country towards the attainment of the 1984 Swiss stan-
dard of living by the year 2000. Due to the spectacular economic
growth that Singapore was experiencing, this goal had been modified in
the mid-1990s, to that of attaining a first-world living standard, compar-
able to cosmopolitan world cities like New York and London.
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The political leadership also began to systematically consolidate Sin-
gapore’s economy, aspiring to transform the country into an interna-
tional service, financial and high-technology hub. Various reports in the
Straits Times (1992-1996), portrayed Singapore as a potential hub of al-
most everything from aerospace and engineering, to scuba diving and
fashion design. The political leadership called for a fundamental shift
from placing the emphasis on Gross Domestic Product (the value of do-
mestic economic activities) to Gross National Product (the sum of the
value of domestic and international economic activities). This shift was
in large part due to the shift in the world economy in the 1980s from
an international economy still dominated by the nation-state to a more
globally oriented economy driven by the international market, commu-
nications technology, and connections to the network of global cities.
The political rhetoric initially called for Singapore to become a regional
hub in Asia. This was then extended in the mid-1990s to Singapore be-
coming an international hub (Low 2004).
Part of the rhetoric for regionalising and internationalising Singapore
meant that the new generation of political leaders no longer talked
about the country in anomalous terms, instead focusing on how the re-
gionalisation and internationalisation efforts could be sustained. These
efforts and visions of Singapore’s future have been framed within the
context of having competed successfully against external competitors,
rather than within the former context of Singapore as a political joke or
quirk of history.
The political rhetoric regarding the social aspects of Singapore was
changing as well. While the rhetoric had hitherto been about the assua-
ging of ethnic differences and the building up of a standardised na-
tional identity that was based on shared experiences in the pre-1965
and post-1965 eras, by the 1990s, it had shifted dramatically to one that
permitted and even encouraged each of Singapore’s major ethnic
groups to preserve the cultural traits that still remained, and for Singa-
poreans to rediscover their cultural roots and linkages, much of which
appeared to have been lost to the new generation of Singaporeans born
in the post-1965 era.
As part of the regionalisation and internationalisation of Singapore
and the rediscovery of the various ethnic roots of the people, cultural
learning in Singapore was to change as well. This included the estab-
lishment of a museum in 1992 – the Asian Civilisations Museum – to
showcase the cultural and historical backgrounds of the major ethnic
groups in Singapore – Chinese, Malay/Muslims and Indians (Goh
1992). At the same time, Singapore’s parliament approved a bill to set
up the National Heritage Board, which was intended to be the state cus-
todian of the heritage agencies of the country (Osman, Ibrahim, Fer-
nandez and Ng 1993).
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By the early 2000s, the rhetoric on culture had developed even
further. Since 2004, the political leadership in Singapore has consis-
tently emphasised the importance and virtue of being at home in two
cultures, in other words, being bi-cultural. The argument thus far notes
that, since Singapore’s citizenry is comprised of the descendants of im-
migrants, Singapore’s core elite should develop the ability to work well
and be comfortable both in the Singapore context as well as in the land
from which their forebears had come, namely China, India, the Malay
Archipelago and the Middle East.
This rhetoric of bi-culturalism, although an extension of the earlier
rhetoric that sought to encourage the rediscovery and retention of an-
cestral cultural traits, is distinct in its focus. Its ultimate goal is both in-
ward, in that it seeks to establish or recover the various ethnic identities
of Singaporeans, but also outward because it actively seeks to export
Singaporeans abroad to establish linkages with the lands of Singapor-
eans’ historical ethnicity, particularly in the economic arena, in order to
further the political leadership’s objective of regionalising and interna-
tionalising Singapore. In this regard, the political leadership has pro-
moted the notion that the nurturing of bi-cultural characteristics
amongst its population could be pursued at both the micro and macro
levels – between Singapore and individual states or between Singapore
and large entities, such as China, India and/or the Middle East.
Bi-culturalism, however, has another objective. While Singaporeans
are being exhorted to become more effective bi-culturally, and to secure
Singapore’s external links with India, China and countries in the Mid-
dle East, the subtle expectation is that Singaporeans will accept the in-
flux of immigrants, in line with the government’s policy to enhance its
population level through immigration, from these same places. Bi-cul-
tural skills can be essential both when Singaporeans are abroad and at
home, where the social fabric is expected to be in a formative flux over
the next few decades.
The political rhetoric expounded by Singapore’s new generation of
leaders since the 1990s began affecting the national narrative in the
early 2000s. Singapore’s national narrative is poised to take on another
form – that of a city-state playing the role of the intermediary between
diverse countries and economies in the regional and international con-
texts. This narrative, which frames Singapore’s historical experiences as
a series of chronological developments that have subsequently led to
the country’s role as the nodal point within the mesh of networks that
connected the various parts of Asia, was initially focused on the mod-
ern, or post-1819, period of Singapore’s history. However, by the turn of
the millennium, the narrative had developed into one that attempts to
portray the island as the logical recipient of the mantle as the interna-
tional city in Maritime Asia, which served both the regional and inter-
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national contexts, with the chronological time-frame extending back in
time, beyond the modern founding of Singapore in 1819, to the late
thirteenth century AD, when the earliest documented settlement on the
island was established.
This narrative is still in its early formative stage. Nonetheless, it has
departed from the earlier, personality-based narrative, to one that ap-
pears to be framed within the larger context of regional and interna-
tional forces and developments, almost devoid of human agency, and
only with a tacit acknowledgement of human agency as a factor in af-
fecting the outcome of key developments and events, and the trajectory
of the historical experience. This is evident in the series of books pub-
lished by the various national heritage agencies of Singapore (Miksic
and Low 2004).
The part of the new national narrative that would encapsulate the
rhetoric regarding society and social issues that has been articulated by
the political leadership since the 1990s is still not being formulated. It
may be possible to speculate what the form of this new narrative will
take. In order to do so, the role of academic history, in the context of
Singapore’s political rhetoric and the eventual national narrative that
has been produced since 1965, must be taken into consideration.
The Role of Academic Scholarship in the Construction of the
National Historical Narrative
The translation of the political rhetoric into a national historical narra-
tive, since 1965, has not been an immediate one-step process. In the
previous two cycles of the formulation of the national narrative, it is ap-
parent that there has been a period of ten years between the political
rhetoric that first emerged and crystallised in the public arena and the
national narrative as it has been written and published. Moreover, by
the time the national narratives appeared in the public domain, the poli-
tical rhetoric had already moved along a different trajectory. Thus it is
obvious that the state has not directly dictated the version of Singapore’s
past that the members of the nation-state have been expected to adopt.
Instead, the process appears to involve an interim stage, whereby aca-
demic history writing played a crucial role in establishing the viability
of adopting the political rhetoric as a framework or approach towards
constructing a historical narrative of Singapore. This interim stage is
evident from the first two national historical narratives that were devel-
oped in the late 1970s and 1990s respectively.
In the case of the first narrative, the political rhetoric was followed by
academic scholarship on the history of Singapore, which includes Tre-
gonning (1966 and 1972) and Turnbull (1977). Both historians, who
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were teaching at the University of Malaya, the predecessor of the pre-
sent-day National University of Singapore, Singapore’s flagship univer-
sity, in the immediate post-1965 years, argued for a modern history of
Singapore, since 1819, as the only relevant period of Singapore’s past in
the understanding of its post-1965 experiences (Tregonning 1969: 14).
Both scholars also argued for the inseparability of Singapore Island
from the Malay Peninsula, and sought to frame Singapore’s history
within the larger context of British Malaya. Their scholarly writings be-
came the basis upon which the first national narrative was constructed.
The second rhetoric and subsequent narrative, the interim period be-
tween the two, was represented by the research and publication of sev-
eral important academic works by historians and sociologists. The most
notable of these included Malayan Union Controversy, A History of Singa-
pore, Imagining Singapore and A Moment of Anguish (Lau 1990 and
1998; Chew and Lee 1991; Ban, Pakir and Chee 1992). Most of the aca-
demic scholarship centred on the post-WWII period of Singapore’s his-
tory up until its independence in 1965, the sociological studies of Singa-
porean society in the post-1965 era, and the first-hand accounts of the
first generation of political leaders, formed a critical mass upon which
the second national historical narrative was constructed. The writing
and publication of the historical narrative in the late 1990s may have
been accorded further urgency by comments first made by the Prime
Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1995, and then again in 1996 by the Dep-
uty Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, expressing a need for a new gen-
eration of young Singaporeans to learn the lessons about national survi-
val and Singapore’s fragility, and to be made aware of the new genera-
tion’s lack of knowledge of Singapore’s tumultuous recent history and
the background of its independence. These comments are believed to
have led to the formulation and launching of the National Education in-
itiative by the Ministry of Education, which has become an essential as-
pect of the public education curricula from the primary to tertiary levels
in Singapore (Ministry of Education).
The two series of scholarship, although embodying the respective po-
litical rhetoric that was being expressed at that time, were academically
sound. The academic scholarship involved historians who conducted re-
search and wrote on various aspects of the history of Singapore, often
testing the themes of the political rhetoric, relating their work to these
themes, or adopting the themes as plausible theoretical approaches.
The resulting publications were then drawn upon, and the resulting na-
tional narratives were syntheses of the available scholarship that had
emerged in response to the political rhetoric. This state of affairs could
not have been achieved without the vital role played by academic scho-
larship in the early stages of research and scholarship.
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While the third and current rhetorical theme has been fomenting
since the early 1990s, a national historical narrative, framed around this
third rhetorical theme, has thus far not been published. The academic
circle has been producing a significant body of publications that are
based, to a large extent, on the themes of regionalisation, internationali-
sation, and continuity, which have evolved over the long term. Peter
Borschberg, Tan Tai Yong, John Miksic, Kwa Chong Guan and Derek
Heng all argue for a history of Singapore in the long term as part of re-
gional and international developments (Borschberg 2002, 2003 and
2004a; Heng 1999, 2001 and 2002; Miksic 2005; Kwa 2004: 124 –
146). The underlying argument proposes that Singapore has thus far
not only been affected by regional and international events, but more
importantly, that it has played a crucial role in affecting how these
events developed. This has been argued not only from the land-based
perspective of the port-settlement/port-city and nation-state, but also
from the maritime perspective of regional and international strategic
considerations, maritime navigation and global conflict.
The national narrative appears to be poised to make the change from
the second narrative to the third narrative in the coming years. This im-
minent change is evidenced by the on-going preparation and publica-
tion of Singapore’s past experiences as a port-city/city-state since the
fourteenth century AD by various national heritage agencies, notably
the Singapore History Museum and the National Archives of Singapore.
These include a forthcoming publication, authored by Tan Tai Yong,
Kwa Chong Guan and Derek Heng, entitled Singapore: A Seven Hundred
Year History, to be published by the National Archives of Singapore.
These publications, written by the same academic historians, have
synthesised and simplified the academic works to make them more ac-
cessible for the general public. Nonetheless, these publications do not
constitute the next national historical narrative. A final aspect of the po-
litical rhetoric – the social characteristics of Singaporeans in a city-state
and world and regional city – is still in its formative stage in academic
scholarship.
How the external cultural and social linkages of Singapore will be
portrayed in the next historical narrative remains unclear. Academic
scholarship, however, has begun to tackle this issue, and it is in the pos-
sible developments of this scholarship on this issue that the probable
nature of the portrayal of Singapore’s society in the new historical nar-
rative may be ascertained.
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Hybridisation or Bi-Culturalism: The Basis of the Next National
Narrative
Significant strides have been made in the field of maritime history, par-
ticularly in the study of societies in the port-cities of Asia. Up until the
early 2000s, however, most of these studies focused on colonial port-ci-
ties. It has only been in the last few years that a number of works exam-
ining the societies of pre-modern and early modern port-cities in Mari-
time Asia have been published. These works, while relying on a diverse
array of textual records and anthropological data, have relied heavily on
theoretical postulations.
In the context of the history of Singapore and its immediate region –
the Melaka Straits region – several papers have been published, explor-
ing the nature of port-city societies in the region during the pre-modern
and early-modern periods (Miksic 2005; Reid 2006). Working under
the assumption that the region’s port-cities originally comprised a core
group of migrants from the region itself, these papers argue that port-
city populations that developed during the early-modern era at their
peak, eventually included immigrants from both the immediate region
and further afield, including China, the Indian subcontinent and parts
of mainland Southeast Asia. Apart from their respective cultural and
ethnic backgrounds that would have served as markers for the identifi-
cation of sub-groups, at a higher level, the population in general may
have regarded itself as a cohesive social group by identifying itself with
the port-city’s head of state. This is, some surmise, how the ‘state’ with
its inherent political relationships and group identification was estab-
lished.
The literature further argues, however, that some among the popula-
tion were able to establish a sense of ‘nation’ over time. This develop-
ment enabled this group to identify itself as an exclusive ‘localised’ so-
cial group, which would have been not unlike the not ‘indigenous’ to
the port-city. This sense of ‘nation’ was arguably achieved through a
process of hybridisation, where certain traits introduced by the immi-
grants were retained and integrated into the dominant culture of the re-
gion in which the port-city was located. The literature argues that the re-
sulting hybrid culture became increasingly entrenched, eventually be-
coming a culture in its own right. Aspects of a social group that may
undergo this kind of transformation include language, cuisine, and the
appreciation of artisanal crafts.
It is interesting to note that the academic scholarship on Singapore
and the Melaka Straits region, has closely followed the development of
American scholarship on language and literature, specifically in the
field of folklore studies. Hybridisation has, since the late 1990s, been
one of the most important theoretical frameworks utilised by folklore
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studies to understand migrant groups that have settled in areas where
there may have been no pre-existing dominant social group or culture
present (Kapchan and Strong 1999). The approach encompasses con-
cepts such as creolisation, and examines, in particular, the hybridisation
of migrant groups through the development of language and imagery.
Hybridisation as an approach towards understanding the population
of a port-city depicts an influx of people and culture. Hybridisation
seeks to reconstruct the indigenisation of an otherwise foreign social
group, into a localised social group that may be recognised as distinct
or unique from subsequent waves of immigration that may even have
originated from the same ancestral land. In the case of Singapore, the
pre-modern historical example that is highlighted is the resident Chi-
nese population in Temasik, the fourteenth-century port-city located
in the southern part of Singapore until the early fifteenth century (Su
1981: 213). These Chinese immigrants lived amongst the Temasik ‘lo-
cals’, and participated in international trade as Temasik-based traders.
These Chinese are distinct, some have argued, from those who were
based in China and who sailed to Southeast Asia on an annual basis.
It is not difficult to extend this model to the post-independence peri-
od of Singapore, and to draw similarities between the localised Chinese
of Temasik and the Chinese population of the nation-state of Singapore,
and between the Chinese traders of old and the present sojourning po-
pulation of migrant workers in Singapore. Hybridisation is therefore a
useful approach in understanding and explaining the construction of
coherent city-state nations that are open to regional and international
forces and groups.
Indeed, hybridisation was not ignored in the early political rhetoric in
the immediate period before and after 1965. The concept of Malayan-
ism encompassed the acceptance of the localisation of immigrant
groups in Malaya, and the indigenisation of the people of Malaya by ad-
hering to certain shared values that were drawn from the various social
groups and the artificial construction of shared socialist values. David
Marshall, Singapore’s first Chief Minister, in the 1950s argued for the
creation of a coherent social group of Singaporeans that was based on
the assimilation of the key characteristics of the dominant social group
in Singapore by the various ethnic groups represented in Singapore,
even though it was not apparent which ethnic groups were being re-
ferred to (Barr 2003: 3). Similarly, in the early post-independence years,
Singapore’s political leaders attempted to construct a society based on
the eventual combination of various cultural aspects of the social groups
represented in Singapore.
However, as a framework or approach to the construction of Singa-
pore’s past at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the approach is
completely out of synch with the present political rhetoric. More recent
FROM POLITICAL RHETORIC TO NATIONAL HISTORY 33
academic scholarship on the population of the port-cities of Singapore
and the Melaka Straits region may, instead, reflect the scholarship’s in-
tended audience. The study of societies in the early-modern port-cities
of Maritime Asia remains, at its core, a topic of discourse conducted
amongst historians at the international scholarly level. In this regard,
Reid and Miksic’s research falls into a larger body of scholarship pub-
lished since the early 2000s, and which includes the work of scholars
such as Skinner, Blusse and others (Skinner 1996; Blusse and Fernan-
dez-Armesto, 2003). The audience of these works is not any country in
particular, but rather the field of Southeast Asian studies in general.
This is indicative of the various levels of scholarship on the history of
Singapore since the 1950s. There has been a significant amount of
scholarly output on the history of Singapore over the last fifty years. A
large proportion of this scholarship, however, did not have Singapore as
its primary target audience. Thus, although significant scholarly work
on the history of Singapore was produced by such historians as Carl
Trocki and Yen Ching Hwang in the 1960s and 1970s (Trocki 1979;
Yen 1976 and 1978), it was the scholarly works that explored Singa-
pore’s history from the perspective of colonial history and decolonisa-
tion, which had the greatest impact on Singapore itself. Again, while
significant strides were made in exploring Singapore’s past in the
1980s and 1990s by adopting the approach of people’s history (subal-
tern) and the study of overseas ethnic communities (Warren 1986 and
1993; Dobbs, 2003), the work that has had the most impact in Singa-
pore remains studies that sought to illuminate the immediate pre- and
post-1965 years in the context of nation building.
Bearing in mind the present-day state of academic scholarship, how
can academic discourse and history resolve the issue of the bi-cultural-
ism that has evolved out of the political rhetoric, and provide a sound
academic basis upon which the national historical narrative can be con-
structed along these lines?
Current academic discourse on Singapore’s society, which at least
purports to address Singapore’s audience, does include work that seeks
to explore Singapore’s social and cultural history from the bi-cultural
perspective. This discourse transcends the examination of the cultural
and social history of the various ethnic groups in Singapore as ‘over-
seas’ groups, and instead assumes that certain groups have portrayed
themselves as members of Singapore while at the same time belonging
to and operating in two distinct spheres – the sphere of Singapore, on
the one hand, and the ancestral homeland from which they had origi-
nated, on the other.
There are currently a number of scholars who are working on the
trans-national links of people based in Singapore. These include scho-
lars such as Mark Frost, Chua Ai Lin and Daniel Goh, and collectively,
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their scholarship spans across different disciplines including history,
English, and sociology. They examine the trans-national or multi-cultur-
al nature of the domicile population in Singapore and the Malay Penin-
sula, specifically the Chinese Straits, as well as the direct implications
that these groups have had on social activism and nationalism in Singa-
pore since the mid-twentieth century. The studies to a large extent at-
tempt to focus on the similarities between the historical precedents of
bi-culturalism in Singapore society and the society of present-day Singa-
pore. This approach has thus far only been successful in the post-1819
period of Singapore’s history, where there is sufficient data for scholars
to study, and to a certain extent, manipulate in order to test and advance
the framework of bi-culturalism.
The state of this scholarship is still very much in a preliminary stage.
The studies have thus far been based on individuals, with the implica-
tions extended to the ethnic group to which the individual belonged.
Moreover, this research has focused almost entirely on the Chinese
from the Straits. One of the latest examples of this type of scholarship
is the 27 January 2007 conference entitled Lim Boon Keng and the
Straits Chinese: A Historical Re-Appraisal, organised by the Department
of History (National University of Singapore) and the National Library
Board (Singapore). The study of an historical personality, as a represen-
tation of an entire ethnic group, or even Singapore’s general population
is tenuous. Such an approach would have to be revised to gain the ne-
cessary scholarly credibility before Singapore’s government will adopt it
as the basis for the construction of the national narrative.
No substantial or significant work on any other ethnic group, or indi-
vidual from another ethnic group, with perhaps the exception of Mun-
shi Abdullah, has been carried out along similar lines. The exclusive-
ness of the Chinese from the Straits in the study of bi-cultural traits
and functions needs to be eradicated, and the model needs to be ap-
plied to other ethnic groups in Singapore, so that bi-culturalism will be
a viable approach to framing Singapore’s social history.
Moreover, the bi-cultural or external linkages explored by these stu-
dies cannot focus solely on Asia. The European colonial context from
which a number of the ethnic groups in Singapore have derived a sig-
nificant part of their cultures needs to be considered in the bi-cultural
matrix as well. Bi-culturalism may have to be considered not just an
Asian prerogative, but also one that includes the West.
Finally, and perhaps most critically, a major hurdle that these scholars
will face is whether their approach to understanding the domiciled
groups in Singapore and their representative personages should be one
of ‘bi-culturalism’ or of ‘hybridisation’. This dilemma has emerged be-
cause the scholars studying the Chinese from the Straits assume that
this ethnic group was in effect culturally creolised, and thus, is not bi-
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cultural. In other words, this ethnic group saw itself to a certain extent
as unique, and not Chinese or Malay, even though they were able to op-
erate within the Chinese and Southeast Asian island spheres. Further-
more, the terms ‘hybridisation’ and ‘bi-culturalism’ have become laden
with significant implications in the current social discourse in Singa-
pore. The former is seen as an academically acceptable approach, while
the latter is seen as a term coined within the context of the current poli-
tical rhetoric. This dilemma may be resolved if the implications of hy-
bridisation and bi-culturalism are better defined.
The best studies on these two sociological concepts are those that
have been conducted in Western scholarship, particularly in the US,
where these two concepts were originally conceptualised. As was men-
tioned in an earlier section of this paper, hybridisation is a fairly recent
approach developed in the field of folklore studies to explore the notion
of identity, as it is manifested in aspects of a social group’s culture.
Thus, it is essentially an approach for the reconstruction of the identity
of ethnic groups that may have had to assimilate cultural traits from the
other groups with which it has had to interact.
Bi-culturalism, on the other hand, was a topic of discourse first raised
in the field of education studies. It was postulated and then framed as
an approach used in an attempt to understand how migrant groups in
the US were able to become fluent in two languages – their native ton-
gue and the tongue of their domicile country. Sociologists then used
these studies to understand how migrant groups and individuals per-
ceived and conducted themselves in the context of their domicile coun-
tries, the host community in which they operate and live, and their re-
spective native communities within the domicile countries and commu-
nities (Paulston 1978). In other words, bi-culturalism was intended to
be a framework for the understanding of social groups and individuals,
while pertaining to their functions within a given social context.
In the discipline of sociology, bi-culturalism is no longer considered a
viable approach for the study of social groups. Nonetheless, in the field
of history, it remains a viable approach. In the context of Singapore and
the writing of Singapore’s history, the narrative may have to be con-
structed along the lines of representative history. In other words, the
history of Singaporeans may be represented by the functions and ex-
periences of individuals or representative social groups within the Sin-
gapore population. As an academic discourse, this approach lacks cred-
ibility. However, as a national discourse, it is possible for the population
to imagine such a past, and to project its relevance onto their present-
day circumstances. Academic historians may be able to provide the
scholarship credibility via their research and writing on historic person-
alities of Singapore.
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This narrative may possibly emerge, supported by a preliminary
phase of academic scholarship in Singapore. The National Biography
Project, is an on-going project under the auspices of the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, which seeks to collate information on key per-
sonalities from Singapore’s past 200 years of history, and to publish lit-
erature on the lives of these individuals. This project is expected to in-
clude personalities from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. The project
would eventually create the necessary critical mass of academically
grounded profiles upon which the social aspect of the new national nar-
rative can then be constructed.
As an example, the experiences of Lim Boon Keng, who was an actual
individual and may have represented an extremely small ethnic group
in Singapore known as the Straits Chinese, could be extended to repre-
sent the historical experiences of Singaporeans of migrant descent in
general, and more specifically those belonging to the present-day Chi-
nese segment of Singapore’s population. They are like Lim Boon Keng,
descended from migrant Chinese families, but have individual and
shared experiences that are based on their residency in Singapore. An-
other example could be Munshi Abdullah, an early-nineteenth-century
Malay scholar, who was firmly rooted in his native Malay culture, but
developed a keen awareness of Western culture, which allowed him to
operate effectively there so that he affected the Southeast Asian island
and Malay worlds in a fundamental way in the early nineteenth century.
In both cases, the key to successfully historicising the bi-cultural
traits they embodied, and to apply that to the reconstruction of the so-
cial aspect of the new national narrative, may be to depersonalise the in-
dividuals, so that any possible linkages to identity, specifically ethnic-
based identity, would be secondary. These traits could then be synthe-
sised and transformed into a singular narrative that would be generic
and perceived as applicable to Singaporeans in general.
Conclusion
In an 11 June 2000 interview, Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo
stated that Singapore needed to maintain an open-door policy regarding
the influx of foreigners, so that the country’s economy could remain vi-
able at the international level. He also highlighted that the result of that
policy has been that Singapore has once again become a migrant so-
ciety, with one in three new Singaporeans (citizens or permanent resi-
dents) being of foreign origin, and that one in four local marriages are
between a Singaporean and a foreigner. As Singapore continues to de-
velop along this trajectory – internationalisation of the economy and ci-
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tizenry – its national historical narrative will have to be recast to create
a direct relevance and bearing of the past on the present-day context.
Current academic scholarship concerning the history of Singapore
has, by and large, successfully reframed Singapore’s economic and poli-
tical history to address the first of these concerns. The chronology has
even been extended to include the pre-1819 period, back to the four-
teenth century, to illustrate the continuity and longevity of the interna-
tional nature of Singapore’s macro-level economic and political his-
tories.
The challenge for academic scholarship, at this point is to adopt a so-
cio-scientific approach to the study of the history of Singaporeans that
would ultimately be viable for adoption by the state as the appropriate
way to reconstruct the new historical narrative. This will have an impact
on the larger collective memory of Singaporeans, which may ultimately
determine if the academic scholarship speaks to a larger, more general
home audience, as opposed to a more scholarly discourse on the history
of Singapore.
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3 Gateway and Panopticon:
Singapore and Surviving Regime Change
in the Nineteenth Century Malay World
Koh Keng We
Introduction
The 19th-century history of Singapore has often been situated within the
territorial contours of the present-day nation-state, or that of the British
Empire in Southeast Asia. These historical narratives focused on Singa-
pore’s commercial success and cosmopolitanism as the basis for its im-
portance within the British imperial system and the moulding of the fu-
ture nation-state. As Wong’s (2003) detailed study of Singapore’s trade
before 1869 has shown, the commercial success of Singapore depended
very much on its connections to other parts of Southeast Asia and the
world.1 Studies of Islamic modernist and reform movements in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries have also shown how Singapore
functioned as an important gateway for the movement of ideas and peo-
ple, be they pilgrims on the haj, religious teachers, or students, both be-
tween different parts of the archipelago and between the archipelago,
the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean littorals (Roff 1980; Laffan
2003). The same could be said of Chinese business networks (Trocki
1990, 2005) and Chinese modernization and reform movements, sub-
sequently nationalist, as they used Singapore as an important node for
similar flows (Godley 1977; Yen 1986; Henley 2003).
The history of Singapore can also be located in the broader category
of ‘colonial port cities’ as posited as a heuristic ideal-type category by
Basu (1985) in the collection of essays he edited on The Rise and Growth
of Colonial Port Cities in Asia, where he outlined a possible comparative
Asian approach to the phenomenon in terms of ‘the city-hinterland re-
lationships, morphogenesis, and the interactions between indigenous
elites’, as well as questions of the resilience of indigenous economic, so-
cial, and political structures and systems, and the impact of Western
European intervention. Subsequent attempts to synthesize the study of
Asian port cities, such as the two volumes edited by Frank Broeze
(1989, 1997), have focused on similar themes, highlighting the impor-
tance of the Asian environment and pre-European/colonial urban forms
and hinterland/‘littoral’ configurations (and the diversity of historical
and geographical contexts as well as morphology and environments), as
well as different conceptualizations of the ‘hinterland-foreland’ matrix,
while delving into the question of Western influence and change during
the colonial period.
The British port of Singapore was similar in many ways to the Asian
port cities studied in these volumes, both prior to and during the Portu-
guese and Dutch periods of expansion in the archipelago from the six-
teenth to the eighteenth centuries. It functioned as a gateway not only
in terms of commodity and people flows, but also for ‘external ideas,
cultural trends and technological influences’ (Reid 1997). Yet, it was
also different. In many pre-colonial port-polities, politics and trade were
inextricably linked, in as much as economic exchange was intimately re-
lated to cultural and political exchange (Kathirithamby-Wells & Villiers
1990).2 This was the case even for the port of Melaka under Portuguese
and Dutch regimes, and various European-controlled port towns from
the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries.3 British Singapore was some-
what an anomaly in the Malay world in this respect, in that the adminis-
tration of the port-town was not directly interested in conducting the
trade in the monopsonistic4 or monopolistic manner of earlier Eur-
opean powers5, or even in taxing such trade.6
The founding of Singapore, the division of Anglo-Dutch spheres of
influence, and what was fundamentally a division of politics and trade
in the new port and its attitude towards its environs, especially after the
cessation of the Company monopoly in the China trade in 1833 (Turn-
bull 1977: 35), raises interesting questions about its relations to the hin-
terland, both on the peninsula and on the Dutch side of the border. The
abovementioned studies all emphasize the importance of placing Singa-
pore’s history within broader regional and global contexts, not only eco-
nomically, but also politically and culturally.7 If Singapore’s position as
a regional entrepot by the mid-nineteenth century has become an ac-
cepted fact, another dimension remains understudied, namely the role
of Singapore in the politics of colonial expansion and regime change
(Blusse 2005) within the archipelago.
Singapore and the nineteenth-Century Malay World: Parameters of
the Study
The establishment of a British port in Singapore in 1819 was seen as
the starting point of the island’s ‘modern’ history.8 Thereafter, with the
Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, the histories of Singapore and the Riau-
Lingga-Natuna archipelagos, now under the rubric of Riau-Lingga and
its dependencies, came to diverge, with that of the Temenggong family
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forming another trajectory through their creation of a new state to the
north of Singapore, which took on the name of the old kingdom, Johor.
Nevertheless, it was the ‘success’ of British Singapore and peninsular
Johor under the Temenggong that attracted more attention than the lat-
ter’s relatives in the Dutch Residency of Riau Lingga.9 This chapter at-
tempts to link the history of Singapore to the history of elite families of
the former kingdom of Johor. The comparison of these families’ strate-
gies has been examined in another essay. Here, I shall focus on the role
played by Singapore in the strategies of survival of three elite families
from the kingdom of Johor in the face of Anglo-Dutch imperial expan-
sion and regime change within the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury Malay world. The strategies of each family not only reflected their
different visions of region and the world, and their places within it, but
also different dimensions and phases of Singapore’s growth as a regio-
nal entrepot and imperial centre in the nineteenth century, as well as
changing regional and global imperial environments and the consolida-
tion of the Anglo-Dutch frontier through the co-operation of the two
European regimes.
The Sultan in Lingga, Tengku Hussein (later the Sultan of Singa-
pore), the Yam Tuan Muda (henceforth YTM) and the Temenggong
were the main figures of authority in the kingdom of Johor whose for-
tunes, and those of their families, came to be changed by the British
founding of Singapore in 1819 and the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Lon-
don, albeit in different ways. The Temenggong and Sultan Hussein re-
linquished all claims to the island of Singapore in return for a lump-
sum payment and a stipend from the English East India Company,
which lasted only through their lifetimes (Chew & Lee 1991: 29; Turn-
bull 1989: 1-34; Trocki 1979: 53-55). They effectively lost ‘all legitimate
claim to status and political power in Singapore’ (Trocki 1979: 55). Their
claims on the islands to the south of Singapore and, in the case of the
latter, over the kingdom of Johor as a whole were not recognized by the
British officials in Singapore, with the latter’s government in London
acknowledging Dutch influence in those islands in the Riau-Lingga-Nat-
una archipelago. They enjoyed the protection of the East India Com-
pany only if they remained on the island. On the Dutch side of the bor-
der, the YTM in Pulau Penyengat in Bintan and the Sultan of Lingga
were recognised in their suzerainty over the Riau and Lingga archipela-
gos, including the islands that had previously belonged to the Temeng-
gong as a fiefdom, while the Dutch government convinced them to
abandon any claims they had on Singapore and the peninsula of Johor.
What emerged were two contrasting systems of imperialism. The
British system was primarily commercial based on the older system of
controlling trade routes and the commerce in strategic commodities.
Singapore functioned in that role of a link in the China trade, at least
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until the Company officially lost its monopoly in 1833. Its imperial role
was defensive, in ensuring that the Dutch or their allies did not exceed
their recognized bounds. It was certainly not territorial. Connections
and traffic mattered more. The Dutch, on the other hand, envisioned a
territorial archipelagic state similar to what the British had achieved in
India (Tarling 1958).
Older geopolitical parameters and hierarchies persisted after the terri-
torial division. The Temenggong and Sultan Hussein continued to exer-
cise rights on the islands south of Singapore, such as Galang and Kari-
mun, leading ultimately to the Karimun War between the followers of
Sultan Hussein and the YTM and his forces assisted by Dutch war-
ships. The end of the 1827 Karimun War coincided with the resolution
of differences over the interpretation of the 1824 Treaty by the European
governments and their agents in the archipelago (Tarling 1958). While
the ‘border’ increasingly became a reality, it continued to be ‘porous’
(Tagliacozzo 2005) as royalty and nobility, merchants, labourers, orang
laut, and other mobile groups continued to cross this cartographical
line.
The redrawing of political borders also changed the axis of competi-
tion and the terms of the ‘game’. While the Temenggong and Tengku
Hussein had aided the British against their adversaries, their families
began to compete for control over peninsular Johor and the trade in key
commodities, such as gutta percha. Similarly, relations between the
YTM and the Sultan of Lingga families also began to sour as the latter
sought to transcend the strictures of control that successive YTMs had
sought to impose in Lingga, while claiming their right to rule on behalf
of the ruler. The families on each side of the border looked to those on
the other side for assistance and support in dealing with their rivals in
their respective spheres. If the consequences of the 1824 treaty varied
for these families, they found themselves increasingly marginalised
from their respective fields of authority within the newly reconfigured
political and territorial parameters.
The families of the Temenggong, the YTM, and the Sultan of Lingga
adopted different strategies in response to the encroachment of and
marginalisation by the new colonial ‘regimes’ and new rivals within the
newly reconstituted fields of power. Each group sought to resist the
new European regimes of domestication, by subverting them through
travel, and in doing so, articulating alternative identities and socio-politi-
cal imaginaries. They ranged from the revival of the geographical and
social parameters of the old kingdom of Johor by the family of the Sul-
tan in Lingga, the tapping of regional and trans-regional networks of Is-
lamic dissemination and practice (and later Pan-Asianism) by the YTM
family in Riau, and finally to European and Asian circuits of royalty on
the part of the Temenggong in Johor. Constituting an important space
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outside of the traditional kerajaan system in the peninsula and archipe-
lago and, for the YTM (Riau) and Sultan (Lingga) families, outside the
Dutch regime, and given its non-interventionist stance prior to 1874,
Singapore became an important recourse for these elite families in their
bids for autonomy, and their concomitant attempts to attract capital, la-
bour, and ideas for their various enterprises.
The strategies and fortunes of the Temenggong, YTM, and Sultan
(Lingga) families highlighted this Janus-faced role of Singapore as en-
trepot and imperial ‘panopticon’ (to borrow a phrase of Bentham’s and
Foucault’s)10 in the processes of regime change within the nineteenth
century archipelago. With its rise as an entrepot in the first half of the
nineteenth century, taking over the role previously occupied by ports
like Riau and Melaka, Singapore provided access to capital, labour, com-
modities, networks, information, and ideas central to their attempts to
create an autonomous economic, cultural or political base of power and
authority. The convergence of shipping, people, and commodities
meant that it became a gateway for different global (or trans-regional)
cultural and ideological flows, connecting different parts of the archipe-
lago to each other and to global centres of authority and knowledge,
such as the Ottoman court, the Islamic reformist centres in the Middle
East, and Japan. It also served, at the same time, as an imperial outpost
on the Anglo-Dutch border overseeing British interests in the peninsu-
lar and its environs vis-à-vis those of the Dutch and their allies, as well
as other ‘foreign’ powers and agents.
The different roles played by Singapore in the strategies of survival of
these elite families reflected its straddling of two imperial systems in
the first half of the nineteenth century (the British commercial mode
and the Dutch territorial mode), the transition between two different
types of British imperial formations on the peninsula in the course of
the century, as well as the tensions between the abovementioned roles.
Ultimately, the crystallisation of the Anglo-Dutch frontier as well as re-
gional and global imperial relations in the world-system in the course
of the nineteenth century meant that the possibility of ‘escape’ from the
colonial strictures offered by Singapore’s access to the ‘outside’ became
increasingly dim for these elite families.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Sultanate of Riau-Ling-
ga and the YTM office had been abolished by the Dutch colonial autho-
rities, with the leaders of these families going into exile in Singapore.
The state of Johor on the peninsula was formally incorporated into the
British Unfederated Malay States with the appointment of an Advisor.
The efforts of these elites to turn to Turkey, Japan, and London respec-
tively were to prove futile ultimately.
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Sultan Mahmud: Old Strategies in a New World
In 1858, representatives of the Dutch government in Batavia delivered a
decree to Sultan Mahmud, who was then in Singapore, deposing him
as the ruler of the Dutch Residency of Riau-Lingga and its dependen-
cies. He was deposed because of his recalcitrance in ignoring warnings
from the Governor-General in Batavia and the Dutch Resident in Riau
not to venture across the border into Singapore and Trengganu, and in-
tervening in the politics there. In the official Dutch accounts, he had
not only neglected the affairs of his kingdom, but also caused embar-
rassment to the Dutch government in the face of British protests over
his travels to the east coast of the peninsula (Matheson 1970; Raja Ali
Haji 1982: 275ff.; Van der Putten 2001).
He took after his father, Sultan Muhammad, in his intransigence
against the YTM family. Since the time of his grandfather, Sultan Abdul
Rahman, successive YTMs had controlled the administration of Lingga
through their intermediaries in Daik (Raja Ali Haji 1982: 219). The alli-
ance between the YTM Raja Jafar and Dutch colonial government in
1818, although tenuous at times, resulted in the consolidation of the for-
mer’s position vis-à-vis the Temenggong and Tengku Hussein, who
found ready allies in Raffles and Farquhar, the officers of the English
East India Company commissioned with founding a settlement south
of Melaka.
While the families of the YTM and the Sultan in Lingga were aligned
with the Dutch against the Temenggong-Tengku Hussein-British in the
contest over Singapore and indirectly, the succession to the throne of
Johor, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty in 1824 and the Karimun War of 1827
brought an end to this ‘Paper War’. The Anglo-Dutch delineations
paved the way for a new axis of rivalry within the new geopolitical para-
meters imposed by the British and the Dutch governments in Europe.
The period between the 1830s and the 1880s saw a contest between the
YTM and Sultan families for the control of Riau and Lingga, in which
the Dutch colonial administration, at least until the 1860s, seemed to
have taken the side of the YTM family, not least due to the proximity of
Pulau Penyengat and Tanjung Pinang, but also due to good relations be-
tween several YTMs and Dutch Residents (Van der Putten 1995, 2001).
Singapore figured conspicuously in the strategies of Sultan Mahmud
of Lingga as he sought to bypass the regime imposed by the YTM fa-
mily in Lingga (Raja Ali Haji 1982; Matheson 1970). Sultan Mahmud’s
frequent visits to Singapore were discouraged by both the YTM and his
circle, and the Dutch administration in Riau. They accused the Sultan
of leaving his court too often and neglecting his duties as ruler, while
the YTM also accused him of mixing too much with non-Muslims, to
the extent of taking a European mistress, and living an un-Islamic life-
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style (Matheson 1970; Raja Ali Haji 1982; Netscher 1870; Van der Put-
ten 2001).
Sultan Mahmud saw the Dutch Residents in Tanjung Pinang as fa-
vouring the YTM family and sought to circumvent Riau by dealing di-
rectly with Singapore and the peninsula. The Dutch did not have an of-
ficial in Lingga prior to 1870, and depended very much on the YTM in
their everyday dealings with the Sultan in Lingga. Given the proximity
of Singapore to Lingga, its importance as the regional entrepot, and its
position as the centre of the British imperial presence in the archipela-
go, Singapore provided the promise of economic and social autonomy,
possibly translating into political autonomy. His father was recorded as
having visited Singapore, at the same time as the Sultan of Selangor.
Sultan Abdul Rahman, his grandfather, had travelled to Trengganu
when he was frustrated with the British founding of Singapore and the
recognition of his brother as Sultan, coupled with the YTM Raja Jafar’s
inability to properly install him with the proper regalia, then held by the
Engku Puteri.11
In Singapore, Sultan Mahmud had become closely associated with a
Parsee merchant, Cursetjee, and the prominent European merchant, W.
H. Read, who was later to become the consul for the Dutch in Singa-
pore. Both Cursetjee and Read were members of the Brethren of the
Lodge Zetland in the East, with Read occupying a particularly high posi-
tion within the lodge (Buckley 1967: 521-522). The latter was also heav-
ily involved in investments in the peninsula and was a vehement oppo-
nent of the Temenggong family in the latter’s interventions on the pe-
ninsula. He was also believed to have been the one who initiated Sultan
Mahmud into the abovementioned Masonic Lodge. The Sultan also con-
cluded agreements with European merchants for the exploitation of tin
on the island of Singkep. In 1852, he had visited Singapore again to dis-
cuss the extraction of coal deposits in Lingga (Matheson 1970: 138). It
was in Singapore that Sultan Mahmud obtained the blueprint for his
European-style residence in Riau, as well as the Chinese labour for
building it (Suwardi 1990; Hijjas 2005: 269).
Nevertheless, Sultan Mahmud’s strategies were neither new nor un-
ique. His ties with Read and Cursetjee were part of a broader pattern
that saw rival chiefs and rulers in the west coast peninsula states turn-
ing to merchants in the Straits Settlements for capital, labour, arms and
access to the British colonial administration in Singapore in their politi-
cal contests and wars. European and Chinese capital, as well as Chinese
labour and fighting men, had been recruited to develop tin districts in
Perak, Selangor, and Sungei Ujong since the 1840s, and the conflicts
between rival factions of Chinese merchants and secret societies in the
Straits Settlements were intimately tied to those on the west coast of
the peninsula (Khoo 1972).
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The Straits Settlements, including Singapore, became important fi-
nanciers of politics, trade, and production on the peninsula. Individual
merchants or cliques and syndicates played important roles in the poli-
tics of the region, as politics remained intimately connected to trade de-
spite the non-interventionist imperial policy of the British administra-
tion. Singapore had a unique political economy on the archipelago in
how political power became detached from trade. As such, it provided
access to important materials of state building without entailing political
subjugation, in contrast to the situation on the Dutch side of the border.
Besides Singapore, the Sultan also travelled frequently to Trengganu
and Pahang, claiming to be visiting his kin in these places. His mother
was a princess from Trengganu, who married his father when he had
followed Sultan Abdul Rahman to the kingdom for refuge in 1820. This
was part of an older pattern of politics, based on extended familial ties
between royal families in the Sultanate of Johor and the royal families
of the polities on the peninsula, such as Trengganu and Pahang. The
rulers of Trengganu in the eighteenth century aided the Malay factions
and the Sultan against the Bugis YTM and his followers in the kingdom
(Vos 1992; Raja Ali Haji 1982). By maintaining his connections to this
circuit of kin in Singapore, Pahang, and Trengganu, Sultan Mahmud
was invoking an older paradigm and network centred on the kingdom
of Johor. He trying to reclaim his rank and status within the broader
Malay world as the Sultan of the old Johor, rather than the ruler of Ling-
ga to which the Bugis YTM regime and the Dutch colonial state were
keen to pin him to.
Reports from newspapers and contemporary accounts in the 1840s
emphasised the status enjoyed by the Sultans of Lingga in the peninsu-
la and the surrounding coasts of Borneo and Sumatra (Milner 1982:
67), in contrast to the family of Sultan Hussein in Singapore. Even the
Tuhfat al-Nafis, a text critical of Sultan Mahmud (d. 1864), suggested,
perhaps through hyperbole, that in a later period, ‘any person he met
joined him’, when he moved through Trengganu galvanizing support
for his protégé in the Pahang War (Raja Ali Haji 1982: 307). The Te-
menggong in Singapore also felt the need to visit the Sultan in Lingga
and the YTM in Riau to pay his respects and for confirmation of his ti-
tle in 1841, even after his installation by the Governor of Singapore and
the Bendahara of Pahang. In doing so, he was both invoking the old Jo-
hor hierarchy, while denying the legitimacy of Tengku Ali, the heir to
Sultan Hussain. The latter, too, had visited Lingga and offered his ‘in-
heritance’ on the peninsula to Sultan Mahmud, even as he competed
with the Temenggong for the territory (Milner 1982: 67).
However, his actions were read differently by the British in Singa-
pore, who saw his intervention in Pahang and Trengganu as an infrin-
gement of the 1824 Treaty by a vassal of the Dutch colonial state. As
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British suspicions increased about the Sultan’s visits to Singapore, and
his use of these opportunities to influence the politics of Trengganu, he
was to exacerbate the tensions further in October 1856. He had ven-
tured to Trengganu after saying farewell to the British governor in Sin-
gapore and claiming that he was returning to Riau. In response to Brit-
ish protests, the Dutch Governor-General in Batavia had written two let-
ters to Sultan Mahmud warning him not to venture to Singapore or the
east coast of the peninsula, threatening him in the second letter with
the loss of his kingdom and Dutch protection if he did so again. Sultan
Mahmud paid no heed to the warning (Matheson 1970; Netscher 1870).
The final straw came in 1857. In the midst of an impasse in the suc-
cession to the YTM office, in which he had procrastinated on naming a
successor because he did not agree with the YTM family’s candidate, he
had attempted to do away with the office by naming an outsider from
Singapore as his representative and demanding the revenues of Riau be
paid to him. When he did not get his way, the Sultan decided to travel
to Singapore, against the advice of the Dutch Resident and the YTM fa-
mily, without resolving this issue. This direct challenge to Dutch author-
ity forced the government in Batavia to take the step of formally depos-
ing him (Netscher 1870; Raja Ali Haji 1982: 291-292; Matheson 1970:
123; Van der Putten 2001).
Sultan Mahmud had remained in Singapore after his deposing, stay-
ing with the Temenggong, and attempting to seek the mediation of the
British with the Dutch in Riau. The refusal of the British administration
to intervene on his behalf made him turn to the east coast to try to
build a new base there. Pahang was the fief of the Bendahara, the ‘Ma-
lay’ (as opposed to Bugis) chief minister, and Sultan Mahmud, on the
basis of his claim to be the descendent of the Johor rulers, was invoking
his higher rank as ruler in the old hierarchy of Johor. He moved to Pa-
hang, and tried to establish himself there by supporting Wan Ahmad in
a power struggle against his uncle and nephew.
Failing to obtain the support of the British or the ruler of Trengganu
for his protégé, the Sultan turned to the ruler of Siam. The support that
had seemingly been provided to him by King Mongkut in bringing the
Sultan back to Kelantan and Trengganu in British warships alarmed
the British government in Singapore (Matheson 1970: 124-125; Milner
1982: 53-71). It led to the dispatch of British warships to Trengganu,
and ultimately the bombardment of the capital after the failure of the
ruler of Trengganu to hand over Sultan Mahmud and his followers (Mil-
ner 1982: ibid.; Matheson 190: ibid.). Wan Ahmad was ultimately victor-
ious over the incumbent Bendahara, but Sultan Mahmud was never gi-
ven the recognition he desired. Smuggling himself back into Pahang
via Singapore (disguised as a sailor), the Sultan eventually died in Pa-
hang in 1864, exhausted and disappointed.
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Sultan Mahmud’s strategies of survival and ‘career’ highlighted the
Janus-faced roles of Singapore as ‘gateway’ and ‘imperial outpost’ (or
‘panopticon’) in a period of transition in the Malay world. As an entre-
pot under British rule, it provided access to sources of European and
Chinese merchant capital, commodities, and manpower for rulers and
chiefs from the Dutch sphere of influence and the peninsula ‘states’.
Even as the British authorities in Singapore and the Straits Settlements
sought to minimize Company intervention in local or regional politics,
the merchant communities and labour networks, especially the Chinese
kongsi, were involved in prospective ventures at the invitation of and in
cooperation with local rulers or chiefs. Taking the case of Selangor and
Perak, for example, multi-ethnic coalitions (backed by merchant capital
from the Straits Settlements) battled for control of tin territory and
power (Khoo 1972: 71-85; Ho 2002: 12). On the Dutch side of the bor-
der, rulers turned to Singapore for independent sources of finance,
arms and ammunition, and political support.
The contrast in imperial visions between the British and the Dutch
administrations in the archipelago made Singapore an important auton-
omous space outside both the strictures of the kerajaan and the Dutch
territorial empire, providing refuge as well as resources for rulers,
chiefs, and Chinese kongsis in their attempts to create or maintain their
claims to authority and power. Singapore and the Straits Settlements
created a situation of fluidity in the peninsula, and to a certain extent,
on the Dutch side of the border, because of its free trade policy and that
of political non-intervention, except where the Company’s and national
interests were impinged upon (especially encroachment by other
powers). While it generally discouraged and sought to prevent support
for such conflicts on the Dutch border by British subjects or residents
on Singapore, flows of materials, money, and people from or via the is-
land and port continued. The merchant communities even clamoured
for Company intervention to secure their investments and interests in
these enterprises (Khoo 1972; Mills 1966: 174-219).
The period of fluidity in hierarchies and boundaries on the peninsula
funded by the Straits Settlements coincided with the crystallization of
the Anglo-Dutch border between the late 1820s and the 1860s. None-
theless, Sultan Mahmud’s attempts to ignore these divisions in his invo-
cation of the parameters of the kingdom of Johor through his travels re-
sulted in the re-affirmation of the Anglo-Dutch border and the geogra-
phical spheres of influence delineated in 1824. The Anglo-Dutch co-
operation to stop Sultan Mahmud’s travels to Trengganu and Pahang,
as well as the Anglo-Siamese agreements over their respective spheres
on the east coast of the peninsula also reflected the crystallisation of An-
glo-Siamese boundaries, soon after the Bowring Treaty of 1855. It led to
the diminishing of amorphous spaces between polities or rival imperial
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spheres and their borders that were so characteristic of the older poli-
ties, a process covered in the works of Thongchai (1993) and Tagliacoz-
zo (2005).
It paralleled a shift in Dutch imperial policy from the ambivalence
surrounding Sumatra and other areas along the Anglo-Dutch border in
the 1840s to a more aggressive policy towards the rulers whom they
considered as vassals in the border zone and against other European in-
trusions. The projects of James Brooke in Sarawak and Labuan, and the
adventures of Gibson and Wilson in Sumatra, together with a series of
revolts against the Dutch overlordship in Palembang, Bangka, Jambi,
West Borneo, and Banjarmassin that broke out in the late 1840s and
the late 1850s, made the Dutch East Indies government particularly ap-
prehensive of recalcitrant behaviour by ‘native’ rulers in the reifying of
what Tagliacozzo (2005) had called the ‘border arc’ between the Dutch
and British spheres during the first half of the nineteenth century.
Growing British and Chinese commercial involvement in the politics
on the peninsula also led to the intensification of calls from within the
mercantile communities in Singapore for British intervention on the
peninsula to protect British interests there, especially against the intru-
sion of other European powers liaising with these states or agents act-
ing on their behalf. Sultan Mahmud’s strategies to revive the older Ma-
lay world political parameters was perceived as such a threat, although
Sultan Mahmud was not the only ruler or traditional elite to continu-
ously cross the new Anglo-Dutch border.12 His visits to Pahang and
Trengganu, first as a Dutch vassal, and subsequently as an envoy for
the Siamese ruler in Bangkok were seen as ‘outside’ attempts to inter-
fere in the politics of the peninsula.
Sultan Mahmud was a victim of the transition between the old and
the new ‘world’ created by Anglo-Dutch delineations of their respective
spheres of influence. His attempts to revive these contours failed miser-
ably in the face of the gradual crystallization of the Anglo-Dutch border
and Anglo-Siamese negotiations concerning the east coast of Malaya.
Ultimately, his use of his genealogical credentials and ties to the ruling
family of Johor proved to be insufficient to secure him the title of Sul-
tan in Pahang and his reinstatement as ruler there.
The YTM Family: Cosmopolitan Singapore and the Gateways to
Asian Modernities
Despite the criticisms of Sultan Mahmud’s frequent visits to Singapore
and his consorting with non-Europeans in Singapore in the Tuhfat al-
Nafis, the YTM family’s fate and fortunes were to become increasingly
drawn towards the port-city in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
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The meaning and forms of these connections were rather different
from those of the Sultan. While economic motives were strong, it was
inseparable from the growing significance of Singapore in the late nine-
teenth century as a centre for Islamic learning and publishing, as well
as a conduit for the flows of ideas, commodities and people between
the Middle East and the archipelago, from pilgrims to newspapers and
literature. The port-city was also later to become an important centre
for early ‘Malay’ nationalism and the Malay language press, as well as
the creation of a Malay-Muslim public sphere.
Islamic knowledge networks have historically followed the major
trade routes linking the Middle East, India, and Southeast Asia. The rul-
ing elites in Southeast Asian port polities have played an important his-
torical role in the patronage of Islam, especially in the promotion of Is-
lamic learning and practice, and in the production and dissemination
of religious knowledge. The perceived importance of Islamic knowledge
as cultural capital was evident in the major pre-nineteenth century port-
polities in Pasai, Melaka, Aceh, northern Java, Banten, and Makassar be-
tween the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, and Palembang, Pontia-
nak, and Banjarmassin in the eighteenth century (Azra 2003; Andaya
1993). What distinguished Singapore from these earlier ports were its
non-Muslim administrative elites and official policy towards religion
and Islam in particular, and its free trade policy.
As Roff (1967) and Milner (1995) have pointed out, the rise of Singa-
pore as a centre for Islamic reformism and Sufi teaching in the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century was due not only to its
importance as a commercial and shipping centre for the diasporic trad-
ing networks from the Middle East and west Indian coast, and its im-
portance as a staging point for the haj, but equally importantly, to the
relative lenient policy the Straits Settlements governments adopted,
prior to 1902, towards the activities of Islamic teachers, authors, clubs,
and publishing activities in these port towns, in contrast to the suspi-
cion accorded to it by authorities in the Dutch East Indies, and the at-
tempts of the Malay polities on the peninsula to domesticate religious
teachers and functionaries within the traditional political hierarchies
(Roff 1967: 32-55; Milner 1995).
Within this context, culture, religion, and history, in particular Islam
and Malay language, grammar and history, became important dimen-
sions in the YTM family’s strategy of survival under the Dutch colonial
regime. The YTM family elite was transformed from famed warriors de-
fending the kingdom to exemplary Islamic leaders and experts not only
in Islamic doctrine and theology, but also Malay language, history, and
culture (Raja Ali Haji 1982; Barnard 1998). They took on the role of cul-
tural brokers to consolidate their position within the new Dutch colonial
regime and to resist attempts by Sultan Mahmud and his father to by-
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pass them and undermine their position. They mediated between the
Middle East, other regional centres of Islamic knowledge in the archipe-
lago, and their kingdom/Residency, in the transmission and translation
of Islamic ideas, doctrine, and practice. They played a similar role be-
tween the Dutch and local/regional repositories of Malay world history
and language. Where necessary, they came to ‘invent’ tradition, in
Hobsbawm’s sense, in order to legitimise and justify their roles as
regents.
The YTM family had benefited the most territorially from the 1824
Anglo-Dutch Treaty. They claimed authority over the islands formerly
considered the fief of the Temenggong. Nevertheless, successive YTMs
were to face the gradual encroachment of the Dutch colonial state into
what they considered to be their ‘traditional’ fields of authority, such as
the collection of revenues and the administration of Bintan. The new
‘border’ also reoriented the axes of contestation in the region. The
rivalry between the Temenggong and YTM families had defined the
politics of the kingdom of Johor since the late eighteenth century, de-
spite the marriages between the families. Under the new European re-
gimes, and delineation of spheres, a new axis emerged, with the YTM
in Riau and Sultan in Lingga struggling over the control of Lingga, Re-
teh, and the Natunas.
The YTM family turned instead to cultural capital to create a basis of
authority that was independent of both the Dutch colonial administra-
tion (financially and politically) and the Sultan in Lingga (for legitima-
tion) respectively, even if the YTM office was dependent on both for its
legitimacy and survival.13 Successive YTMs and members of their fa-
milies became important intermediaries for the Dutch in the accumula-
tion of manuscripts and other materials pertaining to the history and
traditions of the kingdom, partly to be used for the administration of
Riau-Lingga, and partly to be used in the teaching and learning of Ma-
lay in the colonial service. On the basis of these accumulated materials
and the networks formed with repositories of such texts and knowledge
in the western archipelago, the YTM family elite became producers of
knowledge pertaining to Malay history, tradition, language, and litera-
ture, with Raja Ali Haji’s works being published in Dutch journals, and
the same person applying to the Dutch government for a printing press
(Van der Putten 1995, 1997 & 2001; Matheson & Andaya 1971; Andaya
1977; Raja Ali Haji 1982).
Pulau Penyengat, the residence of the YTM family and circle opposite
the Dutch fort of Tanjung Pinang, developed into an important centre
of Islamic learning and practice. Under successive YTMs beginning
from Raja Jafar, efforts were made to ensure closer adherence to Isla-
mic law and Islamic tenets of behaviour and dress in the everyday life.
Islamic teachers from Mekka and the archipelago were invited to stay
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and teach in Pulau Penyengat. The Naqsbandiyyah tarekat or Sufi school
was established in Pulau Penyengat by the leaders of the YTM family,
with Raja Abdullah, himself YTM between 1857 and 1858, recognised as
the leader of the ‘brotherhood’ (Raja Ali Haji 1982: 320).
The first half of the nineteenth century also saw the first members of
the YTM family undertake the haj, including, among others, Raja Ah-
mad, Raja Abdullah (who had studied in Mekka and the Middle East
while on the haj there), and Raja Abdullah’s son, who died during a
haj, while accompanying Sheikh Ismail (Raja Ali Haji 1982: 284). Their
aspirations in becoming important producers and translators of Islamic
knowledge were evident in Raja Ali Haji’s attempts to secure a printer
and to start a school in Pulau Penyengat (Van der Putten 2006).
Singapore played an important role in linking the YTM family and
Pulau Penyengat to regional and global networks of Islamic learning
and knowledge. The global outlook in the conception of Islam and the
ecumene was evident in the growing traffic to Mekka for the pilgrimage
and the interest in news from the Middle East. Raja Ali Haji was, in the
1850s, following the news of the Crimean war, and saw it as a jihad or
holy war (Andaya 1977: 129). The advent of steam shipping, the open-
ing of the Suez Canal, and the designation of Singapore as a major coal
station for the British Royal Navy effectively transformed Singapore into
the main port in the western archipelago in the era of steam (Wong
1991: 41-65); Tagliacozzo 2005). Singapore became an important node
for pilgrims, students, teachers, and other religious experts travelling
from between the archipelago and the Middle East and the Indian
Ocean littoral. Famous teachers, such as Sheikh Ismail, moved between
the Temenggong’s residence in Singapore and Riau. By the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, the YTM family became closely as-
sociated with the Sufi and reformist networks in Singapore (Raja Ali
Haji 1982: 284).
Just as the spread of Islam and movements of Islamic revivalism had
followed the trade and shipping routes that linked the Indian Ocean lit-
toral with the Java Sea in the earlier centuries (Riddell 2001; Gordon
2001; Azra 2003), Singapore’s rise as a cosmopolitan entrepot was com-
plemented by its growing importance as a node for trans-regional reli-
gious, ideological, and cultural flows between the archipelago and other
parts of the world. Networks and circuits positing different visions of
modernity, geographical and cultural/religious, from western European,
to Middle Eastern and Islamic, and to Chinese, converged in Singapore,
which became a regional centre in the production and reproduction of
knowledge (Trocki 2006, 66-69; Roff 1967; Godley 1981; Kenley 2001).
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the members of the ex-
tended YTM family, led by their leaders such as Raja Ali Kelana, the
son and designated successor of the YTM Muhammad Yusuf, and Raja
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Hitam, the son of Raja Ali Haji, participated in these networks and cir-
cuits, especially the reformist sphere emerging in the Middle East and
in Singapore. The YTM family sought to base their authority over the
communities in the outlying islands by emphasising their Islamic cre-
dentials and knowledge, especially their role in Islamic justice and edu-
cation (Raja Ali Kelana 1986).
In the late 19th century, the Persekutuan Rushdiyyah (Rushdiyah club)
was established in Pulau Penyengat as the base of the YTM family and
as ‘a forum for debate on contemporary Islamic issues and an avenue
for disseminating religious treatises.’ (Barnard 1994, 27) Applicants
needed to provide examples of their written work to be considered for
membership (Andaya 2003, 96; Barnard 1994, 26). Most of the Bugis
princes in Penyengat were members, although membership was not re-
stricted to this circle, and included ‘Lingga Malays’ and Sayids, some of
whom, like Sayid Syeikh al-Hadi, were based in Singapore.
The leaders of the Rushdiyah Club also sought to encourage writing
and publication among its members. Its members published exegeses
on Islamic prayers and translations of works from Arabic (Andaya
1982: 127). Its formation seemed to have been related to the establish-
ment of the Matha’at al_Riauwiyah printing press, a realisation of a
long-held dream by leading members of the YTM family (Van der Put-
ten 1995: 15-16). In addition, Sayid Sheikh al-Hady and Sheikh Muham-
mad Tahir Jalauddin, two of the founding editors of al-Imam, the first
Islamic modernist newspaper in Singapore (founded in 1906), were
closely related to the YTM family elite and the Rushdiyah Club. To-
gether with other members of the Riau elite, Raja Ali Kelana and Raja
Hitam contributed regularly to the Al-Imam after its founding in 1906.
Sayid Sheikh al-Hady, whose father was an Arab religious teacher
who stayed in Penyengat for extended periods of time, and who was an
adopted son of Raja Ali Kelana, exemplified these connections of the
YTM family. He grew up in Penyengat and became the manager for
Raja Ali Kelana’s real estate and business interests in Singapore and Ba-
tam (Milner 1995: 145-7; Gordon 1999: 4-5). He assisted in the forma-
tion of the Rushdiyah Club, and ‘took an active interest in its activities.’
He not only accompanied the sons of the Sultan and Raja Muda on the
pilgrimage to Mekka and to Egypt and the Levant, but was also the
manager of the hostel for religious travellers in Riau (Roff 1967: 62).
Sheikh Muhammad Tahir studied at al-Azhar in Cairo, Egypt, moving
between the Riau-Lingga archipelago and the peninsula, while starting
an Islamic school in Singapore with funds provided by Raja Ali Kelana
(Andaya 1977: 140).
The YTM family was also economically drawn to Singapore. With rev-
enue collection in Riau and Lingga increasingly in the hands of the
Dutch administration, members of the YTM began to turn to Singapore
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as a market for their various private business projects and investments,
and indirectly, for the support of their religious activities. The combined
economic and religious orientation of the YTM family towards Singa-
pore was epitomised in the figure of Raja Ali Kelana, the heir apparent
to the YTM Raja Muhammad Yusuf, and a leading figure in Pulau Pe-
nyengat Islamic scholarly and literary circles in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. He not only owned properties in Singapore, but also had his own
steamship that ran between Singapore, Riau and the Natunas. Singa-
pore was also the market for bricks from his Batam factory and coco-
nuts from his plantations in the Natunas (Gordon 1999: 5). He owned
15 houses in Singapore, and had his own residence there. Several Pe-
nyengat princes also owned ‘modest residences’ in Singapore, ‘which
they visited frequently’. Many people also ‘traded extensively with Singa-
pore merchants’ (Andaya 1977: 127-8). Sayid Sheikh al-Hadi was the
manager of these interests in Singapore and Batam.
The cosmopolitan port city of Singapore was to become an important
gateway for the YTM family in their attempts to avoid marginalization
by the Dutch colonial state in their realm, as the leaders were con-
fronted by two crises. In 1899, the Dutch colonial government decided
not to elect a new YTM and to persuade the Sultan to sign a treaty abol-
ishing the office.14 In 1913, when the Sultan refused to sign a treaty in
which he would have conceded all power to the Dutch colonial govern-
ment, he was deposed and the Sultanate abolished by the colonial gov-
ernment. These moves provoked the protests of the YTM family, who
tried to secure foreign assistance to persuade the Dutch government to
drop the decision. Efforts to reach the Ottoman court and the Japanese
emperor by Raja Ali Kelana and Raja Hitam used Singapore as the place
of embarkation and as the node for connecting to these centres’ net-
works.
Raja Ali Kelana’s journey to the court of the Ottoman in 1904 was
not new. Kingdoms in the archipelago had turned to the Ottomans or to
regional Islamic rulers in their wars against European expansion, from
the Portuguese to the East India Companies of the Dutch and English.
In 1858, Sultan Taha of Jambi had sent a mission requesting to be re-
cognised as a subject or vassal of the Ottoman ruler to avoid Dutch oc-
cupation. Ottoman intervention was also believed to be imminent dur-
ing the long-drawn out war in Aceh. It also coincided with the Caliphate
movement promoted by the Sultan of Turkey, Sultan Abdul Hamid II,
since the 1880s. Raja Ali Kelana’s mission also coincided with the trans-
fer of Kiamil Bey, the Ottoman consul in Batavia, to Singapore. The lat-
ter was known to have been an active promoter of the Caliphate (An-
daya 1977). Raja Ali Kelana tried to make his way to Constantinople by
meeting Kiamil, the Ottoman consul in Singapore, who had been one
of the prominent promoters of the concept of the Caliph while he was
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the consul in Batavia. Raja Ali Kelana seemed to have gone no further
than Egypt where he tried to request an audience with the Khedive of
Egypt (Andaya 1977).
Overtures to the Japanese emperor were also made at this same time
(in March 1905), using the YTM’s connections in Singapore, and the
growing Japanese presence in the western archipelago at the turn of the
twentieth century. Singapore was an important base for Japanese entre-
preneurs and enterprises in their southward advance into Southeast
Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Studies have
shown the extent to which the Japanese entrepreneurs and companies
had tried to penetrate the border regions of the Dutch East Indies dur-
ing the turn of the twentieth century, especially in the photography
business, the peddling of medicine as well as in the mining and planta-
tion sectors, especially in rubber (Andaya 1977).
Raja Hitam, a YTM family member, had gone to Singapore on the ex-
cuse that he was setting up a pharmacy in cooperation with a Japanese
firm, although Dutch intelligence reports suggested that he had actually
gone there to negotiate with the Japanese to hand over the kingdom of
Riau and Lingga to them (Andaya 1977: 140). The growing economic
presence of the Japanese in Riau between 1908 and 1911, especially dur-
ing the rubber boom of 1909, and an extension of the rapidly expand-
ing Japanese-owned estates in Singapore, had been a cause of Dutch
concern. It was this Japanese presence that the YTM family turned to
for assistance in reversing Dutch policy. Raja Ali Kelana and the Sultan
of Riau also negotiated secretly with individual Japanese parties for the
sale and rental of certain islands, as well as various mining or copra
growing concessions (Andaya 1977: 145). Japanese officers had visited
Sultan Abdul Rahman in Riau in October 1910, when a Japanese naval
training expedition landed in Riau.
When the Dutch authorities eventually decided to depose the Sultan
in 1910, the YTM family once again turned to Japan. The Sultan chose
Singapore as his place of exile, followed by the flight of large numbers
of people from Riau in expectation of an impending war between the Ja-
panese and Dutch. The Sultan met the Japanese consul in Singapore
and turned copies of all the treaties between the Dutch government and
himself over to the consul. He also met with Japanese representatives
there and sent a letter to the commander of the Japanese squadron in
Singapore, whom he had previously entertained in Riau.
The members of the YTM family turned not only to the Islamic mod-
ernist sphere and its international connections, but also to Pan-Asian
networks based in Japan. They aired their grievances in the major news-
papers in Singapore, including the al-Imam and the Straits Times, the
two major Malay and English newspapers in Singapore at that time.
Some of these articles were reprinted in newspapers and journals in Ja-
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pan, for example, the Dai To, the main organ of a Pan-Asian society in
Japan that had recently been established in 1910, and the Tokyo Islamic
Brotherhood, also established in April of the same year (Andaya 1977:
141).
As Barbara Andaya (1977) has argued, the decision to turn to Japan
was not only a reflection of this economic presence, but also the broad-
er debates in the Islamic newspapers in Egypt and in the archipelago,
especially in the Straits Settlements and Singapore. The success of Ja-
pan in the Russo-Japanese War had not only made it a source of hope
for Middle Eastern and Asian communities battling European colonial
encroachment but also led to fervent discussions about Japan as a mod-
el for Islamic modernist circles, in which technological modernisation
could proceed alongside the maintenance of civilizational identity.
There were even rumours that the Japanese emperor had converted to
Islam, as well as of Japanese warships being sent to the Netherlands
East Indies as a prelude to an invasion.
Raja Hitam began raising funds in 1912 for a mission to Tokyo to
present the case of the family before the Japanese emperor, with a letter
from Sultan Abdul Rahman and his advisors requesting that Riau come
under Japanese rule with the Sultan restored to his former position.
The way he went about organising and raising funds for the mission re-
flected the broader regional networks in which the family was em-
bedded and the importance of Singapore in linking these circuits to-
gether. In September 1912, he was reportedly collecting money from
Riau residents visiting Singapore, and haj pilgrims from Riau calling at
Singapore. He also established a Malay trading cooperative in Singa-
pore, which sold copra directly from the Pulau Tujuh area rather than
through the Chinese middlemen, (Andaya 1977: 151). The Menteri Be-
sar of Johor, in fact, was an active party in discussions held in Singa-
pore and Johor. Singapore formed an important link in the ties between
the Temenggong and YTM families, and the former, because of ties es-
tablished during the late Sultan Abu Bakar’s visit to Japan, provided po-
tential access to official Japanese channels.
For his journey, Raja Hitam made use of his Japanese connections in
Singapore, and ‘Malay’ connections in Tokyo. His journey was arranged
by a Japanese doctor based in Singapore but acquainted with the YTM
family, from whom he had received several land concessions in Riau.
His contact person in Tokyo was a ‘Penyengat native’ working as a Ma-
lay language teacher at the Tokyo School for Foreign Languages, who
was both a friend of Raja Ali Kelana and a son-in-law of the Menteri Be-
sar of Johor. He had even received visits from the deposed Sultan of
Riau-Lingga in Singapore before travelling to Tokyo. However, the trip
resulted in nothing except wild rumours of Japanese military interven-
tion. The failure of the first trip did not deter him from making a sec-
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ond. The project was to die along with Raja Hitam, in 1913, when he
passed away in Tokyo, a victim of the cold of winter, without achieving
his objective (Andaya 1977: 153-4).
The strategies of the YTM family in the course of the nineteenth cen-
tury and especially in the last decade of the Riau-Lingga Sultanate’s exis-
tence reflected Singapore’s importance as a global cosmopolitan port-
city at the beginning of the twentieth century, as a corollary to its
growth as an international entrepot. It became an important hub for the
Islamic intellectual and political networks linking the archipelago with
centres of knowledge and cultural production in the Middle East, as
well as for the agents and visions of Pan-Asianism concomitant with Ja-
pan’s southward economic expansion.15
The convergence of and interaction between these two forces pro-
vided the background for the strategies adopted by the YTM family
against further Dutch encroachment at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury. Nevertheless, the failure of the YTM family’s overture reflected the
crystallisation of the imperial world-system and its borders. Thus, de-
spite the cross-border Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian visions espoused by
the Ottoman court and certain groups in Japan, these states were reluc-
tant to push the causes of the different elites within the Dutch East In-
dies threatened by Dutch colonial expansion. The efforts of the YTM fa-
mily were ultimately futile, and they were to remain in exile.
The Temenggong Family: Singapore and Changing Imperial
Visions
The case of the Temenggong family in Singapore and Johor synthesises
the themes highlighted earlier in the development of Singapore as an
entrepot, a centre for British imperialism, and as a cosmopolitan centre
of cultural transmission and production in the region. The changes in
British imperial policy and the imperial environment to shape the stra-
tegies of the Temenggong family in the last decades of the nineteenth
and the early decades of the twentieth century, and their ties with Singa-
pore. These strategies reflected the changing relations between the fa-
mily and the British administration in Singapore. The family was to
succeed where the two previous case studies failed, ultimately, by push-
ing for global recognition.
Despite their importance as signatories to the initial agreement with
the British over Singapore and his role in brokering the participation of
Tengku Hussein in the arrangements, which lent it legitimacy within
the terms regnant in the Malay world, the Temenggong was gradually
marginalised from the administration of the port. Alarmed by the at-
tempts of his followers to exact taxes from the populace in the new port
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town, as well as other disagreements over the role of the Temenggong
in the new port, the British administration forced the family to relocate
outside the new commercial town to Teluk Belanga (Trocki 1979: 49-
55). The 1824 Treaty also deprived the Temenggong of his fiefs south of
Singapore, especially the Karimun, Galang, and other islands where
there were important orang laut communities. Although the Temeng-
gong was said to have continued to act as if they owned these islands
(Raja Ali Haji 1982: 244) after the treaty, the family’s fortunes under-
went a decline in the 1820s after the death of Temenggong Abdul Rah-
man in 1826.
The growth of Singapore as an international entrepot and the British
imperial policy of non-intervention in the archipelago, as well as the
growing importance of the port as a base for Christian missionary work
in the archipelago, played important roles in reviving the fortunes of
the Temenggong family. A major factor in the success of Temenggong
Daeng Ibrahim, Temenggong Abdu Rahman’s successor, was his rap-
prochement with the British administration in the Straits Settlements
in the mid-1830s, and his co-operation with the governor, George Sa-
muel Bonham, in the suppression of piracy in the region. The Temeng-
gong exploited the limited, primarily commercial, imperial aims of the
Singapore and Straits Settlements administrations, in their non-inter-
vention, by acting as their intermediaries with other local rulers in the
region, not only in anti-piracy campaigns but also in the resolution of
various crises between and within peninsular polities. This role as inter-
mediary allowed Daeng Ibrahim to exploit political crises in the penin-
sula to his advantage, as could be seen in Negeri Sembilan and Pahang
in the 1850s, and to enjoy high regard in the eyes of the British admin-
istration in Singapore, which translated into commercial and political
advantages in Singapore and its environs.
Singapore was thus crucial to the success of Daeng Ibrahim’s at-
tempts to create a new polity in peninsula Johor from the 1840s on-
wards. His standing with the British government in Singapore restored
his reputation in the region, and he drew the orang laut from the neigh-
bouring islands that had been affected by the British campaign against
piracy, such as the suku Galang, to him. He resettled them along the
southern coasts of the Johor peninsula to lay claim to the territory and
to aid in the collection of gutta percha (Trocki 1979: 76-78). He was also
able to secure ties to key European business houses, which were to pro-
vide crucial advice and expertise in managing his business and political
interests in Singapore, Johor, and subsequently London. Paterson & Si-
mon Co. and the lawyer Napier were to play important roles in these re-
spects (Thio 1969; Trocki 1979: 72-76). They were central to his ability
to corner the gutta-percha trade, in a commodity that saw a phenomenal
growth in demand in Europe between the 1830s and 1850s. At the same
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time, he was able to attract Chinese capital and labour, notably from the
Chinese gambier-and-pepper economy in Singapore, for the develop-
ment of peninsular Johor through the extension of this cultivation to
the region. He also achieved control over the region through the issue
of letters of authority under the kang-chu system. In this way, he was
able to lay claim to Johor, despite the challenges from his rival, Tengku
Ali, the son of Sultan Hussein in Singapore (Thio 1969; Trocki 1979,
1990).
His continued ability to continue to tap the British commercial net-
works and Straits Settlements administration was due to his association
with the new Malay missionary schools set up by the Reverend Keasber-
ry, an important missionary educator and publisher in the early and
mid-nineteenth century. The sending of his son, the later Temenggong
and Sultan Abu Bakar, and several children of his entourage, to Keas-
berry was to prove crucial in the development of the family’s fortunes
(Trocki 1979: 109, 320-322). Being conversant in English and in Eur-
opean ways, Temenggong Abu Bakar was to gain the cultural capital for
his later successful cultivating of friendships and ties with European
merchant and government circles in Singapore, and in establishing ties
with European and Japanese royalty.
Nonetheless, by the 1850s and 1860s, the favoured position of the fa-
mily in Singapore was coming under pressure from both within the
European mercantile community (from merchants such as W.H. Read,
who had earlier also criticized the Temenggong for his attempts to
monopolize the gutta percha trade) and from within the British Straits
Settlements government in Singapore. In 1855, the governor was to in-
tervene in the dispute between Daeng Ibrahim and Tengku Ali, the son
of Sultan Hussein, who also laid claim to Johor. A deal was brokered in
1855, in which Daeng Ibrahim was to acknowledge Tengku Ali as the
Sultan and his claims over Muar, while the new Sultan was to recognise
the Temenggong’s claims over the rest of Johor, with the latter to pay
him a lump sum and a monthly stipend (Winstedt 1979: 112).
Although the British administration in Singapore had acquiesced in
Temenggong Daeng Ibrahim’s assistance to his relatives and allies in
Pahang, and later, in his open participation in the Pahang Civil War on
their side during the early 1860s, they were increasingly uncomfortable
with his ambitions on the peninsula and the methods he used. A major
impasse also emerged over the Temenggong’s attempts to channel the
river trade in Johor through his new capital of Tanjung Putri in 1862.
European and Chinese merchants lodged petitions with the British gov-
ernment in Singapore to protest his attempt to control Johor trade.
Although petitions were made in his favour by a group of Chinese kang-
chu and merchants, and he had his allies within the European merchant
communities, his reputation in the eyes of the British administration in
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Singapore nonetheless suffered. His situation was to worsen with re-
verses in Pahang, Negeri Sembilan, and Muar, during the mid-1860s
(Trocki 1979: 118-149).
Concomitant with these reverses was the news of the impending
transfer of the Straits Settlements from the British administration in
Calcutta to the direct control of the Colonial Office in London. His visit
to London was largely to establish direct ties with the monarch and gov-
ernment in London and circumvent both a government in the Straits
Settlements whose support for him seemed increasingly uncertain, as
well as a new colonial hierarchy centred on Singapore reporting directly
to London. He also wanted to be recognised as a ruler in his own right.
Such recognition was, however, not forthcoming from within the old
kingdom of Johor. Rupert Emerson’s explanation of this visit was most
apt. The Temenggong and his family recognized that ‘Singapore was
not the centre of the Empire’, and had ‘made themselves at home in
London and discreetly thrown their influence there into the balance
against the local officialdom of Malaya’ (Emerson 1964: 198; Trocki
1979: 149). Ironically it was their connections with Singapore that pro-
vided them with the connections (and information), cultural capital and
wherewithal to adopt this strategy. Furthermore, Temenggong Abu Ba-
kar’s education and experience ‘as a young man half in the traditional
Malay world and half in the world of a cosmopolitan British port’ laid
the foundation for the success of this strategy (Trocki 1979: 149-150;
Winstedt 1979: 109).
In London, Temenggong Abu Bakar had met the Queen and the royal
family, making a very favourable impression on Queen Victoria and the
Prince of Wales, later Edward VII. He continued to maintain a corre-
spondence with Queen Victoria, and was known to have, upon occa-
sion, appealed to her and the government in London on political mat-
ters, effectively bypassing the Governor in Singapore (Trocki 1979: 149).
In 1875, he even travelled to Calcutta to meet the Prince of Wales.
However, transcending these parameters did not mean forsaking
them. In fact, achieving recognition among the circles of royalty in Eur-
ope, China, Japan, and in the Netherlands East Indies were important
strategies for articulating his status as royalty and changing the percep-
tions of his status and place in the Malay world and in the British im-
perial sphere in Southeast Asia. It was on this journey that he started
using the title ‘Maharaja’ as his primary title (Trocki 1979: 154).16 The
importance of a royal title and recognition as a sovereign ruler as a mo-
tive behind his visit to London was evident in his attempts to secure the
right to use the title upon his return.
Soon after his return, Temenggong Abu Bakar had sent his cousin
and minister as the leaders of a delegation to the YTM and Raja Ali
Haji in Riau to inquire ‘the Temenggongs could now assume “sover-
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eign power”’. As Winstedt (1979: 109) noted, this was but ‘a euphe-
mism for a “royal title” in Riau’. After a survey of the genealogies at
Raja Ali Haji’s disposal, and discussions over the first Bendahara Sul-
tan, the son of Tun Habib, as well as interviews over the rights of Sultan
Hussein and his son, Sultan Ali, their request was agreed to by the
YTM and Raja Ali Haji. Raja Ali Haji arrived in Singapore for the speci-
fic purpose on 7th May 1868 to ‘arrange things (Winstedt 1979: 108-
9).17
It seemed that it was only after the confirmation of the new title by
Raja Ali Haji acting on behalf of the YTM and Sultan, that he received
confirmation in his title by the British. It was on 30 June 1868 that he
also wrote to thank the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Harry
Ord, for the British government’s acceding to his request to be referred
to as ‘Maharaja’ (Winsted 1979: 109).
Maharaja Abu Bakar’s strategies after the 1860s reflected the chan-
ging British imperial vision in the peninsula, and the changing role of
Singapore in nineteenth-century Southeast Asia. From an entrepot in a
commercial network linking India and China, Singapore became an im-
portant base for British imperial expansion on the peninsula. Although
the Maharaja, like Daeng Ibrahim before, came to play an important
mediating role between the British government in the Straits Settle-
ments and the Malay rulers on the peninsula, the autonomous position
of Johor became increasingly an anomaly in the eyes of the Straits
Settlements government in Singapore, with the gradual incorporation
of the peninsula under indirect British rule.
The officials of the British imperial administration in Singapore had
come to see the old policy of using a Malay ruler as intermediary and
advisor in their dealings with the polities and rulers on the peninsula
as an anomaly in the new imperial formation. The emergence of offi-
cials who were antithetical to him and who sought a new, more direct
approach to British intervention in the peninsula, such as Sir Frederick
Weld (as governor) and the Earl of Kimberley (who was the Colonial Se-
cretary in 1880), dashed any hopes he had of securing support from
Singapore for his recognition as Sultan. In the early 1880s, there was
increasing pressure from the Governor Frederick Weld to end the infor-
mal advice policy that had previously been pursued in Johor, and to ap-
point a Resident there like in the other peninsula states (Thio 1967:
101-106; Sadka 1968; Trocki 1979).
The governor of the Straits Settlements in Singapore also tried to end
the role that the Maharaja had obtained in the districts of Negeri Sembi-
lan (Thio 1967: 100). The governor was said to see the Maharaja as a
‘hindrance’ to his policy of expansion in the peninsula. The Maharaja
began to turn away from the governor in Singapore to his private advi-
sors, namely Rodyk and Davidson, his lawyers, which further annoyed
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Weld (Thio 1967: 101). There were also issues with the Johor’s ruler’s
(and private advisors’) concessions of land to ‘foreign’ companies with-
out the approval of the Governor or the Colonial Office. Weld also
raised the spectre of French financiers undertaking the development of
this concession. Weld’s proposals won over some in the Colonial Office,
but the Permanent Under-Secretary stood by Abu Bakar. Nevertheless,
the Maharaja had become alarmed about rumours in Singapore of
Weld’s plan, and even invited the acting governor, Sir Cecil Smith, to
tour Johor to witness its development and administration.
The assistance provided by the Maharaja in the capture of the fugi-
tives from the Perak War had earned him a recommendation from the
British government in London that he be made a Sultan and possibly
even ruler of Perak. This proposal was, however, met with vehement op-
position by Sir William Jervois, who questioned the Temenggong’s royal
status. He argued that the post of Temenggong was ‘not hereditary but
elective, rarely held by a chief of royal blood, and not one conferring in-
dependent sovereignty’. Furthermore, he went on to argue that even the
title of Maharaja was a usage of the British government, and ‘the Ma-
lays … did not regard him as a raja’. Jervois, the governor, argued that it
was British support and his wealth from trade that had allowed Daeng
Ibrahim to ‘buy sovereignty’ from Sultan Ali in 1855. Several officials in
Singapore also believed that Abu Bakar did not have the right to use the
title, and that this would not only arouse the opposition of the other Ma-
lay rulers, but also their disdain, and lower the standing of the British
in their eyes (Winsted 1979: 111).
Thus, when he made his 1885 trip to England, his aim was to secure
recognition as a ruler or Sultan, as well as avert British intervention in
his state. To do so, he utilised the ties he had made in his previous vis-
its to London, and negotiated directly with the Colonial office. As a re-
sult of a treaty he signed with the Secretary of State acting on behalf of
the Queen in 1885, he relinquished control over his foreign policy to
the Colonial Office, and secured his autonomy in the governing of Jo-
hor, although the treaty declared that he ‘would not intervene in the pol-
itics or administration of any native state without the permission of the
British government’, and undertook not to grant concessions to ‘other
than British subjects, British Companies, or ‘persons of Chinese, Malay,
or other Oriental Race’ without British permission.
His request to use the title of Sultan of Johor was also acceded to,
although it was deemed necessary to define it in a way that would pre-
vent any confusion with the older title, which implied rights to the
Riau-Lingga archipelago, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan. The title of ‘Sul-
tan of the State and Territory of Johor’ was decided upon (Thio 1967:
106). The Maharaja had secured his standing as a sovereign ruler by
having the treaty recognised as one signed between two sovereign rulers
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and governments, rather than between the colonial government in Sin-
gapore and himself.18
The Maharaja’s travels to London, Europe, Java, and Japan in the
1870s and 1880s were a response to his changing relations with the
British government in Singapore and the peninsula after the interven-
tion in the west coast states and in Pahang. It was aimed at expanding
the parameters for establishing his royal status and rank. Instead of just
London, he sought to stake Johor’s place within the global framework
of sovereign states and royalty, and secure recognition that was not
forthcoming from the British government in the Straits Settlements or
the other Malay rulers in the region by transcending these parameters.
The Maharaja was to increase the frequency of his travels after the
1860s. The period between the 1860s and 1890s were to see the Mahar-
aja broaden his circuits of travel to other parts of Europe and to East
Asia. In the 1870s and 1880s, the Maharaja visited the Kaiser in Ger-
many, the King of Italy, Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, and Sultan
Abdul Hamid of Turkey (Winstedt 1979: 119; Candilio and Bressan
2000: 43-53). He visited England again in 1878, where he expressed his
intention to visit Italy, Paris and Vienna. Titles held by Sultan Abu Ba-
kar in 1893 at the time of his death include the Royal Prussian Order of
the Crown (First Class), Grand Cross of the Order of Kalakaua (Hawaii),
Commander of the Cross of Italy, Commander of the Order of Saxe-Co-
burg and Gotha, Gold Medal received from HRH the Prince of Wales,
Imperial Chinese Double Dragon Order (First Class), First Class Order
of Boranji Nishana Murazzak of Othmani, First Class Order of the Iron
Crown of Austria, Sovereign of the Most Esteemed Darja Krabat (Family
Order) and the Most Honourable Darjah Mahakota Johore (Order of the
Crown of Johore).
In 1881, he travelled throughout Java. In the same decade, he also en-
tertained various British dignitaries in Singapore and Johor, including
Prince Albert Victor, Prince George of Wales, the Duke of Sutherland,
and the Prince of Saxon-Weimar (Winstedt 1979: 118). In 1883, he had
visited Japan, then in the midst of modernisation based on Western
models, and sought an audience with the Japanese emperor. Maharaja
Abu Bakar’s own reputation as a westernising and modernising mon-
arch was believed to have been crucial to his being granted an audience
with the Japanese emperor (although he was not yet a full Sultan). In
1885, he had called on the King of Italy and the Pope en route to visit-
ing England.
Despite his attempts to resist subordination to Singapore, the port
city remained crucial to the survival of Sultan Abu Bakar and his new
state. Economically, it was tied to the port and its commercial and bank-
ing circles. Singapore also served as a model for his administration in
Johor (Thio 1967: 114-115; Trocki 1979; Nesamalar 2003). Sultan Abu
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Bakar’s success in emulating Singapore in terms of lifestyle and admin-
istrative structure, for Johor, and in maintaining good relations with the
colonial government in Singapore and with the Colonial Office in Lon-
don was due to his ability to move within European and Chinese cir-
cles, especially in British commercial and financial circles, both in Sin-
gapore and in London and Europe. Paterson & Simons Co. remained
his agents and managers, while he continued to take legal advice from
the firm of Rodyk, Davidson & Co., both of which were based in Singa-
pore.
His recognition as Sultan by the Colonial Office and the Queen did
not stop Sir Frederick Weld and other officials in Singapore from press-
ing for a more direct British role in the administration of Johor. Never-
theless, Sultan Abu Bakar behaved increasingly like an independent so-
vereign in the 1880s and 1890s vis-à-vis the government in Singapore,
but he was careful to adhere to the opinions of the Colonial Office (and
the Secretary of State). After his recognition as Sultan, he had also set
up an advisory board made up of former governors and officials from
the Straits Settlements government in Singapore and the Colonial Of-
fice. This board ‘usurped the role played by the Governor vis-à-vis the
other states’ (Thio 1967: 108).
All these measures were a means to avoid Johor’s incorporation into
the broader system of indirect British rule and bypassing the centre of
that system, Singapore. Nevertheless, while Singapore was becoming an
adversary in the Sultan’s attempts to maintain the autonomy of his
kingdom, it remained an important dimension of Johor’s economy. He
kept up his visits to Europe and London, maintaining a close relation-
ship with the Queen (Winstedt 1979: 119). It perhaps came as no sur-
prise then, that he passed away while visiting London in 1895, a trip the
Sultan had taken against his doctors’ advice. The Federated Malay States
were only formed in 1895, the same year that Sultan Abu Bakar’s
passed away. Nevertheless, the Colonial Office was not going to force
the appointment of an Agent as provided for in the 1885 treaty until
1909. This was a testament to the institutions and diplomacy of the old
Sultan.
While Johor managed to avoid being included in the Federated Malay
States in 1895, repeated efforts were made to incorporate Johor into the
F.M.S. in the following decades. Scholars have argued how Sultan Ibra-
him, his successor, lacked the adroitness and diplomacy of his father,
and overplayed his cards through his brusqueness in dealing with the
High Commissioner, the Governor and the Colonial Office on various
matters of dispute, most importantly that of the extension of the Feder-
ated Malay States Railway into Johor (Thio 1967: 229-235). Alienating
the board of advisors and members of his own ruling council (Thio
1967: 225-226), as well as the Colonial Office, i.e., the alternative chan-
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nels that his father had tried so hard to cultivate, the young Sultan came
under increasing pressure to accept a British agent, which he acceded
to in 1909. In 1913, the powers of the agent were finally upgraded to
that of a Resident, marking Johor’s incorporation within the British sys-
tem of indirect rule.19
With Johor’s incorporation into the British Empire on the peninsula,
Singapore’s importance for the ruling elites of Johor emerged once
again. Resigned to British intervention, the Sultan insisted on avoiding
any communication with the High Commissioner of the F.M.S. despite
his efforts to bring Johor under his purview (as part of the peninsula),
and corresponded directly with the Straits Settlements government in
Singapore. In this context, Singapore became an important intermedi-
ary between the young Sultan in Johor and the Federated Malay States
(F.M.S.) government in Kuala Lumpur. It became an important means
through which the Sultanate of Johor sought to maintain its distinction
from the other states and rulers, and autonomy from the F.M.S.
Conclusion
The historiography of nineteenth-century Singapore has largely focused
on its commercial importance and its cosmopolitan social make-up
(with the organization and activities of the European, Chinese, and Par-
si-Armenian trading communities), as well as the infrastructural devel-
opment, locally and internationally, which were central to its growth
into a regional and international entrepot (Turnbull 1977; Chew & Lee
1991). With the exception of several notable studies which have sought
to locate Singapore’s history within the broader context of Anglo-Dutch
rivalry in the first thirty years of the nineteenth century, the growth of a
Malay-Muslim intellectual and public sphere in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, or the regional and transregional networks of
Chinese labour and capital through tax-farming and the kongsis,20 most
histories of Singapore have focused specifically on the parameters of
the island nation-state today, or at best, the British empire encompass-
ing the Straits Settlements and the peninsula. As the abovementioned
studies have demonstrated, more recent histories of Singapore have at-
tempted (Preston 2007; Trocki 2006) to understand its history in terms
of a ‘global system’ and its political and economic structures. Yet, few
studies have attempted to look at Singapore’s nineteenth-century history
in terms of the changes in regime in the Malay world region, and from
the perspective of the elites of the former kingdom of Johor after the
1824 Treaty.
This essay has attempted to examine the nineteenth-century history
of Singapore from the perspective of its place in the processes of re-
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gime change within the Malay world region, by examining the travails
of three elite families from the kingdom of Johor in the face of Eur-
opean imperial expansion. It is an attempt to locate Singapore’s history
within the broader regional framework of the colonial transition in the
Malay world through the synthesis of the existing scholarship [namely
the works of Trocki (1979, 1990, 2005), Andaya (1977), Matheson
(1970), and van der Putten (1995, 2001)] to show how the strategies
adopted by the families of the Sultan in Lingga, the YTM in Riau, and
the Temenggong-Maharaja-Sultan in peninsular Johor highlighted the
different dimensions of Singapore’s growth as a colonial port-city strad-
dling the Anglo-Dutch border, as well as its Janus-faced roles in these
processes of colonial expansion.
In trying to resist the processes of European encroachment and incor-
poration within their new regimes or challenges from other local elites,
these families articulated alternative spatial realities challenging the
new Anglo-Dutch regime in the Malay world through their travels, life-
styles, and ideologies, be it the older networks of the kingdom of Johor,
the trans-regional Islamic ecumene, or the world networks of royalty.
Singapore played an important role in facilitating their ability to do
so. Each of the case studies highlighted a particular dimension of Singa-
pore’s position as an entrepot and imperial outpost, reiterating the Ja-
nus-faced roles played by Singapore in the processes of ‘regime-change’
in the archipelago. While providing access to capital, income, informa-
tion and labour, which actually undermined the new Anglo-Dutch para-
meters of politics and established hierarchies in the autonomous states,
Singapore was also the point from which they policed the movement of
people, arms and other commodities, to prevent any severe disruption
of the status quo and the encroachment of any European or Asian
power into its perceived sphere of influence, namely the peninsula.
Hence, it undermined as well as consolidated the new European imper-
ial parameters in the Malay world. It functioned both as a gateway-inter-
mediary and as an imperial ‘panopticon’.
Approaching the history of Singapore from the perspective of these
families also provides continuity to the pre-1819 history of the kingdom
of Johor and the Malay world. It highlights the convergences and over-
laps in the histories of these families despite the division of the old Jo-
hor kingdom in the 1824 Anglo-Dutch treaty, and the dialectical tension
between continuity and change in terms of the older parameters of poli-
tics in the context of the new realities imposed by the 1824 treaty and
the subsequent implementations of the British and Dutch govern-
ments.
Ultimately, the failure of these elites in maintaining their autonomy
paralleled Singapore’s integration into a modern capitalist world system.
Even as the growing sophistication (and inequality) in the relations of
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interdependence between different parts of the world, and the enhanced
potential for the movement of people, ideas, and commodities through
improved infrastructural changes, provided the impetus and conditions
for the emergence of alternative political and epistemological visions,
the spaces for such autonomy gradually shrank as the British, Dutch,
Siamese, and other European powers consolidated their hold any am-
biguous areas between them.21
Notes
1 In a case study of Melaka, Anderson & Vorster (1986: 1-5) have argued that, contrary to
standard arguments at that time that Melaka had no hinterland, a hinterland did exist for
this entrepot and needed to be seen not only in terms of its immediate surroundings but
to ‘distant zones’ as far as 200 miles from the port, ‘where the products of forest, sea,
and mine were extracted’. The survival and success of the port depended on personal alli-
ances based on close economic, political and social relations, tying the port, often through
a ‘hierarchy of subordinate posts’, to supplies of strategic commodities for the interna-
tional trade networks calling at these ports.
2 Different papers in this volume deal with trade and state-formation in the Malay peninsu-
la, Sumatra, west Java, the Spice Islands, Ayutthaya, Makassar and Magindanao before
European expansion in these areas.
3 See Sandhu (1983), Furber (1976), Boomgaard, Kooiman & Schulte Nordholt (2008),
Veen &Blusse (2005), Sutherland (1989), Knaap & Sutherland (2004), Locher-Scholten &
Rietbergen (2004), among others.
4 Personal communication from Prof. Leonard Blussé, who rightly argued that the VOC
(Dutch East India Company) trade was more monopsonistic than monopolistic.
5 Although the VOC administration in Melaka and other ports liberalized their policies on
non-Company trade in its port, vis-à-vis private citizens or burghers in the port-town or
British country traders calling at the port, they still maintained a vested interest in the
trade in various commodities.
6 Thus, taxes on opium, spirits, gambling and other forms of consumption became the key
source of revenue. The Chinese population became the main source of such revenue, and
this was one of the reasons for the promotion of Chinese migration to the port alongside
labour needs and trade. Buckley (1967) cites incidents of merchant protests against propo-
sals to tax trade in the first half of the nineteenth century.
7 The relations to the peninsula have been studied in detail by Mills (1966), Khoo (1972),
and Trocki (1979), among others. The same cannot be said of Singapore’s ties to the
Dutch side of the border. Only through remedying this balance can a clearer picture be
obtained of the regional significance of Singapore, not only commercially but also politi-
cally.
8 See Wong (2003), Turnbull (1977: 1-127) and Chew & Lee (1991) for more details on the
growth of Singapore as an entrepot, in terms of its trade, its infrastructure and port facil-
ities, as well as the British administration and the different ethnic communities playing
important roles in this growth.
9 Works on the YTM family in Riau have focused largely on their roles as producers of lit-
erature and histories, and their relationships with Dutch officials in this regard. The
works of Jan van der Putten stand out in his attempt to politically and economically con-
textualize these relations and activities, as well as to engage with the theoretical literature
on the colonial encounter and cultural studies. Thus far, the only work on Sultan Mah-
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mud is Matheson’s essay on the ruler based on an annotated translation of the final sec-
tion of the Tuhfat al-Nafis.
10 Both were using the term in a rather different context. Its use here is meant to convey the
function of surveillance.
11 The Engku Puteri was the sister of Raja Jafar and widow of Sultan Mahmud (d. 1812). She
was a very influential figure. It was only through the Dutch officials of Melaka that they
managed to seize the regalia.
12 The Temenggong travelled to Riau and Lingga, and the Bendahara of Pahang had pre-
sided over the circumcision and the installing of Sultan Mahmud himself in the 1840s.
13 Successive YTMs from Raja Ali (d. 1805) onwards were represented as exemplary Islamic
rulers, in their embodiment of scholarship, practice, and patronage of Islam (Raja Ali Haji
1982). It was an attempt to create new standards for kingship. Sultan Mahmud was pre-
sented as the antithesis of the ideal Islamic ruler. Genealogy and rank were no longer suf-
ficient in and of themselves. Islamic piety and patronage, knowledge of Islamic treatises
and theology, as well as respect for elders and humility constituted a new set of ideals for
the ruler, which was rather different from those encapsulated in the Hikayat Siak and the
Sejarah Melayu.
14 After 1885, the Sultan and YTM were both of the same family. Sultan Abdul Rahman, in
fact, was the son of the last YTM who served from 1858 and 1869. He was installed as ru-
ler after the death of his granduncle, Sultan Sulaiman, as his mother was the daughter of
Sultan Mahmud.
15 An expanding European presence in the port town and other parts of British Malaya and
the Straits Settlements, and the influences of political and intellectual changes in China
and India at that time contributed to the diversity and dynamism of this hub.
16 Buckley (1967: 449-451) and Kwa (2003: 49) show that Daeng Ibrahim, Temenggong Ab-
dul Rahman’s father, was already using the title Sri Maharajah in 1846, as evidenced by
the Straits Settlements governor’s address in recognition of his contribution to the sup-
pression of piracy.
17 Sultan Sulaiman of Lingga, who happened to be staying in Tanjung Pinang at that time,
also agreed to the request, although he qualified that they could not make the Bendahara
a raja as yet, and the Temenggong should try to obtain the agreement of Sultan Ali. De-
spite his differences with the YTM at that time, he declared that he and the YTM ‘would
like Abu Bakar to “become a Raja”’ (Trocki 1979: 151).
18 Although the treaty provided for the appointment of a British ‘Agent’, it was worded such
that this agent was to have ‘functions similar to those of a consular officer’ (Nesamalar
2000: 32). He was effectively bypassing the government in Singapore, and negotiating di-
rectly with the Colonial Office in London and the Queen, deliberately avoiding incorpora-
tion into the emerging colonial hierarchy, which was at that time centred in Singapore.
The inclusion of these clauses as well as those providing for succession ‘lawfully succeed-
ing according to Malay custom’ were meant to prevent the incursion of foreign powers
and prevent him from selling his throne (Thio 1967: 107).
19 This is despite the inclusion of Johor among the Unfederated Malay States, vis-à-vis the
Federated Malay States constituted earlier in 1895 of states already brought under indirect
British rule under the Resident System.
20 These were not strictly histories of Singapore per se but histories of Anglo-Dutch rivalry
and piracy (Tarling 1958, 1962), opium farming (Trocki 1990), and Roff (1980).
21 A good example of these processes of defining borders can be found in Sweeney (1982)
for Johor/Pahang in the peninsula, Thongchai (1993) for Siam-Britain-France on the
northern peninsula and along the Siam-Cambodia border, and Eric Tagliacozzo (2005) for
the border arc from the Straits of Melaka to the Sulu Sea.
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4 Beyond the Rhetoric of Communalism:
Violence and the Process of Reconciliation
in 1950s Singapore
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Introduction: The Singapore State’s Teleology of History
The Singapore state’s depiction of inter-ethnic relations in the post-
World War Two period has been predicated upon a progressivist teleol-
ogy that undergirds its political dominance since the separation from
Malaysia in 1965. Rendered ineffective and portrayed as having lost
their grip upon the forces of opposition, the preceding colonial regime
is said to have failed in fostering common bonds and values between a
plethora of racial groupings on the island. Communalist tendencies
arising from colonial neglect thus characterized the postwar era and
this had given rise to the outbreak of violent incidences such as the
Maria Hertogh, Hock Lee and the 1964 racial riots. Although proble-
matic and fraught with presentism, such logic of a radical break from
the tumultuous past to that of a cohesive and ordered society has be-
come a part of the collective memory of Singaporeans today. Indeed, so
strong has been the influence of such master national narrative that it
has impacted the contents and forms of historical texts written by pro-
fessional historians and various genres of popular media (Loh 1998: 12;
Lysa and Yap 1993: 36; Tan 2004: 31-35; Hill 2002).
This chapter offers an alternative view to the prevailing line of rea-
soning. I argue that inter-ethnic relations and interactions in post-
WWII Singapore were more dynamic and vigorous than has been pre-
viously suggested in the mainstream historical literature. In point of
fact, mutual cooperation between ethnic, religious and ideologi-
cal groupings was, arguably, a distinct feature of the island’s social geo-
graphy. By examining the immediate aftermath of the Maria Hertogh
riots as a critical moment in demonstrating how the colonial state, pro-
minent individuals, newspapers and local organisations played crucial
roles in reconciling severed ties and allaying a culture of fear and sus-
picion, this chapter seeks to destabilise the dominant narrative of Sin-
gapore’s history and to build a case for a new trajectory.
The Maria Hertogh Controversy in Perspective
The sequence of events leading up to the Maria Hertogh riots has been
well-documented elsewhere and this is no place to provide a compre-
hensive account of the factors and causes of the outbreak of mass vio-
lence. As an overview, the riots stemmed from a legal battle for the cus-
tody of a 13-year-old Dutch girl, Maria Hertogh, who had been raised as
a Muslim by a Malay-Indonesian family. After having been separated
for more than seven years, the girl’s parents, who were of Dutch-Catho-
lic origins, claimed custody of their child and requested her return to
the Netherlands. Press sensationalism about the legal issues along with
the marriage of Maria Hertogh to a Malay teacher, Mansor Adabi, in the
midst of the legal proceedings had heightened Muslim and non-Muslim
sensitivities in Singapore. The situation was made worse upon the Brit-
ish court’s annulment of the marriage, which meant that Maria Her-
togh was to be returned to the fold of her natural parents. From 11 to 13
December 1950, Singapore witnessed one of its most intense outbreaks
of mass violence. Europeans and Eurasians became the targets of radi-
cal Muslims, hooligans and other opportunists. Coupled by the passivity
of the Malay police, the rioters engaged in widespread destruction of
public property, murder, looting and arson. Eighteen persons were
killed, 173 were injured and hundreds were placed under detention.1 To
be sure, the ties between Muslims, Europeans, Eurasians and the Brit-
ish colonial administration in the colony had been severely impaired by
the riots and the legal controversy. The prospects of reconciliation were
even grimmer.
In what follows, I shall provide an analysis of the daunting task faced
by the British and local communities in reconciling with the interests
of multiple parties on the island. Three inter-connected approaches
were employed by the colonial state to diffuse the tense atmosphere.
First, the British propounded that they were not, by any means, insensi-
tive towards Islam and the immediate concerns of Muslims in Singa-
pore. Secondly, attempts were made to re-establish cordial relations with
politicians and administrators in the Netherlands, yet, at the same time,
they tried to alleviate the established perception among Muslims that
the British were pro-Dutch. Thirdly, intensive measures were underta-
ken to regain the confidence of the European, Eurasian and other com-
munities in Singapore who had been traumatized by the spectre of vio-
lence and the ineffectiveness of the police force. Indeed, a great number
of people from various beliefs, ethnicities and classes in the colony were
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plagued by grief and suffering resulting from the loss of human life as
well as financial losses incurred due to damaged and stolen property.
In other words, the British were confronted with the difficult and pre-
carious task of ensuring that no individual, group or institution impli-
cated in the Maria Hertogh controversy was given preferential treatment
over others. To balance and rule, more than to divide and rule, was the
British approach to the politics of polishing up their tarnished image
and agency in the aftermath of the riots. It is important to point out
that, although the colonial state played a key role in the complex yet in-
tensive process of reconciliation, it did not however possess a sole
monopoly of initiative. Accordingly, I will expound on how non-state ac-
tors within the colonized society actively contributed to the efforts of
mending inter-racial and religious relations that had been severely sha-
ken by the riots and providing relief to those who had suffered through-
out the ordeal.
Restoring Public Confidence
One of the earliest attempts by Singapore Colonial Secretary, Wilfred
Blythe, to reconcile with the distressed public was to make it known
that law and order had been reinstated only two days after the outbreak
of violence. During a radio broadcast, Blythe announced that govern-
ment offices would resume their daily operations and that ‘this example
will be followed by all in Singapore.’ Put simply, life would return to
normal. The Singapore public was also furnished with emergency pro-
cedures that had been established since the quelling of the riots. A coor-
dinated communication network between the Public Relations Office,
the Executive Council and the police force had been instituted to ensure
a swift deployment of military and police officers in the face of all
forms of widespread disturbances (Straits Times, 20 December 1950).2
At about the same time, a diplomatic visit by two American Senators re-
ceived extensive publicity. Theodore F. Green and Homer Ferguson
were reported to have walked along North Bridge Road – a site where
Europeans had been attacked – without police escorts. When inter-
viewed by a reporter from the Straits Times, the Senators remarked that
they ‘were impressed by Singapore’s prosperity (Straits Times, 16 De-
cember 1950).’
This sort of shallow propaganda met with a mixed reaction in news-
paper editorials in both Singapore and England. As the unofficial voice
of the UMNO party in Malaya, the Majlis newspaper expressed its scep-
ticism towards the Colonial Secretary’s optimistic forecast. The editorial
remarked in a satirical way that, ‘Belanda makan nangka, British dapat
getah’ which implied that although the Dutch had been the instigators,
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it was the British who were left to shoulder the long-term consequences
of the riots. The editorial highlighted the fact that a large number of
shops in the riot-stricken areas were still closed, and attendance at work
had dropped substantially as many workers were apparently injured or
arrested, or refused to leave their homes in fear of their lives. This fear
was compounded by a growing animosity towards Muslims who were
perceived as the main culprits behind the riots (Majlis, 15 December
1950).
The Manchester Guardian, a British daily newspaper, in turn empha-
sised the possibility of a major outbreak of violence between the Malays
and Chinese in Singapore. Some claimed that the riots were rooted in
the entrenched bitterness of Malays towards the political and economic
dominance of the British and the Chinese in the colony. Race and class
differences rather than religion were the driving forces behind the riots
and many skirmishes to come. These politically charged comments
were widely publicised in the pages of the Singapore Standard (14 De-
cember 1950). Utusan Melayu denounced what it deemed as the erro-
neous and shallow analyses of the Manchester Guardian. The locally
published Malay daily maintained that most Malays in Singapore re-
garded the Chinese as their co-citizens and that there had never been a
deliberate campaign to uproot the Chinese from Malaya (Utusan Mel-
ayu, 19 December 1950).
Reacting to the seemingly negative portrayals by the press on devel-
opments in Singapore, representatives from various states and organisa-
tions in mainland Malaya published their appeals for Muslims to re-
main calm. They expressed the hope that non-violence and the ideology
of peace would be upheld by all of the parties. Under the chairmanship
of the President of the United Malay Nationalists Organisation
(UMNO), Dato Onn bin Jaafar, Muslim elites in Singapore in turn en-
couraged their co-religionists to work towards mending inter-religious
ties that had been severely disrupted by the riots. Among those who
signed a public statement that was published in all of the major news-
papers in the colony were Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqui, Tuan Haji
Ali bin Haji Salleh (the Chief Kathi of Singapore) and M.J. Namazie
(Utusan Melayu, 14-15th December 1950). The Singapore Colonial Secre-
tary also issued a public statement, which stressed the importance of
the media in the reconciliation process. Newspaper editors were
prompted to seriously ‘reflect upon the incidents of the last few weeks,
for there is a lesson to be learned here too – the lesson that if we are to
maintain that harmony for which Singapore has, since its foundation,
been famed, care must be taken in the presentation of news not to of-
fend religious susceptibilities and exacerbate communal differences
(Singapore Free Press, 20 December 1950).’
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Blythe’s tactic of what has been termed ‘blame displacement’3 for the
outbreak of riots was not left unchallenged. The Straits Budget countered
the Singapore Colonial Secretary’s remarks by publishing several opi-
nion pieces, which portrayed the British as the chief culprits behind the
tensions. A European, for example, commented that although the Brit-
ish colonial administration in Singapore professed their profound re-
spect for the religion of Islam, events that had unfolded in the months
prior to the riots revealed that the government had failed to live up to
its own rhetoric. The outbreak of mass violence was a product of British
insensitivity and indifference to the demands of Muslims (Straits Bud-
get, 21 December 1950). Reflecting on the debate that ensued, John Le-
slie Michael Gorrie (the private secretary to Singapore’s governor) rea-
soned that the blame placed on the press was based on hindsight rather
than foresight. No governmental agency had made attempts to play
down what was alleged to be sensational press coverage of the Maria
Hertogh legal case. Gorrie thought that the British government shoul-
dered much of the blame for the riots. The newly established civil ser-
vice was unacquainted with the socio-religious challenges and anxieties
faced by the Muslim minority community in the immediate post-war
years and this was further exacerbated by the outright mishandling of
various issues that were deemed sacred to Muslims. The government,
and not the press per se, was responsible for the attacks on Europeans
during the riots (Recorded Interview with Gorrie 1991).
The Chinese community in Singapore also played an important role
in promoting a dialogue, assuaging tensions and assisting the British in
the maintenance of public order. The largest Chinese daily newspaper,
the Nanyang Siang Pao, urged the British to ‘think thrice’ before mak-
ing a legal decision in the upcoming appeal trial. The move to restore
Maria Hertogh to her foster mother and husband would be of no great
loss to Britain’s diplomatic ally; the Dutch. On the other hand, the Ma-
lays were an important and integral part of the British Empire. The Brit-
ish should therefore ensure the repatriation of Maria Hertogh back to
Singapore to avoid the violation of the religious rights of the Muslims,
which could potentially lead to further bloodshed and violence. The
Kuomintang newspaper, Sin Chew Jit Poh, called upon the British, the
Dutch and the Muslims to allow Maria Hertogh to decide for herself
whether she wished to reside in the Netherlands or Malaya. The paper
stressed that Dutch diplomatic relations with other Muslim countries,
such as Indonesia and Pakistan, would most certainly be jeopardized if
custody of Maria Hertogh were to be awarded to her natural parents.4
Another observer who identified himself as a ‘Straits Chinese’ ex-
pressed his regrets that the ‘very good name of the Singapore Malays
and Muslims, who are regarded as a most law-abiding community in
the colony has been besmirched (Straits Times, 17 December 1950).’
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Several well-known Chinese personalities exerted their influence over
the community by discouraging youths in the villages from committing
acts of violence. This was followed by an announcement made by the
Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce in regard to the formation
of a Volunteer Special Constabulary Emergency Squad. No age limit
was imposed, though all appointments were temporary. Selected candi-
dates would undergo basic police training to assist the Singapore Police
Force in the course of its on-going reforms (Singapore Free Press, 20 De-
cember 1950).
Admittedly, such a proactive move by Chinese elites in the colony
was not entirely motivated by altruism. It was, in some measure, a la-
tent strategy to regain the trust of the British, which had been blem-
ished by the growing assumption that most Chinese supported the
communists. The Chinese elites in Singapore were purportedly filled
with hope and optimism regarding the quelling of the riots. Although
they were sympathetic towards the Europeans and Eurasians who were
injured and murdered by the rioters, the Chinese elites were glad that
the British had begun to realize the flaws in their pro-Malay policy. The
Chinese hoped that friendship and trust would swing back in their fa-
vour.5 Beyond the public show of support, the general view among the
Anglophone Chinese was that the riots ‘served them (the British) bloody
well right’.6
But hatred, hostility and distrust were too deep-seated to be swiftly re-
medied. Despite the appeals of community leaders, Muslims in Singa-
pore were committed to the perception that the British would not cease
to deny them their religious rights.7 The most radical among them were
prepared for further violent confrontations in reaction to any sign of
Western prejudice towards Islam and Muslims. In the same way, Eur-
opeans and Eurasians expressed their lack of confidence in the colonial
state’s ability to ease the tense situation. On 17 December, an anon-
ymous writer who signed off as ‘A European’ wrote a polemical com-
mentary against the police for its failure to protect the people during
the riots. ‘It is indeed news to learn that the police are issued with fire-
arms only to save their own lives. Surely their primary purpose is to
protect the public whom they serve and to quell riots and other danger-
ous threats to public security? Is it not for this purpose that they are is-
sued with weapons (Straits Times, 17 December 1950)?’
Such alarmist and negative reactions were not surprising, as the two
communities were the main victims of the riots. The Europeans were
particularly mortified by the fact that they were the primary targets of
mass aggression. Women and children from the largely expatriate com-
munity were haunted by vivid recollections of assaults upon their fa-
milies and friends. A former British colonial official in Singapore re-
counted that it ‘was a nasty time for all of us’. Recalling his ambivalence
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towards a Malay driver at the time of the riots, Lionel Griffith-Jones
wrote: ‘We could neither be sure whether his Muslim presence with me
would make it safer for me, or my Christian presence with him makes
things uncomfortable for him (Griffith-Jones 1984: 138).’
Unbeknownst to the general public, government officials had orga-
nized several meetings with Europeans and Eurasians to address their
anxieties and to provide updates on the security measures that had been
taken to protect them. In one of the meetings, a suggestion was made
that Europeans and Eurasians residing in areas where fatal attacks had
taken place should be provided with revolvers for self-defence. But the
idea was shelved as it proved to be problematic at a practical level. Rudy
Mosbergen, who played an active role in airing his views during the
meetings, posited that it ‘could well be that the idea was dropped be-
cause of all kinds of problems that would emerge from such an ar-
rangement (Interview with Mosbergen 1994).’ It was feared that the car-
rying of firearms would precipitate unintended conflicts and violence.
Moreover, the Eurasians were mindful that Henry L. Velge, the Volun-
teer Special Constable who fired the first shots during the riots, which
injured two Malays, was a well-respected member of the Eurasian com-
munity. Hence, one of the safe courses adopted by Europeans and Eura-
sians in the aftermath of the riots was to stay indoors. They were also
advised by the police to refrain from visiting areas where their safety
would likely be compromised. Although it was an exception to the rule,
several Eurasian families did manage to migrate to Europe and Austra-
lia in order to escape Muslim aggression. A similar policy was adopted
by some American expatriates in Singapore who, as a precautionary
measure, had sent their wives and children back to the United States
(Recorded Interview with Chopard 1985; Antara, 11 January 1951).
Meanwhile, members of the quasi-governmental Muslim Advisory
Board stepped up their campaign to restore Maria Hertogh to her hus-
band and to agitate for the release of detainees who had not participated
in the riots. A dialogue between prominent Muslims and the Singapore
Governor (Franklin Gimson) was held, at which three pertinent de-
mands were put forward. First, the Muslim leaders sought an assurance
from the British that the Dutch would be informed of the appointment
of a Muslim who was tasked by the Muslim Advisory Board to ascertain
‘the wishes of the said Nadra binte Ma’aroof (Maria Hertogh) as to
whether she desires to remain in Holland or to be returned to Singa-
pore’. The second demand pertained to Maria Hertogh’s return to Sin-
gapore during the appeals court hearing. The Muslim deputation hoped
that the British would ensure the full cooperation of the Dutch in that
aspect. Finally, a request was made that those in police custody be trea-
ted in a humane manner to avoid punishment of the innocent. Sardon
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Jubir highlighted the need for relief grants for the dependents of those
who had been arrested during the riots.8
In response, Gimson stressed that the British Government viewed
the Maria Hertogh case purely from a judicial angle and that all deci-
sions would be left to the court’s discretion. The Singapore Governor
added that the British would maintain their fullest respect of Islam and
would safeguard the religious liberties of Muslims. He went on to as-
sure them that the first and second demands would be brought to the
attention of the Home Government. As for the third demand, Gimson
gave his word that the Social Welfare Department would commit its re-
sources towards alleviating all forms of difficulties faced by the families
of those injured and the many others who had been arrested. The Gov-
ernor added that the screening of detainees would be hastened to weed
out the innocent. The meeting went on to discuss various measures to
promote the welfare of the Muslim community and the protection of Is-
lamic customs in these emotionally intense times. Acting upon the ad-
vice of the Colonial Office, the Governor later acceded to the first de-
mand and said that the government would assist to the fullest extent in
obtaining the cooperation of the Dutch authorities in ensuring that Mar-
ia Hertogh would be present for the appeal. At a personal level, how-
ever, Gimson was apparently shaken by the meeting because it reflected
the heightened activism and assertiveness of the Muslim elites. He was
certain that the failure to respond effectively to Muslim demands would
further inflame animosities locally and in other parts of the Muslim
world.9
Correspondingly, the Singapore Colonial Secretary issued another
press release, which stated that 45 armed vehicles, 15 armoured cars
and 600 soldiers and policemen had been deployed throughout Singa-
pore. It was reported that crowds were seen cheering as the troops
passed through their neighbourhoods; a clear testimony that a majority
of the citizens of Singapore respected the laws of the colony and were
sanguine that the military would protect their lives and property. The
Singapore Colonial Secretary also paid tribute to the Volunteer Special
Constables for their commitment and vigilance in aiding the regular po-
licemen (Singapore Free Press, 19 December 1950).
In London, colonial officials sought the cooperation of Dutch politi-
cians in the Netherlands to mitigate excessive press coverage of Maria
Hertogh’s arrival at Schiphol airport. Muslims in Singapore were aware
of developments in the Netherlands and would react violently to the ju-
bilant celebrations, which had been planned by Catholic activists. Writ-
ing to the Colonial Office, Philip Nichols (British Ambassador at The
Hague) reported that a strict warning had been issued to all Dutch
newspapers to avoid sensationalism and misreporting. Dozens of Chris-
tian organisations and parties were also advised to practise moderation
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in cheering for the Hertoghs upon their arrival at the Schiphol airport.
Though the Dutch authorities were unsuccessful in preventing the
cheers of large crowds at the airport, pre-emptive measures prevailed
on numerous other occasions. At Bergen-op-Zoom, where the Hertoghs
lived, no extensive celebrations were observed. The nation’s newspapers
covered the story in great detail, yet none highlighted the political and
religious aspects rooted within the legal case ‘except to say that the riots
were [a sign] of the present tension between the East and the West.
Comment in the responsible newspapers were on the lines that un-
healthy interest was being shown in this little girl and that the sooner
the whole story was forgotten the better it would be for all concerned.
In short, I think the Government has not done badly, though for some
reason or other something seems to have gone wrong at Schiphol it-
self.’10
Pacifying the Muslims
From 24 through 25 December, a Southeast Asia Muslim Missionary
Conference organized by the All-Malaya Muslim Missionary Society
(also known as Jamiyah) was held in Singapore. British intelligence was
concerned with attempts by Muslim leaders to garner support for the
Maria Hertogh case, while, Malcolm Macdonald believed the event pro-
vided an excellent opportunity to repair the damaged ties with influen-
tial Muslim leaders in Southeast Asia. Although Malcolm Macdonald
was unable to deliver the inaugural address at the Conference, he en-
sured that a carefully crafted speech was sent to the organizers to be
read on his behalf. Jamiyah was commended for taking the lead in
strengthening the religious commitment of Muslims in Southeast Asia
in the midst of an unending battle against secular ideologies, which
promoted violence. Furthermore, Malcolm Macdonald called for close
cooperation between representatives from different territories to bring
about a climate of religious freedom and mutual tolerance (Ahmad and
Wanjor 1950: 7).
The Commissioner-General’s critical role in the promotion of reli-
gious dialogue and understanding did not end there. He called for a
meeting on his own initiative with members of the Inter-Religious Or-
ganisation (I.R.O). Formed only a year prior to the riots, the I.R.O. was
the brainchild of Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddiqui, whose main goal was
to establish a religious front against the corrupting influence of com-
munism in Singapore and Malaya. The I.R.O. pursued three inter-re-
lated objectives. First, the organisation hoped to foster friendship and
goodwill between leaders and representatives of major world religions.
Secondly, it aimed to promote a spirit of mutual tolerance, understand-
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ing and appreciation among different faiths. Third, the I.R.O. hoped to
foster close cooperation among its members for the common good of
the community. Informal activities, regular discussions and annual con-
ferences were organized to fortify a common set of values between its
members and the general public.11
As the patron of the I.R.O., Malcolm Macdonald was instrumental in
garnering widespread support for the organisation from its inception. A
major setback occurred when he attempted to win over the Roman
Catholics, who were instructed ‘by orders from higher authority outside
Malaya’ to play no part in the activities of the organisation.12 Even so,
the Roman Catholics were kept up to date on the I.R.O.’s resolutions
and activities. Three weeks after the outbreak of the riots, Malcolm Mac-
donald called for an informal tea with the executive members of the I.
R.O. Distrust and disappointment was manifested by those present,
however. The Christians, for that matter, were embittered by the lack of
compassion shown by Muslim leaders towards Christian members of
the I.R.O. who had been attacked by rioters. One of the worst casualties
was a Presbyterian Minister, Robert Greer, who had been beaten nearly
to death. Muslim members of the I.R.O explained that they were unable
to reach out to the non-Muslim victims of the riots because they were
preoccupied with the urgent task of dissuading their co-religionists
from engaging in violent acts. As the tea proceeded, Macdonald mooted
the idea of issuing a public statement on the maintenance of religious
harmony in Singapore. Several members expressed their reservations,
but a consensus was reached in that the declaration would be ‘simple,
sincere and in its way, [a] noble statement of the unity upon this issue
of the leaders of all the religions represented in Singapore and Johore.
As such, it will have a certain amount of influence on large numbers of
local followers of all the faiths.’13 The statement was subsequently publi-
cized by the media, which described it as a notable effort by religious
leaders in the colony to reach out to those who were directly or indir-
ectly affected by the riots (Utusan Melayu 12 January 1950; Straits Times
12 January 1950). Soon after, members of the I.R.O. subsequently orga-
nised visits to hospitals and provided necessary aid to those who had
been injured. It was indeed a crucial juncture in the history of the orga-
nisation, as it rose to greater prominence in the midst of the reconcilia-
tion process (Interview with Singh 1985). Although Catholics main-
tained a guarded distance from the organisation, the I.R.O. played a
major role in bridging religious boundaries and dispelling misconcep-
tions, both in Singapore and in Malaya, up to the advent of the Labour
Front government in 1955.14
Towards the end of January 1951, members of the Muslim Advisory
Board conducted goodwill sessions in rural areas of Singapore with the
object of dispelling rumours, providing the true facts of the Maria Her-
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togh case and admonishing the Muslims to maintain cordial relations
with non-Muslims.15 Although most Muslims were progressively paci-
fied by such initiatives, remnants of dissatisfaction within the commu-
nity prevailed. A case in point was the demand for places of religious
instruction by Malay firemen at the Geylang Fire Station. Even though
the fire station was located adjacent to a mosque, the firemen reasoned
that no classes could be conducted therein as the mosque was built so-
lely for the purposes of prayer and worship. The British saw the issue
as one that could potentially re-ignite Muslim discontent towards the co-
lonial state. Acquiescing to Muslim demands would also set a precedent
for civil servants of other religious faiths to agitate for similar facilities.
The Singapore Municipal Commission conducted extensive investiga-
tions, and discussions were held with the firemen. After a long-drawn
debate, the request was rejected.16
On 8 January, Sardon Jubir exhorted members of the public to in-
form him of specific incidents of abuse by the police during the riots
and in their aftermath (Melayu Raya, 8 January 1951). The Singapore
Malay Union established the ‘Muslim Welfare Committee’ four days la-
ter; its primary task was to assist Muslim and non-Muslim families who
were in dire straits.17 A voluntary contribution of $1,173 was collected
from sympathizers and donors within and outside Singapore. The com-
mittee also distributed $20 worth of aid to each of more than 70 fa-
milies, most of which were Malays, Indian Muslims and Eurasians. The
number of families in crisis as a result of the riots rose rapidly to 145 a
few months later. To further alleviate the extent of the suffering experi-
enced by Muslims, the Singapore Muslim League distributed bags of
rice and packages of meat to the families of detainees.18 Another relief
committee, presided over by Syed Abdullah bin Yahya, informed the
press that $200 had been raised and that only 37 pieces of clothing had
been distributed. An appeal was made for members of the public to
contribute generously to its cause. The Muslim Advisory Board, mean-
while, stepped up its visits to the homes of crisis-stricken families to
show its support (Straits Times, 13 January 1951).
As expected, Singapore’s governor built upon the pacification efforts
and came to the aid of Muslims in Singapore and, at his own discre-
tion, reiterated the benevolent nature of Britain’s rule of the colony.
During a tea party at the Raffles Hotel attended by representatives of
the various religious faiths, Gimson spoke of the impartiality and inde-
pendence of the British courts. He stressed that the maintenance of law
and order was of ‘prime importance to all those who wish to worship in
a country of more than one religion.’ Members of all religions should
work hand in hand with the government to prevent disorder and chaos.
‘Muslim subjects of the King’, said the governor, ‘have always held a
high place in His Majesty’s regard and have always been considered as
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among his most loyal supporters. The Muslim community in Singapore
has, therefore, a high reputation to maintain and I hope that they will
do nothing to besmirch this reputation and so to bring themselves and
their religion into disrepute’ (Utusan Melayu, 13 January 1951 and Straits
Times, 13 January, 1951). At this juncture, it is worthwhile to state that
Gimson’s discourse on governmental non-interference in legislative
processes in Singapore was far from truthful. Instead, officials from the
Colonial Office had requested that the British court in Singapore de-
clare the marriage between Mansoor Adabi and Maria Hertogh null and
void.19 In the realm of Muslim affairs, Singapore’s governor had taken
the proactive action of conducting secret negotiations with the aim of
inducing Muslim leaders to dissolve the marriage in accordance with
the laws of Islam. However, all was in vain.20 Mansoor Adabi was more
than convinced to pursue his appeal at the Singapore High Court.
Efforts at reconciliation were also directed at compensating those who
had sustained injuries or had lost property during the riots. An an-
nouncement was made pertaining to the disbursement of claims to be
considered on an ex-gratia basis. ‘Compensation will be met for injury
(including fatal injury), damage, thefts or destruction of property in the
riots. No compensation will be paid to anyone who was a party or acces-
sory to the riots. Claims should be sent to the Colonial Secretary’s Office
before February 28 (Straits Times, 24 January 1951).’ There was, however,
the problem of determining the appropriate amount of compensation
to be disbursed. Some among Singapore’s residents argued that they
should be compensated for ‘pain’ and ‘suffering’; concepts that were la-
den with subjectivities and were open to contestation. There were others
who contended that inflationary rates should be factored into the com-
pensation scheme, as the price of cars rose sharply after the riots (Straits
Times, 25 January, 1951). To address these ambiguities, a tribunal was es-
tablished to consider all of the cases. In the meantime, the Social Wel-
fare Department obtained updates and rendered financial assistance to
more than 140 riot victims. The Singapore Municipal Commission fol-
lowed suit by paying for property damages incurred by civil servants.
One of the cases that had been brought to light was that of a European
officer whose car had been damaged by rioters. He was compensated in
accordance to guidelines provided by the government (Utusan Melayu,
26 January 1951 and Singapore Free Press, 2 and 8 February 1951).
Partly due to the influence of Syed Ibrahim bin Omar Alsagoff and
Dato Onn, a British political report observed that Muslims in Singapore
were slowly regaining their trust in the British.21 Even so, Muslim elites
advocated that the riot victims, as well as Muslim women who had been
widowed or whose husbands had been detained, be provided with
monetary and other forms of aid by the government. The release of the
innocent among the accused should also be expedited to dispel allega-
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tions of abuses of justice. Gimson and the Singapore Colonial Secretary
assured the public that the government would protect the rights of the
innocent (Proceedings of the First Legislative Council, Colony of Singapore
1951: B78).
Three Key Challenges in Reconciliation
The months that followed were devoted to contending with three key
challenges, which could either redeem or disrupt the colonial adminis-
tration’s efforts to reconcile the various parties in both the local and in-
ternational arenas. The first challenge was the establishment of an im-
partial tribunal to compensate various parties who had suffered from
the loss of kin and property during the riots. To avoid mismanagement
in that regard, the Colonial Office instructed Gimson to obtain and
study several reports of tribunals that were conducted in the Gold
Coast, Aden and Uganda.22 Three distinguished people, Sir Han Hoe
Lim (a medical practitioner and a member of Executive Council), S.C.
Leech (general manager of Boustead & Co.) and L. Cresson (a local
businessman well-known for his public service) were subsequently se-
lected as members of the Tribunal Committee upon the invitation of
the Singapore Colonial Secretary (Singapore Free Press, 22 May 1951).
The Tribunal was provided with the following terms of reference:
1. To inquire into any claims received from any person, other than a
person who was a party or accessory to the rioting, for compensation
for injury (including in the case of fatal injury claims by dependants
for compensation), damage, theft, or destruction of property arising
directly out of riots in Singapore on 11 and 12 December, 1950;
2. To assess, in the case of damage to property, the financial loss suf-
fered in each case on the basis of value at the time of the loss and
in the case of personal injuries appropriate compensation; and
3. To recommend to the government, in cases where the claimant
shows that he or she has suffered or will suffer hardship, an amount
to be paid ex-gratia from Government funds.23
Theoretically, these terms of reference seemed ideal and achievable.
The practice was altogether different, however. Recalling his role in con-
sidering hundreds of appeals for compensation, Richard Middleton-
Smith asserted that the tribunal was fair in its disbursement of funds
(Interview with Middleton-Smith 1997). This kind of claim exposes the
problems of the validity and reliability of oral sources. Indeed, in his
oft-cited essay on oral history methodology, Alessandro Portelli asserted
that oral testimonies are, more often than not, fraught with ‘errors, in-
ventions and myths’, tainting facts beyond their actual motifs (Portelli
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1991: 2). The task of a historian is thus to interrogate and expose preju-
diced representations embedded in oral accounts by cross-examining
them with alternative sources in order to come up, as much as possible,
with historical truths.
A close examination of the documents relating to the inner mechanics
of the tribunal demystifies the rhetoric of impartiality, which Middleton-
Smith had asserted during his interview. In actual fact, the eventual ex-
gratia payments were governed by political considerations and biases on
the part of the Tribunal Committee. For example, full payment was
made for all claims that had been submitted by the Dutch Consulate.24
The tribunal reported that, although the application with respect to the
damages incurred by the Dutch Consulate was not supported by suffi-
cient evidence, ‘in this case, diplomatic courtesy would apply [italics
mine]’. Similar applications by other foreign government agencies were,
however, rejected on the grounds that they had presented their claims si-
multaneously to insurance agencies.25 Partiality was also displayed to-
wards relatives of Europeans and Eurasians who were injured or killed
during the riots. All applications for compensation from civilians be-
longing to these two ethnic groups were approved and widows of servi-
cemen received a pension and monetary awards ranging from $10,000
to $20,000.26 It was different in the case of Asians, however. Only the
dependents of 27-year-old Indian Police Inspector A. Ratnasingham,
who was killed near the Joo Chiat police station during his attempt to
save the life of a Dutch girl, were compensated a total of $2,280 and a
pension (Straits Times, 15 June 1951). The claims of the dependants of
five Chinese men who had died during the riots were categorically re-
jected. However, one member of the Tribunal Committee contested this
decision. Two other committee members overruled him by providing
suggestive evidence from the coroner’s reports that the five deceased
men had died of bullet wounds, which, to some, indicated that the five
men had been rioters who had confronted the military. The tribunal re-
port was also silent on the issue of the applications from dependants of
Malays who were killed during the riots, as they were generally per-
ceived as perpetrators of violence and thus undeserving of compensa-
tion. $93,000 was handed out to the dependants of seven people who
had been killed, $28,491.50 for 29 people who were injured, $16,774
for damage to personal property and $71,995.57 for the 116 vehicles that
had been destroyed by the rioters. The total amount of money disbursed
was $210, 261.07.27 Fully aware of biases inherent in the compensation
process, the government ensured that the full details of the tribunal re-
port were never going to be made public. The Singapore Colonial Secre-
tary asserted that it was ‘not considered to be in the public interest’ for
the report to be published verbatim (Proceedings of the First Legislative
Council, Colony of Singapore 1951: B183).
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The second diplomatic challenge the British were forced to confront
was that of Maria Hertogh’s domicile. British officials in the Colonial
and Foreign Offices were particularly anxious about poor management
potentially further destabilizing ties with the Netherlands and the wider
Muslim world. Concurring with the advice of the Muslim Advisory
Board, Gimson admonished officials in Whitehall to leave the final deci-
sion to Maria Hertogh, that is, to either reside with her family in the
Netherlands or to be repatriated to Singapore in the custody of her step-
mother, Che Aminah. Public opinion in Singapore, Gimson argued,
‘would be very strongly opposed to any attempt to force the child back
to Singapore against her will whatever the Courts might decide on the
point of law’.28 British officials in London were unsure of the implica-
tions of Gimson’s suggestion. A diplomat was dispatched to convince
politicians in the Netherlands to support the proposition that Maria
Hertogh be allowed to decide on her preferred domicile pending the ap-
peal case in the Singapore High Court. The strategy failed. Having
signed a bond of $7500 on the undertaking that Maria Hertogh would
be promptly sent back to Singapore during the appeal hearing in
March, Dutch authorities displayed much reluctance as the Roman
Catholic lobby in the country refused to engage in to any form of
friendly negotiations with Muslims.29
The problem of language further complicated the already complex
state of affairs. Having been nurtured and cared for by Che Aminah,
Maria Hertogh was only fluent in the Malay language. To address such
linguistic barriers, the Muslim Advisory Board nominated a senior mem-
ber of the organisation to conduct the interview with Maria Hertogh. The
British, however, foresaw the danger of being accused of siding with the
Muslims. It was anticipated that the Dutch in turn would request that a
Roman Catholic representative be present during the interview, and this
would provide the basis for protests by Muslims throughout Malaya.
After much deliberation, a well-respected Pakistani Charge d’Affaires
who was conversant in both the English and Malay languages was se-
lected to conduct the interview with Maria Hertogh, accompanied by a
Dutch interpreter.30 An unofficial Catholic representative was also al-
lowed to attend. Meanwhile, the press was denied access to the interview.
In August 1951, the Singapore Supreme Court rejected Mansoor Adabi’s
appeal against the annulment of his marriage and granted Maria Her-
togh’s parents full custody of their child. The scheduled interview with
Maria Hertogh was called off. In a blatant attempt to cushion the impact
of the legal verdict upon Muslim public opinion, Gimson suggested that
an educational scholarship be awarded to Mansoor Adabi. Higham ar-
gued against this suggestion because it would have been perceived by
Muslims as ‘hush money’.31 The idea was subsequently dropped upon
the advice of several members of the Muslim Advisory Board.
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The third challenge to the colonial state’s attempt at reconciliation
was to be found in the residual grievances arising from comments made
by several local Anglophone and European leaders. Malays in Malaya
were upset by Dato Onn’s critique of their innate tendency to act in a
rash manner, as evidenced by the riots. ‘Not only the administration’,
Dato Onn remarked, ‘but 80 per cent of Singapore’s residents lost confi-
dence in us because of the action of a comparative few’. UMNO mem-
bers were also advised to steer clear of destructive acts, which would dis-
rupt the notable efforts of Malays working for various governmental
agencies. The peace and freedom of the country must be protected (Maj-
lis, 26 February, 1951). Reflecting upon the incident, the former Prime
Minister of Malaysia, Tengku Abdul Rahman highlighted that it marked
his ‘first disagreement with Dato Onn’ (Tunku 1977: 190).
Similarly, Muslim and non-Muslim elites in Singapore and Malaya
voiced their fundamental disagreement with Dato Onn’s negative por-
trayal of the Malays. A joint statement by the Singapore Muslim League,
the Hindu Board, the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.) and the
Straits Chinese British Association (S.C.B.A.) stated that it was erro-
neous to place all the blame on the entire Malay community for the
wrongdoings of a few ‘irresponsible’ elements in the course of the riots.
In actuality, a majority of Malays in Singapore had displayed courage in
sheltering Europeans and Eurasians who might otherwise have been
mauled by the rioters (Utusan Melayu, 28 February, 1951). Almost a
month later, another disturbing comment was made by the chairman of
the Singapore Chamber of Commerce. A.F. Taylor told Straits Times that
the British should act swiftly and ruthlessly in the face of those who
sought to take the law into their own hands. Only then can the possibi-
lity of another outbreak of violence be averted (Straits Times, 31 March
1951). The British, meanwhile, refused to side with either of the feuding
parties. This policy of inaction provided non-state organisations the cru-
cial opportunity to pursue activism and social change. The Hindu Asso-
ciation, for example, formed an inter-communal body to consider aid to
the innocent people tried after the December riots. This association also
aided in the process of fostering harmony and goodwill between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims in Singapore, the relations between which had
been severely undermined by the riots (Straits Times, 23 February 1951).
In an attempt to further rectify the relationship between Muslims
and the colonial state, the British acquiesced to their religious demands
and paid tribute to the contribution of the minority community in the
development of Singapore and Malaya. The Municipal Commission as-
sented to various requests by both Muslim and non-Muslim civil ser-
vants to be relieved of having to perform tasks that were contrary to
their religious beliefs. This shift in policy stemmed from the demands
of a nurse who had applied for an exemption from family planning
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campaigns. The nurse argued that the campaigns contradicted her reli-
gious beliefs (Straits Times, 21 July 1951). Meanwhile, the 18-member
Muslim Advisory Board was expanded by the addition of three promi-
nent personalities: Mahmood bin Abdul Wahab (a former Police Inspec-
tor), Syed Abdullah bin Yahya (the President of the Singapore Arab Un-
ion) and Haji Jubir Haji Amin (a committee member of Jamiyah) (Gov-
ernment Gazette, no. 66, vol. VI, May 1951). During the launch of the
first comprehensive Malay Arts and Crafts Exhibition, Malcolm Macdo-
nald capitalized on this opportune moment to argue against the ‘com-
pletely mistaken theory that Malays were an inferior people who needed
special protection in their own country.’ Rather, the Malays had been as
successful as the Indians and the Chinese in the economic and artistic
spheres. Another area, in which Malays had excelled, was in the field of
politics and governance. Malcolm Macdonald cited the names of several
Malay politicians who had won the respect of all communities in Ma-
laya (Straits Times, 11 July 1951). To a great extent, Malcolm Macdonald’s
positive portrayal of the Malays undermines Edward Said’s essentialist
notions that the British and the West in general had promoted consis-
tently denigrating representations of the Orient in the postwar era (Said
2003: 255-288). Conversely, in an age of decolonization, the Orient had,
in many instances, been appropriated as an equal, if not, dominant
partner in an East-West relationship.
Conclusion
By the end of 1951, a shift in attitudes among Muslims in Singapore
was palpable; however, it would be misleading to assert that the en-
trenched feelings against the British as rulers had been fully assuaged.
Realising the futility of engaging in violent acts to achieve their objec-
tives, Muslim trade union activists, journalists, teachers, writers and
middle-class professionals became deeply involved in party politics to
advance their religious and social interests. At a meeting held within Ja-
miyah’s premises, Singapore UMNO (or SUMNO) emerged as a section
of UMNO’s branch in Johore. More than 50 Malays and Arabs regis-
tered as members of the new political party. Syed Ahmad bin Mo-
hammed Alsagoff was elected its first President. Ahmad Ibrahim and
Darus Shariff, two personalities who played crucial roles and had
gained widespread popularity during the Maria Hertogh controversy,
were elected Vice-President and Secretary respectively (Utusan Melayu,
31 December, 1951; Straits Times, 31 December, 1951). The party’s mem-
bership increased steadily in the months that followed, with a strong
following among servicemen in the Navy, the Army and the Police. In
July 1953, a motion was passed by the UMNO Central Branch in Kuala
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Lumpur for SUMNO to participate in Singapore’s elections along with
Singapore’s branch of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). Three
months later, SUMNO members publicized an appeal for unity between
the Malays and Indonesians in Singapore and declared ‘that the time
has arrived for the two races to expel the imperialists.’32
In the realm of diplomacy, relations between the British and the
Dutch had been restored. Having granted the custody of Maria Hertogh
to her parents and having been awarded compensation for losses in-
curred during the riots, the Dutch saw themselves as the victors of this
controversy. Friendly interactions between Europeans and Eurasians
with Malays in particular and Muslims in general returned to normal in
early 1952. In his highly acclaimed travel book, Voices of Asia, the fa-
mous American novelist and travel-writer, James Albert Michener, wrote
about a Caucasian man who, although beaten to near death during the
riots, had subsequently decided ‘to turn my back upon Christianity, con-
fess my sins and become a complete Malay Muslim. I believe now that
my future lies with the Malays’ (Michener 1952, 131). This is a some-
what exaggerated account of Muslim-Christian relations in Singapore,
but there is a grain of truth in it. Although marriages between Catholics
and Muslims were regarded as socially taboo, the practice was not un-
common in the ensuing years.33
More crucially, in the narratives that followed, I have shown that in-
ter-ethnic relations and interactions were far more dynamic than what
has been presented by the entire array of scholarly and popular med-
iums churned out by the reigning Singapore state and its avatars. As
seen from the complex process of reconciliation in the immediate after-
math of the Maria Hertogh riots, it would be erroneous to maintain that
communalist tendencies were prevalent in post-WWII Singapore. Mu-
tual cooperation between ethnic, religious and ideological groupings
prevailed even in moments of tension and unrest and to deny this fact
would entail the suppression of social and historical memories. Indeed,
the rhetoric of communalism that is ubiquitous in the writings on Sin-
gapore’s colonial past is but a teleological construction that has been
garnered, less to shed light on our shared history, than to address, more
often than not, the anxieties of our time.
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5 The Politics of Fires in Post-1950s Singapore
and the Making of the Modernist Nation-State
Loh Kah Seng
Introduction
Present-day Singaporeans, four-fifths of whom reside in modern flats
built by the Housing and Development Board (henceforth HDB; HDB
AR 2007: 78) generally do not worry about losing their lives, homes or
belongings to an unforeseen blaze. However, while they do not fear fire,
many older Singaporeans still remember the infernos of the past, and –
what is significant in this closely managed state – often do so indepen-
dently of the government’s representation of the fires. Admittedly, the
official story of the biggest conflagration in Singapore’s history, the
1961 Kampong Bukit Ho Swee inferno, which narrates how the HDB
successfully re-housed the fire victims in emergency flats built on the
fire site – akin to a modern public housing estate rising literally from
its ashes – is told in school textbooks, exhibition galleries and official
public histories.1 However, both elderly and younger Singaporeans also
remember the fire in distinctly different ways in homes, coffeeshops
and online forums. These opposing memories of the Bukit Ho Swee
fire are symptomatic of the contested history of the kampong clearance
and fires that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the ambiva-
lence with which elderly Singaporeans have come to regard that past.
Across space and time, fires have had a profound social and political
impact on state-society relations. The outbreak of an inferno, which
straddles that grey area between natural cause and human responsibil-
ity, is nonetheless merely a ‘trigger’ of longer-term social pressures,
which are demographic, social, economic, and environmental in nature
(Blaikie et al. 1994). Fires are thus also political events in that they re-
veal how successfully the state dealt with a formidable fire hazard. Con-
versely, blazes are indicative of a community’s autonomy and dyna-
mism, which enable ordinary people to build effective formal and infor-
mal social networks against the threat of conflagration (Pelling 2003).
The tragic Triangle Fire in New York in 1911, where more than 100 fe-
male factory workers perished, galvanised the labour movement’s fight
for safer working conditions in garment factories (Von Drehle 2003).
Conversely, the population of seventeenth-century Edo, Japan, coped
with the frequent occurrence of fires by developing property and even
building entire houses, which could be easily moved in the event of a
fire (Sand 2005).
Urban fires also represent moral opportunities for the authorities to
permanently remove damaged buildings and to create a more desirable
society on behalf of the fire’s victims. The Great Fire of London in
1666 enabled the English monarchy to expand its administrative reach
through large-scale, planned redevelopment and housing projects (Bell
1951). Thus, the question of for whom a fire truly constitutes a crisis
needs to be studied closely. More recently and closer to Singapore,
Hong Kong’s public housing programme emerged from a series of se-
vere fires in slums comprised entirely of wooden housing both before
and after the great Shek Kip Mei blaze in 1953 (Smart 2006). The sheer
scale of the destruction can also unravel hitherto invisible fault lines in
society. Persistent social myths about the causes of fires frequently arise
from tensions that develop between different groups in society. There
was a widespread belief that the Great Chicago Fire in 1871 was started
by a cow kicking over a lamp in a barn owned by an Irish family, illus-
trating the prejudices and stereotypes native-born Americans had to-
wards the immigrant class (Bales 2002).
This chapter examines the historic role of kampong fires in Singapore
in the making of a modern nation-state. Much like other momentous
events that shatter the usual calm of social history, fires are much writ-
ten about and debated, and also well remembered. They produce both a
substantial body of written literature and a rich pool of oral history re-
miniscences, which constitute the main sources of information for this
essay. This chapter argues that the states of emergency created by major
urban fires in Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s enabled both the colo-
nial and postcolonial governments to progressively integrate the pre-
viously semi-autonomous and physically mobile low-income families
living in urban kampongs into the social fabric of the imagined nation-
state. The chapter begins by discussing how official attempts to clear
the kampongs, which were depicted as dangerous ‘black areas’, aroused
both spontaneous and organised resistance from their dwellers. It then
examines how the authorities variously mobilised kampong dwellers and
transformed them into loyal citizens of the state, by forming volunteer
fire-fighting brigades in the kampongs and by re-housing fire victims in
emergency public housing. Although the number of fire victims was
small in relation to the total number of kampong dwellers re-housed for
other reasons, the appropriation of the fire site for emergency flats
served as a vital platform for the clearance of nearby unauthorised
housing. Finally, the chapter brings the past into the present by discuss-
ing how the frequent outbreaks of kampong fires have produced power-
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ful rumours of arson, which continue to persist in contemporary Singa-
pore, creating an uneasy, ambivalent relationship between the citizens
and the ruling government.
‘Let the vegetables grow on rocks’: The Politics of Kampong
Clearance
In the 1950s, over fifty urban kampongs stood in a discontinuous belt
on the margins of Singapore outside the Central Area, the colony’s ad-
ministrative and economic heart. The cheap wooden housing in the
kampongs were home to a quarter of Singapore’s urban population in
1961 (HDB AR 1961: 4), largely low-income Chinese nuclear or semi-
extended families. Such housing, usually built without official approval,
was being erected in large numbers to meet a major spurt in Singa-
pore’s population after World War Two. The annual 4.5% rate of popula-
tion growth between 1947 and 1957 saw a substantial increase in nucle-
ar family life, with men, women and children arriving from China, In-
dia and increasingly Malaya after the war to reunite with their spouses
or to form new families (Singapore 1955b: 27-29).
The demographic changes resulted in a severe housing shortage in
the Central City area, the traditional reception zone for Chinese immi-
grants. Larger families left their shop-house cubicles for larger wooden
homes built on the urban periphery; a 1956 survey revealed that the
average size of the households living in wooden dwellings was 4.8 per-
sons, compared to 3.1 for households residing in shop-houses (Goh
1956: 63-66). Indeed many arriving migrants went directly to the urban
kampongs (Van Grunsven 1983b: 35, 95), where families could keep
transport costs low by residing close to their workplace in the centre or
in the eastern and western parts of the city (Van Grunsven 1983a, 60).
Throughout the 1950s, the urban kampong population grew rapidly,
doubling from 127,000 in 1947 to 246,000 by the mid-1950s (Singa-
pore 1956: 13). Long-established settlements experienced intense over-
crowding as private building contractors illicitly erected wooden houses
en masse on previously vacant hills and disused cemeteries and over
swamps on the urban fringe.
To the British authorities, the uninhibited movement of low-income
families into unauthorised wooden housing was socially undesirable.
The Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT), the de facto colonial housing
authority, worried that ‘[h]uts were erected with astonishing rapidity
and … it was difficult to get them demolished … The situation changed
almost from day to day and was very difficult to control’ (SIT 1947: 17).
The kampong dwellers had both physical mobility and economic fluidity.
Many breadwinners engaged in irregular, part-time or daily-rated em-
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ployment in the informal service sector, either as ‘self-employed’ work-
ers, such as unlicensed hawkers, rickshaw drivers and ‘pirate’ taxi
chauffeurs (Singapore 1955a: 21; Brocklehurst 1957: 47), or as casual la-
bour, who were ‘paid daily and move at frequent intervals from one job,
and one employer, to another’ (Singapore 1957: 3). This work was fre-
quently supplemented by growing vegetables, or rearing poultry or a
few pigs outside one’s wooden dwelling, which helped reduce the
household’s cost of living. But the combination of irregular employ-
ment in the informal economy and semi-rural economic activities,
much of which was illegal or socially frowned upon, meant that urban
kampong dwellers lived beyond the social discipline imposed by full-
time, regular work in the formal economy (Loh 2007: 21).
The British colonial government also deemed urban kampongs to be
places of social danger. The 1947 Housing Committee’s influential re-
port likened the autonomous building development in postwar Singa-
pore to a ‘disease’ of ‘gigantism’, in which a ‘chaotic and unwieldy
megalopolis has been created … by haphazard and unplanned growth’.
This pell-mell urbanisation, the Committee warned, was ‘detrimental to
health and morals’ and could only be resolved by ‘demolition and re-
housing’ (Singapore 1947: 11). The Committee’s Chairman, C.W.A. Sen-
nett, also viewed the kampongs as ‘the nurseries of a C3 nation and
schools for training youth for crime’. Someone could visit, he added, ‘if
he likes to risk his personal safety, such unauthorised kampongs of attap
huts as have sprung up in places such as Kampong Silat or Henderson
Road’.2 Crime was perceived, then, not merely as the province of the
professional criminals but as ‘something ordinary and genuinely social’
(Chevalier 1973, 77). These official views were reinforced by the low-in-
come Chinese people’s conception of government in starkly negative
terms, for whom the ‘notion of “law-abidingness”’ amounted to nothing
more than ‘keeping out of trouble and not interfering in matters not
[of ] one’s immediate concern’.3
The British colonial regime consequently viewed the growing belt of
unauthorised housing on the urban periphery as what Mary Douglas
termed a dangerously swelling ‘margin’, where official control was
weakest (Douglas 2002: 150). The authorities, in seeking to restore
authority over this margin, subscribed to, in James Scott’s words, a
‘high-modernist’ philosophy, based on a ‘self-confidence about scientific
and technical progress’ and ‘the rational design of social order commen-
surate with the scientific understanding of natural laws’ (Scott 1998, 4).
The solution, it was argued, was to replace the haphazard wooden hous-
ing with planned, modern accommodations. The 1947 Housing Com-
mittee called for the SIT to be given ‘proper zoning powers and powers
to plan ahead of development’.4 In 1955, the colonial government com-
pleted a long-range development plan, called the Master Plan. The Plan
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aimed to resettle two-thirds of the urban kampong population into per-
manent housing or planned resettlement areas over the coming 20
years, with the remainder being allowed to remain temporarily in 16
controlled kampongs designated as ‘tolerated attap areas’ (Singapore
1955a: 26-28, 51). The remaining kampongs, such as Tiong Bahru, Bukit
Ho Swee, Kampong Soopoo, and parts of the Kallang Basin, were ear-
marked for complete demolition (Singapore 1955a: 26).
High modernist public housing was not solely a colonial conception.
The PAP had its origins as an anti-colonial party that represented the
interests of the low-income Chinese population. However, the Fabian
socialists in the party led by Lee Kuan Yew, which eventually assumed
full control of the PAP, possessed views of housing similar to those
held by the British. At an election rally in 1959, the party endorsed
modernist concepts of planned neighbourhoods and satellite towns and,
significantly, organised kampongs (PAP 1959: 28-31). Once elected to
power in 1959, the PAP established the HDB, thereby replacing the SIT
with a statutory housing authority under the government’s direct con-
trol with full powers to carry out housing construction.5 The Board’s
first five-year building programme aimed to build low-cost housing in
planned housing estates on the urban periphery ahead of a longer-term
plan to redevelop the entire city area (HDB AR 1960: 8-10). The HDB
single-mindedly implemented the PAP’s campaign against un-
authorised wooden housing, holding the view that ‘you cannot make an
omelette without breaking eggs’ (Interview with Tay 6 October 2006).
Throughout the 1950s, an increasingly intense social and political riv-
alry developed along the margins of the city over the control of the ur-
ban kampongs. In July 1953, the City Council began to demolish newly
erected unauthorised dwellings in the urban area (CC AR 1953, 18, 218).
The SIT also attempted to clear kampong dwellers from its lands to make
way for low-cost housing. However, the eviction and clearance processes
were hampered by the great difficulty of providing alternative accommo-
dations, agricultural land and compensation for affected dwellers. Two
farming families in Kim Keat, when offered accommodations in SIT
flats, wanted to know: ‘[H]ow can you expect us to give up our country
lives for the city life? ... In other words, let the vegetables grow on the
rocks’.6 Poor semi-urban dwellers, who supplemented their employ-
ment in the city by growing vegetables or rearing poultry, were hit hard-
er by the evictions, since they could not ‘move into farming settlements
far from their employment nor do they look with favour on the prospect
of becoming a tenant of a permanent house’ (Singapore 1956: 5).
The attempts to clear the kampongs evoked both spontaneous and or-
ganised resistance from the residents, described aptly by a Chinese
newspaper as ‘a lion’s roar from the oppressed people’ (NYSP 1 May
1954). The SIT found that ‘most of the squatters have either political
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backing or the backing of hooligans or gangsters’.7 In July 1953, when
an SIT demolition team accompanied by two police constables faced off
against two families in Geylang Lorong 27 who refused to vacate their
wooden houses, the team’s very presence aroused ‘a hostile crowd of
about forty people’.8 Kampong dwellers were also being organised to
fight eviction by two left-wing rural associations affiliated to the PAP
left, the Singapore Farmers’ Association (SFA) and the Singapore Woo-
den House Dwellers’ Association (SWHDA), which each had a mem-
bership of 5,000 by early 1956 (Lee 1996: 94, 131). The associations cri-
ticised slum clearance under the Master Plan as a typically ‘tragic affair’,
which did not adequately compensate farmers for the loss of their
houses, crops and farming equipment (PAP 1956: 4-5, 7). Both associa-
tions were removed from the rolls of official organisations for their
alleged roles in the countrywide anti-British riots of October 1956.
However, many of their former members joined the Singapore Country
People’s Association (SCPA) and the Singapore Rural Residents’ Asso-
ciation (SRRA), also affiliated with the PAP left (Lee 1996, 137). The as-
sociations were deeply involved in the social life of the urban kampongs,
organising the young men into crime patrols and helping to repair woo-
den houses. They also organised sewing classes, kindergartens, and lit-
eracy classes (Interviews with Chin 24 November 2006; Chio 7 March
2007), activities with a ‘strong Chinese Communist flavour’.9
Mobilisation against Fire: The Volunteer Fire-fighting Brigades
The PAP’s mobilisation of kampong dwellers against eviction, through
the SCPA and SRRA, represented one way of penetrating into the ‘black
areas’. Fire opened a second route. The densely built-up areas of woo-
den housing, which lacked adequate fire safety precautions, were very
vulnerable to fire. Serious conflagrations occurred in two zones of un-
authorised wooden housing flanking the Central City: southwest of the
Singapore River and north and east of the Rochor and Kallang Rivers. A
survey of the Fire Department’s Annual Reports between 1949 and
1970 reveals common fires were part of the rhythm of everyday kam-
pong life (FD, 1949-1962; SFB 1963-1970). ‘Light thrown down’, ‘rub-
bish fires’ and the ‘sun’s rays striking broken glass’ could be attributed
to the discarding of or failure to remove used or unwanted items from
the kampong; ‘joss burning’ to religious worship and celebrations within
the home or nearby; ‘sparks from fires and stoves’ to household chores
and the use of firewood for cooking; and ‘fireworks’ and ‘children play-
ing with matches’, to festive celebrations and recreation in the kam-
pong’s open spaces.
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But, the kampong blazes largely arose from the social and political dis-
tance between the state and the kampong-dwelling population. Admit-
tedly, the highly combustible wooden housing and attap roofs and the
worsening traffic congestion on the city’s trunk roads were important
contributing factors (SFD 1951: 1; 1953: 1). However, as fire department
officer Arthur Lim Beng Lock explained, the colonial fire service had
also acquired a reputation among the Chinese for fire site pilfering,
with its fire engines labelled pah chiu chia (‘robbery vehicles’). In the
PAP era, mobile water pumps were closely associated with kampong
eviction operations and commonly viewed as being ‘on another URA
(Urban Renewal Authority) job’, which refers to the statutory board es-
tablished by the PAP government to clear the Central Area. In the event
of a fire, kampong dwellers, as Arthur Lim recalled, ‘tended to want to
pull our hoses and try to get water to protect their own properties’ (In-
terview with Lim 7 January 1994). The Fire Brigade, in turn, claimed
that, among kampong dwellers, ‘there was practically no one in the least
fire-minded’ (SFD 1958: 10).
It was the PAP that sought to inform urban kampong dwellers about
fire hazards and, crucially, it did so from both within official circles and
from the political margins of the anti-colonial movement. The party’s
aim, as Lee Kuan Yew declared later, was to bridge ‘the gap to the Chi-
nese-educated world – a world teeming with vitality, dynamism and re-
volution’ (Lee 1962: 10-11). Following the PAP’s victory in the 1957 City
Council elections, the Council became a forum for engaging urban
kampong dwellers. Ong Eng Guan, a party leader who became the first
Mayor of the city, proclaimed a ‘new kampong policy’, in which ‘[t]he
poorest people living in places like Chinatown, and those in the kam-
pongs like Geylang or Kampong Silat … shall have first priority in our de-
velopment programme’ (CC MP 30 June 1958). He pledged to improve
kampong roads, build more standpipes, supply electricity, and establish
maternity and infant welfare clinics as well as mobile clinics in the
kampongs (CC MP 6 Jan 1958). A final and most ambitious measure
was fire prevention. The great Kampong Koo Chye fire of April 1958
provided the catalyst. In the following month, the City Council
authorised the Fire Brigade to form and train volunteer fire-fighting
squads in 36 urban kampongs to ‘deal with outbreaks of fire and hold
them in check pending the arrival of the Brigade’ (SFD 1958: 1). Each
squad had a minimum of 20 men and was provided with basic fire-
fighting equipment. In the following year, the fire-fighting squads
helped to extinguish more than 15 kampong fires (SFD 1961, 11).
Concurrently, the PAP sponsored similar volunteer squads through
its rural and old boys’ associations in the kampongs. Bukit Ho Swee’s
fire-fighting squads, according to Tay Ah Chuan, a member of one such
team, recruited from the local SRRA branch and the old boys’ associa-
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tions of the two Chinese-medium primary schools in the kampong (In-
terview with Tay 21 February 2006). The primary aim of the PAP-orga-
nised squads, which distinguished them from the Fire Brigade-trained
teams, was to prevent acts of arson. Chio Cheng Thun, an SRRA orga-
niser in Lorong Tai Seng, explained, ‘When kampong dwellers faced
eviction, we organised fire-fighting squads for fear that the landlord
would set fire to the houses. If you didn’t want to move and if they
burned your house, you naturally had to move out, then they could de-
velop the land’ (Interview with Chio 7 March 2007).
The fire-fighting squads were a political success, although they were
helpless when a small kampong fire mushroomed into a raging inferno.
In Kampong Tiong Bahru, before the blaze of February 1959 left 5,220
people homeless, volunteer squads had successfully contained a fire in
three attap houses less than two months earlier (ST 16 February 1959).
Similarly, two cases of arson in Bukit Ho Swee were reportedly put out
successfully by its residents in 1960, before the gigantic fire of 1961
swept through the kampong (NYSP 26 May 1961). Unemployed or ca-
sually employed young men, who would have otherwise spent their free
time chatting in coffeeshops or engaged in secret society activities, en-
thusiastically volunteered their time and effort (Chua 1989, 1008). Tay
Yan Woon, a kampong dweller, recalled that ‘people said that Bukit Ho
Swee was being evicted, and everybody had to guard their houses.
There were people keeping watch in shifts in the middle of the night
because they were afraid that someone might come along and set a fire’
(Interview with Tay 28 Sep 2006).
The fire-fighting squads, however, had only a brief political lifespan.
By the mid-1960s, the teams, which had been useful for mobilising the
wooden house population, had become redundant. In 1965, the PAP
government declared that it would clear all of the urban kampongs that
constituted a fire hazard (HDB AR 1965: 23-24). The volunteer squads
disappeared when their kampongs were either destroyed by fire or
cleared for development. By 1971, only 13 squads of the original 38
formed in 1958 remained, testimony to the pragmatic policy of the PAP
government to socialise urban kampong dwellers into becoming citizens
of the high-modernist nation-state.
Mobilisation after a Fire: The Development of Emergency Housing
Besides mobilising kampong dwellers for fire prevention, the re-housing
operations in the aftermath of fires were also valuable opportunities for
the state to reconstitute the structure of society. The social emergencies
created by infernos, which left large numbers of low-income families
without their homes and possessions, gave the state the moral authority
96 LOH KAH SENG
to act on behalf of the victims, by re-housing them in planned, modern
accommodations built atop the sit of devastating fire. Although they
seemed to be non-political events, kampong fires justified the govern-
ment’s efforts to swiftly relocate fire victim families en masse into regu-
lated housing and integrate them into the social fabric of the new na-
tion-state (Clancey 2004: 45). There was, however, a small window of
opportunity: the state had to act with political resolve and speed in order
to neutralise the efforts and desires of the victims to return to their
kampong to rebuild their wooden homes on the site of the fire.
Throughout the 1950s, the British colonial and Labour Front govern-
ments struggled to provide permanent housing for victims of kampong
fires. In the first great postwar inferno at Kampong Bugis in August
1951, which rendered 3,000 people homeless, the SIT was commis-
sioned to build emergency housing for the victims. These semi-perma-
nent housing units, which might only last 40-50 years compared to the
usual 60-100 years for more permanent housing,10 could be con-
structed quickly and cheaply and rented out to low-income families. But
the Trust rejected emergency housing as ‘uneconomical’ and ‘undesir-
able’, because it would probably incur high maintenance costs and that,
‘unless strict control is maintained, they will degenerate into slums’.11
The government, stunningly, left the re-housing responsibility to the
Singapore Joint Relief Organisation (SJRO), a newly formed body
chaired by a British official but composed of representatives of leading
charitable organisations. The SJRO aimed to build 300 three-room
homes on Kolam Ayer Lane for the fire victims but had still only com-
pleted 96 units two years later. In 1954, the Fire Superintendent, when
asked to rank the various urban kampongs by fire risk, listed the rebuilt
Kampong Bugis at no. 13.12
However, the high building costs of the standard housing, which it
preferred forced the Trust to conduct a minor experiment in emergency
housing. In 1953, 25 prototype low-cost houses were built at the Upper
Aljunied resettlement area.13 The experiment became useful for the SIT
during the two kampong fires in Geylang that year – at Lorong 3 and Al-
junied Road – where 2,835 and over 1,000 people respectively lost their
homes. The Trust quickly built 190 two-room emergency units at the
Upper Aljunied resettlement area and 136 three-room emergency units
at Kolam Ayer Lane.14 Both sites were also earmarked for low-rental
public housing, launching the government’s first attempts to carry out a
social transformation on a fire site.15 However, the response to the
emergency housing was disappointing: out of the over 882 families af-
fected by the two fires, only 415 families eventually accepted the emer-
gency housing or SIT accommodations elsewhere (SIT AR 1953, 54).
Disappointed, the Trust scaled its emergency housing policy down in
1955 (SIT AR 1955, 20). In the Kampong Tiong Bahru fire in September
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of that year, the government simply allowed the 792 victims to ‘rebuild
accommodations themselves within the area of the fire’.16
The Labour Front government, elected in 1955, took a unique step
forward during the next inferno at Kampong Koo Chye in April 1958. It
declared that it would purchase the site of the fire, use portions of pub-
lic donations collected for the 2,000 fire victims to build public housing
on the site and sell the houses back to them. Chief Minister Lim Yew
Hock viewed the fire as providing a valuable opportunity to redesign
Singapore, warning that ‘[i]n these congested areas of wooden houses
which are the symbols of the old Singapore, which we are striving to re-
place, fire, although accidentally started, spreads quickly and destruc-
tively, and creates havoc before it can be brought under control’ (Lim 6
April 1958). In a landmark decision, the Trust purchased the fire’s site
under the Land Acquisition Ordinance. In March 1959, the Legislative
Assembly instructed the SIT to construct 192 two-storey, three-room ter-
race houses for the fire victims (SLAD 18 March 1959, 2229). But the
project again was not a complete success. Of the 329 families, only 196
families applied for the new houses, which they were only able to inha-
bit at the end of 1960.
Lim Yew Hock had, meanwhile, adopted a more comprehensive
emergency housing policy because, to put it simply, the political climate
had changed. The replacement of unauthorised wooden dwellings by
modern housing had become an important issue in Singapore’s pro-
gress towards nationhood. The Labour Front government, albeit re-
elected on a slim margin, had partial control of the island’s domestic af-
fairs, including housing, while the more left-wing PAP held sway in the
City Council. Within a year of the Koo Chye fire, both parties would
contest the general elections of May 1959 in the hope of presiding over
a self-governing state. The relief efforts surrounding the Koo Chye fire
were highly politicised, leading the Social Welfare Department to ban
the PAP, Labour Front and Workers’ Party from the relief centre’s pre-
mises. The Department explained that ‘[w]e do not want to allow a tra-
gedy to be exploited for political propaganda purposes’ (ST 8 April
1958).
The Koo Chye fire also invigorated the emergency housing pro-
gramme. In 1958, the Planning Coordination Committee, which
advised the government on the development of land in Singapore,
concluded that ‘the possibility of evolving an economic type of semi-
permanent housing estates with the advantages of speedy, low-cost con-
struction must not be denied and experiments must continue’.17 Above
all, the emergency housing programme could serve as an interim mea-
sure to accommodate low-income families, who would not otherwise
have chosen to leave their cheap wooden housing, before they could be
relocated in more permanent housing.18
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When a second fire in Kampong Tiong Bahru rendered 5,220 persons
homeless in February 1959, its proximity to the general elections raised
the political stakes involved. The Sin Chew Jit Poh emphasised that the
relief work for the fire victims constituted the ‘first step’ in the coun-
try’s practice of self-government (SCJP 14 February 1959). In the City
Council, when Ong Eng Guan turned down a motion from Lee Bah
Chee, the Liberal Socialist Councillor for Tiong Bahru, to raise the
Council’s contribution for the victims, Lee demanded that since there
had been two serious fires during Ong’s tenure as mayor, he should re-
turn to his hometown in Batu Pahat (CC MP 3 March 1959, 18)! The
fire politicking got even worse in the Legislature, a sign that kampong
blazes had attained a newfound political importance at the highest level
of politics. Lee Kuan Yew accused Lim Yew Hock of seeking publicity
during the calamity, referring to Lim’s photograph on the front page of
the Straits Times the day after the fire, showing him at the fire site with
his shirt sleeves and trousers rolled up and holding a bucket to douse
the attap roofs (ST 14 February 1959). Lim countered that ‘there was a
PAP propaganda machine out there saying that the government was re-
sponsible for the fire!’ (SLAD 3 March 1959, 2059).
Most crucially, the Tiong Bahru fire set the government on a substan-
tially broader course of emergency housing development. S.C. Wool-
mer, the SIT’s Chief Architect, urged that ‘[t]he fire, however tragic it
was for the victims, creates an opportunity to carry out demolition and
redevelopment efforts, not only in the area of the fire itself, but of a
substantial portion of the rest of the existing slum’, which would ‘pro-
vide accommodations for more occupants in the area than previously,
with a far higher standard of living’.19 With most fire victims tempora-
rily re-housed in Kallang Estate, the disaster provided the government
with a strategic foothold in Kampong Tiong Bahru to commence its
emergency housing project. Lim Yew Hock declared that the govern-
ment would acquire the site and build low-cost houses for them within
three months (SS 18 February 1959).
The government’s goal was to build a combination of two-storey ter-
raced houses and five- and nine-storey flats, totalling 1,015 flats and
shops, at the site of the fire.20 The authorities, under the Land Acquisi-
tion Ordinance, purchased 37 acres of land, including 13½ acres of the
site. Unlike the plans after the Koo Chye fire, the Tiong Bahru emer-
gency housing was rental housing, because ‘this will, it is hoped, be the
first phase of a larger kampong clearance and redevelopment effort, it
would not appear that these properties would be suitable for sale’.21 The
authorities also acquired 16 acres of the disused Tiong Bahru cemetery
nearby, on which the SIT planned to erect another 1,360 units, mainly
one-room flats.22 The cemetery had attracted official interest as a possi-
ble site for emergency housing in as early as October 1956.23 In fact, in
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January 1959, the authorities had again recommended it as suitable for
multi-storey emergency housing.24 The Tiong Bahru fire, then, pro-
vided the moral justification for the government to acquire the ceme-
tery.
The Tiong Bahru fire site plans were finally realised in early 1961,
nearly two years after the inferno. The HDB, which had replaced the
SIT in February 1960, charged low rents to the fire victims, since ‘suffi-
cient would appear to have been done for the fire victims in re-housing
them over the last 2 years’.25 In April 1961, however, 452 of the 1,016
victim families decided to stay in Kallang Estate, where the rent was
subsidised, with 397 families living in their own accommodations, pre-
sumably in unauthorised wooden housing near the fire site. Only 167
families accepted the Tiong Bahru emergency flats, mostly the larger
units. All 91 of the three-room terraced houses were taken up by fire
victims, but only 72 of the 190 two-room flats and a mere five of the
280 one-room flats with communal latrines.26
Bukit Ho Swee: The Turning Point
The Bukit Ho Swee fire of May 1961 was the biggest fire in Singapore’s
history, destroying 2,200 dwellings and rendering 2,833 families (or
15,694 people) homeless. However, it was the subsequent emergency
re-housing, which distinguished it historically from the kampong blazes
of the 1950s. The PAP’s response, unlike those of the British and La-
bour Front governments, was characterised by political resolve and
speed. On 30 May, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew promised that ‘[i]n
nine months’ time a sufficient number of units will be completed by
the Housing and Development Board to house every fire victim family’
(ST 30 May 1961). In a special Legislative Assembly session convened
the following day, the PAP government passed a motion to acquire the
site for rebuilding and amended the Land Acquisition Ordinance to en-
able the government to acquire sites at one-third of the value of the land
(SLAD 31 May 1961, 1565-66). The educated public similarly understood
the importance of the re-housing operation in the creation of the new
state. The Nanyang Siang Pau urged that since [t]he observance of law
and regulations is the first lesson for the citizens’, ‘citizens will cultivate
good civic habits and refrain from building unauthorised houses for
their own convenience, thus marring the look of the city and sowing
the cause for future fires’ (NYSP 15 June 1961).
By the time of the Bukit Ho Swee fire, the HDB, unlike the SIT, had
also adopted a clear policy towards emergency housing. Although the
Board viewed the two-room flat as its minimum housing standard, it ac-
cepted the necessity of building at least 10,000 one-room flats, most of
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which served as emergency units, near the Central Area of Singapore as
a short-term measure to house the low-income population living in in-
expensive wooden and shop-house accommodations. The Board’s mem-
bers recognised that the ‘political considerations were more pressing
and that the Housing Board might have to sacrifice its ideas on what
units should be constructed’.27 In November 1960, the PAP govern-
ment had instructed the Board to continue the SIT’s experiment with
one-room emergency housing.28 Within a week of the Bukit Ho Swee
fire, a preliminary plan to redevelop the site had already been pre-
pared,29 while the HDB made the rebuilding of Bukit Ho Swee its top
priority.30
In September 1961, the 904 one-room emergency flats at the Tiong
Bahru cemetery site, partially-built at the time of the May fire, were
completed. More than 700 of the flats were allocated to the Bukit Ho
Swee fire victims. The first of the HDB’s building phases on the Bukit
Ho Swee fire site itself was only completed in November 1962, 18
months after the fire, with two subsequent phases that were realised in
early 1965. By the end of 1963, of the 2,600 families registered with
the HDB for re-housing, 2,166 families had been successfully accom-
modated.31 That year, the Board proudly declared that ‘[t]he appearance
of the Bukit Ho Swee Fire Site had been completely changed from one
of the most congested slums in Singapore into a healthy housing estate
with modern community services and amenities’ (HDB AR 1963, 28).
The HDB consequently could be very thankful to the SIT for having
commenced construction on the cemetery site after the 1959 Tiong
Bahru fire. The Board partially acknowledged the strategic knock-on ef-
fects of fires in removing the urban kampongs:
Singapore has just experienced two of its worst fires in recent
years, one in Kampong Tiong Bahru and the other in Bukit Ho
Swee, and it is a rather ironic coincidence that the flats erected
at the first fire site were completed just in time to house the vic-
tims of the second fire (HDB AR 1961: 22).
Bukit Ho Swee Estate was a high-modernist housing estate, in which
formerly semi-autonomous kampong dwellers were being moulded into
disciplined citizens. The development of public housing constituted,
Lim Kim San, the first Chairman of the HDB in 1964 proclaimed ‘a
minor revolution in the social and living habits of a sizeable portion of
the population’ (PAP 1964: 228). Residents were instructed, among
other things, not to keep livestock in their homes, obstruct the common
corridors and stairways, illegally sublet the flat, or make unauthorised
alterations to the flat (HDB 1973: 5). Moreover, its social amenities
sought to draw former kampong dwellers firmly into its official orbit.
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The estate’s community centre, completed in 1965, sought to transform
the local youth into ‘loyal and efficient young people to collectively
shoulder the responsibility in nation building’ (NAS 1966a). The haw-
kers and street sellers also fell under more official regulations. In 1966,
at the opening of a 2-storey street sellers’ centre on the estate, a govern-
ment official enthused that hawkers would no longer block traffic or
present health hazards and could now ‘do their business in sheltered
comfort’, while the residents could ‘enjoy the many varieties of cooked
food in clean, sanitary surroundings’ (NAS 1966b).
Crucially, the Bukit Ho Swee flats served as a springboard for the gov-
ernment’s kampong clearance operations and, subsequently, its urban re-
newal programme to clear the shop-house dwellings in the Central Area.
Out of this social transformation of the urban margins, and thereafter
by the urban core, the HDB announced that ‘a planned new city will be
built’.32 The key to urban renewal was to first resettle the families from
the Central Area into flats built on the urban periphery. As Teh Cheang
Wan, the HDB’s Chief Architect, later remarked, the Board’s ‘construc-
tion plans would have run into difficulties if not for the God-sent oppor-
tunity of the Bukit Ho Swee fire in 1961, where a site was made avail-
able for 10,000 housing’.33 Two-thirds of the people who eventually
moved into the Bukit Ho Swee Estate were not victims of the 1961 fire,
however. In September 1962, a number of two- and three-room flats in
the estate were reserved for kampong families affected by the clearance
of nearby Redhill for industrial and housing development.34 In July
1963, another cluster of flats was allocated, in order of priority, to evicted
families from the clearance areas; victims of the Bukit Ho Swee fire; vic-
tims of the Bukit Ban Kee fires; and general applicants on the housing
register.35 After the 1963 Bukit Ban Kee blaze, the HDB temporarily re-
housed 206 of the 230 fire victim families in Bukit Ho Swee. In Octo-
ber 1964, the Board made more vacant flats in the estate available to ap-
plicants evicted from nearby South Precinct 1 due to the urban renewal
programme.36 By 1970, there were more than 12,000 flats in the estate,
housing 45,066 tenants, an increase of 25,000 residents over figures
from 1957 (Arumainathan 1973: 238).
The emergency flats, as a re-housing expedient, had accomplished
their goal: to shatter the vicious cycle of proliferating unauthorised woo-
den housing, the migration of low-income Chinese families into the ur-
ban periphery and the repeated outbreak of kampong infernos. They also
remained deeply unpopular with even the low-income families. Numer-
ous fire victims allocated one-room emergency flats in Bukit Ho Swee
soon requested bigger flats.37 The HDB quickly realised that ‘the gener-
al opinion of the public is that there is no marked improvement from
moving out of a one-room cubicle in the slum area to a one-room
Housing Board unit other than cleanliness’.38 In 1966, the government
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decided to build less one-room emergency units and to restrict them to
areas further away from the Central Area.39 By this time, modern HDB
estates had steadily replaced the kampongs in Singapore. By 1965, the
Board had built 54,430 housing units, compared to only about 500 woo-
den dwellings annually being built at that time (Singapore 1965: 33-34).
In the new urban periphery within a five-mile radius of the Central
Area stood more than 50,000 units of public housing, accommodating
430,000 people or 23% of the population, and rising. The social and po-
litical margin, which the British colonial regime had sought to erase
had been restored by the PAP government in the form of high-moder-
nist public housing. The result was a marked reduction in the autono-
my of families, which hitherto had had the freedom to move and sublet,
rent, build or rebuild their accommodations on their own terms. The
loss of this individual autonomy was the social price paid for citizen-
ship, as the families were moved from spontaneous, unauthorised woo-
den housing into public housing in the 1960s. By becoming, first, te-
nants and, subsequently, owners of HDB housing, these families were
progressively transformed into citizens of the emergent nation-state.
The Undying Rumours
In the final analysis, however, the success of the PAP’s fire emergency
re-housing also came at a social and political price. What happened in
the aftermath of the kampong fires left a lasting imprint on the collec-
tive social memory of Singapore up to the present. As development pro-
jects increasingly encroached onto areas of unauthorised wooden hous-
ing in the 1950s, kampong dwellers commonly considered fire as an act
of arson committed by hostile landlords, the government, hired secret
society hands, or, simply, a spiteful neighbour. ‘It was always like that’,
they ventured even years later, ‘There was eviction and people did not
want to move. After a while, fire broke out’ (Interview with Chong 13
February 2007). One kampong dweller claimed to have ‘seen a piece of
cloth tied up with a metal wire and thrown onto the attap’ (Interview
with Goh 24 May 2007), while another ‘knew a friend who belonged to
this type of gang, they would set fire to attap houses because when the
landowner bought the land, there were people who refused to be
evicted, so they played dirty tricks’ (Interview with Ang 30 June 2007).
In the logic of arson, fire was always accompanied by suspicious cir-
cumstances: the scale of destruction, in marked contrast to the mini-
mum loss of lives, appeared to establish the existence of a well-crafted
plan, that ‘whenever there was resettlement, there was arson and no
one got hurt’ (Interview with Chin 21 November 2006).
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The enormity of the 1961 Bukit Ho Swee fire and the speed of the
emergency re-housing intensified such beliefs. The inferno was re-
ported to have started at a wooden house, no. 174-A, in Kampong Tiong
Bahru. The Nanyang Siang Pau carried interviews with fire victims
claiming to be residents in the vicinity who recounted how ‘the fire was
caused not by heaven but by scoundrels more evil than wild beasts’ (28
May 1961). A middle-aged man apparently saw two men throwing burn-
ing torches onto the roof of 174-A before fleeing (Ibid.), while an elderly
man, relating how his neighbour had also witnessed the same thing, la-
mented that ‘some heartless person(s) started the fire!’ (NYSP 26 May
1961). In June, the Nanyang Siang Pau reported that the police had
questioned more than ten self-proclaimed witnesses of the alleged act
of arson, which, the newspaper remarked, was sufficient reason to be-
lieve it was arson, with only the concrete evidence was lacking (10 June
1961). Subsequent reports of arson at Kampong Henderson in late May
and early June fanned the flames, leading the Sin Chew Jit Poh to con-
clude that ‘there is every possibility that the recent biggest fire was [also]
caused by some wicked elements’ (14 June 1961). On 9 June, the police
detained a suspect but released him due to a lack of evidence (NYSP 28
May 1961). A fortnight later, two attempts of arson were reported on
wooden housing at Carey Road, which had survived the Bukit Ho Swee
fire (ST 14 Jul 1961).
Given its prominent role in kampong clearance and the wariness with
which wooden house dwellers had previously viewed the state, the PAP
government was strongly implicated in the rumours of arson following
the Bukit Ho Swee inferno. PAP leaders tried to suppress the specula-
tion as baseless and contradictory and attributed it to malicious ‘outsi-
ders’, ‘opportunists’ and ‘agitators’ (NAS 1961). However, these official
strategies were not completely successful, which was indicative of how
‘there was nothing more powerful … than those exchanges of words be-
tween neighbours’ (Farge 1993: 13). The rumours possessed an inner lo-
gic that could not readily be disproved and which linked the local cir-
cumstances both before and after the fire to part of a powerful web of
conspiracy, a theory seemingly supported by evidence and history. The
rumours also reinforced the psychology of calamity among the fire vic-
tims, explaining how families were rendered homeless in an instant. In
the absence of a convincing official report on the cause of the Bukit Ho
Swee inferno, the rumours were entirely consistent with the world-view
and everyday experience of former kampong dwellers.
Many fire victims thought that one major indication that was arson
was that the Bukit Ho Swee fire occurred on a public holiday. This
meant that the kampong children were not at school, but the men were
fortunately at home to take care of their families and consequently only
four lives were lost (Interview with Mok 8 January 2007). Moreover, the
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fire managed to jump two roads and was seen burning in different
places at the same time. It was not possible, some people reasoned,
even with the strong wind, that the flames would roll down a hill to
leapfrog a three-storey shop-house, leave it untouched and then cross
the main road. This ‘curious’ path of destruction suggested that a plane,
visible from the air that day, had set a series of blazes (Interviews with
Soh 10 September 2007; Low 25 April 2007). The government’s culp-
ability, it was argued, was also established by its execution of a coherent
plan of rebuilding and re-housing, which was evidenced in how quickly
the fire site was redeveloped, while the victims were promptly re-
housed in the completed flats at the Tiong Bahru fire site and the par-
tially completed flats at the cemetery site (Interviews with Wee 27 April
2007; Lee 31 December 2006; Ong Bin 26 June 2007).
In March 1963, when two thousand people were rendered homeless
by a massive fire at Bukit Ban Kee, most of them were swiftly re-housed
in the emergency flats of nearby Bukit Ho Swee. What supposedly hap-
pened here in 1961 had by then become part of Singapore’s collective
memory. A fire victim observed that ‘it was just like the Bukit Ho Swee
fire. There were many rumours but there was no evidence’ (Interview
with Lim Kok Peng 16 May 2005). The opposition party in the Legisla-
tive Assembly, the Barisan Sosialis, declared that ‘[w]henever a fire
breaks out in any part of Singapore, the Minister will go there and grab
the land for the building of houses’ (SLAD 10 December 1963: 251). A
subsequent fire at Pulau Minyak in November 1964 destroyed the
homes of 1,657 people, who were allocated HDB flats ‘barely 26 hours
after the fire had broken out’ (Social Welfare Department 1964: 35).
The Barisan party were convinced that the fire had been ‘arranged by
the PAP’ (SLAD 17 November 1964: 639).
Such rumours of arson have left an indelible imprint on the relation-
ship between the government and the population over whom they have
ruled since 1959. On the surface, the PAP’s political control is nothing
short of hegemonic. The party has never lost more than four parliamen-
tary seats in an election since 1963 or seen its popular vote fall under
61%. This hegemony is not simply numerical but also ideological: the
citizenry largely accept the official line that the near-universal provision
of public housing has served their material interests (Chua 1997: 132).
This political dominance, however, has not created an ‘effective’ rela-
tionship between the PAP and the citizenry (Lim 1994). On the con-
trary, the relationship has been based on a pragmatic exchange of goods
– votes for the government, and material rewards, including the ability
to own a modern flat, for the people. In addition, the government’s
management of spaces in contemporary Singapore has met with a mix-
ture of ‘collusion, conflict, and collision’ with the citizenry, which has
protested against policies considered to be inimical to individual or
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community interests (Kong and Yeoh 2003, 11). There is also wide-
spread nostalgia for the ‘good old kampong days’ among the elderly peo-
ple, which may be interpreted as ‘an intrinsic critique of the present by
the ordinary people’ – of the more regulated and stressful lifestyle of
present-day Singapore – and which belies a desire for ‘recovering con-
trol over daily life within the present zone of material comfort’ (Chua
1997: 162, 166). In short, what Singaporeans want both for themselves
and from their government are deeply conflicting things.
When Lim Kim San passed away in July 2006, the occasion precipi-
tated critical emotional responses on Internet discussion forums, parti-
cularly from elderly Singaporeans who remember the days when Lim
presided over the kampong clearance campaign. The perceived anonym-
ity provided by the Internet has emboldened Singaporeans to candidly
comment on sensitive topics, which would not have materialised in a
public forum (Rodan 1998: 75). In the popular Sammyboy.com’s Alfresco
Coffee Shop, a hotbed of anti-PAP discussions, the historical association
between fires and kampong clearance was vividly recalled following
Lim’s death. One forum poster named ‘e_visionary’ asked rhetorically,
‘How many kampongs were burned due to one man?’, to which ÎÚÅ re-
plied, ‘Yes, I heard stories about “government people” “purplely” [pur-
posely] burn down kampongs to make way for new flats when all nego-
tiations failed’ (SB 2006).
It is not only the elderly who are interested in Kampong Bukit Ho
Swee and the great 1961 fire, which destroyed it. A general revival of in-
terest in the country’s history has led Singaporeans one or two genera-
tions younger to ask critical questions about the untold past. Prior to
Lim Kim San’s death, the pilot episode of a Malay-language documen-
tary series boldly posed the question, ‘What caused the fire?’ The pro-
gramme featured interviews with a former resident, a fire fighter, a fire
department officer, a senior civil servant, a sociologist, and a history re-
searcher (myself), none of whom supported the arson theory. While this
refusal to publicly confirm the rumours highlights the sensitivity of the
topic despite the intervening years; it is indicative of the mindset of
younger Singaporeans who pose these kinds of questions, which im-
pinge directly on the history of modern Singapore. The episode con-
cluded, in striking postmodernist fashion, ‘There are various versions
of history. It is up to you to make your own conclusions’ (Oak3 films
2006).
Conclusion
Modern Singapore was born out of fire, and the kampong infernos that
lit up this period of history hold an ambivalent place in contemporary
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society. As historical events, the fires belong to the past but they remain
in the present as personal and social memory. The conflagrations and
the emergency public housing projects, which followed in their wake
helped to create the disciplined, contemporary nation-state, but they
also remain an integral part of present-day critiques of the PAP govern-
ment and the high-modernist philosophy of development which it has
robustly implemented. The uncertainty with which the citizenry regard
both the government and the forms and consequences of the high mod-
ernity is indicative of the scale and pace of the social and economic
transformation, directed from above, which took place during the birth
of modern Singapore.
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6 Gender and Discipline in ‘The Singapore Story’:
The Female Chinese Factory Workers
in Perspective, c. 1980-c. 1990
Ernest Koh
Introduction
In his conclusion to Rickshaw Coolie, James Warren underscores the in-
tention of his book, which is to ‘bring back to Singapore’s own Chinese
people and society, a singkeh coolie culture and history, which is, finally,
their own – a People’s History (Warren 1986, 326).’ In the two decades
since the publication of Rickshaw Coolie, Warren’s intentions have been
echoed in a comparatively small but growing body of literature on Sin-
gapore’s history. But what is People’s History? What do such histories
offer to the readers in the present especially with regard to past and ex-
isting trends in the practice of writing about Singapore past?
People’s History is a historical approach that attempts to solicit an
understanding of the past through the perspective of common people
and the practices of everyday life (Samuel 1981, xvi). Shifting the epi-
centre of analyses from the leaders and key personalities of history to
that of the common people, it recreates the worlds that lie between
worlds – the world of ‘Private Wheeler’ juxtaposed against the world of
the Duke of Wellington or the world of Napoleonic Europe and Geor-
gian England. Historians who adopt People’s History as an approach to
analysis apply it to a broad range of ‘types’ of history, such as military
history, political history, or economic history. The historian takes history
from the privileged classes – the kings, sultans, and literati – and re-
turns it to those who were part of history, but silent. People’s History
can thus be thought of as ‘history from below’, studies along the lines
of E.P. Thompson’s ‘poor bloody infantry’ of the Industrial Revolution
(Tarling 2000: 84-85). It solicits the past through the historical experi-
ence of the everyday individual, based on the assumption that s/he is
an active participant in historical production as both actor and narrator.
Hence, the historian gives her or him the responsibility of a ‘maker’
and ‘keeper’ of history.
Yet the ‘history from below’ does not entail a whitewash of existing
historiography. People’s Histories are strongest when they locate and in-
tegrate themselves within existing ‘mainstream’ history, fleshing out
and completing the picture of the past to enhance the rigour and value
of analyses. That being said, at key junctures, we should expect that
People’s History to contradict the ‘mainstream’ narrative. The value in
uncovering such schisms is inestimable, as these are the heart of intel-
lectual inquiries and the soul of the ‘history from below’.
The writing of Singaporean People’s Histories continues to occupy a
minor niche within the body of literature on Singaporean history in
general. Whilst the appearance of James Warren’s Rickshaw Coolie
(1986) is widely recognised as the landmark beginning for formal stu-
dies on People’s Histories of Singapore, a number of studies that pre-
date Warren’s work attempt to recover the island’s ‘history from below’.
Yen Ching-Hwang’s article in the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies on
early Chinese clan organisations in Singapore and Malaya (1981), the
same author’s subsequent monograph on the social history of the Chi-
nese in Singapore and Malaya (1986), Lai Ah Eng’s Peasants, Proletar-
ians, and Prostitutes (1986), as well as Lee Poh Ping’s Chinese Society in
Nineteenth Century Singapore (1978) are a selection of early efforts that
diverged from the broader historiographical tendencies to focus on Sin-
gapore’s ‘otherside’.
People’s history as an approach to reconstructing Singapore’s history
has ensnared the imagination of a group of historians of Singapore.
Juergen Rudolph’s (1998) efforts have resulted in a splendid but often-
overlooked historical ethnography of ordinary peranakan in Singapore,
while Stephen Dobbs (2003) pursued a People’s History of the lighter-
men who lived, worked, and died on the Singapore River. Loh Kah Seng
is a prolific writer in the field of Singaporean People’s Histories, with
articles on urban kampongs (2007) and the Singaporean Great Depres-
sion (2006), to name but a few of his contributions in this area.
Peter Rimmer and Lisa Allen’s edited volume The Underside of Malay-
sian History (1990) is noteworthy in the area for its contributors’ efforts
in illuminating Singapore’s history ‘from below’, while the Singapore
National Archives has also made significant contributions to the popu-
lar illumination of the people’s past, among which Kampong Days
(1993), a pictorial return to the life and times of Singapore’s rural past,
is especially important. Henry Frei’s Guns of February (2004) explored
the experiences of Malaya during the Second World War from the per-
spective of ordinary Japanese soldiers, while Paul Kratoska’s research
resulted in a social history of the Japanese occupation of Malaya (1998).
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Towards a People’s History of the Factory Workers of Singapore
The beginnings of my interest in the factory workers of Singapore can
be traced to my doctoral research on the historical links between literacy
and class among the Chinese of Singapore. On the one hand, the fac-
tory workers were a community that I ‘stumbled upon’ as I began to
map the patterns of socio-economic stratification in Singaporean so-
ciety. Yet, in hindsight, it was perhaps inevitable that I would encounter
the silent story of the factory workers during any interrogation of Singa-
pore’s development ‘from below’, given the Singaporean economy’s de-
pendence on manufacturing and the fact that the industry was responsi-
ble for the creation of so many jobs for otherwise unskilled or semi-
skilled workers.
Here, I request permission to pause and pre-empt a question that I
have been presented with in several conversations with colleagues: why
Chinese workers? Why not, for instance, ethnic Malay workers who had
a significant presence in the factories of Singapore as assemblers and
operators? My common response to these intriguing queries is that the
historical experience of each distinct community is sufficiently different
due to a plethora of external and internal factors, so much so that they
warrant separate studies in the future. Except perhaps in a broad survey
of the topic, to consider the lived experiences of all of the factory work-
ers in Singapore as being essentially the same, given how ethnicity has
been shown to be an enormous factor in shaping how daily life unfolds,
is highly problematic.
My research into Chinese factory workers resulted in a paper pub-
lished in Tonan Ajia Kenkyu (Koh, 2007). It was a people’s history of
non-English-literate workers and the impact on their lives that broader
changes to the city-state during the 1980s were bringing about. How-
ever, one question stayed with me during the preparation of that paper
and ever since: where was gender and discipline in this phase of ‘The
Singapore Story’? The idea of the disciplined workforce brought about
by the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) policies in the name of economic
growth, is not a new one. Christopher Tremewan’s monograph (1994)
on the island’s political economy is persuasive on a number of levels,
but, nevertheless, I remain only partially convinced. It is true that the
workers were subject to intense disciplining efforts by the state, but as
this paper will demonstrate, the workers also found ways to challenge
the disciplining process, as well as disciplining themselves. Both of
these salient points are critical in our understanding of Singapore’s his-
tory: that the common person was not just a malleable and faceless
mass, completely subservient to hegemonic forces without any aspira-
tions and strategies of his or her own. There is a balance to be found
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between structure and agency, and leaning too far either way can lead
to historical myopia.
There was a significant component on gender in my earlier paper,
where I looked at how it shaped the experiences of life in Singapore’s
factories. However, it was not the main focus and I have always felt that
a more substantial story of gender in the factories awaited further scru-
tiny and illumination. The women were not just part of the pool of fac-
tory workers because as the 1980s progressed we saw more and more
of them rise to positions as assemblers, operators and machinists. We
witnessed a dramatic change in the demographics of the factory floor,
where women went from being a minority, to being deliberately se-
lected to fill these positions and hence became the dominant feature of
production work in Singapore.
Their experience was not unique: male factory workers experienced
some of the same forms of discipline that we shall encounter in this pa-
per, such as the discipline a worker faces via an ideology of productivity
and collectivism as well as the ‘disciplining gaze’. However, men were
not, for instance, disciplined using the language of patriarchy, and the
disciplining of women carries with it sufficiently unique themes to ne-
cessitate a separate examination.
Gender and Discipline in the Patriarchal Factory
One of the distinctive features of Singapore’s society during the 1980s
was the growing presence of women in the workforce. By the early
1970s, Singapore’s economy was characterised by full employment,
averaging less than one per cent unemployment, and by the latter part
of the decade, it was clear to PAP policymakers that growth could not
be sustained without introducing strategies to cope with labour
shortages (Lee 1992: 40-41). A key component in those strategies was
to draw more women into the workforce. While women have had a long
history of various forms of participation in Singapore’s economy, it has
only been since the early 1980s that statistical trends began to display
more obvious trends in the representation of women in formal waged
work. The labour force participation rate among women in Singapore
stood at 44.3 per cent in 1980, two per cent higher than the year before,
and increasing to over 50.3 per cent by 1990 (Wong 1992: 163).
The increasing number of women in the workforce in general corre-
sponded to what was taking place in the factories. With the rising cost
of living, more and more women were joining the workforce in an ef-
fort to meet the needs and aspirations of everyday life. The Labour Force
Survey of 1975 indicates that there were nearly 75,000 Chinese women
in production-related occupations (cited in Salaff 1988: 15). In 1980,
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this figure had risen to 90,086 (Khoo 1981c: 66); a decade later, this
figure had nearly doubled to 161,381 (Lau 1993c: 105). To get a better
sense of how rapid this growth was, in 1990, there was an increase of
over 23,600 women in Singapore’s workforce over the year before, with
an overwhelming majority entering the workplace as production opera-
tors (Yearbook 1990: 55-58).
Numerous studies across disciplines have demonstrated that in con-
temporary developing countries this increase in female participation
rates is fairly common looking at broader employment trends, particu-
larly among the lower socio-economic strata of societies. This trend con-
tinues in communities in the People’s Republic of China, the Philip-
pines, Indonesia, and India. As Janet Salaff argues:
In their search for cheap labor for the manufacture of electronic
devices, textiles, and garments, the new export industries in the
Pacific Rim draw on women. Firms impose ceilings of pay and
promotion and encourage high turnover among women workers
to keep wages low. The family roles of Chinese women shape
them to be a prime source of labor for such jobs (Salaff 1988: 7).
Chinese society in Singapore has historically been organised along pa-
triarchal lines, and it is not surprising to find that the male and female
domains within the factory were often clearly delineated along lines of
power and authority. But how were gender relations and gender roles in
the workplace applied to the factories? How much ‘discipline’ did the
males mete out on females and how did this process unfold on a day-
to-day basis?
At a hard disk assembly site at Industrial Park Two in Ang Mo Kio,
the supervisory positions were occupied exclusively by males, as were
the upper management positions. The production lines were staffed al-
most entirely by females, with only a handful of males among a group
of some 200 workers. This distribution pattern of gender in the fac-
tories resonates with Linda Lim’s findings in her study of female labour
in electronics factories in Malaysia and Singapore. Lim reported that
over 90 per cent of all factory workers in the electronics factories sur-
veyed were female, while males dominated supervisory and manage-
ment positions almost to the point of exclusiveness (Lim 1978: 2-3).
Between the two occupational classes we find the Quality Control (QC)
operators, who were a consistent presence across much of the manufac-
turing industry. These were production workers who were better edu-
cated – in this case, having completed or at least received some second-
ary education – than the other workers and, as was the case of the fac-
tory in Industrial Park Two, they were sometimes asked to take up the
last physical position on the line. This allowed the QC operator to moni-
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tor the level of the finished product as it was being put together. To alle-
viate the line supervisor’s workload, the QC operators were empowered
to accept or reject particular components that were coming down the
line. Poor soldering or even the lack of an appropriate time stamp on a
line of items were just some of the grounds for rejecting a series of disk
drives at Ang Mo Kio (interview conducted by author).
QC operators were usually male, a reflection of the noticeable demo-
graphic trends in the Singapore education system during the 1980s. In
general, although this was a trend that was already beginning to wane,
males still tended to rise to a higher level in the education system when
compared to females (Khoo 1981c: 77-79; and Lau 1993c; 105-106). This
was particularly when household heads had to make choices between
living expenses and their children’s individual educations. Lok Kwee, for
instance, dropped out of the education system completely at the mid-pri-
mary level to alleviate the more pressing financial needs of her house-
hold; but it was not because of the cost of schooling itself. Under then
Deputy Prime Minister Goh Keng Swee’s advice, the PAP government
had made reducing the level of the ‘educational waste’ among the lower
socio-economic classes of Singapore’s society a priority, and allocated a
significant portion of the national budget to promote educational subsi-
dies (see Goh 1979). However, for many like Lok Kwee it was the time
spent at school that was costly, which was better used by earning money
to help pay for household expenses (interview of Lok Kwee , 1/12/2005).
More often than not it was therefore the male who was empowered
to establish the framework of the women’s work experiences. How pro-
ductive a female worker was, the quality of the work that she was re-
sponsible for, and how fast she was working or ought to be working
was determined by this very male domain. The fact that it was common
practice for male supervisors to call the women under their charge
‘girls’ was just another manifestation of the patriarchal nature of the
production floor.
The language of patriarchy and paternalism was used by male author-
ity figures to establish and reinforce a gendered hierarchy within the
factory world. Female workers were constantly being reminded of their
status and positions within the factory, which was more often than not
subservient to their male counterparts. At Ang Mo Kio Industrial Park
Two, one worker remembered how even the older women were referred
to as ‘girls’ by her line supervisor (interview, 17/11/2004). At a transfor-
mer manufacturing plant on Kian Teck Lane, another operator revealed
that the male shift manager made it a point to boast to upper manage-
ment about how he had managed to motivate ‘his girls’ to higher levels
of productivity. Conversely, I have yet to come across any instance of
males in factories, regardless of their occupational status, being referred
to as ‘boys’.
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Women were publicly labelled according to their perceived abilities
by attaching an adjective to the noun ‘girl’. A worker deemed unproduc-
tive was referred to as a ‘lazy girl, while the hardworking ones were la-
belled ‘good girls’. The youngest female workers were referred to as ‘lit-
tle girls’. A larger worker was called a ‘big girl’, and the older workers
were sometimes referred to as ‘old girl’ (interview, 13/1/2005). In some
cases, a beauty pageant (a popular social events of 1980s Singapore)
among the female workers would be organised by male supervisors, os-
tensibly to ‘raise morale’ by ‘having some time for fun at work’, with
the winner being flattered and teased and called ‘pretty girl’ for months
thereafter (interview, 17/11/2004).
The expectations of female workers in a world where males domi-
nated supervisory positions were thus defined by what can be under-
stood as ‘the patriarchal factory’. Female operators were often expected
to make mistakes simply because they were female. Teo Bee Hua re-
membered how, months into her job at Ang Mo Kio, she had acciden-
tally wired an entire batch of hard disks incorrectly when she was ill,
upon which the QC operator reportedly remarked, ‘the government
wants us to be productive. How can we be productive when we have to
rely on women?’ (interview, 17/11/2004) Female workers were expected
to display acquiescence to the strict hierarchy within the factory, and
this often meant biting one’s tongue when faced with sexist remarks
such as these. ‘People can make things very difficult for you if they
want to,’ Ai Lek reflected, ‘sometimes it’s better to just let them think
that they are better (interview, 6/12/2004).’ Thus disciplining oneself in
the gendered workplace was often the path of least resistance.
Discussions on the nature of patriarchy from theorists of sociology
and organisational behaviour point to the institutionalisation of subordi-
nation and dominance along patriarchal lines at work as being com-
monplace in capital economies. Hemming (1987), for instance, argues
that patriarchy in the workplace can be described as a form of ‘paterna-
listic law’, and the application of this authority on other (especially fe-
male) individuals is legitimised on the recognition of male authority,
and is especially prevalent in male-dominated cultures. These theoreti-
cal models do not presume that women are completely powerless, as
Lerner (1986) points out. Instead, there is a voluntary acceptance of pa-
triarchy in exchange for economic protection (i.e., keeping one’s job).
The patronising and paternalistic languages of everyday life used to dis-
cipline and remind the women of their status in relation to their male
superiors, as well as the acceptance – even normalising – of such prac-
tices are striking cases-in-point.
Lim’s research into the hiring practices of electronics manufacturing
firms also reveals another form of disciplining in the patriarchal factory.
Her study found that women were specifically targeted in employment
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drives because women were considered ‘passive, [and] co-operative …
the greater docility of female workers makes them easier to organize
and more productive workers’ by the management of multinational cor-
porations (Lim 1978: 13-14).’ On the other hand, men, especially young-
er men, were considered impatient and egotistical, and had problems
taking orders from superiors. For the firms, there was a prevailing be-
lief that males were more likely to cause workplace disruptions through
insubordination, a critical factor that underscores the PAP’s intentions
in creating, in Tremewan’s parlance, a ‘docile and disciplined workforce
(Tremewan 1994: 50).’
What about opportunities to break out of their prescribed roles in the
factory? To test if patriarchy in the factory was indeed rigid and all en-
compassing, one has to look at the women’s ability to being promoted
to higher positions in the factory. The prospects for advancement were
slim, although it was not entirely unusual for a woman to be promoted
to a QC operator, or even a line supervisor. However, understanding the
reality of actually being able to take such opportunities requires some
appreciation of gender roles in Singapore’s Chinese society. Much has
been written about the role of women and the shifting nature of the
work-family balance that industrialisation has brought upon adult fe-
males in Singapore, and so only a brief outline of the issues will be pre-
sented here.
Whilst labour participation amongst women in Singapore has in-
creased at a steady rate, particularly in the 1980s, as noted earlier, the
roles and responsibilities of women in the family did not dramatically
change. With households in Singapore being increasingly drawn into
the money economy, the earning power of a dual-income household be-
came an attractive proposition. As the city-state became increasingly in-
dustrialised, goods and services that one could barter for as a housewife
in a pre-industrial society now required cash. Homes metamorphosed
from a simple kampong shack to high-rise flats that necessitated a disci-
plined financial regime if one was to make one’s bank payments or pay
the rent. The factories merged with the urban residential landscape
looked like flattened housing projects. Meanwhile, huge industrial parks
were located in the middle of working-class neighbourhoods like Toa
Payoh, Jurong, Ubi, and Ang Mo Kio. The logic of the urban planners
was simple: to draw working-class women into the factories, where they
could help fuel an economy that was desperately short on labour and at
the same time improve their own financial situations. As Singapore’s
entire society began to change, the citizenry found itself on the cusps of
two historical epochs, between the old Singapore and the new. Ap-
proaches to social organisation, gender roles, and gender relations
needed to change, although more often than not, change was only par-
tial and conditional (Salaff 1988: 235-236).
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Within the Chinese household, women remained the primary care-
givers and housekeepers. In more affluent households, women were
able to pass some (or all) of these duties onto housekeepers or live-in
foreign domestic workers. In poorer households, these spheres of re-
sponsibility could not be ‘outsourced’ as readily. Working-class women
were thus the most likely to become what Pauline Tay-Straughan calls
the ‘supermum’ – a woman running a household who was also ex-
pected to prove her economic worth to her family by getting a paid job,
while continuing to be responsible for almost all of the domestic re-
sponsibilities, such as the preparation of meals and the day-to-day child-
rearing (Tay-Straughan 1999: 9-11).
Therefore, it was common for female factory workers to negotiate the
delicate balance of waged work and domestic responsibilities by making
practical and disciplined choices in their employment. Factories that
were located near one’s residence were an obvious advantage, as it cut
down on travel time and maximised what could be accomplished in a
day, at home as well as in the workplace (interview, 1/12/2005). Losing
one’s job was problematic in this regard because there were many job
opportunities in factories across the island, but it was the neighbour-
hood factory that was the most desirable, and thus women were often
obedient in order to keep their jobs at their ‘ideal’ place of employment
(interview, 19/11/2004). Being able to accept work shifts that comple-
mented their husbands’ work schedules and school hours was also an
important factor. Many of those interviewed as part of this project, ex-
pressed the common goal of having ‘one adult at home’, although
achieving it remained problematic (Interview, 6/12/2004).
As a result of these two everyday considerations, a promotions to bet-
ter-paid positions arose that required more responsibility and time in
the factory were usually turned down by women employees. ‘We are
not looking for a career,’ stated one worker bluntly, ‘the money is im-
portant, but we need time just as much ((interview, 13/1/2005).’
An equally pointed statement was made by Chua Kai Lin. ‘A promo-
tion doesn’t come with respect. All of the other [male] supervisors will
gang up on you, and give you the worst tasks. Better to stay where you
stand (interview with Chua Kai Lin, 19/11/2004).’ These type of self-dis-
ciplining sentiments along gender lines which reach the point where a
female worker makes a conscious choice to remain in a subservient po-
sition, echo Salaff’s findings of working-class Chinese families in Singa-
pore during the 1970s and early 1980s:
We can usefully compare the reasons that women do not reach
their occupational potential with those that men give for refusing
promotions. Poor women … have neither the education to study
new techniques nor the confidence to try. They are reluctant to
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handle English-language forms and reporting duties … some wo-
men prefer to augment their incomes by moonlighting. There
are also women who turn down an offer of advancement in fa-
vour of staying with their peers. They fear that they will be re-
jected by younger and better-educated colleagues … in the new
and more responsible post … all women must maintain the fa-
mily domestically as well. A women’s family burden is a power-
ful reason to refuse a promotion (Salaff 1988: 235).
Discipline Through Work Spaces
The need for a docile and disciplined workforce has been a fundamen-
tal notion of the PAP’s planners since the party came to power in 1959.
The disempowerment and deregistration of ‘left-wing’ trade unions that
began in 1963 left little organised opposition to the creation of disci-
plined work spaces. During the period 1963-1964, work stoppages de-
clined by over 90 per cent due to measures taken by the PAP govern-
ment. The PAP’s efforts were so successful that there were no work
stoppages at all during the 1978-1985 period, and only one in 1986 (Bel-
lo and Rosenfield 1990: 304; Deyo 1989: 62).
The creation of an ‘industrially peaceful landscape’ was the centre-
piece of the PAP’s export-oriented industrialisation strategy. To convince
foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) to set up their production
operations in Singapore, the state needed to identify key advantages
over other potential production sites in the region, such as those in
South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. What Singapore offered
was a stable and transparent bureaucratic process, high productivity,
and complete mastery over any attempt to organise the labour force into
a collective force that could not be handled by the government (Milne
and Mauzy 2002: 31). The National Wages Council (NWC) was estab-
lished in 1972 to provide a legitimate channel through which the state
could control the salaries of the lower working class in the private sec-
tor, which was related to regional trends to ensure that the labour costs
for MNCs were no higher than in comparable production sites in Asia.
The NWC itself was not a legislative body, but it was designed to re-
place lengthy bargaining processes between capital-owners and union-
ised labour that could lead to industrial stoppages. The council was
composed of ten union leaders (affiliated directly with the state-spon-
sored National Trades Union Congress, or the NTUC), ten government
officials, and ten heads of business associations who advised the state
and the private sector on appropriate wage structures to adopt, and re-
commended salary adjustments as necessary ‘to promote productivity
and efficiency … in the public interest’ (Labour Rights Report 2003: 10-
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11). Bello and Rosenfield further note that the 1968 Employment Act
and the amendment to the Industrial Relations Act that same year gave
‘management full discretionary power over most aspects of labour rela-
tions, including dismissals, promotions and transfers’ (Tremewan
1994: 33). The end result was that wage levels among the factory work-
ers were kept deliberately low upon the recommendations of the NWC
to attract foreign investors with their winning formula, which was basi-
cally a disciplined, low-wage workforce (Rodan 1989: 144-146).
These initiatives have been well documented by political economists
like Rodan and Tremewan, and a complete review of their analysis would
be incongruous here. What this chapter is concerned with is the process
of discipline and control that occurred within the factory, and less with
the more abstract implications of legislative disempowerment. What did
the broader processes that were aimed at disciplining the workforce
mean on a day-to-day basis for the female factory workers? How obvious
were these processes once they were translated into the everyday experi-
ence of the workplace? Were they at some level ‘aware’ that they were the
subjects of discipline and control, and if so what did they think of it?
The most visible disciplinary strategy used on the workforce was the
requirement to wear uniforms. This is nothing new and not exclusive
to Singapore, of course; since the Industrial Revolution, factory workers
around the world have worn uniforms, and a common and acceptable
explanation (from the owners’ perspective) is that it fosters a sense of
having a collective stake in the performance of the working community.
Lok Kwee works the 7:30 a.m. to 3 p.m. shift at a leads and interconnec-
tors factory on International Road. Her uniform consisted of a light-
blue blouse and matching slacks. A light-blue belt ensured that the
slacks did not compromise one’s modesty, and employees were specifi-
cally warned not to wear a non-regulation belt:
The security guards check us as we report to work. If the guards
miss us, then the QC operators would probably report us for hav-
ing improper uniform. They (the management) took it very ser-
iously (interview with Lok Kwee, 1/12/2005).
The first set of uniforms was provided free, but if a uniform became se-
verely stained (the uniforms needed to be clean at the start of each work
shift), torn or lost then the worker had to pay for a replacement out of
her own pocket. At the factory where Lok Kwee worked, a full uniform
costs approximately thirty Singapore dollars. Considering that female
wages in 1980 averaged between $200 to $400 per month (Khoo
1981d: 64), rising to $600 to $750 by 1990 (Lau 1993d: 111), the uni-
form of a factory worker was often treated with inordinate care by its
wearer (interview with Lok Kwee, 1/12/2005).
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At the factory on Kian Teck Lane, Sarah Chew was told to wear a pair
of safety overalls over a brown, half-sleeved blouse, a long skirt, and
brown rubber-soled canvas shoes. The distance between the skirt hem
and the knee, she was told on her first day, was not permitted to be less
than the width of a man’s palm. A QC operator or line supervisor
might pull individuals with suspicious-looking skirts aside for an in-
spection. Here the ‘male palm rule’ as the unit of measurement was re-
vealed to new factory workers, as the operators and supervisors were al-
ways of the appropriate gender, and they were usually eager to follow
up on the policy. The exceptions were, perhaps inevitably, when a
younger and more attractive worker decided to challenge the rules. As
Sarah Chew reminisced, ‘sometimes these girls were allowed to wear
skirts that were up to their thighs’ (interview with Sarah Chew, 13/1/
2005).
Disciplining appearance did not stop at uniforms, as personal effects
and accessories were often banned. Workers like Sarah Chew at the
Kian Teck Lane factory were told that any personal belongings that did
not fit into the pocket of one’s uniform were banned from the factory.
Large bins were placed in strategic corners of the factory floor for super-
visors to publicly dispose of ‘contraband’ that was brought inside,
whether by accident or purposefully. The most expensive item lost to
the bins, Sarah recalled, was a ‘Walkman’. Handbags were forbidden on
the International Road factory floor, ostensibly so that the workers did
not steal any of the lead components. ‘Who wants to take those useless
bits?’ Lok Kwee stated dismissively, ‘you can’t do anything with one or
two pieces of wire … it can’t even be a toothpick, it’s too soft!’ (interview
with Lok Kwee or is Sarah Crew , 1/12/2005).
All personal belongings were stored in assigned lockers, which work-
ers had access to during their shift. The lockers were used for common
items such as bottles of water, lunchboxes and umbrellas, which offered
some respite from the tropical sun or monsoons to and from work.
Locker checks were common, with supervisors conducting periodic spot
checks. The justification given by management was theft prevention.
They did it all the time, whenever they felt like it … no one dared
to bring anything embarrassing to work. People felt ashamed to
bring spare sanitary pads when they had their periods, as it was
too shameful … and what if he waved it around and made fun of
you? (interview, 6/12/2004).
The regimentation of the daily working routine, which kept the work-
force in line, was a common subject for all of the interviewees in this
study. It started at the beginning of your shift – 3.30 p.m. for Ngai
Leong, who worked at a Printed Circuit Board factory on Corporation
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Road in Jurong until 1986 – when you ‘punched in’. Under the watch-
ful gaze of security guards, Ngai Leong would retrieve her work card in
the general passageway that led from the factory’s foyer into the factory
itself until she arrived at one of six time-clock stations. She would insert
the work card into the clock to register the exact time (down to the sec-
ond) the operator showed up for work. The card was then placed in a
timecard holder above one’s workstation, where it would be checked by
the line supervisor.
Lateness was dealt with summarily, and it did not matter if someone
was late for work, or if someone got caught in a particularly long queue
at the time clock. If a worker was late, the supervisor would simply note
the exact amount of time an operator was late, on the card and on a cor-
responding docket that he kept with him. At the end of each month,
the amount of time missed by tardy workers would be tallied up and ap-
propriate action taken by the management. Workers who were more
than a half-an-hour late in total in a month were denied their year-end
bonus. Repeat offenders received disciplinary actions that ranged from
a lecture by one’s supervisor to dismissal in more persistent cases (in-
terview, 6/12/2004).
Workers were also often subjected to a ‘disciplining gaze’. Mean-
while, their movements in the workplace were monitored by security
guards, line supervisors, QC operators and the occasional manager. The
recollection of a day in Ai Lek’s work life provides a vivid and illuminat-
ing account on how this gaze operated. A bus would drop off a group
of some 30 to 40 female workers like herself to the telecommunications
factory in Ang Mo Kio just before 6 p.m.. They then filed around to-
wards the secured rear entrance of the plant. A watchful guard would
make sure that each woman was wearing her security badge, berating
the odd hapless victim for attempting to enter the factory without her
pass. Then they ‘punched in’ at the time clock, and from then on would
be carefully observed by surveillance cameras as they placed their be-
longings in their lockers. Here they would linger for a few minutes,
drinking coffee and catching up on the gossip. They were always acutely
aware of the security guards who passed the workers every other hour,
which was management’s strategy for deterring theft. Like soulless
glass eyes, security cameras, mounted strategically throughout the fac-
tory, made one conscious of one’s every action. QC operators would
keep track of idling younger employees on the assembly line, or those
who made mistakes due to inattentiveness. Line supervisors came by to
pick up the time cards and would check off an operator’s progress on
target sheets that were posted at every workstation. If someone was
slow, she could expect a sarcastic comment, while the workers who
were consistently slow were often humiliated ridiculed or rebuked (in-
terview with Ai Lek, 6/12/2004).
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Female workers who were involved in this project unanimously ac-
knowledged that they were constantly aware of being watched; for some
even the passage of time did not alleviate the stark consciousness of
unwavering surveillance (interview, 6/12/2004). Sarah Chew describes
some of these practices at her Kian Teck Lane workplace:
You just learn to accept it. Maybe for some people it’s harder be-
cause there’s no privacy. Everything you do, even the embarras-
sing things … you know, like picking your nose or adjusting your
clothes, someone will surely see it. If you try to take it easy when
you’re not supposed to, watch out! The company will make sure
you do OT (overtime) to make up for it. The really bad girls, they
get fired. Just like that. They can always replace you (interview,
13/1/2005).
But there were others who thought that the disciplining gaze in the fac-
tory was necessary. The need for order was paramount for some of the
workers, and can be understood as a manifestation of one of the PAP
state’s strongest claims to legitimacy in the everyday work environment
– the perpetuation of the belief that the ruling party had brought stabi-
lity and synchronisation to areas where there once was nothing but dis-
order and inefficiency. As Tim Harper notes, this was a discourse used
in the telling and teaching of national history, and the fostering of a
public memory that recalled the PAP’s role in creating ‘a bright new
dawn … [that] contrasted with the forces of chaos’ and creating a ‘bibli-
cal narrative of deliverance … [which] has served the regime well in un-
derscoring its role in Singapore’s success (Harper 2001: 6).’ An older
factory worker who had experienced the turbulent era of industrial rela-
tions in the 1950s and early 60s first-hand recalled that:
[Compared to the earlier factories, when] there were strikes all
the time and those of us who wanted to work couldn’t … I think
the factories later [during the 1980s] were a lot better. Most of us
wanted to earn money and raise our families. I worked through
those times, so I know … the strikers were always troublemakers
who wanted more for themselves … it’s good that the govern-
ment could get them under control (interview, 6/12/2004).
A considerably younger operator, Chua Kai Lin, offered a similar per-
spective. She has worked at a computer hard disk manufacturing plant
at Woodlands since the late 1980s. Safety and order were paramount if
one was to achieve one’s daily, weekly, and monthly productivity targets:
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The security is one thing, but it is not only about us stealing
from the factory. It is also about people stealing from each other,
or sabotaging each other’s progress [when people did not get
along] … All of this [security and surveillance] is necessary and
leads to a workplace where you can just concentrate on meeting
your target. That’s all that matters. To you and to the company …
when the company does well, you keep your job and maybe even
get a bonus. Everyone is happy. Take it from me, you cannot have
a productive factory if you try to run it any other way (interview,
19/1//2004).
Productivity as an Ideology
The target that Chua Kai Lin refers to is an important concept in the
factory world, both for the workers and their supervisors. Targets are
the number of components completed in a pre-determined period of
time. The nature of the factory – whether it manufactures shoes,
clothes, leads and interconnectors, microchips, or hard disks – usually
doesn’t matter, as targets were used consistently throughout the manu-
facturing industry.
Targets were prescribed at many levels. There were factory targets,
which were usually comprised of monthly objectives as well as an over-
all annual objective. There were daily targets, which were allocated pro-
portionately to each shift, a shift target, for instance, 100 hard disks
needed to pass the Final Assembly stage by the end of an eight-hour
shift. From there, an individual was also given a personal target for her
station that needed to be met daily. Weekly targets tended to vary, and
could be revised from one week to the next as production could be
stepped up in the event of greater demand (such as the launch of a new
product) or cut back when sales were less than expected. Daily targets
were more concrete, however, and a worker needed to meet the target,
except in the event where productivity was affected by factors beyond
her control, such as technical failures of assembly line equipment (in-
terview with Chua Kai Lin, 13/1/2005).
The line supervisor (or the workstation supervisor) was in charge of
ensuring that an individual met her target, and this is where the daily
drama of discipline through productivity unfolded. Working at a tele-
communications factory in Ang Mo Kio Industrial Park Two, Leng Yip
recalled being placed under constant pressure by her supervisor to meet
her target:
Once he knows who the slower workers are, he will keep coming
back [to their station]. He will look over their shoulders, and if
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he feels they are too slow he will show his frustration (the inter-
viewee makes several loud tsk noises and sighs in an exaggerated
fashion). It was very frustrating. After a while, some of the work-
ers would react badly whenever he walked over. Some would be-
gin to cry, and others would get nervous and make even more
mistakes (interview with Leng Yip, 16/12/2005).
Charts showing individual targets were often put up on the factory walls
(interview, 13/1/2005). These practices were designed to put more pres-
sure on poor performers, and simultaneously foster a sense of competi-
tiveness between the top performers. By most accounts, the charts
never achieved the intended effect, although having one’s performance
gauged so publicly was stressful to even the most seasoned factory
workers (interviews, 6/12/2004).
When someone’s station could not keep up with the production pace,
much of the factory would come to a standstill as the components be-
came bottlenecked. A number of workers described the use of shame
by supervisors to discipline female workers. Operators from other sta-
tions would be brought over temporarily to the affected post to help
clear up the blockage on the assembly line. Meanwhile the worker(s) re-
sponsible for the station in question would be ridiculed. ‘They would
say things like, wow, you managed to stop the whole factory. Well done!’
(interview, 13/1/2005) Ai Lek, who was subjected to similar treatment
once when her station was responsible for a ‘blockage’, remembered
that her supervisor spent the next few weeks mocking her. ‘So ah girl,
how many people do you need to be sent over to help you today to meet
your target?’ her supervisor would ask her at the start of her shift.
‘What could I say to him? All I could do was to try and prove that I
could reach my target even more so that he would shut up’ (interview
with Ai Lek, 6/12/2004).
The workers were also caught up in a broader, national drive of in-
creased productivity – essentially a time where employers were given
even greater control over their employees in the name of national inter-
est. In the early 1980s, the state began to insist that workers develop a
‘good work attitude’ to maintain Singapore’s competitive edge in the re-
gional race for winning new foreign investments. Productivity, and not
just cheap labour, was the buzzword of the 1980s for all those involved
in the manufacturing sector. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, in his 1981
May Day speech, exhorted:
The time has come for us to make a qualitative change in work
attitudes. The Singaporean is an individual achiever. The Singa-
porean must now learn to be a team achiever. He must realise
that he achieves more for himself by working smoothly in a team
124 ERNEST KOH
to help the team succeed. Greater team spirit is the secret of suc-
cess in our next state of economic development. Whether it is in
the manufacturing or in the service, it is co-operation amongst
fellow workers, and between workers and management, which
will increase productivity. This is the meaning of good work atti-
tude (cited in Rodan 1989: 161-162).
As Rodan further observes, Lee’s speech was followed by concerted at-
tempts by the PAP to ‘cement in the population’s consciousness the
close nexus between teamwork and productivity and … worker/employ-
er relations (Rodan 1989: 162)’. Amid the intense and relentless cam-
paign in the media to promote ‘productivity-consciousness’, a Commit-
tee on Productivity was established in April 1981, which was replaced
by the National Productivity Council in September of that same year
(Rodan 1989: 162). The disciplining of the nation’s workforce, by im-
posing a national work ethic and tying productivity to self-interest, was
underway.
In 1987, on the heels of a global recession and endorsed by the
NTUC, the NWC helped introduce a flexible wage system that would al-
low employers to withhold one per cent of an employee’s salary as part
of an Annual Variable Component (AVC) of the wage structure. The
AVC was designed primarily with the manufacturing industry in mind,
and was quickly adopted by most corporations that had production cen-
tres located on the island (Labour Rights Report 2003: 16-17). The with-
held sum could either be paid out to the employee at the end of the
year as a ‘bonus’ at the employer’s discretion, or ‘to offset an antici-
pated drop on production (Labour Rights Report 2003: 16).’ The rationale
for the AVC was that it gave employees an immediate and practical in-
terest in ensuring that the company was productive and performed well
while ‘protecting employers from sharp economic downturns … and by
tying wages to production … this system enables the employer to reduce
or remove these payments if they need to reduce wage costs’ (Labour
Rights Report 2003: 16). In reality, the AVC gave manufacturers even
more control over their workers. Failure to meet productivity standards
would essentially entail a reduction in wages.
Overcoming the Patriarchal Factory
It is tempting to conclude that the female factory workers were helpless
victims of circumstances. Conceding that the structural processes that
shaped the experience of everyday life for female factory workers were
absolute, Lim suggests:
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On the one hand, Third World women workers are obedient, dis-
ciplined and conscientious, which makes them good, subservient
and productive workers. On the other hand, their naïveté when
confronted with multinational labor practices aimed at raising
their work effort without commensurate monetary compensation
makes it relatively easy for firms to raise productivity without
raising costs, thereby raising profits considerably (Lim 1978: 27).
But the value of People’s History comes to the fore when we apply the
evidence to closer scrutiny. Instead of regarding workers as a mere face-
less mass of numbers and statistics, when we recover the lived experi-
ences of the workers through a combination of oral history and micro-
sociology we can trace signs of agency. The world of the factory was a
complex space, where, rather than complete male hegemony, one can
show the tangled skeins of negotiation and resistance in key areas of
everyday life.
For instance, the female operators were not completely subservient to
factory management with regards to productivity. Although the labour
laws were stacked against them in Singapore, the laws did not require
them to work overtime unless they explicitly chose to do so. When a
production site looked like it was falling short of its weekly or monthly
target, or if production needed to be increased on short notice, line or
station supervisors would pass around record sheets for volunteers
among the women who were willing to work extra shifts or put in over-
time (‘OT’). It is at this point that the supervisor and the factory worker
could negotiate. As one worker described it, the women could ‘punish’
the most aggravating supervisors. A rude supervisor who was consid-
ered unreasonable and verbally abusive, one consistently made un-
wanted sexual advances towards the operators, or even supervisors who
were seen as ‘weak’ (in terms of authority) were all potentially ignored
when the OT list came around:
He (the station supervisor) was so angry when nobody volun-
teered. We had all agreed that no one would do OT for him to
teach him a lesson [ for verbally abusing some of the workers a
few weeks earlier] … He knew that we were doing it on purpose,
but we all had excuses. One needed to go to a parent-teacher
meeting, one needed to visit a sick relative, or felt weak because
‘auntie’ had arrived (a Chinese colloquialism for a woman having
her period). He was so angry! However, in the end, serves him
right … after a few times, he became noticeably more polite.
Unity is strength. That’s what we learned quickly. (interview, 6/
12/2004)
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Similarly, Ai Lek would have an opportunity to take revenge of a kind
on a supervisor who had mocked her mercilessly:
[Once the mocking began], all the workers refused to do OT for
him after that. I felt very happy that my ‘sisters’ were standing
up for me. Serves him right if he gets a dressing-down from the
production manager! When he was moved to supervise a differ-
ent line and a new supervisor replaced him, all of us were happy
to do OT. In fact, we deliberately volunteered to do OT before he
could even ask us. I know that he (her former supervisor) knew
about this and it must have made him angry. Good! (interview
with Ai Lek, 6/12/2004).
As Ai Lek describes it, supervisors who were unable to rally enough
workers to pull an extra shift or to put in overtime to meet a variable
target faced the prospect of having to explain the situation to his super-
ior, the production manager. There was no direct threat to a line super-
visor’s job security when the female workers banded together to disci-
pline ‘errant’ supervisors, or at least there was none discernable from
the oral histories collected in this study. However, having it revealed
that one cannot control one’s own line was, to say the least, considered
severely embarrassing and damaging to a supervisor’s workplace repu-
tation. Supervisors who lost control of ‘their girls’ were labelled ‘cuck-
olds’ – in other words, men who had lost (sexual) control over their wi-
ves – by the female workers (interview with Ai Lek, 6/12/2004).
In the odd case when upper management actually intervened in a si-
tuation that seemed to be getting out of hand it was usually to switch
supervisors between stations. In short, despite the nature of the power
relations in the factory it is clear that supervisors could not rely on
‘sound and fury’ to get what they wanted from their workers. In the
longer term, the daily conduct of supervisor-worker relations directly
correlated to a line’s ability to meet productivity targets. A system of
limited ‘bartering’ was thus commonplace in the factories, where the
women would expect certain favours (such as extra or longer tea breaks,
or more polite treatment from one’s supervisor) in return for coopera-
tion. Thus, discipline often ended up being a reciprocal affair (inter-
view, 6/12/2004).
When it came to the ideology of productivity itself, workers were
quick to question who the beneficiary of increases in productivity actu-
ally was. At Kian Teck Lane, one worker remembered a constant topic
over morning breakfast: how much money their superiors were making
and the bonuses that were being lavished on upper management for
meeting company targets (interview, 13/1/2005). It is not surprising that
workers were aware at some level of the hypocrisy of the state’s produc-
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tivity rhetoric. A lack of education does not preclude one from under-
standing how capital economies thrive.
This can be further corroborated by presenting quantitative data at a
broader level. Garry Rodan observes in his research notes that a survey
conducted in August 1982 by the National Productivity Board revealed
that 70 per cent of 590 interviewed workers felt that an increase in pro-
ductivity was beneficial to the company, and not to the worker. Even
more strikingly, the survey implies an obvious willingness to toe the
proverbial line where productivity was concerned, but to go no further
than one had to retain one’s job, with less than 17 per cent of the re-
spondents inclined to participate in work activities that could raise pro-
ductivity (Rodan 1989: 238).
The resistance to the rhetoric presented by both the company and the
state can be corroborated when we look at the actions of individual
workers. At the Woodlands factory, Chua Kai Lin quickly learned that
the most important skill she needed to develop in her first month of
work was the ability to develop an ‘inner clock’ at her station, which, in
the early stages of her factory life, involved ensuring that the hard disks’
internal wires were neatly folded under four brackets, each no wider
than a millimetre, before being sent off down the line. A consistent
pace was necessary for two related reasons. Firstly, one did not want to
work too slowly because that would mean the prescribed target would
be missed, and hence a worker needed to learn how to get the job done
within a specific period of time. At the same time, one did not want to
work too fast, as Kai Lin reveals:
If you work too fast you may make mistakes and get a lot of
items returned to you from the QC operator. That means that
you have to start over again. However, if you work too fast they
may also raise your target – you can do so well, maybe you can
do even better, right? That’s how the company thought. You put
yourself under extra pressure, and there’s no reward for it. There
isn’t a cash prize or a big bonus if you surpass your target all the
time so why bother? You also need to be careful because if you
break your target people will think that you are trying too hard …
The supervisors will say, ‘See, Kai Lin can do all this in the same
time as you. Why can’t you?’ All this in order to inspire the
others, but it doesn’t work that way. That’s the quickest way to
get people to dislike you. By being too good (interview, 19/1//
2004).
The women in the patriarchal factories were also able to pursue other
strategies in order to circumvent the discipline. Youth, gender, and char-
isma could all be combined to one’s advantage if a worker so wished.
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While many women were subjected to unwanted advances from male
superiors, some were willing to transform the patriarchal workplace to
their advantage. Younger female operators often played on the paterna-
listic nature of the factory to gain benefits. Ngai Leong recalled how one
young colleague constantly escaped reprimand by playacting when the
line supervisor came to check on her progress. ‘She was so good at act-
ing. She would pout her lips and speak in a coy girlish way so that he
would overlook her poor progress (interview conducted by author, 6/1/
2/2004).’ Her supervisor, an older man in his fifties, would merely
shake his head and chide her gently, before moving on to the next sta-
tion. If her backlog was particularly great, he would ask one of the other
operators to help her. Once, Ngai Leong recalled, he even did some of it
himself (interview with Ngai Leong, 6/12/2004).
Other women were willing to employ more ‘adult-like’ charms. At
Ang Mo Kio, Leng Yip described how one supervisor – an older, mar-
ried man – had the sexual attentions of more than one female worker.
They had responded to his sexual advances, and it became known that
those who gave in to his sexual advances were either promoted to better
positions (presumably if they so wished), showered with gifts, or both
(interview with Leng Yip, 16/12/2005).
Furthermore, despite attempts to create clear boundaries between the
workplace and one’s personal space, many workers were able to blur
the lines between the two. The experience of factory life became far
more manageable, and more humane when one was able to form com-
munal relations. The monotony of meeting targets was often broken by
jokes and playfulness wherever the opportunity presented itself. Ai Lek
recalled how her colleagues would spontaneously burst into any num-
ber of popular Mandarin songs toward the end of a shift, while the
younger workers would sometimes break into a small dance, holding a
pretend microphone in their hands while gesticulating in an exagger-
ated fashion. Those who did not know the lyrics joined in anyway (inter-
view with Ai Lek, 6/12/2004). Meanwhile, Chua Kai Lin remembered
how her closest friend in the factory, an assembler who worked at the
station next to hers, would sometimes sneak up on her from behind
and tap her on one shoulder before quickly ducking behind the other,
so that a puzzled Kai Lin would wonder for a moment who it was (In-
terview with Chua Kai Lin, 19/11/2004).
These small acts of playfulness, trite and almost self-indulgent at
times, were remembered fondly as being the best parts of the female
worker experience in the factories of Singapore. And it is critical that
history remembers this as being more than simply an individual’s nos-
talgic engagements with the past. Life in the factories, disciplined
though it was for the women, was never totally wretched either because
of the humanity that they were able to bring into each other’s lives.
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However, their ‘Singapore Story’ was not romantic, nor should it be ro-
manticised. When we take history out of the community of Chinese fe-
male factory workers, give it the voice of life, and recover even the smal-
lest and most mundane details of everyday existence, the lives of the fe-
male workers speak to us as individuals and as part of a collective. They
narrate a Singapore Story that illuminates the tangled web of structural
forces and individual agency, while neither totally subservient nor liber-
ating oneself through self-determinism. Theirs is a story of constant
discipline, being disciplined and disciplining themselves. Theirs is ‘the
Singapore Story’ from below.
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LOCATING IDENTITIES ACROSS BORDERS

7 Textualising the Baba Identity:
Insights into the Making of a Bibliography1
Bonny Tan
Introduction
During a Heritage Week held in October 1986, over one hundred Baba
titles were donated to the National Library in Singapore by a woman
named Linda Lim (Hoe 1986). This private collection was later trans-
ferred to Singapore’s National Library. It reveals, among other things,
the hybrid culture of the Peranakan Chinese or Babas of the Straits Set-
tlements with its own language, customs and history. Lim’s kind dona-
tion supplements the existing collection of publications in the National
Library, which documents the history of the Babas to as far back as the
mid-nineteenth century, many of which have been relatively neglected.
Although there has been an increasing interest in the Baba commu-
nity, there has yet to be a single bibliography dedicated to this subject.
The closest is Lewis’s (2000) online listing, which briefly lists related ti-
tles while Clammer’s (1980) appended bibliographic essay is often re-
ferred to for its highlights of key titles. Even so, these listings remain
cursory, with brief annotations, while excluding obscure sources or ma-
terial in different formats such as those found online.
Academic dissertations and scholarly publications on aspects of the
Baba culture, social identity and history have otherwise served as re-
sources for bibliographic references on the community. Some of the
better known are Tan Chee Beng’s The Baba of Melaka (1988) and Ru-
dolph’s (1998) ground-breaking tome entitled Reconstructing Identities:
A Social History of the Babas in Singapore, which provides one of the
most comprehensive bibliographies, capturing not only the cultural
identity but also the historical and political contexts of being ‘Baba’. In
his book’s bibliography, Rudolph includes rare newspaper and journal
articles dating from the late nineteenth century to the post-World War
Two period. However, these listings are organised alphabetically by
author and does not arrange the sources by subject, thus inhibiting
further research.
There have also been several bibliographies of Peranakan literary
works found in local as well as overseas libraries but the focus has lar-
gely been on works written by the Indonesian Peranakan Chinese.2
Otherwise, the mention of Babas in bibliographic listings is, more often
than not, only a subset of a larger documentation of works on other
minority groups such as the Malays.3
Complementing these academic monographs are subject-specific
publications on the Baba material and social cultures, which provides
extensive bibliographical sources on these subjects. This list includes
Ho Wing Meng’s series on the Straits Chinese material culture while
other authors have written about the Nonya kebaya (Endon Mahmood
2002, 2004), the rumah Baba (Lee and Chen 1998, 2006), and Perana-
kan-styled art works (Tung 1997, 2003). Social aspects of Baba commu-
nity such as weddings (Cheo 1983), folk beliefs (Cheo and Muriel 1988)
and the language (Gwee 2006) have also become the focus of entire
publications. Even so, all of the above-mentioned works have bibliogra-
phies, which adopt an alphabetical-by-author listing rather than one by
subject. Recent publications released at the turn of the twenty-first cen-
tury have yet to be documented, which means that an updated and sys-
tematic bibliography was more than necessary.
The Baba Bibliography
In 2007, the Baba Bibliography was published by the National Library of
Singapore. It consists of a compilation of a select and annotated listing
of all known holdings of publications concerning the Babas within the
National Library in Singapore and of dissertations in the Libraries of
the National University of Singapore. The Bibliography is broadly seg-
mented into nine subject areas, with annotations providing short sum-
maries to each entry and an appended author-title index.
There were two motives for compiling and publishing this compre-
hensive bibliography. Firstly, in reviewing the span of published materi-
als on the Babas held in Singapore’s National Library, librarians were
able to identify gaps in the collection and thus prioritise collection activ-
ities. For example, the bibliography revealed that there were many Baba
plays staged even at the turn of the twenty-first century, but very few of
the plays’ scripts were ever published. Secondly, the Bibliography aims
to serve as a tool for academics in defining new research areas. In
bringing together diverse aspects of the community in a single publica-
tion, the Baba Bibliography can offer a multi-disciplinary approach in
the study of the Babas and serve as a venue for the articulation of a
more holistic understanding of the Baba community, its hybrid identity
and hybrid culture.
More importantly, the Baba Bibliography is possibly the first fully an-
notated bibliography that brings together disparate subjects particularly
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the factors that contributed to the making of the Baba identity. Other
than merely building upon the existing bibliographies, the Baba Biblio-
graphy includes unexplored articles found in dailies, serials and ephe-
mera published between the mid-nineteenth and the twenty-first cen-
tury. Selectiveness has been limited in favour of comprehensiveness
especially in areas where limited research has been conducted.
Amongst these, articles that mention the Straits Chinese and its accul-
turated ways found in The Straits Chinese Magazine (1897-1907) and The
Peranakan (1995-2006) have been annotated. Along with print re-
sources, non-print materials such as CDs, DVDs, audiotapes and web-
sites have been listed. Theses and unique items found in Singapore’s
National University Libraries were also included to enhance scholarly
research potential.
Defining the Baba
Defining an ethnic community and the identity of a community re-
mains a complex task for the fundamental reason that identity and cul-
tural markers are fluid and seldom definitive. In defining the Baba
community for the purpose of this Bibliography, ethnic, geographical,
historical and cultural parameters were used as guidelines. The perspec-
tives of both the academic and the community members were taken
into account. The definition is, of course, not absolute and is used pri-
marily to frame the contents selected for the Bibliography.
Ethnically, the Babas are Chinese men who came from the Southern
provinces of China (mainly Fujian). Having taken women from the Ma-
lay Archipelago as their wives and the region as their adopted homeland,
they developed a hybridised culture that merges local rituals and colo-
nial values whilst retaining fundamental elements of Chinese identity.
They are thus seen as a localised community of acculturated Chinese.4
Geographically, the Babas resided in the British Straits Settlements,
namely Melaka, Penang and Singapore. Many Singapore Baba families
trace their lineage to Melakan Baba families. However, Babas from
these communities are not viewed equally. In the eyes of this line of Ba-
bas, the Penang Babas are considered as less acculturated, retaining a
stronger Chinese culture especially in their language. Their dress and
food have also developed a distinctive nyonya style different from their
Southern cousins in Melaka and Singapore. Png (1969) categorised the
Penang Babas as being a part of an outer concentric circle of the core
Baba identity, which he termed ‘Straits Chinese’. This was because Pe-
nang Babas were generally Hokkien-speaking rather than Malay-speak-
ing. Khoo (1996, 37) notes that the sinkek, or China-born Chinese who
had recently arrived in the Straits Settlements, had outnumbered the
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Babas in Penang and thus absorbed the Baba community even prior to
the British departure in the 1950s. By the 1940s, two-thirds of the Chi-
nese in Penang were born in China.
In the larger geographic domain, Babas are often associated with the
Indonesian Peranakan Chinese. However, the Babas from the Malay Pe-
ninsula have developed their own vocabulary of material and domestic
culture distinct from the Indonesian community. Thus, although both
communities are known as Peranakan Chinese, those from Indonesia
do not reflect the same cultural heritage as those from the Straits Settle-
ments. The Baba kinship ties have also extended into Thailand to in-
clude the Phuket Baba Chinese who are linked to the Straits Settlement
Babas through the Penang Babas. In 2006, the Baba Convention, which
is an annual event amongst the Peranakan Associations of Penang, Sin-
gapore and Melaka, was held at Phuket for the first time. The historical
and cultural workings of this community have been studied by recent
scholars in view of the renewed ties between the Phuket and Straits
Baba communities (Khoo 1995 and 2006). Studies of acculturated Chi-
nese in the region have also often made mention of the Babas when
discussing the Peranakan-like Chinese in Kelantan (Thurgood, 1998
and Tan, 1984 & 2000) and the Chitty Indians of Melaka (Dhoraising-
ham 2006) although technically, these communities are unrelated to
the Babas because they are not ethnically Chinese.
Historically, several Baba families trace their lineage to Melaka to as
far back as the seventeenth century. The legendary marriage of a Chi-
nese consort, Hang Li Po, to a Melakan prince, Sultan Mansur Shah, in
the fifteenth century commonly serves as the genesis mythology for the
Baba community.5 However, it is only in the late nineteenth century
and early twentieth century that a hybridised culture began to flourish,
as the Babas’ wealth, legal and political standing strengthened. The Ja-
panese Occupation diminished this wealth as many Baba families suf-
fered the same persecutions as other Chinese families in Malaya. After
World War II, however, with, decolonisation, the devolution of the
Straits Settlements and the repatriation of the British, the Babas
struggled to keep their political standing in the midst of rising national-
ism. Although many Babas such as Tan Cheng Lock, Tan Siew Sin, Lee
Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee took on important political positions
either in Singapore or Malaysia, as a community, the Babas chose to
submit their loyalty to the British. The end of World War II did much
to strip them of their wealth, and with the coming of nationhood, their
political prominence further met with a rapid decline (Rudolph 1998:
186-205).
Decline and estrangement, however, provided the essential pretext for
the Babas’ once privately guarded material culture and domestic arte-
facts to be exposed on the open market. Fuelled by an increased interest
136 BONNY TAN
in Baba goods, by the 1970s Baba culture had begun to project outside
of the community. Books on the community and frequent social events
such as plays and exhibitions propelled the Baba culture into the public
sphere. Although many claim these were the death throes of Baba cul-
ture, elements such as Baba theatre, Peranakan food, nyonya (female)
attire, and even the Baba language were, by the turn of the twenty-first
century, adopted by both Singaporeans and Malaysians as part of their
own unique national cultures. The Babas are popularly recognised today
by their fusion of Chinese and Malay cultural expressions. Some exam-
ples are the Baba Malay language, their brightly coloured attire and
their unique cuisine. Straits Chinese architecture and elaborate social
customs are often typified as Baba even though these houses and rituals
are in actual fact not unique to the community.
Ethnic boundaries and cultural markers remain cumbersome when
used to define the Babas. Although Babas are adamant that to qualify as
a member of the community, one must be descended from authentic
hybrid parentage of Chinese Hokkien and Malay mix, be able to speak
Baba Malay and the women must wear Nyonya kebaya, in reality, many
so-called Babas today adopted these forms rather than being born into
them. Even during their heyday, the community was not that easily de-
fined and only an elite few would have qualified. Chua Ai Lin (2001) po-
sits that the Baba identity and ethnic category should be defined along a
continuum, rather than as discrete classifications (Chua 2001: 44).
Having said this, simplistic community markers were invariably used
for the Baba Bibliography and this is manifested in a few broad subjects.
The first category, ‘Literature and Publishing’, lists translated Chinese
classics written in Baba Malay. It also includes modern writing, poetry
and modern plays that refer to Baba life and culture along with their
critical analyses. The ‘Language’ section covers dictionaries and word
lists as well as linguistic and language studies related to Baba Malay or
early Chinese-Malay adaptations in the Malay Peninsula. ‘Social Life’ in-
cludes studies on Baba demography, social history spanning the pre-
World Wars (late nineteenth century) to independence (1960s), studies
of the Peranakan associations, family and kinship, religion and festiv-
ities, culinary culture, education and entertainment. Meanwhile, ‘Mate-
rial Culture’ includes resources on Baba architecture and place, attire,
furniture, ceramics and porcelain, silverware, the visual arts and exhibi-
tions and auctions. The fifth section covers ‘Business Enterprise’ and is
followed by ‘Biographies’. The seventh section, ‘Area Studies’, covers
the Straits Settlements of Melaka, Penang and Singapore, as well as
new studies of the Babas in Singapore, Malaysia and Southeast Asia.
The Baba Bibliography concludes with ‘Related Studies’, which touches
upon communities similar to the Peranakan in Kelantan and Terengga-
nu, as well as the Thai Peranakans and the Indian Peranakans.
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Baba Literature
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a tangible
Baba presence was evident in the publishing world as seen in the num-
ber of publications produced by the Babas and the various domiciled
ethnic communities of the Straits Settlements. These titles ranged from
translated Chinese classics and poetry to dailies and periodicals, which
were written in Baba Malay. This period of active publishing coincided
with the rise of the political and social influence of the Babas, which
has been dubbed as the ‘Golden Age of the Babas’ by some (Rudolph
1998: 226).
In discussing Baba literature, the works that often come to mind are
translations of Chinese classics into Baba Malay, familiarly known as
Chrita dahulu-kala [Tales of Long Ago]. These were the pulp fiction of the
day, and, although they were recognised as part of the corpus of Chi-
nese literature, were neither original works by the Baba community,
nor of great literary value for the Chinese. Despite the apparent lack of
literary significance, the books provide insights into the Baba commu-
nity as they are written completely in Baba Malay. They have proven to
be a popular field of study with pioneering works by the likes of Sal-
mon (1977) and Tan Chee Beng (1981). Salmon, well known for her bib-
liographical listing of literary works by Indonesian Chinese (Salmon
1981), also conducted studies of Baba literature as found in the Malayan
Peninsula (1977). Her writings are mainly in French (Salmon 1972,
1974) with some translated into English (Salmon 1977). Yang Guiyi
(Yang Quee Yee) has also written on Baba literature, and, as a member
of the Chinese-speaking community, often gives an insider’s perspective
on this subject.6
Yoong’s thesis (2001) developed a bibliometric study in the vein of
Salmon’s annotated bibliography (1981). Building on earlier studies of
tales translated into Baba, he analysed the content of the publications,
providing details of their physical descriptions and statistics of library
holdings of these works. He also examined the background of the crea-
tors of these publications, namely the translators, publishers, and, in
some instances, the illustrators. The stories are then categorised based
on broad subjects such as history, romance, folklore and tales of chi-
valry. Yoong used these distinctions and categories thereafter to trace
publishing trends.
Although many of these studies touch on trends in publication and
the personalities behind the books, most of them simply list these titles.
However, the Chrita dahulu-kala offers unexplored storehouses of mate-
rial dealing with the Baba identity. Many of the translators were trilin-
gual in English, Baba Malay and Chinese. They had travelled extensively
around the Malay Archipelago and to as far away as Japan. Yet, little is
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known about the translators such as Seow Chin San, Wan Boon Seng
and Chan Kim Boon. Certain questions remain unanswered such as
why specific Chinese stories were selected. It would also be interesting
to compare the original stories with their loose Baba translations and
the footnotes of the translators to see how these reflect the mindset of
both the translator and reader of the day. The stories also often include
glossaries of Chinese-Baba Malay and/or English explanations, which
serve as some of the earliest dictionaries and wordlists of Baba terms
used in context. Moreover, the publications often include personal let-
ters, mainly commendations of the translated stories, along with com-
mentaries by the translator concerning the sale of the titles or an-
nouncements of upcoming books. Long-running series included diverse
writings that ranged from world news to jokes and riddles. But these
are only cursorily mentioned in the studies of these Chinese transla-
tions. Teo L.T. (1980) examined Khoo Peng Yam’s (1935-1936) Khian
Leong Koon Yew Kang with regards to its use of Baba Malay and the in-
tegrity of the translation compared to the original. Hers is probably the
only in-depth study of a specific Baba Malay translated text.
Educated Babas took the early lead in publishing in the Straits Settle-
ments, not only in the range and number of publications but also in initi-
ating the use of Romanised Malay over the Jawi script, which ultimately
benefited both the Baba and Malay literate communities. During the late
nineteenth century, publication of the earliest RomanisedMalay7 and even
Chinese newspapers8 were attributed to Babas. Newspapers such as Kabar
Slalu (1924), Surat Khabar Peranakan [Straits Chinese Herald] (1924) and A
Friend of Babas (1906-1908) included articles in the Baba tongue. Other
periodicals associated with the Baba community such as The Straits Chi-
nese Magazine (1897-1907) and The Straits Chinese Annual (1930) were
published exclusively in English, showing the Anglo-colonial influence on
the community. These periodicals provide an invaluable window into the
community’s interests and concerns at the time when the Babas were at
the height of their political and social standing.
Besides news, editorial pieces and commentaries, the periodicals also
published short stories, plays, poetry and dondang sayang lyrics. Thus
far, only Holden (1998, 2003-2005) has paid any attention to these
short stories, especially those found in The Straits Chinese Magazine,
which he considers to be some of the earliest local literary works. More-
over, there are a few studies that analyse the content, context, distribu-
tion, audience and publishers of these periodicals. Baba writings and
periodicals at the turn of the twentieth century often fall under the
study of Romanised Malay publishing9 or Chinese publishing but indi-
vidual studies that focused solely on these Baba resources remain lim-
ited. The only studies on Baba periodicals are Nur Aidah’s (1979) on
the Bintang Timor and Lim Fong Nee’s (1994), which explores Straits
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Chinese identity as it was portrayed in The Straits Chinese Magazine and
The Straits Chinese Monthly.
The published serials do not necessarily reflect the literary strengths
of the Baba, who are renowned for their poetic and musical skills. Other
than a few published sources, the melodious rhyming and wit found in
dondang sayang have not been preserved and have all but faded away.
There are early-twentieth-century limited collections of quatrains (Chan
K.B. 1908), poetry (Tan P.T. 1916), dondang sayang songs (Koh H.T.
1911-1916) and even scores (Boey, Lee and Lim 1924). Sound recordings
and videos of the traditional joget and dondang sayang events are unfor-
tunately rare. Amend (1998) highlights the fact that ‘Peranakan Chinese
musicians do not record or publicly perform dondang sayang unless it is
for a family gathering of some kind or an event associated with the Baba
community as a whole. The reason for this is not that the Baba culture
is reclusive but that it is exclusive.’ (Amend 1998: 92-93). Nevertheless,
Tan Sooi Beng (1996), in his study of 78-RPM Malay records, notes that
the National Sound Archives in the UK holds a large collection of re-
cords by the Gramophone Company that dates from the 1900s. The
EMI Archives has the only collection of Gaisberg’s of Malay 78 RPM re-
cords and these two repositories could be explored further to see if they
include any Babas recordings. The dearth of actual material, published
or performed, has, however, not limited the study of the poetic art of
dondang sayang. At least two academic studies (Amend 1998 and Low K.
C. 1976) and one book (Thomas 1986) have been published, besides
several in-depth newspaper articles, all of which make some reference
to the Baba form of dondang sayang (Yusnor 1985).
On the other hand, the analysis of traditional Baba poetry is limited.
Only Ding Choo Ming (2002, 2004) has taken pains to analyse them
for their literary value. New publications in this field in recent years
show a fresh take on the Peranakan’s poetic style. Chee (2006) adds a
new dimension to the study of Baba poetry as his modern works are
written in the Penang Baba Hokkien dialect rather than the Baba Malay
used by the Melakans and Singaporeans. Chee published both tradi-
tional ditties and compositions of his own, accompanied by photo-
graphs of Baba artefacts and short summaries of customs and culture.
The translations by Lim Poh Keng are carefully rhymed in English.
Kwok’s (2005) more simplified compilation of Baba sayings exemplifies
this growing interest in Baba verse and anecdote.
Closely related to the dondang sayang is the wayang Peranakan. The
bangsawan, although of Malay origin and culture, exercised a strong in-
fluence on the wayang Peranakan (Rudolph 1998, 330-331). In fact, it is
one of the few arts practiced by the Babas (though not specific to them)
that was analysed contemporaneously (Shaik 1898 and Wilkinson
1897). Tan Sooi Beng (1997) remains an authority on this subject, pro-
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viding one of the few academic insights into the evolution of the
wayang Peranakan in the broader context of the bangsawan. Articles on
Baba performing arts, theatre groups and performances are difficult to
find despite the wayang Peranakan being a regular communal event
since before the Second World War.
A new interest in Peranakan plays was ignited with the performance
of Felix Chia’s Pileh Menantu in June 1984. In successfully reinventing
a modernised form of the wayang Peranakan, a host of Peranakan plays
followed, which ranged from the caricatured matriarch in a predictable
domestic comedy of errors, popular song and dance items, to literary
gems like Emily of Emerald Hill (Kon 1989), which has gained interna-
tional recognition. The plays not only serve as a form of entertainment
for the Baba community but have also made the Baba culture accessible
to a wider audience, as well as helping to shape a common Singaporean
identity. In fact, Peterson (2001) suggests that plays like Emily were in-
strumental in making code-mixing and code-switching, now commonly
heard in Singlish, acceptable in local theatre. Yet, the modern Baba play,
initially successful, has been criticised for being predictable and shal-
low, rife with caricatures and rehashed storylines. Besides Emily, how-
ever, Robert Yeo’s (1996, 45) call for staging plays beyond simple do-
mestic scenes to truly highlight the lives of real-life Baba heroes has yet
to be taken up. Nevertheless, Baba plays and musicals have become an
annual event, drawing the community and the interested together to ap-
preciate the re-enactments of the wayang Peranakan of the past.
Audio-visual recordings of some of the Gunong Sayang Association’s
productions are available on DVD and CD, but many of their earlier per-
formances captured independently on video in the National Library col-
lection are rapidly deteriorating. However, aside from the publication of
the more familiar plays, very few Peranakan play scripts are found in
any collection since many of them remain unpublished. Play reviews
published in the local dailies offer possibly the only accessible source
for significant details of these plays. Besides giving the storyline, these
articles also provide insights into audience response, the use of the Baba
language, the playwright and actors’ perspectives and the impact of the
performance on the Baba community. As for analyses of these plays,
although there are more than a few articles on specific plays, there are
only a limited number of scholarly studies of this recent phenomenon
of modern Peranakan plays (Pakir 1986, 1989, 2005; Yeo 1996).
Determining publications that can be considered modern Peranakan
literary works remains a tricky exercise especially since Baba Malay as a
marker for identifying community membership has become redundant
since English has been adopted as the language of communication for
most Babas. The Baba Bibliography nevertheless has added a few titles
of modern works, which reflect the Baba culture or have Babas as their
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main characters or protagonists. Many are about nyonyas in pre-war Ma-
laya (Chin J.M. 1988; Chin K.O. 1984). Noteworthy is Yeap’s (1992)
book, entitled Of Comb, Powder and Rouge, which was written in a light
and lyrical style to capture the perspective of an early-twentieth-century
nyonya and gives a voice to a once cloistered lifestyle. There is even a
children’s book on Peranakan cats living at Emerald Hill and dressed in
cutesy kebayas (Kane 1986). Other titles are included in the Bibliography
because they are written by well-known Babas (Chia F. 1984 and Wee
H.C. 1993). In most of these writings, the context is usually Baba life in
and around the 1920s. These modern writings are thus not expressions
of the Baba present but rather reminiscences of the community past.
New technologies such as digitisation and the creation of databases
make these resources more accessible for further studies. For example,
the Institute of the Malay World and Civilisation (ATMA) has created a
portal – Malay Civilization – hosting information on collections of Malay
and Baba works. Poetry and dondang sayang lyrics published in books
and newspapers between 1899 and 1940s can be found in the Pantun
Baba database, which is part of the Malay Civilization portal. These in-
clude Shaer Almarhoem (1896) by Na Tian Piet, Panah Pranakan (Wan
Boon Seng)’s poetry in Sri Pranakan (1932), Wan Boon Seng’s (1933)
Nyanyi-an extra-turns and pantons and Wee Hock Keng’s (1963) Sha’er
San Pek Eng Tai. Many of these are no longer extant and are difficult to
find. The Singapore Digitised Books online portal of the National Li-
brary of Singapore also offers digital copies of Baba Malay works such
as Chrita orang yang chari slamat (Shellabear 1905) and Sam Kok or the
Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Chan K.B. 1892-1896). As technology
makes rare works more accessible, it is hoped scholarly research in this
field will expand.
Baba Language
Baba Malay has a Chinese linguistic framework but a Malay vocabulary
with added Chinese loanwords, mainly from the Hokkien dialect. Baba
Malay was used mainly by the Baba communities in Melaka and, there-
after, Singapore. Meanwhile, Babas in Penang used Baba Hokkien or
Penang Hokkien instead. At the turn of the twentieth century, Baba Ma-
lay was not just the language of a select community but ‘the dialect of
commerce and the lingua franca of the Straits Settlements’ (Tan C.B.
1988, 121).
Shellabear’s essay on Baba Malay is considered one of the earliest
studies of the language (Shellabear 1913). Contemporaneous language
studies were mainly word lists and dictionaries of Malay for the Chi-
nese or for the British (Hamilton 1924; Lin 1900). It was only at the
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end of the twentieth century, when there was a revived interest in the
Baba culture, that dictionaries and Baba Malay word lists were actually
published. These are primarily the work of one man, Gwee Thian Hock
(1993, 2006). In recent years, Penang Peranakan Tan Choon Hoe
(2001) has also published a guidebook of the Penang Hokkien dialect
while Baba Philip Chan (2007) created a workbook to practice Baba Ma-
lay. Works increasingly added to this pool of linguistic knowledge will
form an invaluable resource for new word studies.
It is in the sociolinguistic application of the language that Baba Malay
is studied in greater detail. Motivated by the perceived decline in lan-
guage use, a dying generation of Baba Malay-speaking Peranakans and
the need to capture the social and historical context of language use,
several academic studies were undertaken to analyse Baba Malay. These
include Tan’s (1980, 1993) on understanding the Baba’s language as a
dialect of Malay; Sonny Lim’s (1981), which considers the language of
the Straits Chinese; Pakir’s (1986), which gives a linguistic analysis of
the language; Cheong’s (1992) with reference to naming and addres-
sing in the language; Chung’s (1992), which is a sociolinguistic study
on politeness in Baba Malay; Yun Weili’s (1996), which provides one of
a few studies of the language in Chinese; Adele Lee’s (1999), which fo-
cuses particularly on grammar and Gabriel Wee’s (2000) study on into-
nation. This simple survey of publications on the socio-linguistics of
Baba Malay shows the wide breadth of research areas in this field.
However, few have turned to existing print sources for the study of
the Baba language. The Baba language was, for example, used in early
Christian publications in the Straits Settlements. Shellabear was instru-
mental in translating some of these works and in particular, the publica-
tion of the first New Testament or Kitab Perjanjian Bharu (1913) in Lower
Malay for the Straits Chinese. The nineteenth-century Chinese classic
tales translated into Baba Malay along with the Baba newspapers and
periodicals of the same period provides a snapshot of the Baba language
preserved in its original state of use. The non-standardised spelling re-
flects how the words were spoken, capturing inflexions and pronuncia-
tions peculiar to the Babas. In some of the translated Chinese tales,
there are points of clarification made in English, showing terms that
may not be familiar to the more English-educated Baba reader. Despite
this wealth of information, only two academic studies analysed the lin-
guistic structures of Baba Malay based on the Baba’s previously pub-
lished resources (Thurgood 1998; Teo 1980).
The Baba language is far from dead, however. Besides the Baba thea-
tre, religious services are one of the most accessible resources for the
study of Baba Malay. It is still used in several Peranakan church services
in Singapore today. At least seven Singapore churches conduct weekly
services in Baba Malay – Kampong Kapor Methodist Church, Bethesda
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Katong Church, Pentecost Methodist Church, Paya Lebar Methodist
Church, Pasir Panjang Hill Brethren Church, Bethesda Frankel Estate
Church, and the Church of the Holy Family. All are Protestant churches
except for the Church of the Holy Family, which is Catholic. Many have
been conducting these services for several years and may have gener-
ated some print resources. These religious services held in Baba Malay
include the use of Baba choruses, sermons and even religious plays.
However, few of these are being collected, recorded or studied.10
Baba Material Culture
Since the late 1970s, the Baba material culture has been extensively re-
searched and published in beautifully illustrated tomes. The colourful
images and descriptions have created a vocabulary of the Baba culture,
which has now become familiar to most. This phenomenon was partly
fuelled by popular interest in these artefacts since the 1970s, which led
to a growing audience of collectors, antique dealers and curators.
Since the 1980s, the interest in the material culture of the Babas was
fanned by museum exhibitions and auctions. The ‘Peranakan Heritage’
exhibition at the Singapore National Museum in 1988 was preceded by
the ‘Warisan Baba dan Nonya’ held at the Muzium Negara in 1983 and
smaller exhibits of specific aspects of material culture (Lum 1988).
However the former’s popularity led to the opening of the Straits Chi-
nese Gallery at the National Museum in Singapore. A permanent exhi-
bition, entitled ‘Peranakan Legacy’, was launched at the Asian Civilisa-
tion Museum in 2000 at Armenian Street in Singapore. By April 2008,
a museum dedicated to the Baba artefacts and culture was reopened in
the same location. The domicile of Baba Wee Bin located off Chinatown
in Singapore, which was purchased through a donation by Tan Cheng
Lock’s sole surviving daughter Agnes Tan, is currently being renovated
to create a social heritage space for the Peranakans as well as house the
Peranakan Association. Thus, small subject exhibits in Singapore focus-
ing on specific aspects of Baba material culture soon grew to become
gallery exhibitions, and ultimately independent museums, highlighting
the rich array of the Baba material culture. Similarly in Malaysia, the
Baba Museum in Melaka and the transformation of various mansions
in Penang into Peranakan museums show the viability of sustaining
such cultural exhibits.
Publications by curators and auction catalogues have helped preserve
the colour and beauty of many delicate craftwork objects (Chin E. 1993
and Khoo J.E. 1996). Insights by these curators show not only an appre-
ciation of the static goods but also a new understanding of the historical
and communal context of the material culture. In the realm of material
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culture, however, Ho Wing Meng dominates the literature especially
with his publications on Straits Chinese silver (Ho W.M. 1976, 1984,
2004), beadwork and embroidery (Ho W.M. 2004), furniture (Ho W.M.
1994, 2003) and porcelain (Ho W.M. 1983, 2004). For each of his
works, the history, craftsmanship, function and design of the artefacts
are accompanied by colour photographs, resulting in a vivid, multidi-
mensional description of his subjects. In the area of furniture, silver-
work and even porcelain, there are few authors that can rival the rich
information found in Ho’s publications. Despite the profusion of detail,
community members do not necessarily agree that such material cul-
ture is peculiar to the Baba community.
Nonetheless, beadwork and embroidery can be considered an authen-
tic Baba craftsmanship. These are the handiwork of nyonyas trained
since they were young to create these beautiful domestic items as part
of their marriageable skills. It is also one of the few material cultural
elements that have become appreciated again in modern times. Much
has been published about the style, symbolism and value of the work
found in kasot manek and the nyonya kebaya. The publications by the
late Datin Endon Mahmood (2002, 2004) that followed the well-re-
ceived exhibitions of her collection of kebayas have helped spur renewed
interest in these clothes. Their affordability has encouraged modern
nyonyas and non-nyonyas to invest heavily in the modern nyonya kebaya
and their accessories with designs of the nyonya kebaya, kerosang and
kasut manek naturally evolving to suit modern tastes. This, along with
an increasing number of classes in Baba beadwork, has led to a signifi-
cant push toward reviving the art of recreating nyonya wear.
In terms of architecture, the style known as Singapore Eclectic (Keys
1983) or Straits Eclectic (A. Ghafar 1994; Khoo 1996, 133) has become
associated with the Babas.11 The style adopted by the Straits Chinese
takes design elements from the Chinese, Malay, Javanese, Arabian and
the various colonial masters that ruled the Straits of Melaka. Colonial
influences on architecture include the Anglo-Indian styles adopted in
the Straits Chinese façade, and in Melaka, the Dutch influence is seen
in the roof tiles and red laterite flooring (Tan S.C. 1983, 47) while the
Portuguese influence is found in the balustrades and Iberian façade
(Villiers 1988). Besides the elaborate physical design of Baba houses,
their domestic life also offers fascinating details of their hybrid culture.
For insights into this area refer to Lee and Chen (1998) as they explore
beyond the façade of the Baba house to show the activities of the Baba
home, along with its social rituals and rich material culture.
Certain places and locations have had strong associations with the Ba-
bas. For example Emerald Hill, Katong and Joo Chiat have popularly
been known as Peranakan enclaves even though they were not exclu-
sively Baba community residential areas. A closer examination of the
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histories, residential constitution and relationship between the Babas
and their neighbours in these communities can shed light on the Ba-
bas’ relations with the wider local society. Conversely, locations such as
Heeren Street in Melaka and Telok Ayer in Singapore were known as
the Baba residences for the community’s elite. However, there has been
little discussion about the peculiarities of Baba lifestyle in these areas
besides the mention of their architectural heritage. Moreover, there was
the exercise in the 1980s, to revive the Baba style in the houses along
Emerald Hill and turn the nearby Peranakan Place into a commercial
location using Baba culture as a magnet. This attempt and its failure, to
reinvent a Baba locality to some degree in the urban renewal of the Per-
anakan Place can also serve as a lesson when it comes to attempts to re-
invent place and culture in the modern context.
The Baba material culture’s vibrancy has led to the flourishing of
new art forms. Paintings that feature material aspects of the Babas,
especially seen in the works of Martin Loh, Desmond Sim and Tang
Yue Nang, reflect this new development (Seah 2004). Could this possi-
bly be the early expressions of a Baba vision in art that is based on a
confidence and appreciation of all things Baba?
Today, the Baba material culture remains a strong commercial pro-
duct, enabling whole towns such as Melaka to thrive on the trade in
Peranakan goods. from the departments of Tourism of Singapore and
Malaysia are further stimulating this trend by marketing the commu-
nity and its kitsch souvenirs to its visitors. However, even while such
publications and activities seem to define the Peranakan culture, com-
munity members themselves often question if there is such a thing as a
Baba material culture. This dichotomy seems to beckon further investi-
gation and study.
Social Life of the Babas
The unique customs and rituals of domestic life of the Babas have be-
come the focus for many studies and publications. These titles cover
primarily ritualistic and extravagant events such as weddings and the
communal celebrations such as Chinese New Year festivities. Many of
these ceremonies were at their height of ritualistic elaboration around
the turn of the twentieth century. Although these ceremonies are reflec-
tive of Hokkien culture and not necessarily unique to the Babas, they
do display cultural adaptation of Southern Chinese beliefs and rituals.
This is especially evident in Ng’s study of the Sam Poh Neo Neo Tem-
ple (Ng C.S.H. 1977, 1983) where Malay influences are seen in the pri-
marily Chinese religious practices. More interestingly, many of these
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traditional Baba customs capture ancient Chinese rituals of the Qing dy-
nasty long forgotten in the motherland.
However, it is in the animistic practices of both Chinese and Malay
origins that the unique hybridity of Baba culture presents itself in reli-
gious rites and rituals. Aspects of this culture remain in the supersti-
tious beliefs and practices in everyday Baba life as outlined in Cheo and
Muriel’s publication Baba folk beliefs and superstitions (1988). Clammer
(2002) has also given a summary outline of the Baba’s conceptual cos-
mology of magic and spiritualism. Elliott (1955, 1990) in his ground-
breaking work on Chinese spirit-medium cults elucidates the peculiar
practices of the Straits Chinese who have adopted shrines of pre-Mus-
lim Malays with Hindu antecedents as their own. Such Chinese temples
collocated with pre-Muslim Malay shrines or Datok Kramat remain pop-
ular sites for Baba worship12 with many Chinese and other worshippers
regularly making pilgrimages there even today.
The Katong Catholic Church annually celebrates the Misa Sambut Ke-
pala Tahun Baru China (Wee A. 1989 and Wong R. 1989). The service
is an example of the ‘inculturation’ of Chinese practices into the Catho-
lic faith ritual. During the service, Peranakan traditional sweet meats
and goodies are brought in through an offertory procession and the al-
tar table is laid out with items of symbolic significance for the Lunar
New Year. The service is a recent development, started by a Peranakan,
Father Alfred Chan in 1985.13 Although mention of Chinese Taoist prac-
tices and Christian celebrations are often made in Baba publications, a
thorough study of the hybrid religious rites and rituals from the per-
spective of the Baba community, particularly their inculturation of var-
ious local elements into the Chinese belief system has yet to be carried
out. Besides several articles in The Peranakan on the Chinese religious
rites and rituals, there is limited information on the hybrid practices
and beliefs found in the Baba’s understanding of his religion.
Beyond religion, the domestic art of culinary preparations can also re-
veal a lot about the community’s non-material culture. A slew of cook-
books have unveiled the secrets to this treasured nyonya skill. Nyonya
cooking has been all the rage ever since restaurants claiming to be Pera-
nakan have enabled others to taste its tantalising flavours. Several televi-
sion series on Peranakan cooking soon followed. The long-running ser-
ies The ways of the matriarch (Tan C.C. 2003, 2004) weaves stories of
Baba ritual, customs and superstitions into each cooking episode.14
However, few have really analysed the etymology of nyonya Peranakan
cooking – its origins and influences. Early travelogues provide more
narrative and description by curious foreigners rather than actual analy-
tical insight. For example, Vaughan offers hilarious insights in his de-
scriptions of the rude explosions of a Baba after his meal. He also has
interesting details of the making and consumption of Balachan (Bela-
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can) (Vaughan 1879: 36-37). Koh’s 1964 article on Melakan Baba cuisine
is possibly one of the earliest modern writings to examine the prepara-
tion and cultural influences in nyonya Peranakan cooking. A few aca-
demics (Tang 1997 and Yeow 1999) have reviewed Peranakan cuisine
as an ethnic marker. William Gwee, Violet Oon and Sylvia Tan have also
given insights into specific dishes, kitchen ware, ritual foods and the
practices surrounding them with Sylvia Tan adding a modern twist to
traditional dishes.15 Ananda Rajah (2003) has also looked at the hybrid-
ity of cultures in Peranakan foods.
It is Tan Chee-Beng (1998, 1999, 2001) who remains foremost in
analysing the influences on and the symbolic functions of Peranakan
food. In his 2001 article on Chinese food and ethnicity, Tan Chee-Beng
details the Malay, Indian and Portuguese influences on Melakan Perana-
kan cooking with reference to recipes by Lee Chin Koon (1974) and Ce-
cilia Tan (1983). Comparing cookbooks in this manner, especially those
published over the decades, provides a breadth of understanding about
the creation and evolution of nyonya dishes. Analysing regional differ-
ence between Melakan and Penang dishes can also show unique influ-
ences on Baba cooking. With the Baba Bibliography listing cookbooks,
videos, restaurant reviews and newspaper articles describing the pre-
paration and flavours of nonya cooking, possibly more can be discerned
concerning the cuisine’s history and its changing symbolism and tastes.
Baba business and leisure, the foundation of social life is seldom de-
scribed except in passing. It is generally assumed that the Babas were
mainly involved in clerical and government positions, an elite status ac-
quired because of their proficiency in the English language and their fa-
miliarity with the Anglo-culture. Yet, it is a well-known fact that many
nyonyas married wealthy Chinese merchants while other Baba families
established themselves through the mercantile trade. However, studies
of Nanyang merchants often do not make a distinction between the
newly immigrant merchant and the long-term resident Baba merchant.
Profiles of outstanding Baba merchants can form an initial baseline for
studies on how the Babas gained their wealth and how they returned
their wealth to society.
With wealth came the leisurely lifestyle of the Babas. The nyonyas are
infamous for their addiction to gambling games like cherki. However,
there are more respectable recreational activities that the Babas have in-
dulged in. This is evidenced in the clubs they have established such as
the Straits Chinese Swimming Club (today the Chinese Swimming
Club) (Teo G. 1998) and the Straits Chinese Recreation Club (today the
Singapore Recreation Club). They were even active in music and drama
(Lim H.H. 1930), often adopting Malay influences in these performing
arts. Their love of sports was of a more Western taste (Lim H.H., 1930)
and included boxing (Oei T. 1995) and horse racing (Lye W.C. 2005).
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The advertorials in Baba periodicals such as those found in Kabar Slalu
and in publications such as the later editions of Chrita Dahulu-kala give
a different dimension to Baba leisure activities. Written in Baba Malay,
these advertisements announce products, services, culinary delights, up-
coming wayang Peranakan and recreational activities that would appeal
to the community. They thus give a glimpse into the social interests
and material tastes of educated Babas, the services purveyed to the com-
munity and their purchasing powers. However, the Baba social life and
leisure activities have not been examined in much depth.
Socio-identity of the Babas
The increasing interest in the Baba’s material culture since the 1970s
was heralded by the publication of studies examining the Baba identity.
Perspectives from academics (Clammer 1980; Tan C.B. 1988; Lim L.P.
1970; Gan L.L. 1979), curators (Khoo 1996) and community members
(Chia F. 1980; 1983; 1994) gave greater depth to the study of the com-
munity, where in the past Babas were mentioned only within studies
of the Chinese in the Malayan Peninsula (Purcell 1948; 1960; 1965;
1967).
John Clammer set the tone for academic discussions on the Baba
identity by providing sociological insights (Clammer 1979; 1980). At
the same time, Tan Chee-Beng (1988) provided an ethnographic analy-
sis of the community in Melaka based on his 1979 doctoral thesis. De-
tails of customs, culture, language and religion, based on observable
practices, make their social definition of the Babas more concrete. Con-
versely, the community began to reflect more on their own identity. An-
ecdotal accounts of the community’s social and historical decisional pro-
cesses is seen in Felix Chia’s works (1980; 1983; 1994), providing a vi-
brant picture from an insider’s perspective.
Rudolph’s Reconstructing Identities (1998) redefined the concept of
Baba identity by describing it in the context of history, tracing the com-
munity’s evolution in the midst of political and social change spanning
Singapore’s earliest colonial times to independence. Rudolph, thus, pro-
vides the first thorough chronological account of the evolution of the
Baba identity. In doing so, he uncovers various assumptions and discre-
pancies. One of it is the lack of data on pre-colonial Babas, especially re-
garding Chinese settlements along the Peninsula. He is adamant that
there is ‘no reliable evidence that a Chinese settlement predates the se-
venteenth century’ with noteworthy Baba families tracing their family
line only as far back as the second half of seventeenth century in Mela-
ka (Rudolph 1998, 81 and 82). Sandhu (1961) corroborates this after ex-
amining evidence from Chinese, Malay, Portuguese and Dutch sources.
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Reid (2006) however raises the possibilities that there were hybrid Chi-
nese-Malay communities resident in the Malay Archipelago as early as
the fifteenth century.16 Tracing the existence of the earliest Chinese set-
tlements in the Straits of Melaka and the possibility of hybrid Sino-Ma-
lay communities prior to the seventeenth century thus remains an ac-
tive area for scholarly research especially with renewed interest in early
references to this region and new archaeological findings.
The contemporary cultural definitions of the Babas are however, in-
adequate when attempting to define Baba identity and instead an under-
standing of the social history of the Babas is required. Rudolph notes
that, prior to World War II, the Babas or Straits Chinese were identified
by their political and legal status (Rudolph 1998: 203). The term ‘Straits
Chinese’ was, by 1852, a legal definition that transformed certain Chi-
nese immigrants into British subjects (Rudolph 1998, 43). Although ap-
plicable to all resident Chinese, the term came ‘to be associated with
status (and) wealth’ (Rudolph 1998: 43), a position which the localis,
English-speaking Babas were to acquire rapidly.
Unfortunately, the political and legal status of the Babas prior to their
post-war decline is mentioned only in passing in most publications.
Only Adrian Ong (1990) has made a study of the complex expression of
the Straits Chinese identity in pre-war British Malaya with reference to
their political and legal status. Otherwise, contemporary newspaper arti-
cles are useful but they seldom explored primary sources for under-
standing the political aspects of the Babas during pre-war Malaya. Stu-
dies of key organisations and leaders also provide insights into the poli-
tical development of the community. In fact, Lee Yong Hock’s (1960)
history of the Straits Chinese British Association goes beyond describ-
ing an institutional history and reveals instead the development of Baba
politics before and after World War II. Publications on the life of lea-
ders such as Lim Boon Keng (Khor 1958), Song Ong Siang (Ching
1973), Tan Cheng Lock (Soh 1959; Yeo 1990), his son, Tan Siew Sin
(Lim B.K. 1990) and contemporary leaders such as Tan Chin Tuan (Lee
1995) describe their leadership in the context of changing times when
British colonial powers influenced the structures of the Straits Chinese
community. Many of these leaders have respective bibliographies, which
can aid in-depth studies of their influence on the community and be-
yond (Ang and Tan 2007; Lim P.P.H. 1989).
With the end of the war, the Babas struggled to redefine themselves.
The transformation of the King’s Chinese to becoming the nation’s peo-
ple is best captured in the biographies of the ordinary people today.
Many locate their stories at the turn of the twentieth century when the
Babas were at their height of wealth and power. However, a few biogra-
phies cover the struggles of more impoverished Babas (Lim S.H. 1997;
Chia J. 2002) or those facing a sudden loss of wealth (Lim S.G.L.
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1996). It is in comparing the lives of Babas before and after indepen-
dence, that the transformations come best to the fore. The separate stor-
ies of father and son, Lee Kip Lee (1999) and Dick Lee (2004), serve as
a striking example of such a contrast. Senior Lee describes the halcyon
days of Babas living in the lap of luxury and the sudden downturn suf-
fered during the Japanese Occupation. Meanwhile, the younger Lee ex-
plores the search for identity and a sense of being Singaporean through
his life’s adventures and his song writing. Though seemingly disparate,
they are the voices of Babas for their respective eras and comparatively,
show the continuing evolution of their communal identity.
However such aspects of the evolving Baba identity are few and far
between. Most publications of the twenty-first century reflect the socio-
identity of the Baba like a warped mirror, trapping the Baba image in
the literature, language and culture of the early twentieth century.
Conclusion
The late nineteenth century is seen as a time of Baba awakening, evi-
denced by the number of publications in Baba Malay, their increasing
material wealth, and their political standing in both colonial systems
and oriental clan groups. A century later, the resurgence of interest in
Baba culture began and, since the 1970s, it has not waned and has been
primarily channelled through visual and multi-sensory experiences such
as plays, exhibitions, shops and restaurants with publication paralleling
this interest.
However, the modern publications always depict the Baba as locked
in another time, in an idealisation of times past. Whether it is a biogra-
phy, a book on material culture or a sociological study, it is the pre-war
Baba who is depicted. Is it because Baba practices serve as a repository
of the old cultures that were once the domain of Singapore’s original
immigrants and have now long faded away? In many ways, the Babas
retain the cultural practices of the Chinese and Malay that they them-
selves seldom practice anymore in their own communities. For exam-
ple, only the Babas continue to take pride in the complex wedding gar-
ment worn by the Chinese in the late Qing period. The dondang sayang
rhyme and song style, which originated with the Malays, was main-
tained by the Babas for some time when strict laws prevented the Ma-
lays from performing their own crafts. The delicate voile and see-
through cutting of the kebaya are only worn by the Babas as religious
prohibitions prevent the Malays from wearing these ethnic clothes to-
day. Teasing apart the warp and woof of the hybrid Baba culture is as
complex as defining it but the effort can reveal more than just the
threads of a single culture.
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According to Rudolph’s picture of the evolving identity of the Babas,
they continue to change right up until the present day. Whilst more can
be done to articulate the historicity of Baba identity, it is the changes in
today’s Baba community, the definitions of being Baba and its accep-
tance as a national identity that requires further study. While, on the
one hand, spoken Baba Malay is seldom used, the number of publica-
tions devoted to the Baba language has never been so plentiful. If the
community is fading fast, why is there a seeming resurgence in interest
in the language? If Baba households have disgorged their possessions
why are there attempts to recreate a Baba house or a museum or even
build housing developments marketed as Peranakan design? Has the
Baba identity finally been laid to rest or has it, instead, become part of a
national identity, promoted and coaxed to life because it exemplifies the
racial harmony and integration the government so desires? Has the un-
iquely Baba identity become the uniquely Singaporean identity? Or has
the Baba community gained its own voice and truly renewed its culture?
Tan writes:
… even if the Singapore Baba were in future reincorporated into
the larger non-Baba Chinese society, it will be an incorporation
into the Singaporean Chinese identity which contains certain as-
pects of Baba identity. Their history will continue to be remem-
bered as a part of Singapore history, and aspects of their culture
like nyonya food and certain local ways of life will continue to be
part of the larger Singapore culture. (Tan 1993: 57).
Tracing this evolution of Baba identity can only be seen as new studies
emerge and this, in turn, is made possible only with the ongoing ar-
chiving of Baba publications and records, both old and new.
Glossary
Except for those marked with *, all explanations of terms are derived from
Gwee (2006).
*Baba – in this chapter, it is used to refer to the acculturated Chinese
community previously found in the Straits Settlements. It is also
used to refer to the male members of this community. The commu-
nity is today more familiarly known as Peranakans, although this is
not to be mistaken with the Indonesian Peranakan Chinese.
bangsawan – Malay opera
belachan – shrimp paste (it is a condiment popularly used in Peranakan
cuisine)
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dondang sayang – quatrain (verse of four lines) in Baba or Malay sung to
a tune
kasot manek (kasut manik) – beaded slippers worn in the Baba commu-
nity
kerosang – brooch in sets of three used to fasten the front of nyonya gar-
ments viz. the baju panjang and kebaya
*misa sambut kepala tahun baru china – mass to usher in the beginning
of the Lunar New Year (Wee, 1989)
nyonya – Baba Peranakan lady
nyonya kebaya – a nyonya long sleeve blouse worn with a sarong
*rumah baba – Baba home
sinkek (singkek) – new immigrant from China; newcomer; unfamiliar
*wayang Peranakan – Baba form of theatre with adaptation of Malay
and Chinese forms
Notes
1 The paper is based on significant research that has been conducted under the auspices of
the National Library Board, of which a reference bibliography on the topic was produced
in 2007. Tan, Bonny, Ang, Seow Leng and Noryati Samad (eds). A Baba bibliography: A se-
lect annotated listing of sources on the Peranakan Chinese (Singapore: National Library Board,
2007).
2 These include Mohd, G. and Selamah (1988), Universiti Malaya (1979) and Salmon’s
(1981) important annotated bibliography.
3 For example, Proudfoot (1993) lists holdings of Baba books in his publication on early Ma-
lay works.
4 Tan, Chee-Beng (1988). The Baba of Melaka: Culture and identity of a Chinese Peranakan
community in Malaysia. Selangor: Pelanduk Publications.
5 Rudolph (1998) argues that a fifteenth-century, hybridised community could not have ex-
isted and that the earliest trace of the Baba community in the Straits of Melaka is likely
the seventeenth century (Rudolph 1998: 81 and 82).
6 Details of Yang Quee Yee’s works and collections can be found at the website entitled Ma-
lay Civilization http://www.malaycivilization.com/main.asp.
7 The Bintang Timor is considered the first fully Romanised Malay daily newspaper. It was
founded by Baba Song Ong Siang.
8 Lat Pau, the first Chinese newspaper in Singapore, was founded by Melakan Baba See
Ewe Lay (Chen 1967: 24-26)
9 These include Md. Sidin (1998) and Proudfoot (1993).
10 Based on a personal communication with Philip Chan, a Baba pastor.
11 However, in publications such as Edwards (1991) and Lee K.L. (1988), mention of Eclecti-
cism is related more to a Western style – Victorian Eclecticism (Lee K.L. 1988, 59-60) and
there is no mention of a style known as Straits Eclecticism or Singapore Eclecticism. Lee,
a Baba architect, instead describes the wealthy Straits Chinese as adopting the Western
style of design for their homes while incorporating local Malay features (Lee K.L. 1988:
94-105).
12 Chia, F. mentions that Babas worshipped at the temple of Tua Pek Kong at Kusu Island
where the Kramat Habib Noor is collocated (Chia, F. 1983: 36).
13 In Reunion and mass for Peranakan 1985, 13 and Peranakan New Year prayers 1985: 2.
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14 Also Kenny Chan’s The cook, his food and the dishy nyonyas (Cheah U.H., 2001).
15 Refer to the Bibliography, section 3.7. Culinary Culture, for a full listing from these
authors.
16 Newbold notes that the ‘early European navigators found colonies of Chinese scattered
over Java, Borneo and other islands. They are also located in states removed beyond the
pale of British dominion; in those of Siam, Borneo, Tringanu, Pohang, and in numberless
others.’ (Newbold 1839: 9-10).
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8 Negotiating Identities, Affiliations and Interests:
The Many Lives of Han Wai Toon,
an Overseas Chinese
Sharon Wong Wai Yee
Introduction
It has been commonly noted that the Chinese overseas are ‘clannish’,
business-minded and utterly loyal to their homelands, which they long
to return to. This is not surprising given that most Chinese in pre-World
War Two Singapore were generally businessmen or workers who saw
their multifaceted activities in Southeast Asia as temporal and transient.
Unlike many overseas Chinese in his time, Han Wai Toon (1892-1970)
took on a Southeast Asian-Chinese identity, whilst maintaining very
strong emotional links to his Chinese homeland, Hainan. Besides his af-
filiations with Southeast Asian-Chinese academic organizations, he was
involved in the activities that were organized by certain clan associa-
tions, such as the Qiongzhou clan association and Han’s clan group.
More importantly, he was a pioneer in the study of Chinese trade
ceramics in Southeast Asia. As a member of two scholarly organizations
that were conducting research on Southeast Asia – the South Sea So-
ciety and the China Society – upon his arrival in Singapore in 1915,
Han propounded the idea that Chinese trade ceramics that were found
in Southeast Asia were ‘the cultural relics of our country (China), and
they need to be collected’ and, if possible, returned to their place of ori-
gin – China. In his book Nanyang yiliu de Zhongguo guwaixiao taoci (An-
cient Chinese Export Ceramics Inherited by Southeast Asia), Han uses
the term ‘inherited’ (yiliu) and not ‘discovered’, as well as ‘export’ rather
than ‘import’, to describe the Chinese trade ceramics that he found in
Southeast Asia (Han 1960a, 2005). Han mainly focused on Chinese
ceramics rather than Southeast Asia ceramics in his studies because
Chinese trade ceramics provided him with a window towards under-
standing the Chinese identity as it was manifested overseas. In 1962,
Han returned to China and donated a large part of the ceramics he had
collected to the Beijing Palace Museum. He continued his research on
Chinese trade ceramics at the Beijing Palace Museum until his unti-
mely death in 1970.
So atypical was Han compared to other Chinese overseas during his
time that one of his best friends, Hsu Yun-Tsiao, who was a Southeast
Asian historian and former editor of the Journal of the South Sea Society
(henceforth JSSS) described Han in the following manner,
[W]e know that there were so many millionaires in Southeast
Asia with ‘rags-to-riches’ stories, but Mr. Han was the only per-
son who became a famous scholar as well as a research advisor of
a museum from a humble background as an autodidact-labourer
with only a basic education (Hsu 1970b: 133).
It is, therefore, tenuous to categorize Han in the common analytical fra-
mework of Chinese immigrants overseas, because he appears to have
contravened sociological stereotypes pertaining to social status, educa-
tion and career within the context of the Southeast Asian-Chinese of his
generation. His life, activities and writings thus deserve to be critically
re-examined because they may reveal hitherto undiscovered insights
into how certain overseas Chinese personalities straddled between their
affiliations to the homeland and their commitment to the making of
modern Singapore, as well as their attempts to interweave the study of
Southeast Asian history with that of China.
It is noteworthy to point out that there have been a large number of
writings on Han Wai Toon’s life and his background that has been
mined for this chapter. Much of the genre of biographical writing was
based on Han’s own accounts in his book and articles (refer to appendix
1) and recollections of his friends in Singapore and Malaysia, such as
Hsu Yun-Tsiao, Lian Shisheng, Liu Zizheng, Ma Ge and Wu Tiren
(Hsu 1962a, 1970a, 1970b; Lian 1951; Liu 1979; Ma 1962; Wu 1952,
1970). Hsu Yun-Tsiao’s article provides the most comprehensive back-
ground information on Han, advocating the view that Han was also a
famous scholar on Chinese trade ceramics. The second genre of
sources is the correspondence between Han and his friends. For exam-
ple, the correspondence between Hsu Yun-Tsiao and Han from 1962 to
1970, and Liu Zhizheng and Han in 1968 provide invaluable insights
into Han’s remaining years in Beijing (Lew and Chou 2006: 74-87, Liu
1979: 61-4). Xu Beihong’s letters and paintings to Han, poems by Yu
Dafu, Zheng Zhiyu and Hsu Yun-Tsiao reveal a close friendship be-
tween these men (Hsu 1947, 70, 1970a: 37; Xu 2008: 248-55; Zhou
1981: 214, 237; Zheng 1954: 36). To this must be added the biographies
and articles written by Han’s friends, namely, Xu Beihong, Yu Dafu,
Hsu Yun-Tsiao and Tan Yeok Seong, which provide supplementary in-
formation on Han’s life. More recently, Leander Seah’s (2005: 13; 2007:
139-41) research on historicizing hybridity and the globalization of the
South Seas Society has brought to light some important materials for
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the analysis of Han’s life and his hybrid identity within the context of
him being one of the co-founders of the South Seas Society. A fourth
source of information about Han is journalistic and popular depictions
published in newspapers such as the Hainan Daily based on a confer-
ence held on 8 April 2008 in Hainan University entitled ‘In Memoriam
of Han Wai Toon [who] passed away thirty-eight years ago’ (Cai 2008;
Chen 2006). Other accounts in this genre were by his clansmen and re-
latives, Han Guangfeng and Han Tan Juan, as well as obituaries pub-
lished in the Sin Chew Jit Poh upon Han’s passing. Editorials notes and
reports on the South Sea Society, the forewords contain useful informa-
tion for the present study (Han 1989, 1990 and 2008). There are two
articles written about Han’s collection and contributions on specific to-
pics, the first being Han’s trade ceramics collection in Beijing Palace
Museum by Wang Jianhua and the other one is about Han’s research
on Hainan stone artefacts by Prof. Tang Lingling (Wang 1988: 76-81,
90; Tang 2008: 305-9).
Negotiating Identities, Affiliations and Interests: The Many Lives of
Han Wai Toon
Han’s life can basically be divided into four stages. These are: 1) The
Hainan Stage (1892-1915); 2) Initial Years in Southeast Asia (1915-1934);
3) Research in Ceramics (1934-1962); and 4) Back in Beijing (1962-
1970). These will now be briefly examined.
Hainan Stage (1892-1915)
Han Wai Toon was born in Fengming Village in Hainan, China, in
1892. He attended Baodun and Weiwen School in Hainan and com-
pleted his basic education at the age of fourteen.
Han gained many gardening experiences at his father’s farm during
Hainan period. He mentioned that he planted different tropical fruit, for
example coconut and lychee, for breeding test (Han 1946a: 46; 1953a:
28). In 1913, he was running a dye-processing workshop with friends.
The business venture proved to be unsuccessful because he failed to test
the chemicals regarding colour fading, while Western cloth inundated
the local markets causing local cloth sales to plummet (Hsu 1970a: 37).
But it actually helped Han to gain first-hand knowledge of chemicals
and gardening for his future studies on Chinese ceramics and botany.
Two years later, Han’s clan brother Han Yanyuan encouraged Han to
embark on his first journey to Singapore to repay his debts. The dye-
processing workshop was handed over to his brother, Han Zhizhun.
Han Wai Toon probably came to learn about Singapore from his cousin
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Han Juzhun. According to Hsu Yun-Tsiao’s narration, Han could not
find a job in Singapore in the beginning and his cousin Han Juzhun of-
fered to give him money to come back to Hainan. However, Han told
Juzhun he would not return before repaying his debts. Juzhun used his
networking in Singapore to help Han find a job (Han 1989: 330; Hsu
1970a: 37).
Initial Years in Southeast Asia (1915-1934)
When Han first arrived in Singapore, he stayed in his uncle Wangyi’s
shop, the ‘Silonghao’, on Robinson Road. Juzhun helped him find a job
in Kuala Bura on Karimun Island, Indonesia, as a rubber-tapper for a
small company. At the same time, Han also worked as a clerk for the
same company. Within two years, he had saved enough money to repay
all the debts accrued during his dye-processing business in Hainan. A
$200 surplus was used for a joint venture to establish the German
Shennong Medical Hall, which dealt with chemicals and laboratory
equipment (Han 1989: 330; Hsu 1970a: 37).
It was not by chance that Han became one of the shareholders and
a staff member working for the German Shennong Medical Hall. He
had some connections with the Hainan clan groups to support himself
in Singapore and, at the same time, maintained regular correspon-
dences with Hainan. The medical shop was first established in 1866
by some German businessmen but was confiscated by the British colo-
nial government, which regarded it as ‘enemy property’ during the
First World War. It was auctioned off in 1916 to some Hainanese mer-
chants, among which was a qualified Chinese pharmacist from Singa-
pore, Foo Khee How. Tellingly, this was the first Chinese business ven-
ture in the world of Western medicine and pharmaceutical products
that were exported to Southeast Asia. Han worked as a dispenser in
the Shennong Medical Hall and through this job he acquired a knowl-
edge of chemistry and pharmacy as well as photography and film pro-
cessing. Indeed, Han was fond of taking pictures of various sites in
Singapore, personalizing these pictures in highly creative ways such as
juxtaposing two pictures so that a person would suddenly be standing
in front of a different landscape (Han 2008: 120-1). In 1933, a senior
judge, J.V. Mills, visited the Medical Hall. He asked Han in Cantonese
‘How do I translate sumu from a Chinese book into English?’ to which
Han replied ‘logwood’. But Han felt that the Westerner was not fully
satisfied with his simple response. Han then started reading up on a
variety of subjects such as chemistry, medicine and the history of the
Chinese-Southeast Asian relationship in his spare time. He saw the ac-
quisition of this knowledge as a form of investment in the acquisition
of a stable income and a long-term position at the Medical Hall. This
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gave him a solid background upon which he was to build his research
(Hsu 1970a: 37).
Research in Ceramics (1934-1962)
In 1934, when Han was passing through a second-hand market, he dis-
covered a finely decorated Chinese porcelain dish. He spent $3 to buy
this dish and wanted to know its provenance. He believed that Chinese
ceramics found in Southeast Asia demonstrated that early contacts ex-
isted between China and Southeast Asia. The encounter with the piece
of porcelain compelled Han to read as many books and Chinese texts
as he could, especially historical documents about Chinese trade cera-
mics. He began to notice the great variety of Chinese trade ceramics
that existed in Southeast Asia and embarked on creating his own per-
sonal collection. To this end, he invented a scientific way to examine
the age of ancient ceramics based on the chemical reactions of the col-
our of glaze and body. His research on Chinese trade ceramics occu-
pied much of his daily routine from 1934 onwards (Han 1989: 311;
Hsu 1970a: 37).
In 1936, Han spent $700 to buy a piece of land along Upper Thom-
son Road to build a garden, which he named ‘Silly Fun Garden (Yu-
quyuan)’. Besides ensuring that different breeds of rambutan were
planted, the garden became an outdoor exhibition hall and meeting
place, where he displayed a wide collection of Chinese trade ceramics
and books to his friends and visitors from all over the world. His guests
would witness his enthusiasm for Chinese trade ceramics studies and
love of tropical fruits (Lian 1951: 8; Sullivan 1960). On 30 July 1955,
Han hosted a South Seas Society seminar at the Silly Fun Garden.
Graced by more than 60 guests, his close friend, Lian Shisheng, spoke
on aspects of Vietnamese Customs. (Hsu 1955: 59). During his four-day
journey to Singapore in the early 1950s, an archaeologist from Cam-
bridge University, Prof. Cheng Te-K’un, through Tan Yeok Seong’s re-
commendation, went to visit Han’s garden. He mentioned that, ‘No
one who is interested in the cultures of the South Seas will [want to]
miss the enthusiastic collector and scholar who builds his study in a
grove of rambutan in Upper Thompson Road … Mr. Han has a very
good collection of export wares and potsherds found in various parts of
Malaya’ (Cheng 1951: 9). Silly Fun Garden was also one of the caches
where the works of a famous Chinese artist, Xu Beihong, were hidden
during the Japanese Occupation. In a correspondence between Xu Bei-
hong and Han, mention was made of Han’s role in ensuring the safety
of Xu’s artefacts. Xu gave repeated instructions on the proper way to
pack ceramic pieces and artworks. After the Japanese surrendered, Han
returned all of the objects he had hidden to Xu’s student, Chen Xiaonan
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(Ouyang 2008: 57-8; Xu 2008: 250-5). More than anything else, the epi-
sode reflects the close friendship between the men, who had a common
interest in ceramics.
Han was one of the founders and pioneer members of the South
Seas Society, which was established on 17 March 1940. Why did Han
become the pioneer member of the South Sea Society? In 1938, Hsu
Yun-Tsiao was working as an editor at Sin Chew Jit Poh. Han went to
meet him in his newspaper office upon his return from Thailand. They
became friends and Hsu often accompanied his colleagues Zhang Li-
qian, Yao Nan, Yu Dafu and Guan Chupu to visit Han and have intellec-
tual exchanges together in Silly Fun Garden (Hsu 1970a: 38). The core
group of the South Sea Society gradually formed. After fellow founder
Guan Chupu left the society in July of that same year, Han subsequently
took over Guan’s positions as councillor and treasurer, which he held
for more than ten years. In 1956, he was elected vice-chairman of the
society. Han was also very active in another scholarly organization –
China Society of Singapore – that from 1949 onwards began publishing
Han’s articles in its annual journal (see Appendix 1). Han also hoped to
become a member of the Oriental Ceramics Society (henceforth OCS)
in London, for this would provide him with the recognition he desired
from Western scholars. However, there were no OCS members in
Southeast Asia who could recommend him to the prestigious society.
Finally, the curator of the Raffles Museum and one of the invited Wes-
tern scholarly members of the South Seas Society, Mr. M.W.F. Tweedie,
recommended him in 1952. His involvement in OCS activities was
highly appreciated by the honourable secretary Lt. Col. Cage Brown
who often encouraged ceramics researchers and collectors to visit Han
at Silly Fun Garden (Hsu 1970a: 38).
According to Leander Seah, one of the benefits that emerged from
Han’s membership in the OCS was that the South Seas Society forged
new contacts and cultivated strong linkages with the Western colonial
scholarly communities especially those from the Malayan Branch of the
Royal Asiatic Society (henceforth MBRAS). MBRAS aimed at steering
its research more towards ‘Southeast Asian’ rather than ‘Chinese’ influ-
ences and thus saw the advantages of working with Han on the ‘arte-
fact-based’ nature of Chinese trade ceramics studies (Seah 2005: 37-9).
Concomitantly, Han had to visit different museums and collectors in
Southeast Asia to compare his collections with those of other research-
ers. He was subsequently acknowledged as one of the most knowledge-
able scholars on Chinese trade ceramics in Southeast Asia at that time
(Pope 1956: 71). Han’s interaction with Western colonial scholars soon
found its way into many of his writings of the period. For example, in
an article entitled ‘Chinese Ceramics Shards with Inscriptions found
from Johore Lama River District’, Han conducted a comparative study
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between his collection of Chinese Ming porcelain shards, the shards
from Raffles Museum, National Museum in Kuala Lumpur, and those
in the collections of Tony Beamish and S. Oliveiro (Han 1953b: 21-2).
MBRAS and the South Seas Society members, H.D. Collings and M.W.
F. Tweedie of the Raffles Museum helped Han compare the stone tools
from Hainan and the Raffles Museum. Later, M.W.F. Tweedie wrote a
short article on Han’s Hainan stone artefacts, which was published in
JSSS (Han 1951d: 10-1; Tweedie 1951: 9). Although Han had made many
intellectual exchanges with other Western colonial scholars, Mainland
Chinese celebrities and Southeast Asian-Chinese academic circles, it is
pertinent to highlight here that he could speak neither English nor
Mandarin (Hsu 1970a: 38, Ouyang 1999: 39-40). Here, the contribu-
tions of expert translators from the South Seas Society proved crucial.
Several of Han’s articles were promptly translated into English and re-
lated articles by Western scholars were translated into Chinese. JSSS
thus became a platform for the conversation between Han and Western
scholars (Braddell 1950b; Han 1948e).
Throughout this period, Han maintained his role as a Chinese busi-
nessman whose goal was to amass as much wealth in Southeast Asia as
possible (Han 1946b: 10). He withdrew his shares from the German
Shennong Medical Hall and set up the Sino Chemical Company with
He Hanguang during the Japanese Occupation of Singapore. In Sep-
tember 1956, the Chinese Communist Party convened the Eighth Na-
tional Congress in Beijing. It held a discussion on the strategy of unit-
ing and mobilizing repatriated overseas Chinese (Guiguo huaqiao) to
join the socialist party (Mao and Lin 1993: 79). Han received an invita-
tion from Guo Moruo, the senior research fellow of the Science Insti-
tute of China, to become a research consultant and live in China.1
Guo’s letter may have encouraged Han’s return to China; however, it
was not the most crucial factor. Indeed, Han had for a long time de-
sired to return to China. In a report on the South Seas Society commit-
tee meeting of 24 December 1949, it mentioned that Han was planning
to return to China and he would be temporarily passing his duties as
treasurer on to Lin Woling (Hsu 1950a: 96). After the establishment of
the new Chinese government in 1949, Han returned to China again in
1950 to visit his mother and conduct research in Guangzhou and Hai-
nan (Lew and Chou 2006; 75). In 1958, Han gave all of his shares of
one of his companies to his eldest son, Qifeng, at a time when the com-
pany was reaping healthy profits. Two years later, he withdrew his
shares from the Sino Chemical Company to support his other two sons,
Yuefeng and Kunfeng, who were pursuing their studies in Beijing and
Shanghai (Hsu 1970a: 39).
Han chose to return to China with his second wife Wuxu, his young-
est son Xiongfeng and his daughter Yaying on 17 March 1962 (Hsu
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1962b). One reason is that it was comparatively difficult for historians
and Chinese ceramics researchers based in Southeast Asia to get access
to books and Chinese texts if they were not based in China. The other
reason was that Han wanted to conduct research trips to different Chi-
nese ceramic kiln sites to compare the ceramic materials he had found
in Southeast Asia (Hsu 1962a, Sin Chew Jit Poh report 1962). A third
plausible reason was Han’s loyalty to his hometown, which grew
through the years as he collected hundreds of ceramic shards at various
Southeast Asian sites, such as Johore Lama, as well as Chinese cera-
mics bought from various dealers, including about 315 intact pieces dur-
ing the 47 years he spent in Southeast Asia. Eventually, on seven differ-
ent occasions between 1956 and 1962, Han donated parts of his large
collection, including the 315 Chinese ceramic pieces, to the Beijing Pa-
lace Museum (Cai 2008; Wang 1988: 76).
Back in Beijing (1962-1970)
In the year before he died, Han was appointed research advisor of the
ceramics division in the Beijing Palace Museum and research fellow at
the National Culture and History Council. In the 1960s, many overseas
Chinese who returned to China were labelled as ‘bourgeois’ or as hav-
ing ‘Overseas relationships’ by the Communists, and were discrimi-
nated against or placed under surveillance by the locals. ‘Overseas rela-
tionships’ sometimes served as the pretext for political persecution,
especially during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) (Mao and Lin
1993: 92).
But it was very different for Han, who, although he was labelled an
‘overseas Chinese returnee’, was treated humanely during his stay in
Beijing. In his letters from Beijing to Liu Zizheng and Hsu Yun-Tsiao,
Han stressed that he was enjoying his life in Beijing and that his rheu-
matism had been cured without taking any medicine in part because of
the dry climate (Lew and Chou 2006: 76). Han also wrote that he was
spending most of his time studying and copying research materials in
the libraries. He had the rare opportunity to go on a research trip with
his son Kunfeng to various parts of Nanjing, Shanghai and Hangzhou
in 1962, and also visited Hainan two years later. During his field trip,
he met with several Mainland Chinese artists and scholars, such as Liu
Haisu, Gao Shiheng and Su Jiqing (Gao and Su joined the South Seas
Society in 1948). More interestingly, Han maintained regular correspon-
dences with Hsu Yun-Tsiao and Liu Zizheng who were based in South-
east Asia during the Cultural Revolution (Han 1965; Hsu 1948: 53,
1970a: 39; Lew and Chou 2006: 77-9; Liu 1979: 62).
There is, however, very limited information about Han’s activities in
Beijing. Nonetheless, from the sources that are currently available, it is
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more than clear that the political movements in Beijing had disrupted
Han’s original research plans and also his views on China. Han had
earlier planned to publish one book on the history of Chinese ceramics
and another collection of his research articles, but neither was ever pub-
lished (Han 1960a: 56; Hsu 1970a: 41). Additionally, Han had only pub-
lished one article during his eight years in China, which was in stark
contrast to his productive years in Singapore (Han 1965). Perhaps the
last sentence in Han’s letter to Hsu dated 18 February 1965 provides us
with a partial reason: ‘I am very busy, so I cannot correspond with you
and other friends for long periods of time. I hope you will forgive
(me)’. Han’s next letter to Hsu was sent almost two years later – 27 July
1967. In 1968, Han, in a letter inviting Hsu and Wu Tiren to visit Chi-
na, he wrote, ‘In China, great advances have been made in science, a
scholar no longer prides himself on his individual narrow mindset.
What is now in place is a “collective thinking”’ (Lew and Chou 2006:
80-1).
On 2 October, 1970, Han died of stomach cancer in Beijing. He was
cremated after a memorial ceremony organized by the Beijing Palace
Museum. Han’s ashes were buried in Hainan, in the village where he
was born (Hsu 1970a: 41). Several years later, the Beijing Palace Mu-
seum honoured him along with two other famous Chinese ceramics se-
nior fellows – archaeologist Chen Wanli and connoisseur Sun Yinzhou.
They were named the ‘Three Unusual Scholars’.2 We can pretty much
assume that 1965 was the watershed of Han’s life in Beijing. Before the
Cultural Revolution, Han had more freedom to do his research, travel
around in China and correspond with his overseas friends. Beginning
in the latter half of 1965, Han apparently became involved in various
political movements until his death in 1970. A clear picture of these last
few years of his life will only emerge with the release of more of Han’s
private papers in the future.
Han’s Research Interests and Scholarly Contributions
Han published one monograph and no fewer than 55 articles in various
journals and newspapers, including JSSS, Annual of the China Society of
Singapore, Central Plain Monthly, Oriental Magazine, South Seas Digest,
Sin Chew Weekly, South Seas Magazine, Saturday Review, Sin Chew Jit
Poh, Sin Chew Jit Poh Semi-Monthly, Journal of Associated Chambers of
Qiongzhou Clan Association in the British Malaya, Kwong Wah Jit Poh
and Culture Relics (refer to appendix 1). JSSS has 16 of Han’s Chinese
papers, while the Annual of the China Society of Singapore and Saturday
Review contain nine and seven articles respectively. Most of his articles
were published in JSSS, possibly because Han was one of the founders
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and councillors in the South Seas Society. It should be noted that after
the internal strife between Hsu Yun-Tsiao and fellow society member
Tan Yeok Seong in 1958, Han stopped submitting articles to the JSSS
and he resigned from the South Seas Society Committee (Hsu 1970a:
38; Seah 2005: 45-6). Most of his articles were submitted to other jour-
nals or Chinese newspapers published in Singapore, some of which
were translated into English by South Seas Society members like Liu
Chiang or Lü Ch’eng-cheng(Han 1948e, 1948f, 1951i).
Han’s articles and books can be classified into six subjects:
1. Chinese trade ceramics: in particular Ming-Ching ware, found in Jo-
hore Lama, Indonesia and Borneo and a knowledge of ancient Chi-
nese ceramics chemical techniques;
2. Plantations and various products of Southeast Asia, including lac,
Bornean camphor, sappan wood, downy myrtle, pineapple, black
pepper, rambutan, coconut and durian, etc. for which he established
the historical relationship between China and Southeast Asia;
3. Chinese gods of Southeast Asia; his articles mainly focus on debates
over the names and origins Tuapekong, as well as one paper on Tien
Hao;
4. Southeast Asian history and monuments: the debates regarding the
location of ‘Longyamen’, Zheng He’s non-Chinese descent, ancient
cannons discovered in Singapore and the ancient routes between
China and Southeast Asia;
5. Chinese history and monuments, including studies of the stone
tools and Chinese inscriptions from Hainan, and international rela-
tions between China and other states in Asia;
6. Han’s collections, including his studies of the function of an ancient
Persian ‘spittoon’ that he bought in a shop during the Japanese Oc-
cupation and a Wei Dynasty ceramic vessel with a protective talis-
man.
In short, Han’s research interests were focused on the historical rela-
tionship between China and Southeast Asia. Some topics were dupli-
cated in different journals, for example the origin of the South Chinese
deity Tuapekong and the function of an ancient Persian spittoon. Han
wanted to use some new evidence to support his arguments, but his ar-
guments usually prompted disagreements with other scholars (Cheng
1948: 15; Gao 2002: 315; Hsu 1951: 6; Tian 1963: 25). His debate on the
historical location of ‘Longyamen’ is a typical example of these aca-
demic disputes (Han 1948b, 1961; Kwa 2004: 126-7; Lin 1999: 39, 42-
3). According to Ling Woling’s detailed literature review of the ‘Longya-
men’ study, Southeast Asian historical geography researcher, W.P. Groe-
neveldt was the first scholar who studied this topic in 1887 (Lin 1999:
28). The debate was discussed again during the first South Seas Society
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field trip to Pulau Tekong and Johore Lama, organised by Hsu Yun-
Tsiao and Han on 6 June 1948. Besides Hsu and Han, Liu Chiang,
Zhang Shoushi, Lin Woling, Guang Chongren, H.D. Collings and seven
others went along on the trip (Hsu 1948b: 77). After the trip, Han wrote
the article ‘A Study on Johore Lama’, which, along with Hsu Yun-
Tsiao’s article ‘Notes on Malay Peninsula in Ancient Voyages’, was pub-
lished in the 1948 issue of the JSSS (Han 1948b; Hsu 1948a). It
aroused scholarly interest in the topic, including amongst the chairman
of MBRAS, Dato Roland Braddell, director of Malay States Museum, W.
Linehan, Dato Douglas, Colling, H.D., Paul Wheatley, Hsu Yun-Tsiao,
Su Jiqing, Lin Woling and others (Braddell 1950a; Colling 1948: 35;
Hsu 1950b: 14; Lin 1999: 39 and 42-3; Wheatley 1961: 157). On 21 May,
1955, an open debate between Hsu and Han entitled ‘Does Temasek
mean Singapore?’ was held at the Book Wholesaling Association with
more than 20 scholars witnessing this exciting discussion. Though Han
may have been wrong, the academic discussion was successfully main-
tained.
Han’s main research strengths remained primarily in the fields of
Chinese trade ceramics, and the plantations and products of Southeast
Asia. Han investigated many archaeological sites and studied unearthed
artefacts, although he admitted he was not an archaeologist (Han 1948:
14). Several weeks or months of research were conducted at Hainan,
Guangzhou, Jakarta, Borneo and Johore Lama. These trips gave him
first-hand experience in identifying Chinese ceramics and other arte-
facts and provided background to the customs and historical relation-
ship between Southeast Asia and China (Han 1951d, 1952b, 1952c,
1952d, 1953b, 1955a). His scholarship on Chinese trade ceramics was
mainly based on his private collection, artefacts kept or sold by Malay
dealers in Padang as well as museum collections (Han 1965: 57; Wang
1988: 76). Unlike dealers or collectors who focus mainly on the outward
appearance of Chinese ceramics, Han was keen to study the chemical
reactions of the glazes and the clay in order to date and determine their
provenances. This research method was very innovative in the Chinese
ceramics circles of the time (Hsu 1970a: 37). His work reflects his at-
tentiveness to Chinese historical sources and this created the necessary
conditions for Western collectors and curators who visited Southeast
Asia to appreciate him as an emerging scholar and member of their cir-
cle (Pope 1956: 71; Sullivan 1960).
At the same time, Han’s passion and his studies evoked his friends’
and other scholars’ interest in Chinese ceramics and artefacts studies.
Han mentioned that he often reported Western ceramics collectors ac-
tivities to Lin Huixiang and Tan Yeok Seong, whereupon Tan, encour-
aged by Han, would then try to collect ceramic pieces (Han 1955b: 39).
Within the South Seas Society fraternity, Hsu Yun-Tsiao, Tan Yeok
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Seong and Zheng Ziyu, Liu Zizheng pursued some uncharted aspects
of Han’s research (Mao 2007: 79-80; Liu 1979: 61-5). Another case in
point was the Contributions of L’ Ecole Française D’Extrême-Orient ex-
hibition held in 1952. One of the South Seas Society members noted
that,
Recently there was the most important but also the loneliest exhi-
bition held in Singapore. I say lonely, because during the open-
ing at Victoria Hall on 8 July at 5 p.m. the audiences included
only Mr. Han Wai Toon, Mr. Hsu Yun-Tsiao, Mr. Tan Yeok Seong,
Mr. Ling Woling and a few others. There was a discussion of ar-
chaeology held in Westerner Youth Club at 8 p.m. Besides some
French ladies and gentlemen, the Chinese who attended [the dis-
cussion] comprised only Mr. Han Wai Toon and a few others.
The Chinese are famous for watching the fun, but the general
public did not pay any attention to this exhibition opening. Now
you understand how this exhibition has been left out in the cold
(Liang 1952: 1).
In Lian’s description, Han appears as the probable initiator of the exhi-
bition, as well as of the study of Chinese ceramics in Southeast Asia in
general. According to Lian, Han was actively researching and trying to
understand the new scholarship that was emerging from Western and
Southeast Asian academic circles.
Undoubtedly, Han was one of the first in Singapore and on Mainland
China to contribute to our knowledge of the historical importance of
Chinese trade ceramics. His impact on Chinese trade ceramics studies
in Southeast Asia became much more widely recognized and aroused
an interest and awareness of Chinese ceramics found in Southeast Asia
amongst the growing number of collectors and researchers interested
in the field (Sullivan 1960). Han’s book Ancient Chinese Export Ceramics
Inherited by Southeast Asia made an important contribution to the
knowledge of Chinese trade ceramics, and served as the first introduc-
tory study on Chinese ceramics in Southeast Asia written in Chinese.
This despite the difficulties experienced by most Chinese scholars who
tried to investigate and study the Chinese trade ceramics outside China
before the 1990s. His book is now quite often cited by Chinese re-
searchers in Chinese trade ceramics studies articles.
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Conclusion
The above outline of Han Wai Toon’s life serves as a reminder that the
oversimplification of the study of the overseas Chinese, based on social
status, education and career, should be avoided. Personal choice, influ-
enced by an idealised image of a Chinese homeland, was a major factor
that led Han to pursue his autodidactic academic career, and to even-
tually return to Mainland China. In Han’s view, returning home to Chi-
na was the best way for him to fulfil the dream encapsulated by the
Chinese proverb ‘fallen leaves returning to their roots’. Like other over-
seas Chinese, Han remained loyal to his native land and always had the
desire to return to it one day. It suggests that Han had strong Sino-cen-
tric views in his studies on Chinese trade ceramics. In fact, Chinese
trade ceramics can also be a source of information for the study of the
developments of Southeast Asia’s societies, rather than solely as a
source for the drawing of the picture of the relationship between China
and Southeast Asia, facilitated by Chinese merchants and migrants.
Chinese trade ceramics could be employed by Southeast Asian societies
as a way to rediscover and explain their ethnic identities (Miksic 2000:
194-5). Although Han remained entrenched in the belief that Chinese
trade ceramics were one of the important heritage and ethnographic
sources of Chinese culture, he did consider Chinese trade ceramics an
important source for the understanding of Southeast Asian societies.
For instance, Han went to Lawas to visit the Maruts tribe in Borneo to
conduct an in-depth study on the relationships between ethnic groups
and the customs and uses of Chinese pottery jars (Han 1955a).
Second, Han had a very strong sense of belonging to China after join-
ing various Southeast Asian-Chinese academic organizations in Singa-
pore, such as the South Seas Society. He also had some connections
with Chinese clan associations. For example, Han was elected councillor
of the Singapore Han Clan Temple in 1947, and his clan relatives re-
vealed that they had such a close relationship with Han that they were
often invited to join Han’s rambutan eating parties (Han 1990: 16; Sin-
gapore Han Clan Temple 1970: 2). Nonetheless, it seems that the clan
associations did not have a stronger hold on Han than the South Seas
Society. One major piece of evidence is that most of his close friends
were well-educated, Southeast Asian-Chinese scholars, or celebrities
from Mainland China who were linked to the academic organizations
that he had joined, including Yu Dafu, Hsu Yun-Tsiao, Xu Beihong,
Guang Chupu, Liu Haisu and Lin Huixiang. The influence of these
scholars led Han to opt for an academic career and the newspapers and
journals that they edited provided him opportunities to publish his arti-
cles. In 1938, for instance, Han was encouraged by his friend Lin Huix-
ing, a professor of the Department of Anthropology, Xiamen University,
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to publish his first article on Chinese ceramics in the Sin Chew Jit Poh
semi-monthly edited by Yu Dafu (Han 1938a, 1938b).
The other factor is the historical and geo-political settings surround-
ing Han’s life that influenced his understanding of his identity and
how he presented himself as a Chinese in Southeast Asia. He always
used ‘our country’ instead of ‘China’ in his articles because he believed
that the Chinese cultural centre was located in Mainland China. Some-
times he called himself ‘Tangshan abo’ (Chinese uncle) rather than Chi-
nese because ‘although a Chinese uncle might be far from his Chinese
homeland, he can always find comfort spiritually by buying and study-
ing different Chinese local products (Han 1954b: 69-70)’. When he was
in Guangzhou, he claimed he was a ‘Nanyang bo’ (Southeast Asian un-
cle) because he said he was in an unfamiliar environment (Han 1952c:
3). These two identities became reversed in China and Southeast Asia
and reflected Han’s anxiety regarding his different identities in these
geo-political settings. But Han finally made up his mind: he was the
only founding member of the South Seas Society of Chinese origin
who actually returned to China after the independence of Malaya and
the enforcement of the Citizenship Ordinance in Malaya in 1957 (Seah
2005: 31-7,52). Changes in the historical and geo-political settings in
Singapore and Malaysia did not undermine Han’s loyalty toward China,
or his Chinese identity in relation to China. In other words, Han rather
saw himself as an Overseas Chinese or ‘huaqiao’, than a Chinese Over-
seas or ‘haiwai huaren’ (Han 1946b: 10).
Appendix 1: Han Wai Toon’s Publications
1938
a. ‘Zhongguo guci zai Nanyang zhi yiliu’ (Ancient Chinese Wares
Found in Southeast Asia). Sin Chew Jit Poh Semi-Monthly 5: 8-11.
b. ‘Woguo ciyou zhi qiyuan’ (The Origins of Chinese Ceramics Glazes).
Sin Chew Jit Poh Semi-Monthly 9: 9-10.
1939
a. ‘Dabogong zhi yanjiu’ (Study of the ‘Tuapekong’). Sin Chew Jit Poh,
December 9, p. 8.
b. ‘Woguo guci youzhi ji secai zhi lice yi’ (A Preliminary Study of An-
cient Chinese Ceramics Glazes and Colours I). Sin Chew Jit Poh
Semi-Monthly 14: 11-2.
c. ‘Woguo guci youzhi ji secai zhi lice er’ (A Preliminary Study of An-
cient Chinese Ceramics Glazes and Colours II). Sin Chew Jit Poh
Semi-Monthly 15: 8-11.
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d. ‘Zhenghe fei huaren xuetong zhi yanjiu’ (Study of Zhenghe’s non-
Chinese Descent). Sin Chew Jit Poh Semi-Monthly 16.
1941
a. ‘Chinese Accounts of Laccifer Lacca (Lac), Kerr’. Journal of the South
Seas Society 1(1): 24-7.
b. ‘Research on “Tuapekong”’. Journal of the South Seas Society 1(2): 18-
26.
c. ‘Notes on Bornean Camphor Imported into China’. Journal of the
South Seas Society 2(1): 3-17.
d. ‘“Tien Hao” and Early Chinese Emigration’. Journal of the South Seas
Society 2(2): 51-73.
e. ‘Study on Glass and Porcelain Beads’. Journal of the South Seas Society
2(3): 44-66.
f. ‘Sumu kao (Research on Sappan Wood)’. Zhongyuan yuekan (Central
Plain Monthly) 5(1): 24-8.
g. ‘Zai guowai fajian zhi Weishenfu taohu yanjiu’ (Study of Wei, 220-
265 A.D. Ceramics Vessel with Protective Talisman Discovered from
the Overseas). Dongfang zazhi (Oriental Magazine) 38(14): 25-7.
1946
a. ‘Notes on the Ancient Chinese Accounts about Coconuts’. Journal of
the South Seas Society 3(1): 36-46.
b. ‘Bosi gutuohu faxianji’ (Notes on Ancient Persian Spittoon Discov-
ery). Nanyang zazhi (South Seas Magazine) 1(1): 10-2.
c. ‘Bosi gutuohu zhi lunzhan’ (Debate on Ancient Persian Spittoon).
Nanyang zaizhi (South Seas Magazine) 1(3): 67.
1947
a. ‘A Study on Rhodomyrtus Tomentosa’ (Downy Myrtle), Rambutan.
Journal of the South Seas Society 4(1): 25-8.
b. ‘Qiongzhou Nanyang jiaotong kao’ (Study on Qiongzhou Nanyang
Transportation). Nanyang yingshu Qiongzhou huiguan lianhehui hui-
bao (Journal of Associated Chambers of Qiongzhou Clan Association in
the British Malaya), pp. 6-9.
1948
a. ‘Notes on Catechu’. Journal of the South Seas Society 5(1): 30-41.
b. ‘A Study on Johore Lama’. Journal of the South Seas Society 5(2): 5-25.
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c. ‘Heding kao’ (Study on Buceros Hornbill). Dongfang zaizhi (Oriental
Magazine) 44(12): 42-5.
d. ‘Du Zheng Dekun xiansheng shu’ (Read Cheng Te-K’un’s Letter). Na-
nyang zazhi (South Seas Magazine) 2(1): 14.
e. ‘A Study on Johore Lama’ (English translation by Liu Chiang). Journal
of the South Seas Society 5(2): 17-35.
f. ‘Summary of Notes on Catechu’ (English translation). Journal of the
South Seas Society 5(1): 43.
1949
a. ‘Huzhao shihua’ (Historical References to Pepper). Annual of the Chi-
na Society of Singapore, pp. 1-4.
b. ‘Yanwo xianhua’ (Bird’s Nest Talk). Saturday Review 6: 10.
1950
a. ‘A Research on Kendi’. Journal of the South Seas Society 6(1): 25-30.
b. ‘Dabogong yanjiu buyi’ (Further Notes on the ‘Tuapekong’ Study).
Kwong Wah Jit Poh, May 13.
1951
a. ‘Durian in Chinese Accounts’. Journal of the South Seas Society 7(1):
41-3.
b. ‘Tan gongpin qie’nanxiang’ (Study on Tribute Calambac). Annual of
the China Society of Singapore, pp. 4-6.
c. ‘Zhongguo huoyao huoqi jianshi I, II, III’ (A Short History of Chi-
nese Gunpowder and Firearms I, II, III). Sin Chew Weekly 25: 14,
26: 9, 27: 14-5.
d. ‘Zai Hainan soude de shiqi’ (Stone Tools Collected in Hainan). Satur-
day Review 85: 10-2.
e. ‘Chaoxian he Zhongguo de guanxi’ (Relationships between Korea and
China). Saturday Review 97: 61.
f. ‘Chushi Yingfae de Zengjize’ (Zengjize, a diplomat sent to England,
France and Russia). Saturday Review 102: 10-3.
g. ‘Dabogong zhuitan’ (More Notes on the ‘Tuapekong’). Saturday Re-
view 109: 3-4.
h. ‘Research on Kendi’ (English translation by Lü Ch’eng-cheng). Jour-
nal of the South Seas Society 7(1): 1-5.
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1952
a. ‘Notes on Some Products in South Seas’. Journal of the South Seas So-
ciety 8(1): 57-62.
b. ‘A Trip to Jakarta’. Journal of the South Seas Society 8(2): 45-53.
c. ‘Hezi kao’ (A Study of Myrobalan). Annual of the China Society of Sin-
gapore, pp. 3-6.
d. ‘Qiongzhou de Songhuizong yushubei’ (Song Emperor Huizong’s
Calligraphic Stone in Hainan). Saturday Review 143: 6-7.
1953
a. ‘Rambutan Planting’. Journal of the South Seas Society 9(2): 28-36.
b. ‘Roufohe liuyu fajian youkuanshi zhi woguo canci’ (Chinese Cera-
mics Shards with Inscriptions found in the Johore Lama River Dis-
trict). Annual of the China Society of Singapore, pp. 20-2.
c. ‘Xingjiapo faxian zhi dapao’ (Cannons discovered in Singapore). Sin
Chew Weekly 117: 3-5.
1954
a. ‘Study on Ming Porcelains form the Johore Lama Excavation’. Journal
of the South Seas Society 10(2): 17-24.
b. ‘Tangshan diaozhonghua’ (Chinese Bell-flower). Annual of the China
Society of Singapore, pp.69-70.
c. ‘Nanyang yanjiu xuezhe Hanhuaizhun xiansheng de hua’ (Foreword
by Nanyang Researcher Mr. Han Wai Toon). ‘In Wu Tiren’ (ed.) Re-
dai jingji zhiwu huangli (Economic Plants in the Tropics: Pineapple).
Singapore: Shijie shuju, pp. 12-5.
1955
a. ‘The Olden Chinese Pottery in Borneo’. Journal of the South Seas So-
ciety 11(2): 46-57.
b. ‘Zhongguo gudai yu Nanyang zhi taoci maoyi’ (Ceramics Trade be-
tween Ancient China and the South Seas). Annual of the China So-
ciety of Singapore, pp. 33-9.
1956
a. ‘A Study of the Tortoise’. Annual of the China Society of Singapore, pp.
43-52.
b. ‘Zhongguo gudai zhi Nanyang hanglu’ (Ancient Chinese and South
Seas Routes). Saturday Review 350: 3-5.
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1957
‘A Study of the Water Spirits Worshipped by the Sea-Faring Men in An-
cient South China’. Annual of the China Society of Singapore, pp. 31-
45.
1959
‘Ancient Persian Spittoon Found During Japanese Occupation’. Annual
of the China Society of Singapore, pp. 64-72.
1960
a. Ancient Chinese Export Ware Inherited by Southeast Asia. Singapore:
Youth Book Co.
b. ‘Zhanshi souhuo de Bosi gutuohu’ (Ancient Persian Spittoon Found
During Japanese Occupation). Nanyang wenzhai (South Seas Digest)
7: 68-70.
1961
‘Xingjiapo bingfei gudai de danmaxi kao’ (Study on whether Singapore
was not Ancient Temasik). Nanyang wenzhai (South Seas Digest) 16:
51-9.
1965
‘Tan woguo Mingqing shidao de waixiao ciqi’ (A Study of Chinese Trade
Porcelain in Ming-Ching Period). Wenwu (Cultural Relics) 9: 57-9.
1985
Notes on Bornean Camphor Imported into China (English translation
by Billy So, Kee-long). The Brunei Museum Journal 6(1): 2-31.
2005
Ancient Chinese Export Ware Inherited by Southeast Asia (reprinted). Sin-
gapore: Youth Book Co.
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2008
Han Huaizhun wencun (Selected articles by Han Wai Toon), Hainan Pro-
vince Cultural and History Society (ed.). Beijing: Changzhen chu-
banshe.
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9 Singaporean First:
Challenging the Concept of Transnational
Malay Masculinity
Lenore Lyons and Michele Ford
Introduction
Since Singapore’s independence in 1965, the People’s Action Party’s
(henceforth the PAP) management of ethnicity and potential ethnic
conflict has depended on a strategy that emphasizes selected ‘race’ iden-
tities.1 Under a policy of multiracialism, all Singaporeans fall into one
of four official race categories – Chinese, Malay, Indian, and Others.
This policy, known as ‘CMIO multiracialism’, goes much further than
simply providing an environment in which cultural and religious prac-
tices are observed and upheld. It downplays diversity within racial cate-
gories and emphasizes shared cultural and linguistic heritages within
racial groups. In the process, race becomes an important way of label-
ling the population and individuals are encouraged to think about them-
selves using these racial categories. CMIO multiracialism relies for its
legitimacy upon the imagery of an ever-present threat to national stabi-
lity from inter-ethnic conflict. It is thus promoted as a pragmatic solu-
tion to the realities of nation building. The policy was developed in a
context of concern about the promotion of Malay privilege under the
leadership of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), in the
short-lived Federation of Malaysia of which Singapore was a part from
1963 to 1965. During this period, the PAP promoted the concept of a
‘Malaysian Malaysia’ in which all races were given equal rights, against
a ‘Malay Malaysia’ in which Malays (as bumiputera, literally ‘sons of the
soil’) would be privileged above other ethnic groups (Lian and Rajah
2002). In contrast to UMNO’s policies, the PAP sought to ‘correct the
imbalance in economic and social development’ between the Malay and
non-Malay communities through a focus on education (Lee Kuan Yew,
cited in Bedlington 1981: 248-9). This view of racial equality continued
after Singapore was ousted from the Federation and formed the basis of
the idea of a ‘Singaporean Singapore’.
However, in reality, not all races are equally valued for their contribu-
tion to the Singaporean national identity. The rhetoric of a ‘Singaporean
Singapore’ contains an implicit, frequently aggressive, program of as-
similation of racial minorities into a Chinese-dominated society. Singa-
pore’s economic success in the post-independence period is routinely
attributed to aspects of Chinese culture, often presented under the rub-
ric of ‘Asian values’, such as thrift, hard work, and a desire for educa-
tion. Members of minority races are expected to maintain a sense of ra-
cial/cultural separateness, as expressed through markers such as diet,
dress, religion and language, while jettisoning those aspects of culture
that do not meet the desired attributes of the national identity (Barr and
Low 2005: 167). Within this framework, Malays are encouraged to as-
similate into Singaporean society in public, while reserving their Malay,
and especially Muslim, identities for the private sphere.2 Significantly,
the state’s rendering of a homogenous Malay racial category serves not
only to set them apart from the Chinese majority population, and by
implication, a Chinese-determined national identity, but also to identify
their cultural inferiority. In contrast to the Chinese, Malays are said to
lack the key cultural attributes that would enable them to succeed in the
modern global economy (Rahim 1998). This cultural deficit is used to
explain the Malay community’s continuing economic and social disad-
vantage when compared to other racial groups (see Kamaludeen 2007;
Li 1989; Rahim 1998).
When stereotypes about Malay cultural inferiority are combined with
widespread concerns about the existence of a Pan-Malay (read Muslim)
brotherhood, the Malay community’s loyalty to the Singapore nation
may sometimes be questioned. Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
articulated these sentiments in 1987 when he referred to concerns
about Malay/Muslim loyalty: ‘Are we sure that in a moment of crisis,
when the heat is on, we are all together, heart to heart?’ (Siddique
1989: 570). These concerns imply the innate perception amongst pro-
minent politicians that there exists a trans-national cultural/religious
identity shared by Singaporean Malays, Malaysian Malays and Indone-
sians that overshadows a sense of Singaporean nationalism – senti-
ments summed up by then Second Minister of Defence (and current
Prime Minister) Lee Hsien Loong during a constituency tour in 1987:
If there is a conflict, we don’t want to put any of our soldiers in
a difficult position where his emotions for the nation may be in
conflict with his emotions for his religion… We don’t want to put
anybody in that position where he feels he is not fighting a just
cause, and perhaps worse, maybe his side is not the right side
(The Straits Times 1987).3
Fears concerning Singaporean Malays’ divided loyalties have become
even more apparent in the post-9/11 environment. During the 1980s,
the state, Malay civil society groups, and Muslim organizations actively
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promoted Islam as a means to counter a range of social problems fa-
cing the Malay community. In the post-9/11 period, however, the value
of Islam as a form of ‘cultural ballast’ has come under intense scrutiny.
Instead, it has been positioned as a potential threat to nationalism. In
January 2003, the government issued a White Paper, ‘The Jemaah Isla-
miyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism’ that included an examina-
tion of a ‘home-grown’ terrorist threat. In both parliamentary and pub-
lic debates about the White Paper, the broader issue of threats posed by
international terrorism to Singapore has been sidelined by a focus on
race relations and a concern that Southeast Asian Muslims in general,
and Singaporean Malays in particular, are susceptible to a radical view
of Islam terrorism that places religion above national loyalty (Ismail and
Shaw 2006; Kadir 2006). This focus on Islam as a marker of potential
disloyalty points to the ongoing conflation of racial and religious identi-
ties, as evident in the collective term ‘Malay-Muslim’ commonly used as
a racial category by the government, community leaders and the press.
This chapter calls into question ideas about the existence of a trans-
national Malay-Muslim identity by examining the ways in which Malay
men understand and perform their masculinity vis-à-vis men in the
neighbouring countries of Malaysia and Indonesia. It starts from the
premise that issues of ethnic (and religious) ‘loyalty’ are questions that
rest on primordial notions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ attributed to ethnicity
and religion. We argue that, in the context of Singapore, concepts of
ethnic and national identity are shaped by two significant forces: the
presence of the Chinese majority population, and the PAP’s stance on
Singapore’s location in a Malay/Muslim archipelago (Brown 1994; Hill
and Lian 1995). The Chinese majority population and the Chinese-
dominated parliament and bureaucracy play a critical role in shaping
Malay identity not through a process of hybridisation that arises
through direct contact and interaction, but through a state-led policy of
comparison that requires the Malay community to constantly position
itself in relation to the majority (Li 1989: 136). At the same time, given
the heterogeneity of the Malay community (a fact eluded to in public
statements about ‘Malay loyalty’), any investigation into the meaning of
a shared Malay identity also needs to consider to what extent ‘Malay-
ness’ is constituted as ‘a Singaporean experience, and to what extent
this experience has itself been conditioned by geographical proximity to
Malaysia and cultural affinities with other related communities in Ma-
laysia, the Riau archipelago, and Indonesia’ (Lian and Rajah 2002:
232).4 By examining how Singaporean Malay men negotiate and con-
struct their identities, this paper both problematises the notion of a
homogenous Malay identity in Singapore and seeks to subvert com-
monly held understandings about the presence of a transnational Malay
masculinity in the region.5
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In the first part of this study, we explore these men’s accounts of Ma-
lay marginalisation and issues of racial discrimination. The second part
of the study will discuss cross-border travel and the construction of
masculinities across borders. We argue that the ways in which young
professional Malay men understand and respond to racial discrimina-
tion reflects their internalisation of a set of state-sponsored values com-
monly ascribed to the Chinese community, but which are also increas-
ingly defined as essential elements of Singapore’s national identity.
These values come into sharper focus in the way that these men talk
about their experiences of travel to Indonesia and Malaysia. In their ac-
counts of ‘Malaysian-Malay backwardness’ and ‘Indonesian corruption’,
the men assert their own national superiority as Singaporeans, and
downplay any sense of shared ethnic identity. In a global context where
Muslim masculinity has been positioned as inherently threatening, and
in a local context where Malay (Muslim) masculinity is always already
problematic, our analysis contributes to a more nuanced understanding
of the ways class and ethnicity intersect in shaping Singaporean Malay
men’s sense of identity.
Our discussion draws on data collected in interviews with Singapor-
ean Malay men in the middle- and lower-income brackets over a four-
year period to 2008. The interviews were conducted as part of a larger
study on the construction of national and ethnic identity in the Indone-
sia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle.6 For the purposes of this paper
we concentrate primarily on our interviews with professional men aged
between 25 and 34. It is important to note that the ways in which these
Malay men talk about their identities is coloured by the lens of class.
These men are experiencing rapid social mobility in Singapore and the
majority espouse a distinctly ‘middle-income’ outlook in terms of their
aspirations and perceptions of their social and economic opportunities.
At the same time, it is not possible to describe their class position solely
as ‘middle-income’, since this label obscures the complex nature of in-
ter-generational differences in education and income levels within Sin-
gaporean households. Their parents are employed in the service and
manufacturing sectors, but these men have benefited from higher levels
of education (including access to university) and subsequently higher
wages. However, like most unmarried Singaporeans, they continue to
live with their parents and siblings until they are married. Household
income and residential structure are thus poor measures of their class
location. Although these men represent less than 8 per cent of the Ma-
lay population of Singapore (Leow 2001), their status as potential com-
munity leaders makes them a significant group in the eyes of the state.
By focusing on middle-income professional men, we can also explore
the nexus between class and ethnicity in the construction of Malay mas-
culinities.
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Understanding Malay Marginality
Malay marginality is a constant trope in the narratives that the Malay
men in this study construct about what it means to ‘be a man’ in con-
temporary Singapore. These narratives draw on state-sponsored re-
search that highlights the Malay community’s disadvantage when com-
pared to other racial groups. This relative disadvantage is measured in
economic and social terms. Chinese households consistently out-per-
form Malay households in relation to household income and the mar-
gin has continued to grow. In 1980, the average Malay household in-
come was 73 per cent of the Chinese household income, but by 2000,
had dropped to only 60 per cent of the Chinese household income (Lee
2004: 32). Importantly, these figures do not take into consideration sig-
nificant class differences within the Chinese community and the pre-
sence of significant numbers of Chinese households on low incomes.
Thus the focus on ‘Malay marginality’ serves to obscure class divisions
within Singapore, and forefronts race as a causal factor in economic
and social disadvantage. Attention is primarily placed on Malays as a
homogenous racial category in opposition to an undifferentiated, homo-
geneous ‘Chinese’ community.
This form of analysis is supported by data that highlights broad racial
differences in socio-economic performance. According to the 2000
Census, over 30 per cent of working Malays were found in the manu-
facturing sector and were over-represented in manufacturing, transpor-
tation, business and social services industries compared with Indians
and Chinese (Lee 2004: 33). By contrast, the Chinese dominate in pro-
fessional, managerial and technical occupations. Educational differences
play an important role in creating these occupational disparities be-
tween the Chinese and other ethnic groups (Rahim 1998).7 In compari-
son with the Chinese and Indian populations, Malays also experience
higher divorce rates, larger numbers of single parents, larger family
sizes, and are over-represented in drug offences, truancy, and un-wed
teenage pregnancies (Mutalib 2005). These ‘social problems’ attract con-
siderable government and public attention and serve to reinforce a ser-
ies of negative stereotypes about the Malay community. In an attempt
to redress these problems, the government supports a number of ‘social
uplifting’ initiatives. Many of these programs are run through the Ma-
lay/Muslim community self-help organizations that provide education
and training support for Malay children and lower-income workers, as
well as life-skills and marriage preparation workshops.
The PAP has always been careful to assert that Malays occupy a spe-
cial status within Singapore as the indigenous people of the island na-
tion. This special status is officially recognized in Article 89 of the Sin-
gapore Constitution:
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The government shall exercise its functions in such a manner as
to recognize the special position of the Malays, who are indigen-
ous people of Singapore, and accordingly it shall be the responsi-
bility of the government to protect, safeguard, support, foster
and promote their political, economic, social and cultural identity
and the Malay language (cited in Mutalib 2005: 57-8).
Among the ‘privileges’ granted to Malays was the recognition of Malay
as the ‘national’ language (with Mandarin, Tamil and English identified
as the other three ‘official’ languages); free education from primary
school to university; the provision of a mosque in every HDB estate;
and the appointment of Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs in the Ca-
binet. These constitutional provisions are mainly symbolic. In practical
terms, the symbolism of Malays’ special status means little in the face
of the Malay community’s marginality vis-à-vis other groups, particu-
larly since Singapore Malays no longer enjoy the special quotas and
other forms of governmental support originally identified at the time of
Independence (Mutalib 2005: 70). For example, Malay and Muslim fa-
milies contribute to Mendaki programs that support a range of activ-
ities, including the payment of tertiary educational fees. Consequently,
while tertiary education remains symbolically free for the community as
a whole, it is not automatically a right for individual students and their
families.
The PAP government recognizes that the Malay community still lags
behind other ethnic groups on a range of key socio-economic indica-
tors, but asserts that a state-sponsored policy of meritocracy ensures
that anyone can succeed based on merit and not racial background (Mu-
talib 2005).8 While these claims are certainly supported by countless ex-
amples of working class individuals who ‘work hard’ and succeed, such
statements overlook the extent to which hard work is frequently cultu-
rally inscribed. Writing in the 1980s, Tania Li (1989: 167) observed
that:
the image of Malays as perennially backward, or reified cultural
explanations for Malay backwardness, cannot be dismissed as
merely false. The image of backwardness and its supposed cul-
tural causes have themselves become part of the cultural fabric
of Malay and Singapore society, and they have real practical ef-
fects as they are incorporated into the daily lives of ordinary Sin-
gaporeans and into national political processes.
Although Tania Murray Li’s study is now several decades old, it provides
one of the few detailed ethnographic accounts of the Malay community.
Her comments are thus important for historicising the formation of
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‘marginality’ as both a policy imperative and a socially inscribed trait.
Lily Rahim’s (1998) study of Malay marginality, published a decade
after Li’s book, is also insightful in its demonstration of the way that
the discourse of backwardness has been taken up at the policy level.
These and other studies show that Malay marginalization is attributed
by both the state and community members themselves to entrenched
cultural values which hold Malays back from taking advantage of the
education and employment opportunities provided under PAP rule. Ma-
lay men are said to lack intellectual capacity and motivation, and to be
better with their hands (physical and technical skills) and less capable
in academic areas (Rahim 1998). This is combined with a cultural pro-
pensity to be ‘laid back’ and not interested in hard work, which echoes
the ‘lazy native’ thesis proposed by colonial authorities, who described
Malay men as effeminate and unsuited to waged labour (Crinis 2004).9
These stereotypes reflect a widely held view in the non-Malay com-
munity that Malay men lack the key cultural and biological attributes
that would enable them to succeed in the modern Singaporean econo-
my (Li 1998). In his study of youth in the army, Leong Choon Cheong
notes that Chinese national servicemen describe Malay men as ‘lazy,
unintelligent, unhygienic, and aggressive’ (cited in Rahim 1998: 57-8),
while laziness and drug taking also emerge as common stereotypes of
Malay male youth in contemporary studies of popular culture (see Liew
and Fu 2006). There has been little scholarly attention, however, to the
continued salience of these stereotypes and the complexities surround-
ing ‘Malay identity’ over the last three decades, particularly in the con-
text of growing class diversity amongst Malays. There has also been lit-
tle examination of the implicit gendering of these accounts. Common
racial stereotypes of ‘Malays’ rarely make gender distinctions, with the
exception of accounts regarding teenage pregnancies that focus on the
promiscuous behaviour of Malay girls. For this reason, our study sought
to examine the ways in which young professional men themselves un-
derstand the continued relevance of the common stereotypes that circu-
late about Malay men.
When asked how they thought Malay men were perceived by the
non-Malay Singaporean community, the men we interviewed responded
with terms and phrases like ‘slacker’, ‘relaxed’, ‘sitting in void decks’,
‘soccer players’, ‘doing technical work’, ‘artists’, or ‘not professionals’.
Another man, Abdullah, a 28 year-old entrepreneur, described the traits
commonly ascribed to Malays as pre-colonial:
The Malays are easily content, laidback. We managed to survive
the British invasion in that way. Can you imagine what would
have happened if the Temenggong had not sold our island? Got
some money, happy already!
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For the men we interviewed, the marginality of Malay masculinity is re-
inforced in these stereotypes. Acutely aware of how their own life
choices and experiences are shaped by expectations of Malay cultural in-
feriority, these men actively construct their own masculinities in contra-
distinction to these images.
The ‘Level’ Playing Field
Ambitious young Malay men’s decisions not to act out the ‘typical Ma-
lay’ trope are complicated by state and community structures that rein-
force Malays’ subordinate positionality. The claim that Singapore oper-
ates on a ‘level playing field’ (i.e., meritocracy) obscures the myriad
ways in which Singaporeans from all racial groups are encouraged to
assimilate into PAP-promoted values. The education system is an im-
portant site for this process of ‘social engineering’. For example, Barr
and Low’s (2005) study of kindergartens demonstrates the ways in
which education policy and the policy of educational ‘streaming’ tie fu-
ture success to academic learning. These practices impact negatively on
many children in low-income households of all racial groups, who often
lack positive role models in school and find it difficult to study and re-
ceive support in their home environments. Rahim (1998) argues that
active discrimination and stereotyping also occurs in schools – Malay
children are streamed into technical areas and rarely encouraged to pur-
sue academic subjects. When educational streaming is combined with
racial stereotyping, it can have a profound impact on future education
and employment opportunities.
These processes are further reinforced by the strong segregation that
occurs within schools, in which children (and teachers) tend to mix
with members of their own ethnic group (see Lee et al. 2004; Li 1989;
Rahim 1998). For Malay children this is enhanced by a strong cultural
imperative not to be a ‘loner’. This pressure is exemplified in the fol-
lowing conversation amongst three young professional Malay men in
their late 20s. The three men met during secondary school.
Zainul: I didn’t play soccer until secondary school. When I see
Malay guys playing soccer … I have this perception that
these are the real Malay guys … because they play soccer,
they speak Malay. [As a consequence] I feel pressure to
play soccer.
Musa: You feel isolated.
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Zainul: Pressure to play. So I started to learn, but after a while
you grow up and feel more confident to try other things.
But at elementary and high school soccer is more central.
Interviewer: Pressure from other Malay boys?
Zainul: They feel that you must or otherwise you are not [a real
Malay].
Iqbal: We pressure ourselves. Not to be seen as isolated indivi-
duals.
For Zainul, a 26 year-old civil servant, playing soccer became a means
of being accepted within his Malay peer group. In the process, he be-
came ‘a real Malay guy’ who spoke Malay and could perform a culturally
acceptable form of Malay masculinity. The transcript presented above
does not portray the reactions of Iqbal (a 26-year-old civil servant) and
Musa (a 27-year-old teacher) to Zainul’s opening statement. When Zai-
nul said ‘I didn’t play soccer until secondary school’, Musa immediately
responded by shouting out: ‘But good!’ [meaning: He played well] fol-
lowed by laughter from Iqbal and Musa and a wry smile from Zainul as
he continued to speak. When he said ‘I feel pressured to play soccer’
there was further laughter. The laughter and jibe about Zainul’s soccer
skills served to reinforce the centrality of the soccer identity for all the
men. Soccer is a means of establishing group identity for Malay men
despite their recognition that peer pressure to be a ‘real Malay guy’ by
playing soccer served to re-inscribe racial stereotyping.10
Positive racism
Although the men we spoke to were able to provide detailed descrip-
tions of the stereotypes that circulate about Malay men, they were un-
comfortable describing these as instances of racism or prejudice. Where
a stereotype is linked to a positive portrayal of skill (as in the example
of soccer or Malays being good singers), it is difficult to identify those
stereotypes as discriminatory. Jamal, a 27 year-old therapist, related how
in secondary school non-Malays always assumed he would be good at
soccer: ‘Even if they haven’t seen you play, they automatically think you
are going to be good and call you up to play on their team’. As the men
asserted, ‘We really are good soccer players.’
Racist notions of minority men’s masculine physicality are common
in other cultural and national settings (cf. Majors 1998; Messner 1989).
The men were cognisant of the parallels between their situation and
that of minority men in other countries, as demonstrated in the follow-
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ing exchange that preceded the discussion of soccer playing outlined
above:
Zainul: At university, they know I am Malay, they want me to play
soccer.
Musa: They perceive us to be better at technical aspects, soccer,
sports, that kind of thing. I think in terms of education
they don’t know us, because our numbers in university
are so small.
Iqbal: Similar to African-Americans and all.
Positive portrayals of minority men’s ‘innate’ physical attributes and
sporting prowess act as a source of community pride, and also serve to
channel boys and young men into naturalized roles in commodified
sports cultures that in turn reinforce ‘positive’ racism (Hokowhitu
2004: 262). In a similar way, for the young men in our study, the domi-
nance of Malay players in the national soccer league is both a reminder
of ethnic stereotyping and a source of ethnic pride.
Another common image that the men found difficult to critique is
the emphasis on the Malays’ suitability as entertainers given their ‘in-
nate’ artistic abilities. Musa asserted: ‘We are considered to be good ar-
tists because two Singapore Idols are Malays.’ Similarly, the men could
see little harm in the comic role commonly played by Malay men in
English and Chinese sit-coms. Zainul stated: ‘I think the Malay man in
the mass media is portrayed not as a negative. They may portray [him]
as a buffoon but not negative. In a comedy setting it is very funny.’
Stereotypes in film and television serve as a convenient form of short-
hand to convey information about characters. In the case of comedy,
such stereotypes help to establish instantly recognizable character types
(King 2002). Exaggerated portrayals of racial traits can be a form of par-
ody, and thus a strategy of subversion of racial norms. Distinguishing
between satire and the reproduction of racism is fraught. Scholars of
race have argued that trying to differentiate between racism and ‘harm-
less’ racial jokes obscures the normalising function of racial stereotypes.
For example, writing about the United States, Park et al. (2006) assert
that although comedies starring racial minorities facilitate racial toler-
ance, including the acceptance of Asian men, they rely on an explicit,
and often normalized, representation of racial hierarchy. One of the
consequences of this is the naturalization of racial stereotypes. The as-
sociation of Malays with technical, sporting or artistic skills and Chi-
nese with entrepreneurial ability is reinforced in a local Chinese joke,
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which serves to entrench a widely held belief that the Chinese excel in
business and other racial groups do not:
Q: Why don’t the Chinese play soccer?
A: Because as soon as we get a corner, we open a shop.
The men’s discussion of stereotypes and their reluctance to identify
these as instances of racism may reflect a widespread unwillingness by
Singaporeans to discuss race issues publicly (Lai 1995). Openly voicing
opinions about racial discrimination can lead to public (and criminal)
charges of being a ‘racial chauvinist’.11 At the same time, however, these
views must also be read against the men’s own understanding of the
saliency of such stereotypes – as in this conversation with Salleh, a 27
year-old engineer:
Salleh: I think sometimes you can’t blame them [non-Malays].
Like Malays take drugs and all. And I also feel that Malays
are lazy.
Interviewer: Why?
Salleh: They are easily content with life. They have a short-term
objective in life. To get a car. Even if they cannot afford
one they must buy a car, must buy a big house, but their
kids education they don’t care about. I have some stories
from my friends lah. They can’t afford their kids poly[tech-
nic] education or university education but they can afford
one big car and everything else lah. They like to show off.
And they are full of debts.
The men contrasted their own achievements, including their tertiary
education and professional employment, with those of the ‘typical Ma-
lay’. Although they were familiar with the common stereotypes used to
describe Malays, they either excluded themselves from these descrip-
tions or admitted to limited, and less problematic, ‘slippages’. A com-
mon example was the men’s descriptions of their own study habits in
contrast to those of their Chinese classmates. A number of the men ad-
mitted that unlike their Chinese peers, they did not study as hard, but
rather were satisfied with achieving a pass grade in their tertiary stu-
dies. They described this character fault – laziness – as a product of
their Malayness and simultaneously painted an unproblematic portrait
of all their Chinese classmates as hardworking, high achievers. Al-
though the men did not measure up to an idealized vision of hegemo-
nic Chinese masculinity, they nonetheless aspired to it and strived to
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achieve what they described as a ‘normal’ way of ‘being a man’. When
asked to talk about Chinese masculinity, Zulfikar, a 30 year-old flight at-
tendant, responded: ‘I guess Chinese guys are like normal. Stereotypical
… what we expect of normal society.’
The men in our study are caught in a double bind – they want to
challenge the veracity of the many negative stereotypes used to label the
Malay community, and particularly Malay men, but they also rely on
those same stereotypes to secure their own ‘exceptional’ status in rela-
tion to education and employment opportunities, as well as achieve-
ments, within the Malay community. When they fail to measure up to
their own, and society’s, definition of a ‘normal man’, they attribute
their personal failings to an inherited cultural inferiority. The men’s en-
try into the middle class is thus always fragile and premised on their
ability to internalize and demonstrate the ‘superior’ values of industry
and thrift. Tania Li (1989) observed that amongst middle-income Malay
parents these insecurities are manifested in the decision to move their
families out of lower-income housing estates and to encourage their
children to socialize with non-Malay friends. While the majority of men
in our study were unmarried, they exhibited a similar desire to demar-
cate the boundaries between themselves and other Malays whom they
described as members of the ‘lower class’.
Masculinity across Borders
During the discussions that were held with the interviewees about non-
Singaporean Malay men, the internalization of the middle-income attri-
butes of thrift and hard work by professional Singapore Malay men be-
came even more apparent. In asserting a claim about the ‘foreignness’
of non-Singaporean Malays, the men drew on their direct experiences of
travel to Indonesia and Malaysia. All of the interviewees had travelled to
Malaysia for short holidays, and sometimes on business. Two-thirds of
them had travelled to Indonesia, primarily Jakarta, for similar reasons.
Their accounts of these ‘other Malays’ drew on their travel experiences
as well as common Singaporean stereotypes of Malaysian Malays and In-
donesians.12 The men were all sensitive to the national significance of
the discourse of a ‘Singaporean Singapore’, in opposition to a ‘Malay
Malaysia’, and were familiar with the issue of loyalty that hung over the
Malay community. However, they were adamant that the concept of a
shared cross-border identity with other Malays made little sense.
In their accounts of their trips abroad, shared culture, language and
religion emerged as important factors in facilitating ease of travel.
While many of the men described the enjoyment they obtained from
eating Malaysian and Indonesian food when they travelled,13 some also
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expressed relief that they did not have to worry about dietary restric-
tions. As Musa observed in relation to the presence of halal14 food: ‘The
moment I reach Malaysia or Indonesia the first thing that hits my mind
is that I can eat almost everything.’ Musa’s comment suggests that for
Malay Muslims living in Singapore, restrictions associated with food ta-
boos cannot be underestimated. A wide variety of halal food is available
in Singapore, and most large businesses and schools which provide
canteens also supply separate eating utensils for halal food stalls. When
eating in unfamiliar places many Muslims may err on the side of cau-
tion by only ordering drinks or fruit. Many Singaporean Muslims also
acknowledge that non-Muslims are not always aware of the issues asso-
ciated with food taboos, and do not appear to understand that many
Muslims feel awkward if their Chinese friends and colleagues order
pork dishes and eat them at the same table. Food taboos become less
important when travelling abroad to a predominantly Muslim country,
and consequently the men felt a sense of ease in relation to their dietary
habits.
For those men who had travelled to Indonesia or Malaysia as part of
a racially mixed group of friends or colleagues, language was an impor-
tant source of cultural capital in the groups’ interactions with Indone-
sian or Malay service providers, including hotel and restaurant staff and
taxi drivers. Their ability to communicate in Bahasa Melayu or Bahasa
Indonesia immediately made them indispensable to their Chinese
friends and colleagues. Their ethnicity was thus a positive rather than a
negative attribute. They explained that in Singapore, Malay language
abilities are not highly valued when compared to Mandarin. They ar-
gued that Chinese employers frequently discriminate against Malays in
job advertisements by using the phrase ‘Bilingual in English and Man-
darin’ as a required or desirable skill. When travelling to Malaysia and
Indonesia, Malay men’s ability to act as language brokers for non-Malay
speaking Singaporeans not only improved their status within their peer
group, but also inevitably allowed them to adopt the position of cultural
broker in interactions between their peer group, and between them-
selves and Indonesians or Malaysian Malays. Language ability thus be-
came an important source of power.
At a personal level, shared language is a means to ease the stress that
often accompanies travel. The majority of the men are effectively bilin-
gual in English and Malay, and professed to feeling comfortable travel-
ling anywhere these languages are spoken. Although their travels to In-
donesia or Malaysia for work or leisure were not premised on language,
it clearly facilitated the travel process. However, shared language is not
an attribute that all of the men wanted to draw upon in their interac-
tions with Malaysian Malays or Indonesians. For example, Zulfikar, an
ambitious flight attendant with Singapore Airlines, chooses to distance
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himself by deliberately using English as a marker of his Singaporean
nationality:
I choose to let them know that I’m Singaporean because… be-
cause I know we are much more superior than them … I choose
not to be mistaken as being like Malaysian or an Indonesian.
Although I can do a Malaysian-Malay accent or an Indonesian ac-
cent. That kind of thing. But I choose strategically not to be as-
similated. But … if there’s trouble or that kind of thing and I
know that being local counts, I guess I can… I have to do it. But
otherwise, to show my superiority [I speak in English] I guess.
Differences in purchasing power are another area for the demonstration
of Singaporean Malay superiority. This sense of superiority is most
clearly expressed in a comment by Iskandar, a 32 year-old journalist,
who said: ‘When realising that you are Singaporean, they like kowtow
to you a bit and, okay, make a deal. We have better bargaining power
nowadays.’ The greater bargaining power experienced by Iskandar is a
product of Singapore’s rapid economic development, which has pro-
duced higher standards of living and significant income disparities be-
tween Singaporeans and their regional neighbours.
The men stated that as a consequence of Singapore’s economic devel-
opment there has been a distinct divide between their lives and those of
their regional neighbours. Despite the benefits that accrue from shared
language and cultural and religious practices, all of the men felt alien
when they travelled to Indonesia and Malaysia. In our conversations,
the men frequently distanced themselves from the backwardness of In-
donesian or Malaysian cultures by emphasising their Singaporean-ness.
They claimed that although they shared language and religious and
cultural traits with Indonesians and Malaysian Malays, they identified
more closely with Chinese and Indian Singaporeans. According to
Salleh,
When in Malaysia, I feel proud to be a Singaporean because at
least I can tell the Malaysian guys that I stand on the same page
as the other races in my home country. Because I met some Ma-
laysians who kept telling me that that Malays in Singapore don’t
know their rights. What they are saying is that Singapore belongs
to the Malays [as indigenous peoples]. I think Singapore belongs
to no one. It’s a meritocracy.
While the divide is most easily measured by English language ability
and income differentials, it also manifests itself in the outlook and be-
haviour of Malaysian Malays and Indonesians.
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When I was there [Malaysia] I felt that we are better off. Better le-
vel of education. Can speak English. More worldly. … Because
over there not many Malays are that well educated. And they
don’t really speak English. They work in the services sector …
And it doesn’t help that some of them are really quite rude to
you in a very bad way. Like a third world country mentality.
The ‘third world mentality’ that Zainul refers to was brought up by
many other interviewees who described the perceived differences be-
tween Singaporean efficiency and Indonesian or Malaysian backward-
ness, inefficiency and corruption. The poor standard of living and lack
of economic development in both countries were compared unfavour-
ably to conditions experienced in Singapore. According to Iskandar,
I think the standard of living there is very low. Many of them
would do anything just to get a dollar, they will just do anything,
even cheat others. Even though I am a Muslim, he is a Muslim.
I am from the same culture, they are from the same culture but
they don’t care about that. They would do anything just to get a
dollar.
For the young men in our study, travel to Indonesia or Malaysia did not
represent a trip back to some form of authentic Malay culture and iden-
tity.15 This is in contrast to older Malay men and women informants
who described in some detail the joy they obtained from experiencing
‘the real kampong lifestyle’ and visiting places that were ‘just like Singa-
pore in the 1950s or 60s’. Rather, it served to strengthen the young Ma-
lay men’s awareness of their middle-income achievements. In this way,
inefficiency, corruption and deception are not only markers of national
difference between Singapore and its neighbours. These traits distin-
guish backward non-Singaporean Malays from modern Singaporean
Malays.
At the same time, the keen awareness that remnants of an inefficient
Malay culture remain in Singapore, coupled with a culture that venerates
the Chinese as hard working, results in a cultural hierarchy that posi-
tions other Malays below Singaporean Malays. According to Zulkifar,
Malaysian Malays see us as being much more snobby – snob-
bish. And, ah … yeah, more like among the upper class. But I
guess I deem them as much more inferior because of how their
living standards are and how they grew up lah. I guess in a way
they don’t really have to work hard – they don’t have to put in ef-
fort to survive. And there’s no competitiveness in them. So
they’re much more – they’re even more laid-back than us lah!
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And they really have bad English. So, they’re inferior to us. …
The Chinese deem the Malay group to be Ma-lazy. So, I guess in
a way we have to prove ourselves, that we can actually also do the
job – even better than them. But of course, although the Singa-
porean Malays are deemed to be lazy, I guess you can really see
that the Malaysian Malays are much lazier.
According to the men, their own personal difference from those they
consider to be more ‘Ma-lazy’ stems from the opportunities that Singa-
pore’s advanced, meritocratic society has afforded them. As Mustafa, a
29 year-old IT worker, states: ‘[Singaporean] Malays tend to be go-get-
ters, we live in an environment where you have to work, don’t laze
around. Over there they don’t work unless they really have to.’ Although
Mustafa describes all Singaporean Malays as ‘go-getters’, he acknowl-
edges that he is really only referring to middle-income, educated Malays
such as himself, who have taken advantage of the opportunities pro-
vided in a multiracial, meritocratic society, and adopted a ‘Singaporean’
identity.
Mary Louise Pratt’s (1992) concept of the ‘contact zone’ provides
a useful way of thinking about the nature of these Malay men’s cross-
border encounters. Pratt uses the term to emphasize ‘how subjects are
constituted in and by their relations to each other… not in terms of
separateness or apartheid, but in terms of co-presence, interaction,
interlocking understandings and practices, often within radically asym-
metrical relations of power’ (Pratt 1992: 7). As we have shown here,
middle-income Singaporean Malay men’s experiences with the other
Malays of Malaysia and Indonesia in the contact zone serves to rein-
force their Singaporean-ness, not their shared cultural and religious
heritages. It enables them to recast their marginality within Singapore
by emphasizing the cultural capital afforded to them by being modern
Malay men.
Conclusion
Our analysis calls attention to the complex intersections between ethni-
city, class and nationality in shaping constructions of masculinity. How-
ever, it is also apparent that there is the need to understand the ways
masculinities are shaped by temporal and geo-spatial shifts. These is-
sues are clearly demonstrated in the interviewees’ descriptions of their
lower-class Singaporean Malay compatriots, as well as in their accounts
of their travels to Indonesia and Malaysia. The interviewees’ discussions
of what it means to be a Malay man in Singapore today are shaped by
their complex reading of their own location within an ethnic commu-
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nity that is the subject of constant criticism and the object of racial dis-
crimination. They have been brought up in an environment that va-
lorises hard work as a Chinese attribute. In contrast to the positive ac-
counts of the Chinese community’s entrepreneurial spirit and thrift,
Malays are reprimanded for their indolence and questioned about their
loyalty to the nation. The young professional Malay men in our study
have responded to these issues by internalising a set of state-sponsored
values that they describe as essential elements of Singapore’s national
identity. At home, amongst the Chinese majority, they work hard to dis-
tance themselves from other Singaporean Malays whom they depict as
lazy and backward in their outlook.
These distancing strategies are also apparent in the men’s accounts
of their travel to Indonesia and Malaysia. They describe Malaysian Ma-
lays and Indonesians as backward, corrupt and inefficient and assert
that these other Malays are even lazier than their lower-class Singapor-
ean counterparts. When they travel abroad, the men’s wealth, education
and middle class outlook serve as easily identifiable markers of their
superiority when compared to subordinate Indonesian and Malaysian
men.16 More significantly, the men actively use these attributes to lay
claim to a ‘Singaporean-ness’ that they share with other middle-income
Singaporeans. Rather than providing a shared sense of ethnic Pan-Ma-
lay identity, travel serves to assert the men’s difference from Malays in
the region. Paradoxically, then, the sense of superiority that these men
experience when travelling to Indonesia and Malaysia re-inscribes their
marginality in Singapore. Rather than making them feel racial discrimi-
nation more keenly, their experience of travel to majority-Malay coun-
tries reinforces their satisfaction with the status quo. This view was
summed up by Iqbal, who asserts that ‘Although we are discriminated
against… we are all living happy lives here.’
It is this statement, perhaps more than any others, that sums up the
complex nature of these men’s subordinate masculinity vis-à-vis Chi-
nese Singaporean men. The men seek to minimize the damaging impli-
cations of racial discrimination by distancing themselves not only from
lower-class Malays within their own ethnic community, but from the
Malay citizens of less developed countries in the region. Crossing the
border affords them the opportunity to imagine a space in which they
are no longer a marginalized ethnic minority, but a successful example
of Malay masculinity built on hard work and disciplined effort. At
home, however, they know that as much as they try, they will always be
tainted by the discourse of cultural inferiority. As Iqbal’s comment sug-
gests, young middle-income Malay men manage this dilemma by enter-
ing into a bargain with the state – they decide to be ‘Singaporean first’,
and in doing so accept cultural discrimination for the rewards of mod-
ernity.
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Notes
1 The term ‘race’ is used in Singapore to refer to official state ethnic categories. Its usage
implies that ethnic groups are marked not only by cultural and linguistic difference, but
also biological differences. For a discussion of the ways in which the term race is used in
popular and state discourses in Singapore, see Lai (1995). We use the term ‘race’ through-
out this article to reflect its common usage in Singapore.
2 Malays are a significant ethnic minority in Singapore, representing 14% of the total popu-
lation. The Chinese are the dominant ethnic group (75%), with a smaller minority of In-
dians (9%), and Others, including Eurasians and Europeans (Singapore Department of
Statistics 2007). The state defines Malays as ‘persons of Malay or Indonesian origin, such
as Javanese, Boyanese, Bugis, etc.’ (Singapore Department of Statistics 2007).
3 Lee Hsien Loong’s comments were made at a time when bi-lateral relations with Malaysia
were particularly tense, and further sparked ongoing allegations by the Malaysian govern-
ment that the PAP actively discriminated against Malays (see Leifer 2000).
4 For example, Lily Rahim (1999: 39) argues that the ‘Malaysia card’ has been ‘periodically
employed by the PAP leadership to maintain a collective psyche of insecurity among the
predominantly Chinese populace who are acutely conscious of the island’s resource lim-
itations and geo-political locale in the heart of a Malay-Muslim region’. She notes that the
‘Singapore card’ has similarly been deployed on the Malaysian side of the causeway.
5 In seeking to problematise the notion of a homogenous Malay identity we are not suggest-
ing that ‘the Chinese’ are a monolithic group. CMIO multiracialism obscures heterogene-
ity within all so-called official races (Lai 1995).
6 The research on which this paper is based was funded by an Australian Research Council
(ARC) Discovery Project grant In the Shadow of Singapore: The Limits of Transnationalism in
Insular Riau (DP0557368) – see project website http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/research/in-
theshadow/. We particularly want to thank Mohamed Fairoz bin Ahmad for his assistance
in conducting some of the interviews.
7 Differences in educational qualifications do not provide the only explanation for Malay
marginalisation. The numerically superior Chinese erect a range of barriers to exclude
Malays (and Indians) from higher paying occupations, including active discrimination in
hiring practices and promotion practices, as well as more subtle barriers such as language
requirements (Lee 2004).
8 Barr and Low (2005, 161) argue that CMIO multiracialism enjoys a ‘truly symbiotic rela-
tionship’ with the other key pillar of PAP rule – meritocracy – a policy that emphasises
the fairness of the Singapore system and explains the subordinate role of minority races.
9 This view continued to be deployed by the new ruling elite in the early years of Indepen-
dence. For example, Holden (2001: 420) argues that in former Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew’s memoir, The Singapore Story (1999), Indian and Malay men are portrayed as ‘effete,
governed by emotion and appetite, and unable to apply the disciplinary practices necessary
for the founding of a new nation’.
10 It is also a source of ethnic pride. At the very end of this interview, they returned to the to-
pic of soccer and concluded the discussion with the following comment – ‘Mostly we are
good soccer players’. We interpreted this statement as a means of concluding the inter-
view with a positive statement about Malay masculinity.
11 Although it was easy for the men to provide lists of common stereotypes about different
racial groups, some of them were reluctant to discuss instances where they had personally
experienced discrimination. Sometimes they would talk about events that had affected un-
named friends or family, or they would halt the direction of the conversation with claims
that such matters were ‘too sensitive’ for further discussion. These concerns were also ex-
pressed in the men’s choice of language. The majority of interviews were conducted in
public places such as restaurants and coffee shops. In these settings, there were frequent
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opportunities for other patrons to eavesdrop or overhear comments. It was not uncom-
mon in these settings for the men to lower their voices or code switch from English into
Malay when discussing instances of racism, or when talking negatively about the beha-
viour of the Chinese majority population.
12 We use the term ‘other Malays’ here in the way in which our respondents used it – to re-
fer to Malays in Malaysia, and Indonesians. The term does not refer to an ethnic identity
but a seemingly homogenous population characterised by language (Bahasa Melayu/Indo-
nesia) and religion (Islam).
13 Enjoyment of food in itself is a marker of one’s authentic ‘Singaporean-ness’ (cf. Chua
2003).
14 ‘Halal’ is a word taken from Arabic that means lawful or permitted, and refers to any food
or drink that is permitted for consumption under Islam.
15 A number of our Chinese informants described their trips to Mainland China as an op-
portunity to ‘re-connect’ with their Chinese culture and identity, often with mixed results.
16 It is these men’s middle class outlook that is perhaps the greatest marker of difference.
Due to the greater purchasing power of the Singapore dollar in the region, many working-
class Singaporean Malay men are able to experience a ‘middle-income lifestyle’ when they
cross the border. However, these experiences of class mobility are usually only transitory.
For a greater discussion of working-class Singaporean Malay masculinity, see our work on
cross-border marriages and sex tourism in the Riau Islands (Lyons and Ford 2008).
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10 Trans-National Biographies and Trans-National
Habiti: The Case of Chinese-Singaporeans
in Hong Kong1
Caroline Plüss
Do individuals who have lived in different societies, develop multi-local
life-worlds? How, and why, do life-worlds, with cultural, social and eco-
nomic characteristics that have their roots in different geographical re-
gions, develop within individuals? The present chapter aims to elucidate
and apply the concept of trans-national habitus to make a contribution
to the scholarship by analysing why and how individuals who have lived
in different societies and cultures develop cosmopolitan or culturally hy-
brid identities (Basch, Schiller and Blanc 1994; Kelly and Lusis 2006;
Onwumechili et al. 2003; Levitt and Schiller 2004; Plüss 2005; Plaza
2006).
Trans-national migrants are likely to establish and maintain networks
with people with different cultural characteristics, given that the people
with whom the migrants are in contact with are likely to live in differ-
ent geographical regions (Conway and Potter 2006). The line of enquiry
this study investigates is whether people who have lived in different so-
cieties change their cultural identities (by forming trans-national habiti),
since it may be assumed that they wish to construct new forms of cul-
tural capital to access cultural, social and economic resources located in
different social networks that are rooted in different geographical re-
gions and that, therefore, have different cultural characteristics.
The concept of habitus is important in conceptualising the fluid char-
acteristics of migrants’ cultural change in more tangible terms. This
concept has been developed in the work of the French sociologist Pierre
Bourdieu, who defined ‘habitus’ as a person’s ‘durable and transposable
systems of schemata of perception, appreciation, and action that result
from the institution of the social in the body’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant
1992: 126-7). In simpler terms, habitus may be understood as a person’s
‘lasting disposition’, consisting of ‘habits of behaviour, feeling and
thought’ (Thapan 2006: 200). As Bourdieu emphasises, although a ha-
bitus is a lasting disposition, it is also an open system of dispositions
that can be changed through new experiences (Bourdieu and Wacquant
1992: 133).
The question of how migrants transform their habiti is part of the lar-
ger question of how habiti become transformed under conditions of glo-
balisation. These include conditions in which the cultural, social and
economic experiences of a person no longer correspond to the cultural,
social and economic characteristics of any one place alone, but intersect
the cultural, social and economic dimensions that have their roots in
different regions. Migrants’ formation of new habiti is likely to express
the fact that trans-national migration, which is characterised by the fact
that migrants refer to several societies on cultural, social and economic
levels, changes the cultural, social and economic matrices in which
those migrants’ experiences take place. Trans-national habiti are ways of
perceiving and expressing things that integrate cultural, social and eco-
nomic characteristics that have their roots in different regions and local-
ities. Trans-national habiti are always partially de-territorialised, which
makes them correspond to the cultural conditions of globalisation.
Singaporeans are a mobile population. Approximately ten per cent of
Singapore’s population (citizens and permanent residents) were esti-
mated to be residing abroad in 2007, that is, 370,000 individuals (Peh
2007). Unverified sources estimate the number of Singaporeans living
in Hong Kong in 2007 at between 10,000 and 14,000. My pilot study
of ten Chinese-Singaporeans in Hong Kong shows that they have lived
in more than two countries. One male interviewee born in 1962 had
lived in eight countries; two female interviewees born in 1961 and 1962
respectively had each lived in seven countries; one female interviewee
born in 1965 had lived in six countries; one male interviewee born in
1965 had lived in five countries; one female interviewee born in 1983
had lived in four countries; and two female and two male interviewees
born in 1981, 1975, 1979 and 1961 respectively had each lived in three
countries. Although Hong Kong and Mainland China are in fact the
same country, for the purposes of this study, they have been considered
as distinct, given their cultural, social, economic and political differ-
ences.
This is an astonishingly high number of countries to have lived in,
especially given return migration to any one country of previous resi-
dence has not been considered as an additional migratory experience.
Doing so would yield an even higher number of international move-
ments. However, it cannot be expected that each single instance in a
series of migrations is equally important in terms of how migrants
build trans-national habiti. Counting the number of countries the mi-
grants had lived in increases, at least potentially, the number of cultural
matrices a migrant has possibly had to negotiate. Perhaps the length of
residence and the reasons for migration, rather than how many times a
person lived in a place, are also relevant in explaining an individual’s
cultural transformations.
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Despite the fact that serial migration, or trans-national sojourning, is
growing as a social phenomenon in tandem with the increase in globali-
sation, with more and more people seeking to maximise their cultural,
social and economic resources by living in different places, the question
of why and how such serial migration changes people culturally has not
yet been given sufficient attention (Ley and Kobayashi 2005; Potter,
Conway and Philips 2005; Onwumechili et al. 2003; Waters 2006).
This study therefore seeks to elaborate upon the ways in which
migrants transform their cultural identities and their adoption of new
cultural elements in order to signal insider positions in new social
networks, and to access the social and economic resources of those
networks. By examining the accounts of the trans-national biographies
of three Chinese-Singaporeans who lived in Hong Kong, the study aims
to find answers to the question of whether a migrant’s transformation
of his or her cultural identity is driven by his or her wish to construct
new cultural capital.
Constructing a Trans-National Habitus and the Building of Cultural
Capital
The formulation of the concept of a trans-national habitus was first ela-
borated by Kelly and Lusis (2006). They suggested that a trans-national
habitus is defined by the fact that migrants experience cultural, social
and economic characteristics in a new place of residence while also tak-
ing into account the cultural, social and economic characteristics of
their previous place of residence. ‘Habitus’ is a person’s ‘framework of
evaluations and expectations which lead to the conscious or intuitive
prioritizing of certain dispositions and practices’ (Kelly and Lusis 2006:
833). It seems important to stress that trans-national habiti may derive
not only from conscious decision making but also from the uncon-
scious and tacit adoption of new cultural elements, even though there
may be no immediate rationalisations for such change. This is not to
say that migrants remain unaware of how they change. Rather, such
changes are not necessarily always a rational and deliberate calculation.
When a person moves voluntarily to a new place, he or she does so
because they perceive that new place to embody cultural, social and/or
economic characteristics that are different from those of their current
place of abode, and that the new place and its characteristics are more
conductive to realising his or her goals. Moving to a new place is often
done in the hope of augmenting resources. However, when a migrant
moves to a new place, he or she also brings cultural, social and/or eco-
nomic characteristics that are different from the new place of residence,
and these differences often lead to migrants being rejected (Potter, Con-
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way and Philips 2005). One strategy that a migrant may use to increase
his or her social acceptance is to acquire some of the new cultural char-
acteristics, that is, to partially assimilate, so that he or she can display
more of the cultural characteristics that are shared with the inhabitants
in this new location.
If this cultural change is linked to ‘signal characteristics’ in order to
access cultural, social and economic resources in a new place of abode,
this can be called building and assimilating new cultural capital (Plüss
forthcoming). Cultural capital comprises the cultural resources that are
required to be admitted into the membership of a social network. Cul-
tural capital derives largely from cultivation and self-presentation, in-
cluding such elements as educational qualifications, professional quali-
fications, tastes, knowledge, status symbols, language, accents and dress
(Bourdieu 1984; Plüss 2005; Waters 2006). When the manifesting of
cultural capital helps a migrant access some of the social resources en-
shrined in a network, cultural capital is thereby converted into social ca-
pital (Bourdieu 1986: 243-8).
Members of a social network are entitled to some of its resources (so-
cial capital) because social capital is based on reciprocity and trust. So-
cial capital includes information, friendship and various forms of sup-
port, including business contacts or access to manpower (Bourdieu
1986: 248-52; Mobasher 2004; Portes 2004). Educational and profes-
sional qualifications have often been described as cultural capital that
enables people to access social and economic resources (Bourdieu
1984). Social capital can be converted into economic capital, for in-
stance, when someone gains a salary from employment that is obtained
through helpful information provided by a social network.
A trans-national habitus is likely to contain different forms of cultural
capital that enable people to establish and maintain access to social and
economic resources located in different networks in different regions.
Migrants may wish not only to assimilate in order to augment their re-
sources, but also to maintain cultural characteristics rooted in their pre-
vious place or places of residence so that these cultural characteristics
can serve as cultural capital to access social and economic resources en-
shrined in networks with co-ethnics, or with people still living in the
former place or places of residence (Portes 2004). The formation of cul-
tural capital may not always be a deliberate and calculated strategy,
although it may often be so. People can adopt new cultural characteris-
tics without receiving explanations about their meaning. They may do
so after experiencing what works and what does not work, that is, by ex-
periencing what brings acceptance and what brings rejection. On the
other hand, it is important to stress that cultural capital cannot always
be converted into social or economic capital, despite dedicated efforts to
do so. For example, racial differences may work as negative ‘symbolic
198 CAROLINE PLÜSS
capital’ (Ong 1999: 25), leading to the social exclusion of migrants de-
spite their cultural and economic resources.
Wishing to maintain ‘old’ cultural capital and include new cultural ca-
pital in a habitus may cause a person to endorse values that contradict
one another. One way to resolve the ensuing tensions is to not fully en-
dorse any one of the contradicting values, thus reducing contradiction.
A person can seek to construct cultural capital by only partially endor-
sing the values of a social network, while simultaneously emphasising
partial differentiation. For example, people can stress that they possess
characteristics that the network values, but lacks. Cultural capital that
only partially endorses the values of a network, and that stresses some
differentiation from these values, can be described as differentiating
cultural capital. For example, a young Chinese-Singaporean migrant
who wished to increase his acceptance among Australian students in an
Australian boarding school hoped that by emphasising his Singaporean
education, namely his good knowledge of Asian history as well as his
acquisition of cosmopolitan characteristics, these would constitute fea-
tures that Australian students valued. He found these characteristics
were somewhat lacking in Australian students (Plüss forthcoming). On
the other hand, if migrants acquire cultural characteristics that affirm
the cultural values of a network, they construct assimilating cultural ca-
pital.
The data for this study stem from three in-depth interviews, during
which the interviewees were encouraged to recount their trans-national
lives. The interviews lasted between one and three hours. One of the
aims of the interviews was to gather information that would answer the
question: To what extent were the migrants’ constructions of trans-na-
tional habiti the result of the need of the migrants to establish and
maintain an insider position in different networks in different places?
Careful consideration was made to let the interviewees identify the
events that were important to them. Questions about what happened
after each migration, especially on the social level, and about their ex-
periences of rejection and discrimination, were also posed.
The interviewees’ accounts of their trans-national biographies are ret-
rospective, and are therefore made from the standpoint of their present
experiences and interests. Nonetheless, these accounts are valid data to
be used for the examination of how migrants construct trans-national
habiti, insofar as these habiti are situated in the present. In interviewing
returning migrants to the Caribbean, Gmelch has pointed to some diffi-
culties in interviewing migrants about their past experiences. These dif-
ficulties included the interviewees’ inability to remember events accu-
rately, interviewees being selective in the recounting of past events,
changes in the interviewees’ attitudes over time as a result of changes
to their recollections, and the influence of the interviewer upon intervie-
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wees’ accounts (Gmelch 1995: 311-8). The present study has allowed for
the fact that the interviewees were making retrospective interpretations,
because trans-national habiti are formed through experiences made in
subsequent places of residence, and therefore always intersect present
experiences with those of the past. Experiences of the past influence
how the present is then experienced.
The data gathered from three interviews, or ten, cannot accurately re-
present the experiences of all Chinese-Singaporeans in Hong Kong.
However, the importance of the three accounts studied here is to indi-
cate, at the micro-level, that we can expect a high degree of diversity in
how individuals who lived in different societies combine elements from
different cultures; and that trans-national habiti can become relatively
fluid constructs when they contain cultural capital through which mi-
grants seek to realize cultural, social and economic aspirations in differ-
ent social networks with roots in different geographical regions.
Layering Assimilating Cultural Capital through the Building of a
Trans-National Habitus
This is the example of Cheryl, who was 45 years old at the time of the
interview, and works in the information technology sector. Her current
stay in Hong Kong started in 2004, although she had also lived in the
territory during the 1990s. She is divorced from a Hong Kong-Chinese
man, plans to remain in Hong Kong until she retires, when she might
decide to move to Mainland China. She does not visit Singapore very of-
ten, although she keeps in contact with her Chinese-Singaporean family
members in Singapore and in the United States. Cheryl has migrated
five times, having lived twice for extended time periods in three coun-
tries: Singapore, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong.
Cheryl moved to Britain to go to boarding school when she was 17
years old. The cultural capital she acquired in Singapore, namely a good
command of English and familiarity with the British syllabus, prepared
her well for Britain. She excelled in boarding school and did well at uni-
versity. She found education in Britain to be ‘less pressurising’ than in
Singapore. She explained that because of her familiarity with British
culture, she did not experience any problems with social and cultural
integration, even in relation to the British people she met at boarding
school, through part-time work, and at university. She did not have to
make any major adjustments. The cultural capital she acquired in Sin-
gapore enabled her to relate positively to more aspects of British culture
or, in her own words, to follow her motto while living abroad: ‘When in
Rome, do as the Romans do.’ She reported a few difficulties regarding
re-adjustments to life in Singapore upon her return, as she experienced
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some loss of independence and found she had fewer choices than she
had had in Britain. She married her Hong Kong-Chinese boyfriend,
whom she met at university, and started working in the Information
Technology sector.
They moved to Hong Kong when she was 29 years old, as her
husband wished to set up a business with his family. The friendships
Cheryl had established with her fellow Hong Kong students in Britain
helped her integration process into Cantonese society, a process, how-
ever, that she found difficult, in terms of both learning Cantonese and
interacting with new people. The process of integration became more
intensive when she started working and learned more Cantonese from
her colleagues. She reported that after three years of working, she
found more acceptance:
Those colleagues who were initially not that close … think I am a
Hong Kong person now … They don’t even ask if I am a foreign-
er anymore. That’s how much I picked up the culture, the lan-
guage … I do feel like I’m part of the society.
She divorced her husband and, when she was 37, accepted a transfer to
work in Scotland. There, she had an expatriate life that she shared with
colleagues who had also been transferred from other countries. When
her employment became less secure, she felt she had few remaining
prospects in the United Kingdom. She thought that if she worked in a
Chinese society, she would be on ‘her own home ground’ and would be
treated like a ‘grade-A worker’ rather than as a ‘grade-B person’. She felt
her race and nationality, despite her familiarity with the UK, prevented
her from having the right access to social and economic resources she
felt she needed.
Cheryl returned to Hong Kong in 2004, ‘switching’ to a Cantonese
culture. When I asked her about how one changes cultures, she ex-
plained that she never tries to ‘merge’ cultures, and that this is why she
has been easily able to fit into any one of the cultures she has lived in:
Let me give you an example. A lot of people in Hong Kong ask
me about language … I speak English all the time with someone,
I speak Cantonese, and then of course … I will speak Hokkien,
and in China I speak Mandarin. So they say … what language do
you think in when you speak a language? I say you have to think
in that language that you are speaking in. So if you ask me in
English, I will think in English and I will speak in English. If I
speak in Cantonese, I will speak in Cantonese. So you don’t do a
translation. … So maybe I have built myself up to use whatever
parts that I need at the appropriate time.
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When asked about how she identifies herself, given that she admits to
being able to readily change cultural scripts, she emphasised that she
identified herself as Chinese:
Now I think … I am Chinese. … [Even when I am in Britain] I
am a Chinese. … [When] I am in someone else’s society, I do be-
lieve that when you are in Rome, you do as the Romans do …
That’s how I integrate … Chinese means … Confucianism and
the culture, I accept that, I believe in that … because Confucian-
ism is inherited. You don’t question, you see. I don’t believe that
men and women are always equal in the world. I always felt that
… in the boardroom, at least 80 to 90 percent are still men. Why
is that so difficult? First of all, they don’t treat you as an equal.
You have to work doubly hard and still not get to the level of the
man. So is that equality? No. But then you just accept it, I just ac-
cept it … and that’s why I think of myself as more Chinese, even
though I am educated overseas, I’ve lived overseas, fundamen-
tally I think I’m still very Chinese.
When asked whether she would say the same thing had she continued
to live in Britain, she replied that she would do what the British do, but
that this does not mean she would be British, because she would still
be Chinese at a ‘fundamental level’. She saw herself as neither Hong
Kong Chinese nor Chinese-Singaporean, but a Mainland Chinese, be-
cause China is the origin of Chinese people and Confucianism.
Cheryl’s construction of her trans-national habitus shows that she
layers the importance of several cultures in her identity, with Confucian
Chinese culture being the most central, and Western culture the most
peripheral. Her model coincides, to some extent, with the social net-
works in which she was seeking to maintain and establish herself at the
time of the interview, that is, her family and her Cantonese colleagues.
Her perceptions of the disadvantages that would come with trying to
work in Britain had a strong influence on her decision to return to
Hong Kong, where she believes she has the best and most flexible ca-
reer prospects. However, she said she also partially distinguishes herself
from her Cantonese colleagues by pointing out that she feels a stronger
attachment to Mainland China. She explained that many of her collea-
gues only visit Western countries when they go on holidays, whereas
she always goes to Mainland China.
In terms of combining elements rooted in different cultures into a
trans-national habitus, Cheryl’s account indicates that when she adopts
elements from a new culture, it does not deny the validity of the cultur-
al elements she has already acquired. As she emphasised, she keeps the
different cultures separate by grouping them into a hierarchy in her ha-
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bitus. She emphasised that Chinese culture is, and always has been, the
core of her identity, and that this became stronger when she lived in
Hong Kong. She has acquired elements from other cultures, and uses
them as assimilating cultural capital for social interaction, but keeping
such cultural capital peripheral in her habitus did not lead her to experi-
ence strong contradictions between the various elements from different
cultures, as she indicated in her views on gender equality.
Developing a Trans-National Habitus with Little Cultural Capital
The second case study looks at Celine, who returned to Hong Kong in
2007, after having already worked in the territory from 2004 to 2006.
Celine was born and educated in Singapore, and in 1998, at the age of
33, she moved to the US to pursue her postgraduate studies in Chinese
linguistics. She did not enjoy her studies, and started teaching instead.
Although she found she was familiar with American culture and ex-
plained that she did not experience any culture shock, she found little
that attracted her to American culture, which she found unexciting.
Nevertheless, she stressed that she appreciated the openness of her
American working environment, especially the fact that she had some
control over her work and was consulted about her views. For example,
she commented about her transfer by her American employer to Beij-
ing in 2002 as follows:
You know what my American boss told me before I went to Beij-
ing? … My American boss told me: ‘Feel free to suggest anything
and feel free to tell me what you think we are not doing well and
come up with better suggestions. We want a fresh pair of eyes to
look at things. So feel free to bring up anything that you feel can
be done better.’ … There was a lot of mutual respect … They re-
spect you and they will consult you. They will listen to you, and
that’s very important. But this process does not always occur in
Asia.
Being a specialist in Mandarin made her feel close to her colleagues in
Beijing. She explained: ‘There are a lot of things that we have in com-
mon that we can talk about’. However, she emphasised that:
When it comes to work practice, management style, how you run
an office, working culture, I am closer to the Americans … Work
culture [in China] is very different. But we speak the same lan-
guage, share the same history, so there is this part. It’s your heri-
tage. It’s your heritage that bonds. But when it comes to how
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you work, and how they run the society, it’s different from where
I came from. It’s different from Singapore, it’s different from
America. But there is this heritage that binds us together so clo-
sely.’
Her knowledge of Mandarin and her interest in Chinese culture
brought her acceptance in Beijing, and she appreciated the fact that she
could share and develop her knowledge of China, which she felt she
could not do in Singapore or the US. Celine had grown up with both
Chinese and Western culture in Singapore. She attributed her familiar-
ity with Western culture to her schooling, although she started her
schooling in the Chinese language. Migration has rendered her already
multicultural habitus more trans-national by adding cultural elements
that she picks and chooses. These additions were not intended to be
cultural capital to access social and economic resources. Instead, she
chose new social networks and new economic pursuits through migra-
tion to fit her evolving interests.
For personal reasons, she moved to Taipei in 2004, but changing cir-
cumstances and a certain amount of discontent with her work forced
her to return to Hong Kong that same year. In 2006, however, she felt
she had few prospects for promotion and was feeling overworked, so
she accepted an offer of employment in Singapore. However, she found
it difficult here to adapt to the management style, explaining that:
If I had never left Singapore, I wouldn’t have questioned certain
things that were done in Singapore. … So when I came back, I
would question why it is done this way. At least in my workplace,
sometimes it was frustrating. And it’s especially disappointing
because it’s my own country, my own home, and I was supposed
to feel comfortable at home, but I wasn’t … People expect you to
behave like them. They will always take you as a Singaporean
and they will not take you in a different way, even if you have
been away for so long. So they expect you to behave differently,
to behave like them.
She then accepted an employment offer in Hong Kong, and returned to
Hong Kong in 2007. She explained that her friendships with the Chi-
nese people in Beijing, Taipei and Hong Kong were based on a com-
mon heritage, which she likes to strengthen by living in these places.
She said that she is not connected to her friends in Singapore in this
way. However, when asked to name the one place where she feels the
closest to the people, she replied:
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It’s hard to compare. I am definitely close to the Chinese-Singa-
poreans, but for the reason that it is my country, we share the
same upbringing, education, we have a common history. But
with the Chinese in Beijing, Taiwan and Hong Kong, we share
something that is different than what the Chinese-Singaporeans
can share with me. This is the Chinese culture, the Chinese heri-
tage … With Chinese-Singaporeans, the common thing we share
is Singapore, but not Chinese culture.
Migrating for intellectual reasons, yet needing to access economic re-
sources, led to contradictions in Celine’s trans-national habitus: She in-
creased her knowledge of Chinese culture while rejecting the ‘Chinese
work ethic’, and she sought employment that emulated ‘the American
work ethic’ while rejecting American culture in most other regards.
Moreover, she found that the new cultural elements she liked, and with
which she came into contact because of migration, were not totally ab-
sent in Singapore, but were insufficiently developed. But, she also
stressed that the Chinese-Singaporeans whom she met while studying
Chinese at university in Singapore are still her best and closest friends.
She admitted that living in several societies had made her quite critical
and stressed that she does not wish to exclude the possibility of living
in most of them again. These contradictions between cultural affinities
and her affinities with people indicate that Celine’s construction of
trans-national habitus cannot be characterised strongly by a wish to con-
struct new cultural capital in order to access social and economic re-
sources. Rather, it is her wish to realise her cultural interests that ex-
plains why and how she changes her habitus through migration.
Maintaining Core Networks, Avoiding the Development of a Trans-
National Habitus
The final case study is of Thomas who began his tenure in Hong Kong
in 2002. He is 42 years old and is married to a Chinese-Singaporean
woman. They have a young daughter. His Singaporean employer trans-
ferred him to Hong Kong for a temporary assignment. This stay is in-
scribed in Thomas’s migration history, which started in 1965 when he
moved as an infant from Singapore to Malaysia. He returned with his
family to Singapore in 1970 for his education. He started primary
school, had an ‘idyllic childhood’ in Singapore, successfully completed
his university studies, and joined a charity organisation. When he was
30, that organisation asked him to work in an orphanage in Sri Lanka
for two years. Thomas saw this posting as an opportunity to gain inter-
national exposure and to see ‘a bit of the world’. He reported that he
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had no difficulties adapting to life in Sri Lanka. He had learned some
Sinhalese in Singapore, which he needed because English was seldom
spoken in his new surroundings. Perhaps the fact that he was doing
charity work among children, for a limited time only, and for a Singa-
pore-based organisation, meant that he did not have to assimilate very
much in order to gain social acceptance. Thomas did not seek to access
economic resources in Sri Lanka. He enjoyed learning about Sri Lankan
history, which became cultural capital in relation to Sri Lankans and
also, later in relation to another Singaporean employer, who valued such
knowledge.
Thomas insisted that living in Sri Lanka did not change how he ex-
perienced Singapore upon his return. He considered this lack of change
as proof of his view that all people, regardless of their cultures, are fun-
damentally the same:
People are just people. They have their needs, their wants, their
desires. At the end of the day, we are all sort of equal, there are
sorts of common standards of humanity: Joy, sorrow … Emotions
are not different from one ethnic group to another. So, in this
sense, all human beings are the same.
Upon his return to Singapore, Thomas joined an employer who sent
him for subsequent postings abroad, each one lasting several years. He
thus chose the lifestyle of a serial sojourner, judging that the advantages
of learning about different cultures and places would outweigh the dis-
advantages for his family of having to ‘relocate’, ‘re-adjust’ and ‘make
new friends’ every few years. At the age of 35, he was transferred to
Vietnam for two years, and his daughter was born there. He does not
believe that living in Vietnam transformed him, and stressed that he re-
gretted that he was unable to learn much Vietnamese. He attributed
this difficulty to the fact that he already spoke a tonal language, Canto-
nese, which he had learned from his parents.
In 2002, when Thomas was 37, he was transferred with his family to
Hong Kong. This did not change the fact that Thomas remained firmly
rooted in Singapore:
Each time I return to Singapore, during my breaks, I feel as if I
have not left the place at all … I feel totally at home and comfor-
table, as if not a day has passed … [since] I have been away … I
don’t see any break, or any sort of dysfunctional aspects, of
being, or of having been, away … There is no sense of disloca-
tion.
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As to whether living in Hong Kong linked Thomas more closely to Chi-
nese culture and could thus change how he views Singapore, he com-
mented:
I do not compartmentalise myself into boxes … Being Singapor-
ean is not just being Chinese. You have certain characteristics
that come from the fact that you come from a region which is in
South East Asia … It’s not that my current posting to Hong Kong
has made me feel more Chinese. I don’t think that has happened
at all.
Living abroad has reportedly not changed Thomas, and the interview
yielded no evidence indicating that he has constructed a trans-national
habitus, in the sense of changing his lasting disposition. In addition to
gaining economic resources, he considers that overseas postings have
allowed him to do and learn things that are not so easily available in
Singapore, such as hiking in Hong Kong’s countryside, or practising a
new language. However, these new activities, despite being performed
outside of Singapore, have not influenced Thomas’ habitus.
Bourdieu views the relationship between habitus and practice as dia-
lectical, with the habitus informing the practice and the practice influen-
cing the habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 139). In Thomas’s case,
there appears to be some disjuncture between habitus and practice. For
example, learning Cantonese to a ‘higher level’, and thus learning new
ways of saying things, does not appear to have changed Thomas’s per-
ception of his identity, nor does he think that learning these new skills
has changed his behaviour. Does the fact that Thomas did not see
things differently during his tenure in Singapore after his overseas post-
ings mean that he did not change while he was abroad? He responded:
Maybe this is one hypothesis … What I’m saying is that the min-
ute I arrive back in Singapore I feel totally at home. I don’t feel
that I have been away.
Working with the idea that the wish to include new forms of cultural ca-
pital is a strong motivation for migrants to construct a trans-national ha-
bitus, Thomas appears to have had few incentives to build new cultural
capital – he has been transferred for temporary assignments abroad by
a Singaporean employer who employs only Singaporeans in higher-level
positions, and who greatly values the maintenance of a Singaporean
identity as cultural capital. Most of Thomas’s friends and acquaintances
in Vietnam, as well as in Hong Kong, were either Singaporeans or ex-
patriates from other countries who were themselves mostly sojourners,
and therefore partially de-territorialised. For example, when asked
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whether he would feel at home if he were to return to Vietnam after
having lived in another place for a few years, he replied:
If I were to go back to Vietnam today, I think I would feel a little
bit lost, in the sense that many of my friends who were with me
are also not native Vietnamese. Many of them are from the ex-
patriate community and many of them have left as well … My cir-
cle of friends would have shrunk significantly.
Thomas’s social networks, which give him access to the greatest social
and economic resources, are firmly rooted in Singaporean culture, and
this explains why he had few reasons for wanting to establish insider
positions in networks with a different culture. Significantly, his daugh-
ter attends the Singaporean International School in Hong Kong.
Conclusion
Singapore’s bilingual education policies (English and mother tongue,
the latter being either Mandarin, Malay or Tamil) have provided Singa-
poreans with cosmopolitan cultural capital that they may use to access
cultural, social and economic resources in other places. Possessing
these skills has enabled Singaporeans to live and work in several socie-
ties, meaning that they may change their geographical location to in-
crease the cultural, social, and/or economic advantages they perceive as
stemming from migration. Recent scholarship on trans-national so-
journing emphasises this new trend in migration (Ley and Kobayashi
2005; Potter, Conway and Philips 2005; Waters 2006). Trans-national
migration may change the habiti of Singaporeans to the extent that they
experience significant differences between themselves and others in
their society of origin. The examples of Cheryl and Celine indicate that
changes may be stronger when trans-national habiti are formed without
including strong new assimilating cultural capital when residing
abroad.
Cheryl’s and Thomas’s reconstructions of their trans-national biogra-
phies show how they maintained and adopted cultural characteristics in
order to gain cultural capital in the networks from which they derived
the largest amount of cultural, social and/or economic resources. Cher-
yl’s redefinition of her identity from a Singaporean to a Chinese person
took place during her return stay in Hong Kong. She has made great ef-
forts to integrate herself into Cantonese culture and, in some ways, this
may even rival the importance she accords her own family. She indi-
cated that members of her family were never all that close. Rooting her-
self in Mainland Chinese culture does not mean that Cheryl is denying
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the validity of her family habitus, nor the habiti of her Cantonese collea-
gues. The priority she gave to Confucian Chinese culture largely sup-
ports, rather than contradicts, the cultures of the social networks from
which she derives her economic resources and significant social re-
sources. She draws on what she defines as British culture in her trans-
national habitus as peripheral cultural capital for work purposes.
Cheryl enjoyed her studies in Britain, but was negative about her pro-
spects for working in Britain. Her ambivalent attitude towards British so-
ciety may indicate that as a foreign student in Britain, as opposed to
being a highly qualified foreign professional later on, she made a differ-
ent claim to access cultural, social and economic resources located in the
UK. People’s rejection of her differences may have increased as she be-
came a more serious competitor for economic resources. As a foreign
student, she was expected to leave the country at the end of her studies,
and she was providing economic resources. She did not have to construct
strong assimilating new cultural capital to overcome the barriers block-
ing her access to cultural, social and economic resources, however. Ima-
gining herself as a candidate for managerial positions with significant
economic rewards, Cheryl thought that even large amounts of new as-
similating cultural capital would not help her to overcome racial barriers.
Thomas’s account of his trans-national biography repeatedly stressed
that his habitus has remained strongly rooted in Singapore and did not
change through migration. Sojourners working during a temporary
transfer of employment to another country often experience relatively lit-
tle pressure to adopt new cultural characteristics (Kong 1999; Yeoh and
Willis 2005). The project to increase economic resources through immi-
gration, however, is a strong motivation for assimilating in the work-
place (Chang 2001: 12). The value that Thomas placed on increasing his
knowledge of other cultures may be an expression of Singaporean cos-
mopolitan cultural characteristics, and is important for his Singaporean
employer. Thomas derives nearly all of his social and economic re-
sources from his relations with people who are firmly rooted in Singa-
pore, namely his family, his employer and his colleagues in managerial
positions. He had few incentives to construct new cultural capital.
Celine’s account of her trans-national biography stands out due to the
fact that her frequent changes in her place of residence were strongly
motivated by her wish to increase her cultural resources. She did not in-
tend for her knowledge of Chinese culture and language to become cul-
tural capital that would increase her social and economic resources.
Her biography shows that intellectual interest alone can change habiti,
and that the construction of a trans-national habitus does not necessarily
need to include strong new cultural capital. Although Celine’s interest
in Chinese culture originated in Singapore, she found that learning
more of the Chinese language made her feel more distant from Singa-
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pore, and closer to people in Hong Kong and Mainland China. This clo-
seness was based on sharing a similar way of expressing things. She
also developed common ways of doing things in relation to what she de-
fined as the Western work ethic, namely rejecting strong hierarchies
and having control over one’s work. Through her new cultural adop-
tions and rejections, she transformed her habitus. However, she contin-
ued to maintain that her closest friends were still the Chinese Singapor-
eans whom she met while studying Chinese in Singapore. She empha-
sised that this closeness is maintained because they spend their leisure
time together, as opposed to working together.
This study’s characterisation of cultural change migrants undergo in
terms of the creation of different types of habiti indicates a high degree
of diversity in how serial trans-national migration, or repeated sojourn-
ing, transforms people on a cultural level. Differences stem from the
cultural, social and economic differences of the migrants, their migra-
tion trajectories, the reasons for migrating, the different characteristics
of different places, and perhaps most importantly, the characteristics of
the social networks the migrants maintain and establish. Serial trans-
national migration, therefore, is likely to produce highly diverse experi-
ences of cultural change.
Note
1 Part of this research was funded by the Academic Research Fund, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore. Thanks to Siya Chen and Grace Teo for transcribing interviews. A
similar version of this paper may be found in Suryadinata, Leo and Lee Guan Kin (eds.),
Chinese Migrants: Their Adaptation and Development (Singapore: CCLC [NTU] and Chinese
Heritage Centre, forthcoming in 2009).
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SINGAPORE AS TRANS-REGIONAL CONDUIT

11 Indian Media and the Lure of
‘Uniquely Singapore’
Faizal bin Yahya and Arunajeet Kaur
Introduction
India’s rise as an economic power in the post-Cold War era has led to
the emergence of a burgeoning Indian middle class. The growing afflu-
ence of this Indian middle class has meant their recognition as signifi-
cant consumers in the global capitalist markets for retail, fashion, lux-
ury items and tourism. As tourists they have been pitched to replace
the Japanese as the stereotypical, ‘most sought after’ vacationer due to
their propensity to be big spenders at tourist destinations. The Singa-
pore Tourism Board (STB) has been quick to capture the potential of
the Indian middle classes as tourists, which reflects, among other
things, Singapore’s drive to embrace trans-regionalism. A number of
STB offices have been established in the four major cities of India to or-
ganise publicity events on the Indian subcontinent to market ‘Uniquely
Singapore’. These efforts have paid off. India has steadily become one
of Singapore’s main sources of tourists. However, the increasing num-
ber of Indian tourists to Singapore cannot solely be attributed to the
STB’s efforts. This paper argues that there are two other significant fac-
tors that have had an impact on the increased influx of Indian tourists
to Singapore. First is the increasing influence of Indian media; film (in
particular Bollywood) and television on the subcontinent as well as glob-
ally, through the intermingling of Indian local and global ‘location
shooting’ has fuelled the imagination of the Indian middle class to tra-
vel more widely. Secondly, the economic acceleration of India timed
with the advent of the global knowledge-based economy era has led to
the Indian government giving increased attention to the Indian diaspo-
ric communities around the world as well as acknowledging the trans-
national lives of Indian professionals. This has encouraged Indians
from the subcontinent to visit destinations with prominent Indian dia-
spora communities as much as it has encouraged Indians in the dia-
spora to reconnect with the homeland.
Indian Inbound Tourists to Singapore
Today’s Asian tourists are increasingly playing an influential role in
tourism development because of their rapidly improving income levels,
increasing access to competing airlines, new air routes and more re-
laxed travel regulations. Most prominent in this regard are Indian tour-
ists who are now among a middle class that numbers 300 million
strong, which enjoys a rapidly increasing disposable income that is pro-
jected to increase from US$468 in 2000 to US$17,000 by 2050. While
leisure travel may still be considered a status symbol for the majority
on the Indian sub-continent, it is estimated that some 25 million In-
dians will engage in tourism over the next few years. The increasing
significance of the Indian tourist is made obvious when we see the ris-
ing number of travellers to Singapore (see table 12.1). Indeed, today’s
Indian tourist is adventurous. This could be attributed to the higher dis-
posable incomes and changing mindsets the middle-class Indian now
enjoys. Besides increasing incomes, airfare has become cheaper, hotels
are offering big discounts and travel loans are available on easy instal-
ments. All credit cards issued in India are valid internationally and the
annual foreign exchange allowance for an outbound Indian tourist is
$10,000 compared to the $2000 in the 1990s and the meagre $500 is-
sued every three years in the 1970s and 1980s (Khanna, IBEF). As a re-
sult, the demand for off-beat, far-flung destinations, adventure tourism,
theme holidays and spa and wellness getaways that are usually more ex-
pensive to access, is on the rise (Khanna, IBEF). Furthermore, informa-
tion regarding tourist destinations has become more easily attainable
via the Internet and media, creating a more informed Indian tourist
with more desires to satisfy.
At the opening of the STB New Delhi Regional Office on 30 March
2005, Lim Neo Chian remarked that India was Singapore’s sixth largest
visitor-generating market and that STB was confident India’s expanding
economy will ensure that it remains one of Singapore’s fastest growth
markets.1 In 2005, MasterCard’s Index of Consumer Confidence con-
firmed that Singapore is one of the hottest destinations among Indian
outbound travellers (Business Line, 17 February 2005). The STB’s Regio-
nal Director, Kang Siew Kheng has attributed the double-digit growth in
percentage terms of Indian tourists to the increasing affluence of the
middle class and the introduction of low cost carriers.
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Table 11.1 Number of Indian Tourists Visiting Singapore, 2002-2006
Year Number of Indian Tourists Remarks
2002 375,659
2003 309,423 SARS epidemic
2004 450,000 45% increase
2005 580,000 29% increase
2006 700,000 (figure was based on
projections made in 2006)
27% increase
Source: ‘Singapore hopes to receive 7 lakh visitors from India’, Business Line, 17 February
2006
Indian tourists stay an average of five and a half days in Singapore and
spend between SGD$1200 to $1500 each, 60 percent of which is spent
on retail goods, especially jewellery (Business Line, 17 February 2005).
According to the STB Chief Executive Lim Neo Chian, Indian tourists
are the biggest spenders in Singapore. However, the big spenders
amongst the Indians are usually corporate chieftains on business trips,
rich industrialists or ‘yuppie’ couples who constitute just 2 percent of
the total number of inbound tourists. The Indian tourist experience in
Singapore varies according to their income level. The upper-middle-
class Indians prefers destinations to Europe, the UK, the US and China
(Khanna, IBEF). However they are not averse to a quick getaway to Sin-
gapore due to its close proximity and increasingly regular flights be-
tween India and Singapore. For example, Singapore Airlines (SIA) alone
has more than 50 weekly flights to various destinations to India. This
does not even include its subsidiary Silk Air flights. To suit various in-
come types, different tour packages priced at between US $450 to US
$1100 that include airfare, accommodations, visas, sightseeing and
meals are often publicised (Khanna, IBEF). Most Indian tourists are
keen to do some sightseeing in Singapore and are especially interested
in the ‘Night Safari’, the Singapore Zoo and Sentosa, a resort island just
south of Singapore (The Hindu, 19 December 2004).
Apart from these ‘compulsory’ sights, other activities that the Indian
tourist engages in varies according to budget, as well as his priorities as
a traveller. Indian ‘yuppie’ couples, who are familiar with Singapore as
a quick getaway, are excited about the shopping opportunities along
Orchard Road, the restaurants offering Western and Eastern cuisine,
and such watering holes as ‘Zouk’ (Bridgesingapore.com, 17 September
2004). Single IT ‘techies’ are a common sight at the Sim Lim Shopping
Centre, purchasing computer paraphernalia or electronic goods. Indians
travelling as families are less adventurous, sticking to the familiar sights
and sounds as well as vegetarian cuisine at Little India. It is also com-
mon for Indians to shop for gold in Singapore, especially from the gold-
smiths in Little India as they offer Indian designs and patterns.
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The typical profile of the Indian tourist, according to the STB, is be-
tween the ages of 24 and 34 and the main purpose of travel is leisure
followed by business. It is common for Indians to travel as a family
unit, with young toddlers or with aged parents to Singapore as it is con-
sidered a safe destination with First-World facilities and amenities. Sin-
gapore is especially attractive to Indian couples with ‘Double incomes
and no Kids – DINKS’ (Economic Times, 17 April 2006). Besides the
short-trip visitors who stay for an average of 5 days, a subsidiary cate-
gory of Indian tourists who stay longer in Singapore has also emerged.
The latter category consists of family members and friends of Indian
professional expatriate families who have begun settling more or less
permanently in Singapore in 1991. This genre of Indian tourists cate-
gorised as ‘Visiting Friends and Relatives’ (VFR) usually stay for a peri-
od ranging from a week to several months. VFR tourists usually stay in
the residential housing of their hosts for purposes of reunion, and in
the process, pay much less for accommodations. However, the VFR ca-
tegory of tourists are proving to be equally valuable in terms of generat-
ing Singapore’s economy because they visit various attractions, dine out
frequently and purchase gifts for loved ones and friends before return-
ing home. In addition, the VFR tourists are repeat visitors to Singapore
as long as they have accommodations among friends and relatives.
The STB has also stepped up its portfolio in marketing Singapore as
not just a leisure destination but also an educational hub, thereby classi-
fying students from India as a category of tourist/visitors to Singapore.
According to the STB, about 160,000 Indian students seek to study
overseas every year, and Singapore would be cost competitive because
of its reputable educational institutions and much lower costs of living
compared to the US or Europe (Channel News Asia, 7 October 2005).
The Singapore Tourist Visitor Centre (STVC) at Chennai, in the state of
Tamil Nadu in southern India, established by the STB in February
2004, is a ‘one-stop shop’ for the dissemination of information to tra-
vellers. It actively markets educational opportunities in Singapore (The
Hindu, 8 August 2004). The STVC centre in Chennai covers Tamil
Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, apart from Sri Lanka and
Maldives. It promotes its ‘Uniquely Singapore’ brand by focusing on
the Asia Pacific region (The Hindu, 8 August 2004). Not all Indian stu-
dents interested in Singapore necessarily vie for positions in the govern-
ment-linked tertiary institutions. They are also interested in privately
run certification courses, diplomas and degrees offered by universities
with offshore campuses based in Singapore. These Indian students/visi-
tors, depending on their course of study, stay anywhere from a couple
of weeks, to years with generous vacation breaks. Upon graduation, they
rarely attain employment in Singapore’s competitive job market, there-
by disqualifying their opportunity to integrate into the settled popula-
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tion of Singapore and assimilate non-tourist forms of social experiences
and consciousness (Urry 2002: 2). These students are a category of
tourist/visitors because they display tourist tendencies such as sightsee-
ing and spending on souvenirs and gifts as their departure date ap-
proaches. Besides the students who come to Singapore to study, there
are also the Indian students who are also part of overseas school trips
from India organised by the STB. The STB facilitates five-day tours and
a two-week educational tour for students (The Hindu, 8 August 2004).
Overseas Business Study Missions caters to both organisations and in-
dividuals and form part of Singapore’s aggressive attempt to attract In-
dian students (The Hindu, 8 August 2004).
STB and the Indian Tourist Market
Earlier mention was made of the ‘Uniquely Singapore’ brand, which
was launched in 2004 by the STB. The STB believes this branding strat-
egy, was good for more than 9.4 million tourists by the end of 2006.
This guarantees approximately SGD$12 billion in tourism expenditures,
an expected improvement over the 2005 figure of SGD$10.8 billion. To
achieve this target, efforts to increase the influx of Indian tourists have
been extensive. In late 2005, STB projected a growth in tourism from
India at between 11 and 12 percent, a two to three percent increase over
the previous year’s growth rate (Business Standard, 25 August 2005). In-
dia is considered a serious tourist market for Singapore and this is re-
flected in the fact that the STB has offices in India’s key metropolitan
cities such as Chennai, Delhi and Mumbai (Lim 2005) and it is still ex-
panding its network into secondary cities like Punjab, Gujarat and Ma-
harastra (Bridgesingapore 17 September 2004). According to STB’s area
director for West India, Edward Chew, the plan was to target first-time
tourists in other cities and towns but at the same time to reposition Sin-
gapore for the more seasoned traveller in the metropolitan areas.
Road shows, educational fairs and exhibitions have been launched in
Chennai, Delhi, Kolkatta, Mumbai, Bangalore and Hyderabad to not
only showcase Singapore as a travel and tourist destination, but also as
a business hub that is ideal for conferences and networking opportu-
nities as well as an education and healthcare hub (Triparthi, 23 October
2004). The STB organised a two-day educational road show on 4 and 5
September 2004 to popularise ‘Uniquely Singapore’ in India (The Hin-
du, 25 August 2004). The STB has also collaborated with Air India and
Indian Airlines (The Hindu, 19 December 2004), while, at the same
time, working on cost-sharing deals with airlines like Jetstar and other
carriers for advertising and promotional programmes (Business Stan-
dard, 19 December 2004).
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The STB has taken serious initiatives to promote business tourism
among Indian business travellers, which make up less than one-quarter
of the total number of Indian tourists. Increased Indian business tour-
ism is due to the changing profile of Indian companies that are becom-
ing increasingly global and seeking to expand their activities in the in-
ternational market (Business Standard 19 December 2004). STB’s Area
Director for Southern India, Bridget Goh explained that
top companies from India prefer to go to Singapore where they
can conduct business as per needs of the day. It is also the place
for business networking and it will give the learning experience
as well (Business Standard 19 December 2004).
The STB works closely with Indian companies in conducting their busi-
ness in areas such as the incentive conventions. In this regard, Indian
companies may hold their company meetings in overseas locations like
Singapore as incentives for their employees. The company personnel in-
vited to these overseas meetings would have their expenses paid by the
company. They would also receive free tours of Singapore or admission
tickets to various attractions. This is done to ensure that no stone is left
unturned in wooing the Indian tourist to Singapore. It is pertinent to
note here that the booming influx of Indian tourists to the island repub-
lic is not a unique phenomenon (The Hindu 19 December 2004). To-
day’s Indian tourist belongs to a class of Indians that profiles itself as
the ‘Global Indian’ (Triparthi 23 October 2004). The term implies being
a globetrotter as part of an ‘urban transnational cosmopolitan class’ (De-
sai 2003: 45). To be sure, the confluence of certain factors such as the
economic liberalisation of India, the forces of globalisation, particularly
in the advent of technologies such as the Internet and cable television,
and the global popularity as well as the reinvention of Bollywood pro-
ductions to incorporate a more cosmopolitan outlook, has bred a class
of urbanite Indians who are no longer insulated from the rest of the
world. The middle-class ‘Global Indian’ has travelled widely not just as
a tourist but as someone who is posted overseas because of develop-
ments such as India’s expanding economy, the establishment of over-
seas offices to Indian businesses and the global demand for Indian pro-
fessionals in the IT and financial sectors. He may also have relatives in
the settled Indian communities that are part of the wider Indian Dia-
spora. These developments create the opportunities for the Indian mid-
dle classes to engage in fantasy-like wanderlust.
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Indian media and Tourism
The effects of the media on tourism have been researched thoroughly
by Hudson and Ritchie (Brent and Hudson, May 2006, 387). They
came up with four categories by which to approach the topic: ‘the influ-
ence of film on the decision to travel … film tourists … the impact of
film tourism on visitation numbers and on residents … and destination
marketing activities related to film tourism’ (Brent and Hudson May
2006: 387). In extending these analyses, this paper will attempt to un-
derstand how Indian film and television production, especially Bolly-
wood, was basically reinvented in 1991 to reflect the narratives of a cos-
mopolitan class of Indians, necessitating location shooting in foreign
countries, hence fuelling the Indian imagination to travel and increase
the flow of outbound Indian tourists.
Jigna Desai has written about the ‘New Wave’ Cinema, which depicts
the narratives of the ‘urban transnational class’ and the ‘new middle
class’ that has emerged in the South Asian metropolises, especially
Mumbai. He agrees with Rachel Dwyer who identifies the new Indian
middle class as distinct from the previous colonial and postcolonial
dominant bourgeoisie, and describes them as a class of people with
their own unique structures of feelings and ideologies. Their fluency
and frequent use of English as well as consumption of material leisure
goods and services such as food, fashion, travel and high priced com-
modities associated with the West reflects their global outlook and influ-
ence (Desai 2003: 47). Desai explains that this new middle class is an
outcome of a generation bred on MTV, ‘familiar with DKNY, Blimpie,
Nintendo and vacations in Seychelles, coming of age and carving their
own public sphere in cultural production and consumption’ (Desai
2003: 47).
To explain his thesis, Desai has chosen to concentrate on new low-
budget English-language ‘independent’ cinema. His theses could how-
ever be extended to Bollywood cinema which has, since the early
1990s, seen the development of a new middle class of producers, direc-
tors, scriptwriters. Artists such as Karan Johar, producer and director of
several Bollywood productions such as Kuch Kuch Hota Hai and, most
recently, Kabhie Alvida Na Kehna, and Farah Khan, director of the movie
Main Hoon Na, are representatives of the new urban transnational class
of Indian film producers and directors who have successfully trans-
formed Bollywood into the public sphere of the new middle class. Bolly-
wood has a popular reach beyond the urban transnational class and the
23 million-strong Indian Diaspora, extending to the masses throughout
South Asia, South East Asia and the Middle East. The content of its
films, especially since 1991, are usually centred on the lives of primarily
the urban transnational urbanites and the diasporic middle class (Desai
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2003: 53). The box office successes of films produced by Karan Johar
under the Yash Raj banner are a clear testament of this. They are re-
nowned for depicting the lives of Indians in the West, implying the fas-
cination and allure of foreign lands for the Indians versus by-gone In-
dian attitudes to travel and crossing the ‘Kaala Pani’.
Indian media, as constituted by Bollywood cinema and cable televi-
sion channels such as ‘Zee’ and ‘Sony’ television, have been responsible
for reducing the distance between the migrant and the homeland and
between the Indian viewer and the foreign, and by popularising Bolly-
wood themes that encompass dual-nation settings, which includes such
box office successes as Dilwale Dulhaniya Le Jayenge (1995), Pardes
(1997), Kabhie Kushi Kabhie Gham (2001) and recently Krrish (2006).
The characters are depicted as having links with both India and abroad.
These films, which have required location shots in countries such as
Scotland, England, the USA and Singapore, serve to familiarise the
middle-class Indian audiences with lands that could be potential holiday
destinations. Most Bollywood film producers hope to emulate the huge
box office earnings of the above-mentioned films, and continue to pro-
duce narratives that either describe dual nation settings or even a com-
plete overseas setting, depicting the lives of the Indian diaspora com-
munities, such as Neal ‘N’ Nikki (2005) and Kabhi Alvida Na Kehna
(2006), or narratives that would appeal to the cosmopolitan Indian’s
imagination, such as Rang De Basanti (2006) which was popular
amongst Indian audiences in the US. Bollywood producers plan their
productions for audiences outside of India, because they now account
for around 65 percent of a film’s total earnings (David 2006. 50). Even
in bigger budget Bollywood productions that do not depict dual-nation
narratives, overseas location shooting as backdrop to song sequences
has become almost compulsory. While the target audience for Bolly-
wood producers might be overseas, the subsidiary effect on the Indian
middle class has been tremendous in inciting a desire to travel and par-
ticipate in the fantasy and glamour that Bollywood is famous for.
Secondly, the proliferation of India’s cable TV channels has led to the
creation of a media community comprising of Indians home and
abroad as well as enthusiasts of Indian entertainment. The global avail-
ability of Indian cable TV channels implies a global community of In-
dians subscribing to TV channels such as ‘Zee TV’, ‘Sony Entertain-
ment’ and ‘Star plus’ telecasting travel documentaries, overseas location
shoots of its soaps and cookery shows, as well as talent quests that not
only help to ‘sustain the triadic relationships that migrants forge be-
tween their countries of birth or ancestry, countries of settlement and
the wider settlement’ (Gillespie and Cheeseman 2002, 127) but also in-
cite a curiosity to travel, by Indians in the diaspora, back to India in
search of roots while the Indian outbound tourists travel to various
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spaces of the diaspora to experience points of similarity and differences.
In his article entitled ‘Zee TV-Europe and the construction of a pan-Eur-
opean South Asian identity’, R.K. Dudrah acknowledges the potential of
Indian cable TV channels as an integrative and community building
mechanism (Dudrah 2002: 164). He quotes founder and Chief Execu-
tive of Zee TV, Subhash Chandra announcing ‘his … global vision for
the channel, wherein it would be a way of “networking” South Asians
with each other around the world …’ (Dudrah 2002: 164). This process
of ‘networking’ would inevitably lead to communications and travel.
Singapore as the ‘product in placement’ in Bollywood
Film tourism is a new field in tourism research. Hudson and Ritchie
attempt to define film tourism as tourist visits to a destination or at-
traction as a result of the destination being featured on television, vi-
deo, or the cinema screen (Brent and Hudson 2006, 387). The destina-
tion featured in visual media therefore receives the same treatment as
any other product placement, which Balasubramaniam explains as the
planned entries of products into movies or television shows that may
influence viewers’ product beliefs and/or behaviours favourably (Brent
and Hudson 2006, 387). The Bollywood film industry offers tremen-
dous potential in the product placement of a destination, since it
reaches a large audience in India and abroad. David Martin Jones ex-
amines the phenomenon of popular Indian films being shot on loca-
tion in Scotland. He focuses primarily on three Hindi film produc-
tions, Kuch Kuch Hota Hai (1998), Kandukondain Kandukondain
(2000) and Pyaar Ishq aur Mohabbat (2001). In assessing the impact of
these films being shot on location in Scotland, Jones highlights three
major ways in which Bollywood films bring money into Scotland;
through location spending, the box office in Britain itself, and tourism
(David 2006: 51).
STB has enjoyed successes in promoting Singapore through film
tourism. Previously, the STB enlisted the assistance of the National
Geographic Channel Asia (NGCA) to share ‘Uniquely Singapore’ with
millions across the globe (New Release National Geographic Asia, 22
November 2004). Three world-renowned NGCA photographers; Steve
McCurry, Sisse Brimberg and Michael Yamashita toured Singapore to
document its unique cultural and ethnic blend. The product, according
to the NGCA’s Vice President for Sales and Partnerships, Avinash Hi-
matsinghani, is a series of short vignettes whereby each photographer
gives his or her personal travel experience in Singapore in the areas of
food, history, art, nature or architecture (New Release National Geo-
graphic Asia, 22 November 2004). In response, STB spokesperson and
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Assistant Director of STB, Dawn Phang, acknowledged the publicity
Singapore received as a result of the project, ‘we are delighted to have
partnered NGCA and invited its three award-winning photographers to
experience Singapore’s unique offerings. Through their lenses, we hope
to share Singapore’s unique blend of culture, tradition and modernity
with the rest of the world’ (News Release, National Geographic Asia, 22
November 2004).
STB has also assessed and tapped into Bollywood’s potential as a va-
luable medium to promote Singapore. An STB spokesperson revealed
that Bollywood represented the best way to showcase Singapore to In-
dians, given the passion Indians have for film (New Release National
Geographic Asia, 22 November 2004). In May 2004, Singapore hosted
the International Indian Film Academy (IIFA) awards. The Bollywood
industry produces some 700 to 800 more films than Hollywood each
year, and has a strong following worldwide, especially among Indians
overseas. When hosting the IIFA awards in 2004, the STB also orga-
nised worldwide contests for Indian cinema fans to win travel and ac-
commodation packages to visit Singapore and catch their favourite film
stars in action at the Samsung IIFA Awards. The Samsung IIFA
Awards was the highpoint of the IIFA weekend in Singapore. The IIFA
awards attracted not only Indian movie stars but also international stars.
According to STB’s Chief Executive Lim Neo Chian, ‘Today marks the
beginning of a glamorous and glitzy weekend extravaganza, where our
friends of the Indian community will be treated to a myriad of enrich-
ing and unique experience that Singapore has to offer’ (Singapore Tour-
ism Board, Press Release 5 March 2004). Various events organised
around IIFA were also meant to promote Singapore overseas. For exam-
ple, the forum ‘Globalisation of Indian Cinema’ was a key highlight of
the IIFA event and drew representatives from foreign embassies, terres-
trial, cable and satellite broadcasters, filmmakers, distributors and exhi-
bitors.
The STB has launched a concerted campaign to use India’s movie in-
dustry and its Bollywood stars to promote Singapore in a mutually ben-
eficial way through its ‘Film in Singapore’ scheme. This strategic move
is linked to Singapore’s own ambitions to be a media hub and to resur-
rect Singapore’s thriving film industry of the late 1950s and 1960s
(Venthakumar 2005). However, the interest in Singapore as a film loca-
tion died when Bollywood producers shifted their focus to exotic and
European locations. Some headway was made when the Hindi films
Rakht (2004) and Vaada (2005) were in part shot in Singapore (Lee
Boon Yang, Minister for Information, Communications and the Arts,
IIFA Academy Award Forum, 21 May 2004). To create a bigger impact
and attract more producers and directors to use Singapore as a location
for their films, the STB introduced a new scheme of providing major
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film funding to encourage foreign producers to showcase Singapore in
their film and TV projects. The US$10 million project encourages film-
makers and broadcasters to film and produce movies and television pro-
grammes in Singapore (Business Line, 7 July 2005). Funding for the
scheme was planned for disbursement over three years and subsidised
up to fifty percent of the qualifying expenses incurred during shooting
in Singapore (Business Line, 7 July 2005). Film director and producer
Rakesh Roshan, who participated in the IIFA Awards of 2004 fell in
love with Singapore and collaborated with STB for his upcoming project
– Krrish. Rakesh Roshan had won the Best Director’s Award for Koi Mil
Gaya (2003), the blockbuster prequel to Krrish, and is renowned as a re-
liable producer and director with several film hits under his belt. Ra-
kesh Roshan was attracted to the clean and efficient environment in
Singapore, which he considered as a radical departure from the pedan-
tic bureaucracy in India. Filming overseas also meant that production
costs would be cheaper given the tight schedules and cooperation re-
ceived from the foreign government (Bhardwaj, Asia Times, 19 May
2006). The STB then struck a deal with Rakesh Roshan in July 2005 to
film Krissh in Singapore. In September 2005, filming for the movie
started, starring the director’s son, Hrithik Roshan, former Miss World
Priyanka Chopra and popular actors Rekha and Naseeruddin Shah.
The film Krrish is about a man with super powers inherited from his
father after being touched by an alien – or Jadoo. The scenes shot in
bustling Singapore are contrasted with the peaks of the Himalayas,
where the protagonist, Krrish or Krishna, is from. He comes to Singa-
pore because of his girlfriend who is a Singaporean Indian working at
an international television network. She coaxes him to reveal his super-
natural powers to further her career, but the truth is only revealed when
he repeatedly takes on gangsters, purse-snatchers, rescues children
from a circus fire, and a mad scientist who wants to build a machine
that predicts the future. Singapore is effectively portrayed as a sunny
and colourful place in some song sequences as well as action scenes.
The super hero ‘Krrish’ glides off the peaks of buildings at Raffles
Square, Shenton Way and the Singapore River, whilst the villain’s main
laboratory features the ‘durian’ architecture of the Esplanade. Viewers
of the film agreed that the director had, in effect, featured Singapore ex-
tensively as a bright, oriental and attractive site juxtaposed with an un-
realistic portrayal of a country where gangsters, street fights and purse-
snatchers were a regular part of the landscape. The producer and direc-
tor’s also portrayed Singapore as primarily a Chinese country that fea-
tures buskers who are, at the same time, also kung-fu street artists.
Several action sequences with Chinese triad-like gangsters inaccurately
portray Singapore’s multicultural landscape.
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Krrish was the first film shot in Singapore under the STB’s ‘Film in
Singapore’ programme. The STB facilitated the logistics support and
ground requirements for the filming in Singapore. In addition, the STB
also secured locations and ensured a hassle-free shooting schedule for
Roshan, which included liaising with the traffic police to ensure that
streets were blocked off for the filming such as Robinson Road and the
East Coast Parkway. Over 100 cast and crew members from India, Chi-
na and the US were in Singapore during the shoot and some 100 addi-
tional local cast members were also hired.
The various locations in Singapore that were featured in the film in-
cluded the National Library at Bugis, the Esplanade Theatres, Clifford
Pier, Pulau Ubin Island, Changi Airport, heritage sites such as China-
town and the Singapore Zoo. The film stars and director abstained from
being interviewed by the press until the film was launched in June
2006. The film crew also enforced strict security during the shooting of
the film because 60 percent of the content was based in Singapore.
There were concerns about the silence of the Bollywood stars and
whether this had undermined the publicity that the STB desired. Ac-
cording to Ken Low, the Acting Assistant Chief Executive (Brand and
Communications) at the STB, the strategy had been to create a stronger
level of awareness of Singapore’s destination brand overseas through
the film medium (Singapore Tourism Board, Press Release, July 2006).
Therefore, by enforcing a media silence, mystery would be added to the
film as part of the marketing strategy of the film when it was released.
Singapore is not the only destination that has assessed the capacity of
Bollywood and its reach in luring middle-class, outbound Indian tour-
ists. As a film location, Singapore faces regional competition in wooing
Bollywood to its shores. According to Kiran Nambiar, country manager
of the New Zealand Tourism Board, Bollywood films are the best plat-
forms to create awareness and interest amongst viewers who could be
potential tourists. The Thai tourism agencies also believe that there is a
huge potential for attracting Indian weddings, visits by friends and rela-
tives, and the traffic of young people and students. In 2004, about
300,563 Indians visited Thailand, which was an increase of 30.26 per-
cent over 2003 (Bangkok Post, 9 January 2006). The Tourism Authority
of Thailand has also opened up an office in India and is also focusing
on attracting movie productions. Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister Na-
jib Tun Razak has also said that Malaysia’s tourism sector has benefited
from the Indian film industry, ‘Indian movies have made Malaysian
scenes and landmarks – including our Petronas Twin Towers, Langkawi
and Penang famous in the film business and attracted Indian visitors to
Malaysia’ (Xinhua News Agency, 7 June 2006).
Global acceptance of Bollywood films has convinced the Hong Kong
Tourism Board (HKTB) that it should enhance its campaign for attract-
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ing Indian visitors and promote the country as a location for Bollywood
filming (Business Line, 2 October 2004). The HKTB had also organised
a Bollywood Movie Magic evening, which is attended by Bollywood ce-
lebrities and HKTB’s travel trade partners. According to HKTB Execu-
tive Director, Ms Clara Chong ‘the synergy between Hong Kong and
Bollywood presents a platform to promote Hong Kong to Indian travel-
lers. We are confident that Bollywood-linked marketing can work well
in India, where movie-going is a national pastime’ (Business Line, 19 Au-
gust 2004). What evidence is there that connects media and films as an
influence on travellers? Ms Lara Chong said that, ‘our surveys have
shown that 14 percent of the visitors were interested in Hong Kong mo-
vie scenes and our promotions built around the country’s movies have
already proved successful in other Asian markets’ (Business Line, 2 Octo-
ber 2004).
Indian Diaspora and Tourism
Following the advent of Indian independence, the Nehru government
excluded non-resident Indians (NRIs) and the Indian diaspora from pol-
icy making. It was only in the 1990s that the Indian government began
to take the economic potential of its diaspora seriously. With the eco-
nomic reforms of the early 1990s, the Indian government, emulating
China’s relationship with the Chinese diaspora, hoped that the Indian
diaspora would invest heavily in India. After a long-standing ambiva-
lence towards the diaspora, the Indian government took several initia-
tives to reintegrate the diaspora, based upon the recommendations of a
High Level Committee appointed in 2000. In reviewing the status of
people of Indian origin (PIOs) and NRIs, the Indian government
decided to host two annual events to recognise its relationship with the
diaspora, the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Family of India Days) on 9 Janu-
ary of each year and the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman (Family of India
Awards) (Kevin 2004). This recognition of the diaspora was, signifi-
cantly enough, timed with the occurrence of two other phenomena to
bring about a greater integration of the diaspora – firstly, the rise of
Knowledge Based Economies (KBEs) has created a global demand for
professional Indians particularly in the ICT (Information and Commu-
nications Technology) finance sectors; and secondly, the proliferation of
technologies such as the Internet and cable network television.
As the Indian diaspora moves towards greater integration, this in-
creases the potential for tourism, not only from the perspective of the
diaspora back to India in search of its roots but also amongst the desti-
nations that have significant Indian communities. Coles and Timothy
explore tourist activity within the diaspora by primarily highlighting the
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flow of tourism from the diaspora back to the ‘homeland’. Coles and Ti-
mothy explain that the main motivation for tourism to the homeland is
‘ethnic reunion’ – the desire to delve into family histories, motivated by
familial piety or ethnic pilgrimages to ancestral homes. In discussing
the distinct assemblages of characteristics and attributes, the temporal
and spatial experiences of the Indian diasporic tourists to India, the
contemporary geographical juxtapositions and the social and cultural
constructs of different groups within a diaspora, Coles and Timothy do
not make explicit that this interplay of sameness and difference in ex-
periencing an ethnic identity also encourages the curiosity to travel
(Coles, Tim and Timothy 2004: 12).
For instance many Indian tourists interviewed in Little India (Seran-
goon Road, Singapore) admitted that they were there to experience the
familiarity of Indian cuisine whilst marvelling at the differences in cul-
tural practices and varying modes of consumption of Indian merchan-
dise. For this reason, Little India has been transformed, with the locus
of Indian tourist activity centred at the Tekka Market, Buffalo Road and
Campbell Lane areas, which attract mainly local Singapore Indians.
Mustafa Centre, a shopping complex located at Syed Alwi Road, has be-
come an iconic symbol and beacon for Indian tourists through word of
mouth in India and elsewhere in the Indian diaspora. Owned by Indian
Muslim millionaire Mushtaq Ahmed, Mustafa Centre has over 90,000
items on display spread over 75,000 square feet and is open 24 hours
daily, seven days a week. Mustafa Centre is not only a famous depart-
ment store but it also has a supermarket, pharmacy, jeweller, money-
changer, hotelier, travel agency and post office. In order to capitalise on
Mustafa’s popularity as a tourist attraction, businesses have mush-
roomed along Syed Alwi Road to cater for the needs of tourists as well
as to provide alternative choices to the merchandise being sold at Mus-
tafa.
The need to experience ‘sameness and differences’ within the dia-
spora has also led to the mushrooming of various ethnic Indian restau-
rants, vegetarian and non-vegetarian, in Little India. These restaurants
offer the comfort of familiarity of cuisine from back home in India
while at the same time allowing the Indian tourist to experience the
variety of local Indian fusion dishes, such as Roti Prata and Mee Gor-
eng, which are not available on the Indian subcontinent or any other
part of the diaspora except in Malaysia and Singapore. Indian tourists
are also attracted to Indian enclaves around the world to experience var-
iations in the consumption of traditional Indian products. For example,
Singapore is a favourite site for Indians in the purchase of gold items,
which are revered by many buyers as appropriate religious and custom-
ary objects. Indian tourists claim that they prefer gold items from Sin-
gapore as the quality is certified according to the Singapore Institute of
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Standards and Industrial research (SISIR) standards, which is valued in
India because of the guarantee it offers on the purity of the gold pur-
chased.
Coles and Timothy also state that the temporary return of expatriate
migrant workers account for tourism back in the homeland. The re-
verse is also applicable. In the early 1990s, when Singapore was keen
to attract Indian foreign talent, Singapore became the host of 90,000
NRIs,2 the singles or married couples with young children who work in
Singapore. It is common for their parents, relatives and friends to visit
them often either to get together or to help in difficult times when, for
instance, there is a newborn in the family and the mother-in-law or
mother flies to Singapore to be of assistance to the new mother. Young
NRIs are also frequent hosts to relatives and friends who might be
heading through Singapore on their way to another destination. By of-
fering accommodations, Singaporeans extend the stay of those passing
through Singapore. This makes it possible for a segment of the Indian
middle class to be able to afford travel without having to pay for lod-
ging. As has already been mentioned, these tourists usually stay longer
and make return trips. They are at their own leisure to visit tourist
sights and enjoy the local cuisine as well.
Conclusion
India has shed its previous insularity. The economic reforms that were
introduced in the early 1990s have created an affluent Indian middle
class that acquired a cosmopolitan identity. Indian media reflects the
wants, desires and lifestyles of this middle class, which is continues to
grow as India continues to rise as an economic power. Moreover, the re-
juvenated links India now maintains with its diaspora makes Indians
an ever more globalised people. These developments have generated a
wave of Indian tourists who are keen sightseers and have the means to
be big spenders. By embracing the ideal of trans-regionalism, Singa-
pore, with its STB, is riding atop a high wave of Indian consumerism.
The profits reaped from this growing market, as shown above, have
been increasing steadily over the years.
Notes
1 Speech by Mr. Lim Neo Chian, 31 March 2005, Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive,
STB at the opening of STB Regional office, New Delhi.
2 http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/contents.htm (Accessed in August 2006).
INDIAN MEDIA AND THE LURE OF ‘UNIQUELY SINGAPORE’ 227

12 Localising the Global and Globalising the
Local: The Global Households of Filipina Trans-
Migrant Workers and Their Singapore Employers1
Janet M. Arnado
Introduction
The world-system perspective conceives the household as an ‘income-
pooling unit, with boundaries subject to continuing change … [depend-
ing on the] pressures [derived] from the cyclical rhythms of the world
market and from the state machineries’ (Wallerstein and Smith 1992:
253). Due to the malleability of its boundaries, the definition of house-
hold does not depend so much on the structure as it does on the nature
of relationship which ‘impose[s] sharing obligations’ (Friedman 1984:
46). This income-pooling arrangement, according to Kathie Friedman
(1984: 51), has two types: one is ‘a long-term household with life-time
obligations and rights ensuring exchanges among’ members; and the
other is ‘a short-term household with less cohesive networks between
fictive kin, “friends”, neighbours, and co-workers that exist for specific
purposes and for a shorter duration’.
Drawing from the world-system theory’s notion of the household as
an income-pooling unit (Smith, Wallerstein, and Evers 1984), I examine
the formation of ‘global households’, by which I refer to transnational,
multiple, shifting, and paradoxical households, within the context of
global capitalist economy.2 The unprecedented flow of global South-
North labour migration in the period of heightened globalisation has
engendered the restructuring of households. Conventionally, co-resi-
dentiality and kinship constitute the boundaries of households. The
changes in the world economy and continuing accumulation of capital,
however, have had their toll on households, which have become ‘in-
creasingly commodified’, as Immanuel Wallerstein (1984: 21) puts it,
‘from the preparation of food, to the cleaning and repair of home ap-
purtenances and clothing, to custodial care, to nursing care, to emo-
tional repair’. Wallerstein further suggests that with the increasing com-
modification of everyday life has gone a decline in co-residentiality and
kinship as determinative of the boundaries of household.
The growing income gap between core and peripheral nation-states
facilitates the importation of labour power for house and care work in
the core region from peripheral countries. Labour needs in wealthy na-
tions are translated into work opportunities for unemployed or under-
employed breadwinners in poor nations, often at the expense of their
families who must be left behind. In the case of Filipinos, efforts to
support their families have sent parents, sons, and daughters away from
their homes, as they sought greener pastures in affluent countries.
Along with numerous labour opportunities in wealthy nations, cheap
travel and better access to information technology, have allowed ‘family
and kinship ties’ to move from a largely local to a global scale (Al-Ali
and Koser 2002: 3), resulting in the formation of global households that
challenge the conventional notion of ‘household’.
This chapter will seek to examine two global households – one based
on the conventional arrangement of co-residentiality, and the other on a
transnational dispersed kinship group. The co-residential global house-
hold involves a multi-class, multi-ethnic, and multi-citizen membership.
Thus, core-periphery relations are experienced right within a middle-
class household in the First World, through the incorporation of foreign
domestic workers. In this sense, the global household is a site where
gender, ethnicity, and class-identity formation of these foreign domes-
tics is embedded within the discourse of citizenship. On the other
hand, the kin-based global household has its members physically sepa-
rated by the geographic differentiation of the First World and Third
World. The first scenario localises the global as it depicts the ‘global vil-
lage’ (Brecher and Costello 1994) inside a dwelling, while the second
globalises the local as a household that has become de-territorialised
outside the dwelling unit and into the global village. These paradoxical
notions of global household are embedded in the everyday lives of for-
eign domestic workers, who are marginally integrated in First World
households that they live in, while at the same time reproducing their
kin households in the geographic Third World through remittances and
long distance intimacy (Parrenas 2005). Ironically, these women have
transcended traditional gender roles by becoming breadwinners in their
own households, only to perform traditional gender roles for pay in
other households beyond their national borders.
Moreover, the present chapter will also delve into core-periphery rela-
tions within co-residential households, addressing the impact of citizen-
ship on power dynamics between employers and domestic workers.
Likewise, it seeks to examine the ‘global householding’ of transmigrant
workers towards their families that have been left behind. The conse-
quence of global capitalist expansion on households, involving the close
range interaction between citizens of the First World and Third World
within a household versus the long-distance reproduction of trans-na-
tionally dispersed families will also be discussed.
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Materials for this research are drawn from seven months of conven-
tional ethnographic fieldwork in Singapore, involving face-to-face inter-
views and participant observation with Filipina domestic workers and a
few employers. In addition, I performed what Nicole Constable (2003)
calls ‘virtual ethnography’ in an online forum among Singapore em-
ployers, as they discussed issues related to their lives with foreign do-
mestic workers.3 In the succeeding pages, I will refer to this online dis-
cussion forum as the Forum.
Forty-three life-history interviews with Filipina domestic workers and
four interviews with employers were conducted. The interviews, half of
which were voice recorded with the informants’ permission, ranged
from 45 minutes to four hours per session. Thirteen informants under-
went one or more follow-up conversations through telephone, SMS
messaging, and face-to-face meetings, where I accompanied them as
they did their shopping, went to the disco, religious service, picnic, and
watched their wards in the playgrounds. To supplement interview data,
I conducted participant observation in public places inhabited by for-
eign domestic workers. Ethnographic sites include places frequented by
Filipinas on Sundays, such as the Lucky Plaza mall along Orchard Road,
Singapore Botanic Gardens along Cluny Road, and various churches. I
also included public spaces explored by Filipina domestic workers on
their workdays, such as schools, playgrounds, and markets. To obtain
the voices of Singapore’s employers, I followed the discussion in an on-
line discussion forum specifically intended for employers of domestic
workers in Singapore. The text data consisted of 110 threads from over
100 members and guests. Employers’ narratives have been edited for
style and brevity; many of them employ Singapore English and SMS-
style of writing, which highly abbreviates spelling. To protect the identi-
ties of domestic workers and employers, pseudonyms will be used in
this paper.
Constructing the Global Household
The kin-based notion of the global household is often conceptualised in
the literature as ‘transnational household’ that entails the analysis of the
placement of family members in different countries, as well as the mov-
ing back and forth of members and remittances to these countries.4 Mi-
chael Douglass (2006) employs the term ‘global householding’ when
referring to the nurturing practices of family members back home
while employed in another country. The term ‘householding’ itself was
coined by Fernand Braudel Center’s household project, to refer to ‘the
practices that compose this sharing [of obligations] and ensure continu-
ity (Friedman 1984: 46)’. In the context of this chapter, I use the term
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‘global households’ to refer to a specific dual positioning of overseas do-
mestic workers in the dispersed kinship (sending) and co-residential
(receiving) global households. Global households incorporate the defini-
tion of transnational households as having dispersed membership, but
global households also include multiple and shifting co-residential
households in which trans-migrants have acquired membership
through their occupation as houseworkers, and in a few cases, as wives.
In line with Chaney’s description of the ‘people with feet in two socie-
ties’ (1979, 209 in Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1994), the global house-
holding of overseas domestic workers involves having their feet and
hands in at least two different and otherwise unrelated global house-
holds.
The term global household is also adopted to refer to multiple house-
holds simultaneously occupied by migrant workers. That is to say, they
are concurrent members of two global households – their dispersed kin-
ship household and the co-residential household. Furthermore, two of
my informants have indicated that they were members of three global
households in three different countries, the third being the household
in which they have acquired membership through marriage. In Amy
Soriano’s case, this household in a third country is a newly and symbo-
lically occupied household in Canada.5 Thirty-two-year-old Amy had
been working for almost two years in Singapore, when her Canadian
boyfriend of six months visited her, at which time they went through a
civil wedding ceremony. Amy secured a few days of leave from her job
and stayed in a hotel with her husband. A week later, her husband re-
turned to Canada to process her immigration papers, while Amy re-
mained in Singapore to complete her two-year contract, doing house-
work and attending to two preschool children. Even while in Singapore,
Amy began her householding activities with her Canadian husband
who had a teenage daughter by his ex-wife. She performed ‘transna-
tional homemaking (Lan 2006)’ by visiting home appliance stores, look-
ing for items she would buy once she reached Canada. At this point,
she collected bed sheets and curtains – small items she could bring
with her. Besides her households in Singapore and Canada, she sup-
ported a household in the Philippines, inhabited by her sibling and her
adopted sister, for whom she had resolved to provide a college educa-
tion. She and her sister divided the mothering role in which she as-
sumed financial support while her sister performed the physical and
psycho-emotional care.
While the kinship household is deemed to last a lifetime, the receiv-
ing co-residential global households are shifting, short term by nature,
and coterminous with a person’s employment contract. To provide per-
petual support to their kin households, Filipinas continue their domes-
tic work, moving on to another household in the case of irreconcilable
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differences with their employers. In each and every instance, when a Fi-
lipina migrates she undergoes an adjustment process, forgetting her
previous knowledge and adapting to the new housework and carework
methods of her new employer.
In their years of domestic service, ranging from less than a year to
22 years, my informants have not only shifted households within Singa-
pore but also across countries. Of the 43 informants, 33 have changed
employers and nine have worked in two to three countries, such as Du-
bai, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. All in all, Filipinas perform paid and un-
paid homemaking duties in their global households – to include the
one they left behind in the Philippines, their paid work in Singapore,
and for a few, another household in a third country.
Core-Periphery Relations Within the Singapore Household
Core, semi-periphery, and periphery are positions in the new capitalist
world system that structure the international division of labour and
power relations among nation states (Wallerstein 1974). The core region
gains the most from this arrangement, and expropriates much of the
capital surplus generated by the periphery through unequal trade rela-
tions. The periphery is composed of countries with weak central govern-
ments, largely controlled by other states, relying on ‘coercive labour
practices’; while the semi-periphery is situated between the two (Mod-
ern History Sourcebook 1997). Simplifying the variations among the
three, Valentino Piana (2004) defines the core as countries that are in a
dominant position, the semi-periphery as countries that are dominant
relative to some while dominated by others, while the periphery com-
prises countries that are dominated on all levels. Consequently, the core
region is composed of countries with power and wealth, while the per-
iphery is generally impoverished. The core is also known as the First
World, while the periphery is known as the Third World. Detailing as-
pects of core and periphery, Immanuel Wallerstein and Joan Smith
(1992) indicated that besides the positioning of nation-states in the
world economy, core and periphery are observable within a country,
through their ‘core-like’ and ‘peripheral activities’. In addition, they ar-
gue that, ‘Core and periphery are not discrete entities. They are rela-
tional antinomy. Core-like and peripheral processes are opposite sides
of a single coin. Peripherality exists only in relation to, and by contrast
with, coreness’ (Wallerstein and Smith 1992: 255).
Viewing Wallerstein and Smith’s theses as a continuum, I consider
countries such as Singapore and the Philippines as representations of
the core and the periphery, respectively, in the Southeast Asian context.
Singapore’s GDP per capita is the second highest in Southeast Asia,
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while the Philippines’ GDP per capita is one of the lowest in this region
(Asian Development Bank 2007). Because of these two countries’ differ-
ential positions in the international division of labour, the Philippines
has become the supplier of labour while Singapore has provided the de-
mand in keeping with the global pattern of international labour flows
originating from the less developed countries and directed to satisfy the
labour needs of industrialising countries (Sassen 1984: 33). The Philip-
pines, whose main export is labour, has an economy that is kept afloat
by remittances, pegged at US$12.7 billion in 2006 (National Statistics
Office 2007) from more than 11 million overseas Filipinos (Population
Reference Bureau 2003). In contrast, Singapore is beset with a limited
labour supply and relies on foreign talents and low-wage workers to ful-
fil its goal of rapid modernisation. Singaporean women who used to
withdraw from the paid labour force once they began childbearing have
been called upon by the state to remain productive in the labour force
to meet the challenges of a continuously growing economy. Thus, here
lies the paradox – while the state has encouraged women to be active in
the paid labour force, it has also called on them to sustain their repro-
ductive roles in the domestic sphere by increasing fertility (Pyle 1997;
Lee, Campbell, and Chia 1999). Accentuating the problem is the in-
creasingly nuclear family households, which now constitute 80 percent
of Singapore’s population (General Household Survey 2006). Given the
diminishing support of the already minute extended households, one in
six of Singapore’s households relies on foreign domestic workers (Min-
istry of Manpower 2006). As a whole, the population of 4.3 million Sin-
gaporeans and permanent residents depend on 160,000 foreign domes-
tic workers from neighbouring countries (Transient Workers Count Too
2006) to help Singapore’s women meet the challenges of an industria-
lised country, while sustaining the reproductive requirements of their
households (Yeoh and Huang 2000).
In observing transnational societies, Abram de Swaan (2002: 20) ex-
plains the dialectics between the global and the local, or between the
universal and particular vocabularies. The presence of foreign domestic
workers in Singapore households allows the experience of global village
right within the house, or in many cases, condominium and HDB flat
where the majority of Singaporeans reside.6 By looking into core-per-
iphery relations within these households, a localised context of global
dynamics, of human relations mirroring relations of power among na-
tion states, may be observed. The nature of core-periphery dynamics be-
tween domestic workers and their employers is an interaction of class,
ethnicity, nationality, and gender, embedded in the discourse of citizen-
ship.
The Philippine government’s hailing of its overseas workers as mod-
ern-day heroes is only a euphemism. Given the nature of state control
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that is imposed on the Filipina workers in Singapore, these women are
in effect modern-day slaves who are called heroes by the Philippine gov-
ernment for sacrificing their lives for their country and families. The
uprooting of Third World women from their own households and hav-
ing to leave their own children behind cannot be called a free choice.
Rather, it is a matter of survival brought about by their country’s inabil-
ity to provide adequate jobs for them. Without consideration for their
educational attainment and skills, these women are lumped into the ca-
tegory ‘Filipina’, which has become a term used in many countries to
indicate the domestic worker.
With the abundant labour supply from its neighbouring countries,
Singapore is unhindered in its establishment of the employment terms
of foreign domestic workers. In Singaporean households, foreign do-
mestic workers do not have the same freedom as Singapore’s citizens
and permanent residents. State restrictions on FDWs in particular, and
blue collar workers in general, include the following: exclusion from
the Employment Act that protects workers; absence of a legislated day
off and a minimum wage; curtailment of reproductive rights by the pro-
hibition of pregnancy and marriage to Singaporeans; as well as a being
restricted from becoming a citizen of Singapore. The call for a manda-
tory day off per week was rejected by the government, because it would
bring ‘inconvenience’ to the employing households. In contrast, no con-
sideration was given to the round-the-clock inconvenience borne by for-
eign domestic workers, except to say that they be given ‘adequate rest’,
which remained undefined (Reuters 2006). Consequently, only about
half (21) of my informants had a regular day off each week.
In addition to these deprivations, we notice the daily incidents of ‘sec-
ond-class’ treatment that foreign domestic workers daily face in their
co-residential households, which can vary enormously, depending on
the ideologies of their employers. My informants report that Singa-
pore’s Chinese employers are the most discriminatory towards their
‘maids’ (as they are popularly called in Singapore), while Western ex-
patriates and Asians with exposure to Western egalitarianism generally
provide better working conditions. Most informants with expatriate em-
ployers enjoyed higher pay rates, a weekly day off, and a lighter work-
load.
The movement of foreign workers into Singapore households has
transformed the lives of Singaporeans in both positive and negative
ways. The female employers who were interviewed admitted that they
benefited enormously from the burden of housework being lifted from
their shoulders. Employer Melissa Wong used to live with her husband
in her in-laws’ apartment.7 She was expected to wake up early in the
morning to mop the floors and prepare everyone’s breakfast before she
herself left for work. Upon her return from work, she would do her
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household’s laundry. Her husband, on the other hand, was not expected
to help with any household chores. After they moved into their own
apartment and employed a foreign domestic worker, her domestic bur-
den was eased, as she now only needed to provide detailed instructions
for her domestic helper.
Antagonism is inherent between employers and domestic workers due
to their hierarchical placement in the social stratification of nationality,
ethnicity, class and gender. Their ethnic differences create some dissen-
sions, with Singaporeans socialised in a highly disciplined social order
while Filipinos are reared in quite the opposite way. Concerning their up-
bringing, Singaporean employers often attempt to create a disciplined
domestic helper. Many domestic helpers initially resist, but acquiesce
over time. Other problems result from varying cultural definitions and
practices pertaining to cleaning, food preparation, and childcare.
Besides the obvious class gap between employers and domestic work-
ers who live together in the same housing units, citizenship, with all of
its rights and vulnerabilities, also shapes their First World-Third World
relations. Ulrich Beck (2006) has argued that a specific citizenship no
longer defines one’s rights, because, in many cases, cosmopolitans or
expatriates enjoy almost the same rights as citizens. This is, however,
not the case for non-citizen, low-wage workers in global cities such as
Singapore. Filipina domestics come to the country as non-citizens with
work permits that make it virtually impossible for them to acquire Sin-
gaporean citizenship or to marry Singaporeans. The position of cosmo-
politan domestic workers at the lower end of the labour market excludes
them from the citizen-like perks enjoyed by their counterparts in the
upper segments. Furthermore, their exclusion from the Employment
Act, which protects workers, increases their vulnerability (Yeoh, Huang,
and Gonzales 1999). Consequently, some employers tend to abuse their
authority over their employees, not only treating domestic workers as
second-class individuals but also subjecting them to subhuman condi-
tions. One employer in the Forum justified her second-class treatment
of foreign domestic workers as follows:
Maids should not have any hand phone! Period. No ifs or buts!
No exception. What do they need hand phones for? They are
here to work, not to socialise … Furthermore, maids are second-
class and they deserve to be treated as second-class.
This employer prohibits her maids from owning mobile phones not be-
cause the phone leads to poor work performance but simply because
she is a second-class individual. Part of the ‘second class’ treatment of
domestic workers is to make them work longer hours and follow diffi-
cult procedures despite the availability of labour-saving technologies in
236 JANET M. ARNADO
Singapore. The use of these labour-saving devices is regulated by some
employers who demand that their domestics hand wash their clothes in
order to save on electricity. There were also cases where employers de-
manded elaborate cleaning rituals to reflect the maids’ lowly position in
the household. One employer in the Forum would watch her maid
clean the toilet and insist that her maid ‘brush the toilet floor on her
hands and knees.’
Other employers shape the disposition of their domestic workers into
unattractive unisex objects. Priscilla Bondoc’s employer, for example,
prohibited her from wearing her chosen working attire.8 Instead, her
employer bought plain white shirts and knee-length shorts for her
everyday use. Many employers in the Forum prohibited their domestic
workers from wearing nail polish and insisted that their maids keep
their hair short. They also worried about their maids getting too chum-
my with their spouses. Thus, sexy clothing is regularly prohibited. It is
as if these (mostly female) employers fear that if their domestics appear
in the least attractive, it will threaten their marriages and undermine
their position as employers. Another employer in the Forum, Jenny
Teh, expressed her views this way:
My previous maid is extremely good to my hubby. She even
wears translucent shorts and sways in front of my hubby. Now
she’s out! … Maids are maids. They are deprived of our ‘luxury’
as they wanted very much to replace the Madams … They cannot
resist this temptation and are willing to pay a high price for it.
We can’t blame them. But we have to protect our family from
breaking up.
Jenny’s narrative again justifies the employers’ second-class treatment
of their domestic workers, because maids are maids and thus should
not have access to the employers’ luxuries. These ‘luxuries’, which are
reserved exclusively for the employers and their families, include hair-
styling, clothing, and body care, as well as leisure time and the freedom
to move around. Furthermore, most employers bring their maids to res-
taurants and other dining situations to extend their household duties
beyond the confines of the home. A common spectacle in restaurants is
of a family dining while the maid looks after the children. These maids
may have eaten at home beforehand so that they can concentrate on
their task, or perhaps they have brought a home-packed meal to be con-
sumed later, or is quickly provided a cheap meal by her employers.
Other employers restrict their maids from leaving the flat or entertain-
ing visitors while they are out. A number of employers in the Forum
told of how they locked their maids in when they went off to work, leav-
ing a key in a sealed envelope that domestic workers can only use in
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emergency situations. All of the restrictions that employers impose on
their foreign domestic workers are meant to protect their families from
potentially abusive workers.
The narratives of Filipina domestic workers reveal that they interna-
lise a great deal of their peripheral positions in the household. Many
have grown satisfied with their jobs and have accepted the restrictions
imposed upon them. Those who become dissatisfied resign and look
for other employers. As Sandra Aldana told me, satisfaction does not
arise from the kind of employer but from one’s own disposition.9 As
she noted, ‘it’s all about getting used to things.’ Sandra’s Singapore-Chi-
nese employers, a business executive and a stay-at-home mom, treated
her well. She referred to them as ‘Ma’am’ and ‘Sir’, while the children
called her ‘Auntie’. The entertaining of visitors inside her employer’s
home was prohibited, along with the use of the telephone, which she
voluntarily avoided out of respect for her employers’ property. The so-
cial boundaries are sometimes breached, because of their physical
proximity. Being at home, her female employers spent a lot of time with
her, and she became emotionally close to her from listening to her stor-
ies and even offered her the advice to take it easy, both work-wise and
emotionally. Sandra acknowledged that she was in Singapore to earn
money; she worked hard but did not allow others to step on her dignity.
When her employers scolded her, she listened, but she always talks
back when her employers are being unreasonable. Talking back is cer-
tainly one of the many pet peeves that employers in the Forum have
about Filipina maids.
To avoid confrontations, most domestic workers remain passive when
their employers scold them. When the scolding becomes excessive,
however, they will often answer back. While many employers prefer
their maids to have short hair, most of the Filipinas I met at the Luck
Plaza had long hair. In the Ladies Room, they talked about how they
liked letting their hair down after having to keep it in a ponytail all day
at work. A few complained about being forced to cut their hair short.
Most of these women also owned mobile phones, which they used in
the mall. One domestic worker told me that her employers did not al-
low her to own a mobile phone, so she kept it hidden from them.
Global Householding in Diffused Kinship Households
International migration has inevitably transformed the Filipino family
household structure. Family members used to meet everyday for meals,
prayer and leisure activities, among other things. With the ever-increas-
ing number of international migrants, many families are either left with
one or no parents. What used to be co-residential family households in
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the Philippines are now becoming increasingly globalised in response
to the forces of the integrated world economy. Based on Department of
Foreign Affairs data from 2001, some nine million children under the
age of 18 years had parents working overseas (GMANews, 2007). When
the minimum wage no longer serves as a living wage for families in
poor countries, and when overseas low-wage work presents an alterna-
tive to this dilemma, men were the ones who often left their co-residen-
tial units to ‘provide’ for their families. More recently, however, the fem-
inisation of international migration, spurred by the increased demands
for women workers, has further restructured Filipino families. The Phi-
lippine Overseas Employment Administration reports that women ac-
counted for 70 percent of newly hired overseas Filipino workers be-
tween 2000 and 2005 (ABS-CBNnews 2007). Women who are tradi-
tionally considered the ‘light of the house’, are now often the main
breadwinners, while struggling to maintain their roles as the light of
the house, which they perform trans-nationally and in symbolic ways.
An increasing number of Filipino families are supported by non-resi-
dent breadwinners who care for other households overseas. My infor-
mants have worked outside the Philippines for an average of ten years,
and an average of eight years in Singapore. While Singaporean house-
holds often treat them in a ‘second-class manner’, Filipino households
regard their family members who have worked as domestic workers
overseas as pseudo-citizens of Singapore. They may not have achieved
citizenship and may have remained maids all these years, but they have
lived in a ‘First World’ country and have maintained somewhat middle-
class lives in terms of food, housing, language usage, and global travel.
Some have also managed to win the hearts of their employers and the
children who literally grow up in their care. Through the years of do-
mestic service, they often acquire what many trans-migrants develop, a
sense of ‘multiple belonging’ (Christiansen and Hedetoft 2004). While
they clearly see themselves as domestic labourers, they also view them-
selves as cosmopolitans, having travelled to many countries, stayed in
first-class resorts, and flown in business-class with their employers. It
usually does not matter that they had to work while their employers re-
laxed; the point was that they have stayed in these expensive resorts,
flown business class, and visited new places.
Besides their breadwinning skills, Filipina trans-migrants are often
also held in high esteem by their families because of their privileged ex-
perience of cosmopolitanism through their work as domestic helpers.
When they are ‘back home’ with their Philippine families, they rejuve-
nate their lost bonds. Reunited with their families, they are treated as
important members. Their suggestions are considered as orders be-
cause of their financial contributions to the family. One informant
noted that, ‘when I am home, I am treated like a queen.’
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Trips that bring them back home, however, are rare among Filipina
domestic workers as they only receive two weeks vacation every two
years, assuming they have completed one contract cycle. This benefit
varies based on arrangements made between employers and employees.
Because of the short vacations, their actual time spent with their fa-
milies is very limited. Pepita Valmoria is the eldest daughter of a large
family who provided financial support for her 12 younger siblings. In
her 18 years of service with a single employer in Singapore, she had
only visited the Philippines four times to attend significant events in
her family’s life, such as funerals and weddings.10 Pepita is single and
51 years of age and never got married in order to better provide for her
many siblings. Pepita preferred to stay in Singapore for the most part,
preferring cash to plane tickets and vacation money for practical rea-
sons. She noted that, ‘when you do not have a family of your own [i.e.,
spouse and children], you do not want to go home anymore’. This is a
common sentiment shared by other single domestic workers as well.
By contrast, Judith Gomez is a single parent who raised her six chil-
dren via her 14 years of service as a domestic worker and was returning
home annually, paying half of her airfare while her employer shoul-
dered the other half.11 Even though she could not save as much as those
who sacrificed their vacations for money, she found it necessary to bond
with her children.
Besides their remittances and occasional telephone calls, migrants’
intimate relationships with their families are often destabilised by their
long absences overseas. But as other scholars have already pointed out
(i.e., Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997) motherhood has been reconfi-
gured to deal with the changing roles of women, who decide to serve as
the familiy’s breadwinners and who have had to pass on their nurturing
functions to other caregivers. Despite the distance, however, the women
do try to perform their roles as parents in a transnational way. Mobile
phones – a ‘time-space compression gadget’ as Harvey (1990) puts it –
is a key to maintaining long-distance relationships with their families.
Of my 43 informants, only one did not own a mobile phone. Ingrid
Calo spent Singapore (S) $100 per month on international calls.12 An-
other single parent, Ingrid would call her son everyday to wake him up,
remind him to go to church, and seek updates about his girlfriend, his
studies, and his nutrition. As Ingrid noted, ‘It just feels like I am in the
Philippines. Although my son cannot see my face, he hears my voice all
the time.’ Ingrid spent a lot of money on her calls to compensate for
her absence.
Having gone through the hardships of growing up in a single-parent
family, another interviewee – Ivy Canlas – was determined to keep her
family intact and provide an education for her children.13 Consequently,
she called her family several times a week to check up on them. While
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she had no marital problems, she rarely called her husband in order to
save money. Her children were the most precious things in her life,
and considering the high costs for phone calls to the Philippines, she
preferred using the money to talk to her children rather than her
spouse. During her weekly short chats with her daughters, she fulfilled
her long-distance mothering, advising the girls to do well in their stu-
dies. ‘Sacrifice. Bear what I provide for you and study hard’ is what she
always told her children.
Because international calls are expensive, most of my informants lim-
ited their voice calls. Instead, they utilise ‘SMS’ (or text messaging) to
communicate with their families because the costs are comparable to
those in the Philippines. Through Smart and Globe innovations, send-
ing a text message or SMS to the Philippines costs less than two pesos.
Families in the Philippines pay only one peso per text message to Singa-
pore. The affordability of text messages has allowed for the daily ex-
change of basic information among household members. Clarissa Lica-
yan, an ex-factory worker in Manila, had been working in Singapore for
14 years.14 Because of Singapore’s restrictive policies regarding intimate
relationships, Clarissa had remained single even though she was al-
ready 38 years of age. Eager to find a life partner, Clarissa resorted to
cellular phone technology and found a ‘textmate’ back in the Philip-
pines. Because of her Pinoy-Globe SIM card, which is readily available
at the Lucky Plaza mall in Singapore, she and her boyfriend in the Phi-
lippines only pay a minimal amount to send each other text messages,
practically the same amount or cheaper than a local SMS.
Indeed, support services such as improved communications technol-
ogy, affordable door-to-door delivery services, and cheap air travel have
helped sustain relationships between distant family members. All of
this facilitates daily interactions, allows for the development of transna-
tional homemaking, so that distant mothers can do the grocery shop-
ping for their families and visit during vacations. Strong family ties and
extended household structures are other enabling components that aid
families of domestic workers abroad. Close families enable the care of
children left-behind to be assumed by extended family members. In re-
turn, these guardians benefit from remittances sent from overseas. Of
the 24 mothers in my pool of informants, eight indicated that they had
left their children with their mothers or mothers-in-law, eight with no
one but themselves, three with their siblings, three with their husbands,
one with another relative, and one with hired help. Studies have shown
that the presence of extended family members in a household ‘strongly
mitigated’ the social costs of labour migrations by parents on their chil-
dren (Bryant 2005: iii).
Support services are necessary, as there seems to be a trend towards
a permanency of kinship-based global households. Return migrants, for
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instance, refrain from remaining too long in the Philippines; instead,
circular migration has become increasingly common. Among those I
interviewed, 17 were circular migrants, having returned to the Philip-
pines for various reasons and then returned to overseas employment as
determined by financial necessity, family trouble and the desire to earn
more. More than half have been away from the Philippines for ten
years or more and about one-quarter of them have lived overseas for 15
or more years. Sandra Aldana has worked in Singapore for four years,
in addition to six years of domestic employment in Taiwan and Hong
Kong. Extensive years of overseas employment afforded the construc-
tion of her house in the Philippines and support of her children
through school. Forty-year-old Sandra earns S$500 per month, a little
more than the starting rate of dollars S$320 for Filipino domestics in
Singapore. Despite her relatively high salary, Sandra confessed that she
was unable to save anything for her own retirement. Registering for the
Social Security System is a good move, but she never had an extra pen-
ny to pay for the monthly contributions. Although she did not have sav-
ings, she viewed her material assets in the Philippines as concrete pro-
ducts of the hardship she endured for the sake of her family. Having
good relationships with both her family in the Philippines and her cur-
rent employer, she planned to work in Singapore for as long as her
French employers remained there. She wanted all her children to
become professionals so they would not experience what she went
through. Sandra’s case is one example of those who have endured long
years of separation from their families to provide for the children’s
needs. With barely six years of formal education, Sandra could never
find employment in the Philippines that could pay for her family’s
needs. Thus, she decided to remain overseas.
These enabling conditions also have their negative consequences on
their children and marriages. The absence of parents has caused psycho-
logical and social problems among their children. Reviewing the litera-
ture about children left behind, John Bryant (2005) reports that psycho-
logical difficulties are more likely when mothers migrate overseas and
leave their families behind. Studies have shown that children becoming
estranged from their parents and view them only as sources of gifts and
money, or of children blaming problems such as delinquency, drugs,
and premarital sex on parents’ absence … There are claims that children
of migrants have difficulty making decisions, because they are used to
having two layers of authority in the family (first their caregivers and
then the absent parent). There are claims that children of migrants are
spoiled and wasteful or lonely and resentful (Bryant 2006: 6).
Prolonged separation also commonly results in either marital break-
ups or the redefinition of marital relationships. Of the 24 informants
who had ever been married, five were separated, six were widows, while
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13 have remained married. To keep their marriages intact, many of my
informants tolerated the extra-marital affairs of their spouses. They
viewed their tolerance as practical, knowing they could not perform
their conjugal duties. At 38, Becky Indang had gone through major
trials in her life, having been married and fulfilling her roles as a teen-
age mother at the age of eighteen. In 1991 when she was 22 years old,
she left for Singapore leaving her husband and a little daughter behind.
Soon after her departure, she realised that her overseas work had cre-
ated a rift in her marriage. Neighbours, friends, and relatives disclosed
her husband’s extra-marital affairs, which she did not feel was all that
surprising, given their social circumstances. Knowing that she could
not fulfil the sexual needs of her husband, she tolerated it, as long as
the relationship remained in the domain of bodily sex. Upon her return
to the Philippines four years later, she discovered that her husband had
abandoned her and their only child. He left them to be with his mis-
tress. Becky was in a difficult position as she had the intention of work-
ing in Hong Kong for six months. Her nine-year-old daughter, Virginia,
was left alone. Virginia felt abandoned by her parents, and she later be-
gan neglecting her studies and quit school after graduating from high
school.
While transnational mothering may work in some cases, the exam-
ples of Becky and Virginia prove that there is another side as well.
Many trans-migrant workers often end up being part-time wives and
full-time servants. Although tormented emotionally, most Filipina do-
mestic workers acquiesced to their partners’ extra-marital activities.
Many were resigned to the fate of being ‘transient wives’, performing
their conjugal roles when they are with their spouses, and allowing the
latter freedom to have illicit relationships in their absence. Even those
who are not yet aware of the activities of their partners often prepare
themselves for the worst.
Conclusion
Because of the nature of their work, trans-migrant workers need to find
a balance between their co-residential work lives and transnational fa-
mily life at different stages of their overseas stints. Newcomers often
find it hard to concentrate on their work because of adjustment issues
and separation anxieties from the families they have left behind. Return
migrants fail to settle down on a long-term basis in the Philippines due
to various financial difficulties, relationship problems, and their ‘addic-
tion’ to overseas work. Long-time domestics working for one employer
had become quite attached to their employing families and could not
easily take their leave.
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Following Friedman’s typology involving short-term and long-term
households discussed earlier, the co-residential global household of do-
mestic workers in Singapore is meant to be a ‘short-term’ household.
However, for one-quarter of my informants, it has indeed become a
long-term engagement, ranging from eight to 20 years, the latter being
longer than the number of years those children in Western societies or-
dinarily live with their parents. Despite the contractual slavery involving
second-class treatment, state restrictions, and separation from their fa-
milies, many Filipinas have remained in Singapore. They have accepted
the restrictive and marginalised lives in Singapore as well as the notion
of remaining domestic workers throughout the productive years of their
life. Despite the years away from their children, trans-migrants in their
late 40s and early 50s who can otherwise afford to be with their chil-
dren, often do not quit their jobs in Singapore. Accustomed to
the transnational arrangement with their families, long-time domestic
workers shared their fears of early retirement from their overseas jobs.
A never-been-married informant who had been given a special place in
her extended family because of her financial contributions verbalised
this fear: ‘How will my relatives treat me when I no longer have a stea-
dy cash flow?’ Another commented, ‘I don’t want to be a burden on my
children.’ These anxieties are not without justification. A case in point
is a recent newspaper report of a 59-year-old domestic worker who final-
ly returned to the Philippines after nine years in the Middle East. No
one was at the airport to celebrate her homecoming and her nieces and
nephews whom she supported through college were nowhere to be
found. Without a penny in her pocket, she ended up staying tempora-
rily with a group fighting for migrant workers’ rights (Philippine Today
2002).
In examining the consequences of trans-nationalism on families, Eli-
sabetta Zontini (2004) found that prolonged separation from their fa-
milies triggers ‘considerable suffering’ for the transmigrant women
but, at the same time, these separations ‘increase [the] freedom and
control over their time and income.’ Similarly, Zontini noted that chil-
dren left behind benefit economically from their mothers’ migration
but at the same time, suffer from long-term separation. A foreseeable
danger of global households occurs when trans-migrant workers, parti-
cularly those with 20 years of employment in a single household, no
longer suffer from living away from their families and become content
living with their employers and distantly supporting their families.
Their workplace becomes their home and their home becomes merely a
beneficiary of their charity. This is problematic because of its impact on
family cohesion and old-age social security. Marriages are often too dif-
ficult to sustain when partners are separated this long, and children
may grow up not really spending much time with their mothers. Sec-
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ond, domestic workers are unable to become citizens and the absence
of legislation that provides for retirement benefits for foreign domestic
workers offers no other option for these workers other than to grow old
and have to return to the Philippines. It will be a challenge to renew re-
lationships with family members when they are already retirees. If this
phenomenon does occur, it is important for trans-migrant workers to
go home financially prepared to be able to support their own retire-
ments. Thus, the governments of the Philippines and Singapore and
other aid agencies must assist domestic workers to save up for their old
age, by controlling their contributions to their families and engaging in
forced saving schemes.
The global household is an interesting site to examine, especially re-
garding the ways in which processes of globalisation affect the micro-
dynamics and how the abstract is made concrete in the domestics’
everyday lives. This chapter has identified the transformation of house-
holds as a consequence of global capitalist economy. These global
households include the restructuring of households from largely co-re-
sidential families into global households, involving internationally dis-
persed families and co-residential citizens from First World and Third
World nation-states. The paradox of these global households highlights
the transformation of social relations in a highly globalised society.
What we have here is a ‘condition of postmodernity (Harvey 1990)’, a
decline of clear-cut definitions of some social categories, such as house-
holds, housewives, marriage, and mothering. For instance, housewifery
is now shared by the world’s women; children obtain care at home not
only from their own parents and relatives but also from foreigners who
represent a different culture. Some marriages are considered intact
even though spouses neither live together nor espouse fidelity to each
other; some women become transient wives, fulfilling their roles only
during biannual breaks from their work. Mothering becomes possible
through technological innovations such as mobile phones, the Internet,
and door-to-door delivery services. Finally, foreigners are absorbed into
the homes and allowed to take care of employers’ infants and children.
Indeed, global capitalist economy has established new forms of institu-
tions and roles replacing the old ones.
Notes
1 This article is made possible through the support of ASIA Fellows Awards by the Asian
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would like to thank the Filipina domestic workers and employers who shared their life
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2 Petra Weyland (1997: 85) has employed the term ‘global household’, which she referred to
in the context of moving households of global corporate executive men, who were as-
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signed in one global city and then another, in a two-to-five-year period, accompanied by
wives and their domestic workers.
3 To protect the identities of the Forum members, the name of this online discussion forum
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4 Some of the authors who employed the term ‘transnational household’ in their work
include Gardner and Grillo (2002), Thomas-hope ( 1988), Castaneda (2005), Parrenas
(2005), and Willis and Yeoh (2000).
5 Amy Soriano was interviewed on 7 January 2007. Our conversation started at the Lucky
Plaza Mall along Orchard Road, and continued as we hopped from one mall to another.
Since then we would follow up on each other by phone, and later through e-mails when
she eventually reached Canada.
6 HDB or Home Development Board is a public housing project in Singapore.
7 Employer Melissa Wong was interviewed on 7 January 2007.
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13 Raffles Hotel Singapore:
Advertising, Consumption and Romance
Chris Hudson
Introduction
While much ink has been spent on the life and career of one of South-
east Asia’s most celebrated colonial administrator and the founder of
modern Singapore – Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles – there is a paucity
of literature regarding the processes which contributed to the reification
of the ideas of luxury, prestige and exclusivity associated with his name
(Solomon 1997; Madden 2003; Aljunied 2005). This chapter attempts
to fill this gap by examining the creation and sustenance of the Raffles
brand in Singapore. A number of landmarks, botanical specimens,
streets, buildings, businesses and institutions have been named after
Raffles. There is Raffles Museum, Raffles City Convention Centre, Raf-
fles Hospital, Raffles Tailors, Raffles Investment Group, Raffles Hold-
ings, and the list goes on. The Raffles Institution, and Raffles Junior
College are known as perhaps the two best schools in Singapore, whose
notable alumni include former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew. The Raf-
fles Hospital is one of the best in Singapore; and of course, there is the
Raffles class on Singapore’s national airline, which offers the ultimate
in luxury air travel. It is the Raffles Hotel, however, that has maintained
a prestigious international reputation for more than a century. This is
the site around which the romance of an essentialised and exoticised
East has emerged.
The branding strategy of the Raffles Hotel invokes nostalgia for a
decadent and self-indulgent colonial past. It regularly recalls ‘the legend
of Raffles’ and the hotel’s ‘legendary’ status. An examination of the
ways in which this legend has been created and what it means necessi-
tates the employment of the works of Raymond Williams, Jean Baudril-
lard and others whose theorising of consumption is underpinned by an
understanding of the distinction between the use value and the sym-
bolic value of a product. Williams suggests that if as consumers we
were only interested in use, then ‘a washing machine would be a useful
machine to wash clothes, rather than an indication that we are forward
looking or an object of envy to our neighbours’ (Williams 1980: 185).
One might also make the point that if we were only interested in use,
then a comfortable night’s accommodation would be enough for us,
without the promise that the Raffles ‘lifestyle experience’ will transform
us into ‘privileged guests’.
Baudrillard’s work on advertising addresses the question of the social
logic of consumption where the symbolic outweighs use value. A suc-
cessful brand name can create a coherent, collective vision of a product
through which may emerge its social or symbolic value (Baudrillard
2004: 27). Cronin has encapsulated the role of advertising in this pro-
cess when she says that advertising acts as an intermediary that can
translate products into symbolic social entities, and integrate them into
a larger system of people, ideas, practices and institutions (Cronin
2004: 1). Through an exploration of the branding strategies which cre-
ate a collective vision and integrate symbolic entities into larger systems
of meaning – in effect, the brand logic – it becomes possible to uncover
what it is that is really being consumed when a hotel is, as Raffles
advertising asserts, ‘more legend than hotel (Raffles Hotel, Singapore,
n.d.).’
Leiss has outlined the complexities and ambiguities inherent in any
commodity. Products, objects, things, and increasingly, services, can re-
present a complex amalgam of the material and the symbolic and be-
come ‘material-symbolic entities (Leiss 1978: 84).’ Urry, in turn, points
out that in the modern economy services, such as those associated with
tourism, are now of greater significance than material objects (Urry
1990: 24). The complex relationship between people, commodities and
images that constitutes the material-symbolic entity of Raffles is played
out discursively in the websites and advertising material and in the
books and brochures commissioned by the hotel. Of paramount impor-
tance in constructing this relationship is the brand.
After more than a century of expansion, Raffles is now a global chain
with seven branches in Europe and Asia currently in operation and a
number of others planned. The Raffles chain currently includes: Raffles
Grand Hotel D’Angkor (Siem Reap, Cambodia); Raffles Hotel Le Royal
(Phnom Penh, Cambodia); Raffles Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten (Hamburg,
Germany); Raffles Beijing Hotel (People’s Republic of China); Raffles
Le Montreaux Palace (Montreaux, Switzerland); Raffles L’Ermitage (Bev-
erly Hills, California); Raffles Resort Canouan Island (The Grenadines).
New branches scheduled to open in the next three years are: Raffles Du-
bai; Raffles Resort Taimana (Tahaa, French Polynesia); Raffles Resort
Bali (Indonesia); Raffles Resort Phuket (Thailand); Raffles Resort Da
Nang (Vietnam). This essay, however, will focus on the Raffles Hotel in
Singapore, the ur-hostelry, and the birthplace of the Raffles legend. The
Raffles chain offers not just a night in a hotel, but a ‘lifestyle’ experi-
ence through a coherent, collective vision, which has been diffused
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from the reputation and branding strategy of the original Raffles in Sin-
gapore.
At the Raffles International chain of hotels you can ‘seek the good
life’1 (Angkor Wat), find ‘elegance and exclusivity … [and] that inimitable
Raffles experience’2 (Beijing) and discover ‘a place like no other where
East and West meet in an architectural sense as well as in the vast
range of care and treatments available’ (Montreux). Its enduring and
transferable brand power seems to demonstrate the benefits of estab-
lishing a relationship between people, commodities and images and to
affirm Baudrillard’s point that the satisfaction of needs is outweighed
by the importance of the ‘social logic of differentiation (Baudrillard
2004).’ That logic is, as Baudrillard puts it, not the logic of propositions
and proofs, but the logic of fables, and people’s willingness to go along
with them (Baudrillard 1996, 166). The brand logic of Raffles, designed
to maintain its prestige and reputation as one of the finest hotels in
the world, depends not on the logic of Reason, but on the logic of Ro-
mance. The romance is part of what Ritzer (1999) recognised as the
character of enchantment conjured in spaces dedicated to consumption.
The Raffles romance emerges from its place in the narrative of Western
travellers to Asia, and it lends itself to the construction of an Orientalist
fantasy. This same romance, and nostalgic attachment to the past, is
still promoted as part of the coherent, collective vision, and is one of
the salient features of its brand image today.
On the one hand, as Giddens writes, the capitalistic market with its
imperatives of continuous expansion attacks tradition (Giddens 1991:
197). On the other hand, the same imperatives allow it to reinvent and
commodify tradition. It is worth recalling here Barthes’ (1972) conten-
tion that advertising can create modern mythology by investing cultural
objects with a range of meanings and connotations. Recognising the
mythological status of a commodity is also important in the context of
Kellner’s assertion that advertising, like myth, can resolve social contra-
dictions, provide models of identity and celebrate the existing social or-
der (1992, 158). The brand is paramount in this process. A brand is
more than just a cultural artefact, it is a capitalist institution (Arvidsson
2006). As a parasitic cultural form, colonising other cultural forms, its
role is to sustain capitalist ideology (Holt 2006).
Travel and the tourist experience, along with many other opportu-
nities for consumption, are implicated in the nexus between consump-
tion and identity, and are factors in what Giddens has termed ‘the re-
flexive project of the self’, that is, the creation and continuous revision
of a coherent biographical narrative (Giddens 1991, 5). In Giddens’ ac-
count, individualism is lodged in the sphere of consumption, and indi-
vidual self-expression is enveloped by a freedom of individual choice
governed by the market. He asserts that: ‘To a greater or lesser degree,
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the project of the self becomes translated into one of possession of a de-
sired good and the pursuit of artificially framed styles of life (Giddens
1991, 198).’ Kellner has argued that one of the functions of advertising
is to sell not only lifestyles, as Raffles branding strategy clearly does,
but also desirable subject positions (Kellner 1992: 167). Arvidsson’s
work on branding crystallises the concept even more succinctly when
he says that consumers pay not for the brand itself but for the power to
transform themselves, for what they can become with it (Arvidsson
2006: 68).
Branding strategy and advertising for the Raffles Hotel present not
only the promise of a ‘lifestyle’, but also a narrative coherence with
which the consumer can identify (see Giddens 1991, 199). Raffles co-
herent, collective vision provides a narrative with which the trajectories
of self of potential consumers may converge. This dovetails with Arvids-
son’s discussion of the ways in which consumers co-create brands. That
is to say, symbolic value is created by a relationship between brand and
consumer, and it is only when consumers allow a brand to assume a
significance in their lives, that it emerges as a symbolic social entity (Ar-
vidsson 2006, 82).
I begin with an overview of the history of Raffles Singapore and the
making of the legend and explore, in particular, the continuing reitera-
tion of the romance of Raffles and the transformation of travellers’ ac-
commodation into a global cultural icon. Two aspects of the branding
strategy of Raffles are the key to the Raffles image. The first is that Raf-
fles guarantees exclusivity. Only a select few can become part of the le-
gend and enjoy the nostalgic experience; its symbolic value – its desir-
ability – is predicated on exclusion. Historically, ‘most visitors to Raffles
were rich, rare and energetic globetrotters’ (Liu 1992: 55). An integral
feature of the romance is that Raffles has always been imagined as a
place to exclude the plebeian.
The second important feature of the Raffles branding strategy is the
notion of intimacy. Raffles brand logic encourages consumers to ima-
gine themselves in an intimate and personal relationship with the hotel.
The hotel invites consumers to become part of the legend, and charac-
ters in the romance. The trajectory of the self, as described by Giddens
(1991), can then be experienced as ineluctably enmeshed with the logic
of luxury consumption. Both of these features of Raffles advertising of-
fer not only the material but also the symbolic privileged subject posi-
tions. The subject positions of the consumers own making are made
possible by the power of the brand to provide a context of consumption,
a field of experiences and relationships in which the construction of the
subject is made possible (Arvidsson 2006).
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The Romance of Raffles – The Making of the Legend
Raffles Hotel, on the corner of Beach and Bras Basah roads, Singapore,
was founded in 1887 in a much smaller incarnation than today’s Raf-
fles.3 Since 1899, when Rudyard Kipling encouraged people to ‘feed at
Raffles (Raffles Hotel Singapore, n.d.).’4 Raffles has undergone large-scale
renovations, extensions, modernizations and a series of refurbishments.
It was one of the first buildings in Singapore to receive electricity, and
had a Grand Marble Dining Room capable of seating 500 people. A
large ballroom was added in 1920.
Liu (1992) dates the beginning of the legend to 1904 when the Raffles
Hotel began to be known as ‘the finest caravanserai East of Suez’ (Raffles
Hotel Cookbook, 2003: 10). In 1905, it was referred to as a global standard
of luxury when The Sphere, a popular London magazine, called it ‘The Sa-
voy of Singapore’, and was by then already being patronised by the rich
and famous. In 1917, it advertised itself as the hotel that made Singapore
famous (The Raffles Cookbook 2003: 37). An important element in the
construction of the Raffles legend is the catalogue of ‘distinguished
guests’ who have become characters in the on-going romance. Actors,
writers, poets, European and Asian royalty, Hollywood celebrities and
people famous for being rich figure prominently in the inscriptions of
the hotel’s history. Celebrated writers include Hermann Hesse, Joseph
Conrad, Rudyard Kipling, Noel Coward, André Malraux, Pablo Neruda
and James Michener. Amongst many others who have stayed at Raffles
were Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks (1921); Charlie Chaplin
(1932); Ava Gardner, Rita Hayworth and her husband the Aga Khan, Jean
Simmons, the young John Fitzgerald Kennedy, John Wayne (1950s); Hay-
ley Mills, Trevor Howard, William Wyler, Milos Foreman, Otto Premin-
ger, Peter Bogdanovich, Claudia Cardinale, Ben Gazzara, (1960s and
1970s). Members of various royal dynasties who have at different times
during the last century stayed at Raffles include the King and Queen of
Siam, the Sultan of Johore, Grand Duke Cyril of Russia, Prince Adalbert
of Germany, Prince Kan-in of Japan, Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, the last
White Rajah of Sarawak, and a number of Indian maharajahs. The im-
portant guest referred to most often is, of course, William Somerset
Maugham, who stayed at Raffles between the two world wars. Photo-
graphs of many of these guests, and other less well-known pre-war glit-
terati, are featured in the museum on the hotel’s top floor.
The Raffles management has long been aware of the selling power of
history and romance, and have used them effectively in their branding
strategy. According to Liu, it was Franz Schutzman, a Raffles employee
in the post-World War Two period who spotted Somerset Maugham’s
reference to Raffles Hotel ‘standing for all the fables of the exotic East’
and thereafter they decided to use it in their advertising (Liu 1992: 143).
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This phrase has become a very powerful evocation of the romance of
Raffles, and such an integral part of the brand logic of Raffles, that it al-
most never fails to appear in any advertisement or commercially pro-
duced discourse about the hotel. To reinforce the association of Raffles
with both the famous writer and the romance of the exotic East, Maug-
ham was invited to stay at the Raffles (compliments of Schutzman) and
returned in 1960 as an octogenarian. He was given the suite he had oc-
cupied 40 years earlier.
The ‘Raffles experience’ has been generating nostalgia and attach-
ment to tradition since the early twentieth century. The British agent,
Bruce Lockhart, returned to Raffles in the 1930s after a 25-year absence
only to be disconcerted by its modernisation and a certain loss of old
world elegance:
It was the old Raffles of my youth, but so altered, so re-equipped
and so enlarged as to be almost unrecognizable … when I came
to the bathroom my face fell. There, firmly set on the tiled floor,
was a European bath of the latest model with hot and cold water
complete. The old Siamese jar with its tin-pan for sluicing one’s
self was evidently a thing of the past. I felt a pang of regret (Liu
1992: 99).
Even in the 1930s, tourists came to Raffles looking for the Raffles le-
gend in the authentic East that they had heard about. One tourist com-
mented: ‘We motored in a car of Cook’s to the Raffles Hotel; here, I
thought was the East that Maugham, Sir Hugh Clifford, Bruce Lockhart
and countless others have written about’ (cited in Liu 1992: 102).
By 1935, according to Liu, Raffles was no longer merely a hotel, but
had become ‘an icon for all that was perceived to be romantic and exotic
in travel, a symbol for the myths and fables of the East’, and was pro-
moting itself as a place that was ‘immortalized by writers, patronised by
all’ (Liu 1992: 99). Advertising may be one of the few discourses left in
which it is acceptable to use the words ‘the East’, the ‘Far East’ and ‘the
Orient’, since these terms are now so closely associated with discredited
colonial ideologies and the attempt to universalise Western values. Raf-
fles branding is dependent on the reclaiming of Orientalism as part of
its charm, and it is a key feature of its brand attraction. Holt asserts that
iconic brands ‘work to organize collective identities, as expressions of
the major social axes such as class, gender and race within a particular
national discourse and beyond (Holt 2006: 357).’ This is an especially
apt description of the ways in which Raffles inscribes its iconic status
and sustains it with reference to colonial era discourses of the West and
its Romantic, Exotic Other.
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The hotel underwent major restorations and refurbishments in the
period 1989-1991 in response to an increasingly disappointing financial
performance. It was perceived as being old-fashioned, shabby and un-
comfortable (Henderson 2001: 16). The appearance of the first genera-
tion of five-star hotels on Orchard Road providing direct competition
emphasised the fact that those people who came to Raffles were, accord-
ing to at least one source, ‘travellers in search of a past’ – the Singapore
of the rubber planters and Somerset Maugham (Raffles Hotel Cookbook
2003: 32). For these ‘nostalgia seekers’ the hotel’s shortcomings were
considered to be part of its charm (Raffles Hotel Cookbook 2003: 32). All
the alterations that took place during this period, which included the re-
moval and replacement of the 1920s ballroom, were done with profit
maximisation in mind. There was a deliberate effort within these para-
meters to not compromise the traditional atmosphere of the hotel in or-
der to keep the romance alive. Warren’s reminiscences of Raffles
helped turn its history into a saleable commodity. His history of Raffles,
in the form of a book commissioned and published by Raffles Hotel it-
self, describes the colonial style of Raffles and concludes that:
… This quality invokes a bygone era, one far removed from the
cost-efficient principles that determine the design of most hotels
today, yet at Raffles it seems perfectly right and natural, even in-
evitable (Warren 2001: 12).
And to ensure that the renovated hotel did not disappoint those tourists
looking for the romance of the East, it was refurbished with Oriental car-
pets, antique fittings, period furniture, old engravings and photographs
to create ‘the special ambience of the Raffles style’ (Warren 2001: 12).
The Raffles brochure tells potential guests that: ‘Few hotels can look
back on more than a century of legendary service to so many distin-
guished guests and fewer still have preserved their past with more lov-
ing attention to detail’ (Raffles Hotel n.d). Warren describes the hotel as
‘a treasured heirloom’, one of the elements of which is ‘a powerful
sense of history’ (Warren 2001: 12). Peleggi points out that, although
the 1980s refurbishment of the hotel was a matter for private enter-
prise, it was marketed as the recovery of a major asset of Singapore’s
heritage (Peleggi 1996: 444).
The Raffles website offers the chance for consumers to merge their
personal history with Raffles history by ‘Living the Legend in Grand
Style’:
Raffles Hotel celebrates 120 years of legendary history with two
exclusive accommodation packages that promise an experience
of a lifetime with many fond memories to bring home …
RAFFLES HOTEL SINGAPORE 253
Distinguished by their premier location within the Hotel, Grand
Hotel suites are imbued with character and individuality. In-
spired by the romance of travel in a bygone era, each is a glamor-
ous world of gleaming brass and polished wooden floors, opulent
drapes and oriental carpets. Elegantly appointed with handsome
antiques and historic 19th and early 20th-century masterpieces,
residents may luxuriate in an ambience of nostalgic charm and
sublime personal service rare in today’s world. 5
Legendary service, legendary history, romance, nostalgic charm, these
are the tropes used consistently by Raffles on their website and in the
brochures in order to keep the romance alive. The branding of the Raf-
fles Hotel employs a discourse in the Orientalist paradigm. While it has
been renovated, it continues to draw on the tradition of Orientalist ex-
pressions of an essentialised and exoticised Orient. Nineteenth and
early twentieth-century attitudes, which transformed the Orient into an
object to be scrutinised, disciplined and governed, have been modified
in a post-colonial world, and a new Orientalism has emerged which in-
scribes the Orient as an object to be consumed (Said 1995: 41). Raffles
Beijing advertising proclaims: ‘Epitomizing the beauty and refinement
of the Orient’.6 Raffles Hotel Singapore is a microcosm of a romanti-
cised Orient, a place to consume the exotically luxurious encapsulated
in Somerset Maugham’s comment that Raffles is ‘the legendary symbol
for all the fables of the Exotic East.’ Raffles is, following Ritzer (1999),
an enchanted space of consumption.
Raffles has also become ‘more legend than hotel’ through a process
of sacralisation. In his study of the tourist, MacCannell (1999) has ar-
gued that sightseeing is a modern ritual, performed by pilgrimages to
mandatory sights. There are some things every tourist must see. Ima-
gine, for example, going to Paris without seeing the Eiffel Tower. The
element of ritual is an integral aspect of the sacralising of some sights.
Sight sacralisation begins when the sight is named and authenticated as
worthy of preservation and respect. Raffles has been anthropomor-
phised and revered in its renaissance as ‘the grand Old Lady’, it has
been ‘immortalized by writers’ and is ‘loved by all’ (Raffles Hotel Cook-
book 2003: 32). Its brochure announces: ‘Majestic. Grand historic hotel.
International landmark. Glittering social venue’ (Raffles Hotel Singapore
n.d). The large array of publicised eulogistic comments about Raffles by
the rich, the famous, the talented, the powerful and the beautiful over a
century, have ensured that it is a named sight, an object for sacralisa-
tion. Liu (1992, 99) cites the 1930s brochure advertising cruises on the
S.S. Franconia:
254 CHRIS HUDSON
While in Singapore you undoubtedly will wish to visit Raffles
Hotel … As you comfortably lounge on one of the verandahs try-
ing nonchalantly to sip your first ‘Million Dollar Cocktail’, you
will probably pinch yourself to see if you are awake and that it is
you who are actually sitting at a table at Raffles, perhaps the most
famous and widely known hostelry in the East.
And in a metonymic transformation in which Raffles takes on greater
significance than Singapore itself, Wolfgang Bauer, the Austrian play-
wright, asked: ‘While at Raffles, why not visit Singapore?’7
Sight sacralisation also occurs when the sacred object is mechanically
reproduced (MacCannell 1999: 45). The Raffles Hotel shop sells,
amongst other consumer items, a soft toy in the shape of a Sikh door-
man, a Sikh doorman magnet, a ‘heritage’ magnet of the façade of the
hotel in a previous era, ‘heritage’ coasters and placemats with images of
the old Raffles, a miniature model of the hotel, a Raffles water globe,
passport wallets, bags, key rings, hair and beauty products, teas, honey,
chocolates, curry powder, jam and other foodstuffs bearing the Raffles
logo. Raffles has its own song known as ‘I’ll see you again at Raffles’,
which is available on CD. Its own cocktail, the Singapore Sling, is avail-
able in bottles of premix, not to mention accoutrements such as the
Singapore Sling glass and Singapore Sling shaker. Even the advertising
for Raffles has become a saleable commodity, with postcards and repro-
ductions of early-twentieth-century for sale posters of the hotel. The
shop itself ‘exudes an old world charm that is inimitably Raffles’.8 Ser-
ious aficionados of Raffles can continue to consume it long after they
have returned home. Even people who are excluded from the ‘lifestyle
experience’ by their lack of financial resources can consume it in sym-
bolic form. A Sikh doorman magnet is affordable for those for whom
the Somerset Maugham Suite is not. The popularity of the souvenir –
surely a materially symbolic entity – might be understood with refer-
ence to Baudrillard’s (1981) notion that people are not so much con-
suming products as signs or images.
The metonymic transfer of significance has also been seen elsewhere.
This advertisement appeared in the Straits Times Annual of 1955:
Singapore would not be Singapore without Raffles Hotel. This is
a fact well known, for Raffles is world famous and offers its
guests so much more than other hotels … Singapore is the focal
point of the East and Raffles Hotel … Singapore’s international
rendezvous of world-fame repute (cited in Liu 1992: 144).
And, in 1989, the Melbourne Age newspaper commented that: ‘Like
Paris without the Eiffel Tower or the Vatican with no pope, Singapore
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would not be the same without Raffles’ (July 22, 1989, cited in Liu
1992: 190). The Tourist Board of Singapore confirmed that Raffles was
sacred:
Raffles Hotel is quite possibly more famous than Singapore itself
… It is still possible to return it to its former splendour and make
it the national treasure it should be – the Crown Jewel of the visi-
tor industry in Singapore (cited in Henderson 2001: 17).
The hotel was awarded the status of National Monument and the entire
site was re-gazetted as a national monument in 1995 (Henderson
2001). Raffles Hotel is not now, and apparently never was, just a place
to spend the night. It has always been a tourist sight that should not be
missed on any visit to Singapore, even if you cannot afford to stay there.
Raffles’ role as a national icon is secured by its ability to spin a compel-
ling myth that resonates national myths (Holt 2006: 364). MacCan-
nell’s final stage of sacralisation is social reproduction, that is, when
other entities begin to name themselves after the famous attraction.
The Fairmont Group, which also owns the Savoy in London, has named
at least eight of their hotels after the Raffles in Singapore; and, of
course, Raffles class on Singapore’s national airline offers the ultimate
in luxury air travel.
Like so many sacralised sights in Europe such as the Notre Dame,
Raffles has also achieved mythological status. Liu reports that when the
hotel was closed for renovations in 1989, the director of the restoration
was in the hotel: ‘As he walked the echoing verandas, listening for her
voice and absorbing her atmosphere, he was struck by her feeling of ea-
gerness for a face-lift, as if the dramatic turn of events was fated (Liu
1992: 150).’ The renovation of the Raffles meant that ‘… history was gi-
ven new life’ (Liu 1992: 151). Jhally’s study of advertising as a system of
meaning defines fetishism as a way of seeing the meaning of things as
an inherent part of their physical existence, when in fact that meaning
is created by their integration into a system of meaning (Jhally 1990:
29). According to this definition, Raffles is a fetishised commodity. It
was transformed into a life-enhancing material-symbolic entity and relo-
cated into a higher ontological plane when the writer James Michener
pronounced: ‘To have been young and had a room at Raffles was life at
its best.’9 Raffles, it seems, is a brand, which can, as Arvidsson sug-
gests, transform the relations of everyday life and become a context for
life (Arvidsson 2006: 13).
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Raffles and Exclusivity
Raffles brand strategy promoted elitism and exclusivity from the begin-
ning. An advertisement for Raffles dating from 1904 proclaimed that it
was for: ‘First class visitors only … [and was] the rendezvous of the elite’
(Liu 1992: 54). American travel writer and adventurer Harry Foster,
who visited Singapore in the 1920s, found his entrance to the hotel
blocked by a Sikh doorman. Foster says of the encounter:
English people, girls in summery creations of silk, men in spot-
less white linen, grouped about wicker tables, laughing, chatting,
playing cards, smoking gold tipped cigarettes, sipping whiskey-
stengahs … I never felt so insignificant in my life as I did when
walking up the driveway towards that veranda (cited in Liu 1992:
99).
More recent advertising continues the sense that many people who
might love the romance of Raffles will be excluded. The brand’s inter-
national luxury hotels are designated as ‘landmarks and legends for the
fortunate few (Raffles Hotel brochure n.d.)’. The Raffles Singapore web-
site advertises:
Celebration Package – A Bygone Era of Charm at Raffles Hotel
In celebration of the prestigious Conde Nast Traveler Business
Travel Awards accorded to Raffles Hotels & Resorts, ranked sec-
ond amongst the Top 10 International Hotel Chains by influen-
tial readers, Raffles Hotel has launched an exclusive suite pack-
age ‘A Bygone Era of Charm’.
This exclusive suite package offers all elements that reflect the
inimitable Raffles experience … an unmatched ambience of tran-
quillity ... fine Oriental carpets … complimentary welcome Singa-
pore Sling cocktail upon check-in …daily breakfast at Tiffin Room
… choice of a leading newspaper.10
The brand logic fuses exclusivity and the approbation of influential
readers with the romance of colonial times when people took tiffin and
enjoyed the charm of the Orient. Raffles coherent, collective vision owes
much to the colonial imagination and the costumed performance of
some employees (I note, in particular, the continuing penchant for Sikh
jaga-style11 doormen in quasi-military dress uniform) in some ways, si-
mulates colonial relationships, and affirms the desirable subject posi-
tion of the consumer. The logic of the Raffles brand is the production
of the Western subject in relation to the East as a location of service. Ex-
clusion is predicated on the maintenance of a social order based on
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forms of social differentiation. Advertising celebrates the existing social
order, as Kellner predicted.
As in any expensive hotel, at the Raffles, the offer of service was, and
still is, clearly based on social differentiation, a constitutive feature, ac-
cording to Urry (1990) of modern tourism. The many photographs of
Raffles’ patrons in the first half of the twentieth century reveal a white
world in which it was rare to see non-Europeans who were not em-
ployed as service staff. In a twenty-first-century global environment
class and race distinctions have been decentred and their signifiers de-
tached. The visual signs of class, such as the dinner suit, the ball gown,
the upper-class manners of a Noel Coward or a Somerset Maugham, or
even the fame and glamour of an Ava Gardner, are no longer necessary.
It may be true that Raffles is ‘loved by all’ but only the affluent can af-
ford the social experience it offers. These days, wearing jeans and a t-
shirt (formerly workers’ clothes), being black or Asian, or having won
money in a lottery does not bar one from entry. Nostalgia doesn’t come
cheaply. The cheapest suite at Raffles is the Courtyard Suite at $1000
(Singapore dollars) per night. The ‘Bygone Era of Charm’ package
(which was available at the time of writing in February 2007) was listed
as $2000 Singapore dollars per room/per night (single or double occu-
pancy, minimum two nights stay).12 The most expensive on the tariff
schedule is the Grand Hotel Suite at $6000. The tariffs for the Sarkies
and the Sir Stamford Raffles suites, the most prestigious suites of all,
are not listed and must be reserved privately. What some people might
consider to be exorbitant prices is packaged as a desirable feature by
dint of its power to exclude. Price is, of course, an important aspect of
brand prestige. Premium price, as Arvidsson reminds us, represents
what consumers are prepared to pay extra for the brand in relation to
other brands, and is one of the main mechanisms of brand valorisation
(Arvidsson 2005: 250).
If the privileges of race and class have been replaced by ‘all major
credit cards are accepted’, then those with a substantial amount of
money in their pocket, or an extensive credit limit, no longer have to be
upper class, they can play at it. To experience the Raffles legend is to ex-
perience life as it used to be when self-definition linked to class distinc-
tion was not confounded by post-modern fragmentations of identity
and social structure.
The cost of staying at Raffles means that most travellers are denied
the privilege of becoming a ‘guest’ or lodging themselves ‘in residence’
and availing themselves of the experience of ‘life at its best’. Raffles
website cites The Robb Report on Luxury Hotels which deems it to be the
‘Ultimate address for the luxury traveller’, thereby locating it in a uni-
versalised standard of self-indulgence and gratification. The brand strat-
egy addresses a global elite: ‘Across Europe, Asia and the Caribbean,
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each of its hotels is a treasured landmark in its respective destination,
and provides one of the most memorable experiences elite travel offers
in this world today.’13
The Raffles ‘lifestyle experience’ signifies high status and wealth to
the exclusion of a large number of potential consumers of the legend
and the memorable experience elite travel can offer. It is also, quite
clearly, contingent upon the social differentiation between those ‘in resi-
dence’ and the service class which supports the lifestyle experience. For
Veblen’s leisure class (1970 [1925]), the avoidance of engagement in any
productive occupation was an important thread in the narrative of self,
and placed one in a superior social position. In a postmodern global en-
vironment, leisure is still a ‘status-positioning activity’ and the con-
sumption of leisure, and the choice of leisure activities, is a signifier of
a person’s class, education, gender and other social variables (Rojek
2000: 3). The ‘attentive, yet unobtrusive service’ is not only part of the
romance of Raffles, but also part of the romance of belonging, even for
just one night, to the leisure class. MacConnell (1999: 11) contends that,
while differentiation is the basis for a broad range of negative conse-
quences including violence and alienation, it is also the origin of alter-
natives and the feeling of freedom in modern societies. Conspicuous
leisure can offer this feeling of freedom, and conspicuous consumption
differentiates the consumer from those who cannot afford it. It is possi-
ble to buy and retain these feelings of freedom and status, even if only
temporarily. This is the promise of Raffles, and any number of other
leisurely and luxurious experiences such as a cruise on the QE 2, din-
ner at Jamie Oliver’s restaurant, or a week in Phuket.
Kellner’s socially desirable subject position, and the social differentia-
tion on which it depends, can be achieved in Raffles Grand Indulgence
Package. The website advertises a privileged subject position in the on-
going romance of social exclusion:
Today, residing in grand style continues at Raffles Hotel with the
introduction of Grand Indulgence. Designed to be a promise of
absolute luxury, the Grand Indulgence package embodies ele-
ments of absolute luxury:
– Two-night accommodation in a Grand Hotel suite …Inspired
by the romance of travel in a bygone era, each is the epitome
of sophistication characterised by … opulent drapes and or-
iental carpets.
– … private city tour onboard a limousine is arranged for your
enjoyment …
– Exclusively for privileged residents of Grand Indulgence pack-
age are premiums and vouchers from Escentials (sic) and
Molton Brown, with its flagship store at Raffles Hotel Arcade.
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The Grand Indulgence package also includes the following:
– breakfast at leisure for two, either at Tiffin Room or in-suite;
– afternoon Tea served on three-tier silver stands, for two at
Bar & Billiard Room;
– a pampering 55-minute full body massage at RafflesAmrita
Spa for the couple;
– two-way limousine transfer;
– a memorable departure gift.14
The power of exclusion, and its ability to produce a desirable subject po-
sition, is also dependent on its being able to offer all of the symbols of
wealth and privilege: Grand Indulgence; the romance of the bygone era;
the epitome of sophistication; opulent drapes; elegance of interiors;
pampering; silver stands; limousine; privileged residents; private city
tour; breakfast at leisure, etc., in short, absolute luxury.
Since the consumption of travel and associated services is a social ex-
perience, it follows that an important part of the act of consumption is
to consume services and commodities in the company of others. Ve-
blen’s emphasis on conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption ac-
knowledges the importance of leisure activities being on display. Urry is
clear that what people buy is in effect a particular social composition of
other consumers, not just an individual act of consumption (Urry 1990,
25). The brand logic of Raffles, then, is to demonstrate that anyone else
who might be consuming their services will belong to an appropriate
social stratum. Raffles Singapore ensures the exclusion of undesirable
others, and provides a social composition in which the trajectory of self
can overlap the trajectory of important and acceptable others. Charlotte
Cameron, an English guest at Raffles in the 1920s noted that, while vis-
iting the East, it was even more important to identify oneself as a mem-
ber of one class, and distinguish oneself from other, lesser classes:
In the evening both men and women are more particular than
we are in England to don dinner-jackets and décolleté gowns. I
presume this is with the idea of setting an example to the natives
and to proclaim our caste (Liu 1992: 2).
In the twenty-first century, class and status can be displayed by exercis-
ing the ability to occupy the same space as the rich, famous and glamor-
ous. This line-up of celebrities, so often cited as distinguished guests
and ‘the hotel’s dearest friends’, is the kind of company that any travel-
ler would be delighted to be associated with. The Raffles L’Ermitage in
Beverly Hills, California, claims to be: ‘Favoured by Hollywood celebri-
ties, movie stars and luminaries’ and it is located in ‘the centre of it all’,
near all of the important attractions such as the ‘major movie studios’.15
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And to ensure that potential guests are confident that the company with
whom they will be sharing the Raffles experience is appropriate, the
Raffles homepage announces that Raffles is: ‘Patronised by nobility,
loved by all.’16 Raffles’ focus on exclusivity ensures that consumers un-
derstand that it is not mass consumption, but privileged consumption.
Raffles and Intimacy
The narrative coherence inscribed in Raffles brand logic encompasses
another important node of identification for the consumer. While Raf-
fles continually reiterates its exclusionary strategies, it also recognises
those who are members of the social composition that can afford to pa-
tronise Raffles and enjoy ‘the finest caravanserai East of Suez.’ The co-
herent, collective vision offers consumers a point at which to interpolate
their own narratives into the hotel’s history. The hotel can become a fea-
ture in the consumer’s life, forever linked to significant personal events.
As a potential consumer the hotel addresses you directly and declares
that if you ‘celebrate your special occasions with us … we promise
memories to last a lifetime’. It gives you the opportunity to be self-ag-
grandising and enhance your project of the self when it invites you to:
‘write your own history at this magnificent location with a Raffles Wed-
ding Experience’.17 In Arvidsson’s account of brand management, an
important ingredient for success is the building of inter-textual spaces
within which consumers are provided with raw material for the exercise
of their productive agency. The product or service is contextualised in a
particular life situation, as Raffles rhetoric suggests, and the brand be-
comes an authentic meaning in the life of the consumer (Arvidsson
2005: 247).
In the case of Raffles, what gives this marketing strategy its power is
that it is directly addressed to the consumer. One of the features that
make this possible is the establishment of a false intimacy between con-
sumer and seller, something that Baudrillard (2004, 15) recognised. Dif-
ferentiation is both individual and personalised. The special offer for
March and April 2007 at Raffles Singapore is A luxe affair, which offers
‘sheer splendour’, but only ‘for the discerning and well heeled visitor in
a class of their own’.18
Under the heading: ‘Raffles Capital. Recognising Raffles Residents’,
the website offers membership to an exclusive club. It describes the so-
cial composition of people who would have access to ‘Raffles Capital’
and what privileges you may enjoy as a member. Recognition by the ho-
tel does not only place you in a particular social milieu, but also offers a
fetishised commodity:
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The world’s travelling cognoscenti who choose to return to Raf-
fles again and again are accorded the ultimate recognition – an
invitation to accept membership of Raffles Capital. Just as elabo-
rate capitals adorn many of our heritage hotels, so too does Raf-
fles Capital membership elevate residents to the very peak of
the Raffles experience; members enjoy extra recognition and
exceptional privileges at Raffles hotels and resorts around the
world …19
In a simulated intimacy, Raffles directly addresses consumers as cog-
noscenti and draws them into a word only for the initiated. It is difficult
not to think that Raffles is attempting to create what Muniz and
O’Guinn (2001) have called a ‘brand community.’20 While the Raffles
‘cognoscenti’ do not manifest all of the characteristics of the brand com-
munity outlined by Muniz and O’Guinn, they certainly exhibit two of
the ‘core community commonalities’; one is the sharing of rituals and
traditions such as the ‘complimentary welcome Singapore Sling cocktail
upon check-in’, and high tea in the afternoon. Even the daily breakfast,
which is usually a mundane aspect of a hotel stay as well as ‘your
choice of newspaper’ have both been ritualised by the hotel. The other
is the ‘consciousness of kind’ or a shared ‘knowing of belonging’ (Mu-
niz and O’Guinn 2001). As cognoscenti, Raffles’ guests know how to
consume because they are members of a community of consumption,
members of Raffles Capital. They are an imagined community (Ander-
son 1991) of like minds, tastes and incomes, sharing brand experience.
It should also be noted that Raffles branding is designed to discou-
rage the idea that people who stay there are just tourists. Anyone stay-
ing at Raffles is said to be ‘in residence’. Paying customers are ‘guests’
and are made to feel as if they are participants in and contributors to
the on-going myths, the writers of the legend, the characters in the ro-
mance. One stays in the Somerset Maugham Suite so that one can be
Somerset Maugham for a night. ‘Guests’, especially rich and famous
ones, have become so instrumental in the creation of the romance that
they have transcended the category of ‘guest’ to become a ‘friend’:
Over the years, Raffles Hotel has been privileged to host some of
the world’s brightest luminaries from the entertainment, literary
and political arenas.
The twelve Personality Suites (Joseph Conrad Suite, Rudyard Ki-
pling Suite, Somerset Maugham Suite, Noel Coward Suite, Char-
lie Chaplin Suite, John Thomson Suite, Ava Gardner Suite, An-
dré Malraux Suite, Pablo Neruda Suite, James Michener Suite,
Gavin Young Suite and John Wayne Suite) are posthumous tri-
butes to some of the hotel’s dearest friends and are distinguished
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by the specially sourced celebrity memorabilia placed within each
suite. All suites feature private parlours and dining areas.21
Raffles is a series of linked physical spaces, which seem to fit Arvids-
son’s description of a ‘themed commercial environment’ (Arvidsson
2006: 79). It has a museum, a theatre, a florist, a food store, an exten-
sive shopping arcade, 18 restaurants and bars, a pool, seven utility
rooms, a gymnasium, an executive centre and a ‘culinary academy’.
Each ‘personality suite’ is a miniature theme park, complete with mock
period furniture and fittings, and memorabilia of a famous person who
once stayed there. Ritzer has pointed out that the distinction between
mall and amusement park has been almost obliterated (Ritzer 1999:
135). It seems that the line between a night’s accommodation and a
themed experience is also blurred at Raffles.
The Raffles coherent vision involves selling the romance of the Raf-
fles, and the intimate relationship customers are encouraged to imagine
themselves having with the hotel, as much as the contemporary reality
of a globally acknowledged standard of excellence and luxury:
Raffles The Plaza, Singapore – A Night to Remember
The moment you arrive, a knowing smile darts across your face.
With plenty of space to unwind and indulge, it's little wonder the
Penthouse Suites at Raffles The Plaza were voted amongst the
most decadent in the world.
The suites are a sensory pleasure, where panoramic views of the
Singapore skyline compete with the unadulterated luxury inside.
Here, you escape into an unhurried world of blissful luxury, and
you give yourself up to being completely spoiled. After a slow
sauna in a bathroom larger than the average hotel room, you
dress for your private dinner party. On the patio, your personal
valet prepares a gourmet barbecue for two, as you sip chilled
champagne to the gentle sounds of trickling water. The night is
now unforgettably yours.22
One knows what to expect from the Raffles Oriental experience. It is,
after all, inscribed in legend and one can also create oneself as the privi-
leged subject of the social relations on which the experience depends.
As one of the privileged few who share the knowledge, guests are ‘pam-
pered in an atmosphere of intimacy and privacy’ surrounded by old-
world opulence and displays of decadence. The delicate frisson of sexu-
ality introduced by the sensory pleasure, the slow sauna leading to the
private dinner party for two and the unforgettable night may not have
escaped the reader’s attention. An important aspect of a brand’s success
is encapsulated in this vignette. Lury (2004: 6) tells us that the brand
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operates as a platform for practice. Arvidsson (2006: 8) addresses this
point, explaining that an iconic brand name anticipates future experi-
ences and offers a field of possible responses by providing the context of
consumption (Arvidsson 2005: 244; author’s emphasis). This might ac-
count for the knowing smile on the face of the consumer. Furthermore,
the brand suggests ways in which a product or service can be experi-
enced, related or felt. Everybody knows they are expected to enjoy the
indulgences described above. Who could resist the opportunity to take
possession of the night via the chilled champagne and other sensory ex-
periences?
The theme of intimacy is continued in the focus on the consumer’s
body encapsulated in the invitation to the Amrita Spa, a feature of every
Raffles hotel. The advertising taps directly into the project of the self,
and into Raffles’ promise to recognise the cognoscenti, the people with
the knowing smiles darting across their faces. In this discourse, the
cognoscenti become enlightened souls in search of eternal youth:
Raffles Amrita Spa
Inspired by Amrita. For centuries, enlightened souls on journeys
of self-discovery have celebrated this mystic nectar of the gods,
the elixir of eternal youth. This legendary assurance of renewal is
a commitment to every guest of RafflesAmrita Spa.
Get Pampered...
RafflesAmrita Spa at Raffles Hotel offers relaxing and pampering
wellness therapy in the privacy and luxury of a grand hotel.
Exclusively for residents only, this full-service spa features a gym-
nasium, hot and cold dip pools, body care, exclusive therapy
rooms and unique couple rooms, designed for a relaxing and
soothing massage, facial, or any of our therapeutic services with
your partner. Fragrant aromatherapy burners, candles, soft light-
ing and signature RafflesAmrita Spa cuisine, backed by the le-
gendary Raffles service, create a simple philosophy of complete
wellness.23
Therapeutic services with your partner? Unique rooms for couples?
Along with the ‘legendary assurance of renewal’ and the ‘simple philo-
sophy of complete wellness’, there is the suggestion, albeit oblique, of
an erotic experience. To enhance its legitimacy, it also mobilises the
mythology of ancient India,24 with a gesture in the direction of ayurve-
dic medicine.
The Raffles Hotel le Royale, Phnom Penh, a Hotel with those rare at-
tributes-history and civilised style, offers no less than 41 separate ser-
vices for the body including massages, facials, aromatherapy and ‘the
botanical experience’, not counting the seven different types of waxing
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services.25 Its rhetoric of personal care plunders a variety of traditions
of body maintenance to offer the consumers their choice of tradition: a
traditional Khmer massage which ‘works on the pressure points of the
Oriental Meridian’; Swedish massage, involving the ‘five classical mas-
sage movements of European origin’ and Thai massage which mobi-
lises ‘Zen energy lines’.26 Exclusivity, legend and the hotel’s concern for
the consumer’s intimate experiences pervade the discourse of technolo-
gies of the self and reinforce the privileged subject position of the con-
sumer. The promotion of hedonism and the creation of desire is a
prime agenda for advertising.
Conclusion
While the discursive construction of Raffles hotels in each of their loca-
tions is adapted to local conditions and historical circumstances, all the
hotels in the Raffles chain deploy similar signifiers and create meaning
with similar imagery. All branches reproduce a political economy of an
aristocratic past characterised by a leisured and sumptuous lifestyle for
those who deserve it, supported by a service industry. All reprise the ro-
mance of an essentialised and orientalised Belle Époque of social exclu-
sion, while subscribing to the myth that anyone can be ‘[transported]
into the opulence and splendour of days gone by…’ There is a global
pattern of inducements: the celebrated Oriental service, refinement, cui-
sine, décor, architecture, ambience, splendour, elegance and luxury.
Featherstone’s comment that advertising provides a poetics of everyday
life (Featherstone 1992: 174) is particularly relevant to an understanding
of Raffles’ promotional strategies. The consumption of luxury appar-
ently has a universal meaning. Brand Raffles pre-structures the consu-
mer’s experience in an enchanted environment that any global traveller
knows how to respond to (Lury 1999). Raffles has been promoting a
luxurious context for consumption for more than a century, so it by no
means fits Ritzer’s description of a new means of consumption. It has,
however, some similarities to Ritzer’s ‘cathedrals of consumption’. The
‘sacred, even religious character’ of the shopping mall cathedrals has its
parallel in the quasi-religious overtones of the Raffles Pilgrimage to Self
(‘enlightened souls on journeys of self-discovery’) (Ritzer 1999: 8). Raf-
fles is, if you will, not so much a cathedral of consumption, as a High
Church of Indulgence.
A stay at Raffles is a ‘commodified experience’ (Giddens 1991, 196).
Individual self-expression, manifested in ‘lifestyle’, requires visible
signs of consumption, which outweigh the use value. Giddens (1991:
200) also makes the point that commodification promotes appearance
as the prime arbiter of taste, and sees self-development above all in
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terms of display. The coherence of the Raffles brand and its provision
of a collective vision are primarily articulated through this lifestyle ex-
perience. A pre-determined frame of action accompanies the lifestyle ex-
perience, embedded in the brand (Arvidsson 2006: 8).
But, Raffles promises more than just a lifestyle. Its symbolic value
lies in its power to exclude others, and to locate the consumer in a de-
sirable social composition. It offers both the pleasures of the intimate
and the glamour of the public display of wealth and status. It has the ef-
fect of linking the particular (the knowing individual, the privileged
guest) with the universal (a global elite). Like a true cultural icon it has
articulated itself through a discourse beyond itself and inserted itself
into the myths of nationhood (Holt 2006: 355).
The Raffles experience is not just a night in a hotel. Its symbolic va-
lue comes from its association with social and personal meanings. This
has been made possible by what Williams has identified as a form of
magic, or a highly organised and professional system of magical induce-
ments and satisfactions (Williams 1980: 185). It is a material symbolic
entity embedded in a larger system of meaning. The true magic of the
Raffles romance is that it provides models of identity, offers a desirable
subject position and celebrates the colonial and postcolonial social or-
der.
Notes
1 http://siemreap.raffles.com (accessed 27 March 2007).
2 http://beijing.raffles.com (accessed 27 March 2007).
3 The founders, four Armenian brothers named Sarkies – Martin, Tigran, Aviet and Arshak
– came from Isfahan, Iran. The family also established the Eastern and Oriental Hotel in
Penang, the Strand Hotel in Rangoon and the Hotel Majapahit in Surabaya (now called
the Mandarin Oriental Hotel Majapahit). As some of the most successful hoteliers in Asia,
they dominated the hospitality trade in the British Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang
and Melaka) for nearly 50 years (Wright, 2003).
4 This is a statement frequently reiterated in Raffles advertising. What he actually said was:
‘Feed at Raffles and sleep at the Hotel de L’Europe’ (Liu 1992: 29).
5 http://singapore-raffles.raffles.com/offers/anniversary_suite_packages.html (accessed 29
April 2007).
6 http://beijing.raffles.com/z891/index.shtml (accessed 29 April 2007).
7 http://singapore-raffles.raffles.com/ex_offers/offers07.html (accessed 17 February 2007).
8 http://www.raffleshotelgifts.com/ (accessed 17 April 2007).
9 http://singapore-raffles.raffles.com/z912/accommodation.html (accessed 17 February
2007).
10 http://singapore-raffles.raffles.com/offers/RHCelebration_Package (accessed 11February
07).
11 Jaga: watchman, guard (Malay).
12 http://singapore-raffles.raffles.com/offers/RHCelebration_Package (accessed 11 February
2007).
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13 http://www.raffles.com (accessed 27 March 2007).
14 http://singapore-raffles.raffles.com/ex_offers/offers07.html (accessed 17 February 2007).
15 http://beverlyhills.raffles.com (accessed 1 April 2007).
16 http://singapore-raffles.raffles.com/ (accessed 1 April 2007).
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14 The Role of Recruitment Agencies for Japanese
Working Women in Singapore
Yoshimichi Yui
Introduction
Economic globalisation has increased the mobility of the international
workforce. Transnational flows include the following socio-economic
groups: the transnational business class comprised of highly mobile,
highly skilled professional, managerial and entrepreneurial elites, a
large group of low-waged immigrants filling unskilled and semi-skilled
niches in the urban service economy, expressive specialists who enliven
the cultural and artistic scene and world tourists attracted by the cosmo-
politan ambience (Yoe 2001). Moreover, it has been argued that the
most powerful manifestations of the internationalisation of the capital
in the world real estate economy are global cities, distinguished by their
high concentration of corporate headquarters, advanced telecommunica-
tions and research and development infrastructures, as well as the pre-
sence of international financial services, and disproportionately large
clusters of high-waged professional and managerial expatriate workers
(Beaverstock 1996). Skilled international migration is a fundamental
globalisation process in the ‘flows of space’ of societies that are exter-
nally networked. These include not only the skilled professional and
managerial elite, but also, interestingly enough, their assistants and
support personnel. Globalisation, therefore, induces large volume inter-
national migration of both skilled professional workers and support-ser-
vice personnel who routinely occupy subordinate positions or positions
that are based on locally hired remunerative packages.
The labour practices of large accountancy firms are a case in point.
These international firms have restructured their demand for profes-
sional labour on a global scale. Accounting staff members are subcon-
tracted to their respective firm’s network of various international offices
or attached to the firm’s multinational clients through secondment,
transfers, or personnel exchange procedures (Beaverstock 1996). Bea-
verstock and Boardwell (2000) have reviewed the linkage between glo-
balisation and migration in light of skilled international migration. They
have analysed the transnational elite who are highly educated, highly
skilled, highly paid, highly mobile, and who are ‘trans-local’ corporate
actors/agents of global capitalism, in an attempt to understand the role
of expatriates as a transnational elite in the global city context. This la-
bour mobility has resulted in the heightened importance of overseas
job searches in this trans-national mobility process. Consequently, elite
labour market intermediaries – headhunters from human resource con-
sultancy firms – have emerged as important players who generate and
operate within the more subtle and at times not immediately perceiva-
ble sphere of knowledge capitalism (Faulconbridge, Hall and Beaver-
stock 2008).
Globalisation has given rise to the movement of skilled professionals
not only to the economic centres and cities of developed countries, but
also, increasingly, to the growing cities of countries whose economies
are growing at a healthy or robust rate. Singapore, with its rapid and
consistent economic growth, has become the key business centre of
Southeast Asia. As a regional hub of East Asia, short-term business tra-
vel to Jakarta, Hong Kong and other regional international financial and
business centres has become an important facet of career development
and local knowledge accumulation of professionals based in Singapore
(Beaverstock: 2002). Staff members are posted abroad to the overseas
branches of their firms in order to fulfil business strategy; develop
transnational human resource skills, and to train the local staff of over-
seas branches.
However, when it comes to the practicalities of everyday private life,
the expatriate home life, as well as the social contexts within which ex-
patriates interact with others, local Singaporeans appear to be excluded
from these activities. Expatriates are therefore dis-embedded from the
locals within the context of Singapore the global city.
As early as the 1970s, over 200 Japanese companies moved their pro-
duction offshore to Southeast Asia. Closer to the present, there are over
3000 Japanese companies represented in Singapore, resulting in the
movement of many Japanese expatriates to the city-state. Singapore is
an especially interesting location for expatriates, as the Japanese consti-
tute one of the largest expatriate communities in the country, number-
ing about 20,000. Japanese expatriates have gained prominence in Sin-
gapore over the last three decades with the expansion of Japanese direct
foreign investment in manufacturing industries in Singapore in the
1980s and 1990s (Thang et al. 2002). The number of workers in the
service sectors and customer service has increased and become diversi-
fied in order to support the growing number of Japanese expatriates. Ja-
panese companies have also led in their demand for more bilingual
staff who speak both Japanese and English. Japanese women normally
fill these support positions. Consequently, globalisation has affected Ja-
panese working women as well. Thang et al. (2002, 2004, 2006) have
analysed the work and experiences of Japanese women in Singapore,
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and they have confirmed that Singapore and Hong Kong have emerged
as two of the top destinations for Japanese women seeking employment
overseas. Human resource recruitment agencies in Japan have recorded
huge upsurges in the number of women applying for jobs at these two
locations, and by 1994, at least one major recruitment firm had estab-
lished a profitable business in career seminars catering to women look-
ing for job opportunities in the northeast and Southeast Asia (Thang et
al. 2006).
Recruitment agencies play a major role in facilitating emigration. Ac-
cording to Thang et al. (2004), one of the more popular agencies had
more than 14,000 Japanese registrants as of early 2002, of which 60
percent were female. The single women in the study conducted by
Thang et al. were representative of Japanese single women working
overseas. Most had obtained their jobs either through classified adver-
tisements, recruitment agencies specialising in placements for Japa-
nese, or personal recommendations from friends already working in
Singapore. Some had signed up with recruitment agencies in Singapore
and attended job interviews while vacationing, but the overwhelming
majority had been hired in Japan. In Singapore, they would hold full-
time positions, usually as secretaries or in administrative occupations,
as well as sales, marketing, and teaching positions. These jobs usually
required a proficiency in the Japanese language (Thang and MacLachlan
2002).
In this chapter, we will discuss the role of agencies recruiting Japa-
nese women to work in Singapore. Most Japanese men are expatriates
sent by their company. By contrast, most Japanese women gain employ-
ment in foreign countries through local hiring efforts in Japan, and
upon their own initiative. This chapter, which stems from a larger pro-
ject that investigates the background and activities of Japanese women
abroad, is concerned with the information on jobs provided by recruit-
ment agencies, as well as the activities conducted by the agencies in
their attempt to ride the crest of the wave of globalisation.
The data upon which the present paper bases its discussion may be
found in job information magazines, and job-search websites that spe-
cialise in positions abroad for young Japanese.
The Background to Japanese Going Abroad to Work
Japan’s own employment situation has been deteriorating since 1990.
Japan’s Employment system has been drastically and systematically
changed to mirror the practices of American companies. Most remark-
able amongst these changes is the creation of a flexible labour market
and working conditions. Many Japanese companies have phased out the
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lifetime employment guarantee and have eradicated the seniority sys-
tem. At the same time, the non-permanent employee has replaced the
regular employees, which include part-timers, dispatched employees
from human resource companies and temporary staff. At present, non-
permanent employees constitute over 30 percent of the entire Japanese
workforce.
This phenomenon has obvious and serious effects on the prospects
of young people and women in Japan. The young, as well as women,
form the bulk of non-permanent employees. They are employed in ‘fra-
gile’ positions, and their unstable and unpredictable state of employ-
ment and career prospects in Japan are a cause for anxiety. This has
been recognised as a significant social problem, to the extent that the
word ‘freeter’ as a Japanese-English term has come to denote the free-
lance part-time worker, while the term ‘NEET ’ refers to young people
not in education, employment or training. Furthermore, this social de-
velopment has an impact on those Japanese entering into marriage at a
late age, and on the low fertility levels in Japan, as many young people
who face unstable employment conditions avoid or delay marriage and
childbearing.
The second remarkable change in the Japanese labour market is the
rapid feminisation of the work force. Since the 1970s, the number of
women who are in active employment, both in proportion to the num-
ber of men working as well as in real numerical terms, has been on the
increase. However, in terms of the social advancement of women and
equality of pay, Japan is not listed amongst the top 100 in the world.
The number of professional or skilled women is indeed increasing in
Japan. However, it is also apparent that the numbers of female part-
timers and dispatched workers are also increasing. Women tend to suc-
cumb to these forms of employment because they are often considered
by firms to serve a mitigating function within the labour market. The
result is that the economic disparity between elite professional females
and most other female workers is, in general, increasing in Japan. Many
unskilled women have to put up with unstable and low-paid works.
Furthermore, women are easily cut off during an economic recession.
In recent years, a significant number of young people have begun to
seek employment through job-information magazines and websites. I
have found a number of job information magazines specialising in
overseas employment. A number of job information websites specialis-
ing in jobs abroad have also been found. It has to be recognised that it
is becoming more commonplace to choose a foreign country as a place
of employment out of one’s own free will. Such an international demo-
graphic movement has, however, not been sufficiently examined.
It has been assumed that the boom in the number of Japanese work-
ing overseas was launched in 1994-95. The boom is believed to have gi-
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ven rise to discussions concerning Japanese people working in Hong
Kong, which resulted in a lot of media attention. At that time, the diffi-
culty in finding employment in Japan was due to the country’s serious
economic recession. The reasons for the boom in Japanese employees
working in Hong Kong was due to the relative ease with which one
could get a work visa under United Kingdom laws, and also because of
the attractiveness of Hong Kong as an-English speaking location.
Working overseas is subjected to the primary constraint of securing a
work visa. This can be difficult to obtain in Western countries, where a
working visa can be issued only to workers with special skills or exper-
tise. Conversely, in Singapore, graduates from 4-year college programs
can secure a work visa with relative ease, which makes it easier for Japa-
nese employees to obtain employment in the city-state. That has been
due to Singapore’s government’s search for non-blue-collar foreign
workers for the purpose of developing the city-state’s objective of be-
coming a global economical hub. In addition, Singapore, like Hong
Kong, is English speaking.
Furthermore, many Japanese-owned companies abroad have been at-
tempting to cut their operating costs by reducing the number of expatri-
ates they send abroad, and instead, switching to local employees or lo-
cally-hired Japanese employees. In Singapore, Japanese expatriates tend
to live with their family, as most Japanese feel comfortable and safe in
the city-state, factors that are of primary importance to the Japanese. Se-
curity and safety are particularly important considerations for Japanese
women.
When I conducted an interview survey of Japanese women employed
in Singapore, I discovered that most of the respondents were using job
information gathered from recruitment agency websites. The survey of
recruitment agencies reveals that over 80% of Japanese applicants are
young women, and many engage the agencies’ services in their search
for employment. Therefore, we think the role of recruitment agencies is
important for applicants who hope to work abroad. This study is in-
tended to investigate the role of recruitment agencies in employment
abroad, while the survey clarifies the role of recruitment agencies for
applicants of work abroad.
The Activities of Recruitment Agencies
The recent growth of labour-related producer services is remarkable. Be-
fore taking up the main subject, recruitment agencies should be briefly
explained. Recruitment businesses are divided into two categories in Ja-
pan: temporary staff employment agencies, regulated by the Law for
Worker Dispatching Undertakings; and recruitment agencies, as fee-
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charging employment placement bodies matching businesses that seek
workers and workers seeking employment, which are regulated by the
Employment Security Law.
Recruitment agencies are called ‘personnel introduction businesses’
for employers, and are considered ‘job placement businesses’ for appli-
cants, since jobs are being introduced.
While the operation licensing of both temporary staff employment
agencies and recruitment agencies differs, both types of agencies tend
to operate jointly due to recent deregulations in the Japanese labour
market. When looking at the business performance of recruitment
agencies dealing with both temporary staffing and recruiting, most of
their revenues came from temporary staffing. Moreover, headhunting,
which introduces a talented candidate to a managerial position, brings
in as much in referral fees as the person’s annual income. The higher a
client’s job level is, the higher the ratio that an agency charges in refer-
ral fees.
The services provided by recruitment agencies are as follows:
1. Sales: This pertains to the collecting of information on vacancies
from client companies. Most agencies assign male representatives to
provide this service. Information on vacancies is often requested di-
rectly from a client.
2. Consultation: This pertains to the matching of job offers and job
seekers. This service tends to have more female representatives, ap-
parently due to the need for delicate communications skills and a
friendly attitude. Thus, there are quite a high percentage of women
in recruitment agencies in this role.
3. Staff education/training: Many Japanese companies have their own
training programs. However, a number of companies depend on
employment agencies to acquire data on local business practices and
business cultures.
4. Other services: These include translation services. In Singapore,
many job offers involve translation services. Many Japanese compa-
nies usually utilise bilingual Japanese residents in Singapore.
Business condition Changes in Recruitment Agencies
As a complement to the national Public Employment Security Offices
(job placement offices) in Japan, recruiting by private agencies had been
limited to 29 job descriptions, including nurses. However, the labour
market was liberalised in 1999. With this deregulation, Japanese firms
changed their employment systems from regular to temporary, part-
time or dispatch jobs. Moreover, in recent years, the recruiting of white-
collar workers by employment agencies, involved in clerical work or en-
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gineering has been increasing. Furthermore, the recruiting business
has diversified into areas such as mid-career recruitment and job
changes, headhunting, as well as reemployment support for middle-
aged workers or older. These changes in the Japanese labour market de-
stroyed the former employment practices and caused unstable employ-
ment conditions. We can say that the growth of the human resource
business is the result of the liberalisation of the labour market, a situa-
tion that has been influenced by economic globalisation.
As a result of the deregulation of the Japanese labour market, it has
become increasingly unstable and mobile. This instability has led to an
increase in the demand for job information, because workers want
stable companies and higher income jobs. Consequently, both job see-
kers and employees depend on recruitment agencies, as recruitment
agencies have a wealth of job information and job seeker data. The re-
sult is that the human resource sector has grown rapidly.
The main reason that recruitment agencies can garner such large
amounts of information is because of how they acquire their data – by
collecting job information from both companies and job seekers via
their registration on various agency websites. Internet recruiting has
been used to target relatively skilled workers, primarily managers, pro-
fessionals, and other highly skilled workers. Even so, referral-based re-
cruiting has remained the preferred hiring strategy because of its rela-
tively low cost, speed and reliability (Niles and Hanson: 2003). Despite
the growing importance of Internet-based recruiting for Japanese com-
panies, these companies use this medium minimally and mostly to re-
cruit for relatively high-level positions. These positions usually have to
be advertised region-wide because they are harder to fill locally (Niles
and Hanson 2003). Japanese Internet recruiting is developing a grow-
ing presence overseas.
Recruitment agencies in Japan may roughly be grouped into two:
One group comprises of affiliated foreign companies. These include
Adecco and Manpower, of which the former is one of the most well-
known global human resource consulting companies and is based in
Switzerland. The other group comprises independent agencies such as
Recruit Ablic, Temptaff, Pasona, JAC, Staff Service and Intelligence.
Some employment agencies specialise in temporary staff and were
established to meet their parent company’s human resource demands.
Some manufacturers secure their staff through subsidiary temporary
staff employment agencies, set up to pare off personnel costs. Such
trends have been seen in all industrial fields. As an example, a number
of universities have experienced a sudden surge in the number of non-
regular clerical staff, employed by university-established temporary staff
agencies.
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Website for recruitment agencies
Niles and Hanson (2003) point out that employers use the Internet stra-
tegically to enhance the volume of applications when the labour market
is tight and to segment the applicant pool when the market becomes
looser and the number of resumes becomes overwhelming. The Inter-
net is one such potentially revolutionary information technology, offer-
ing the possibility for the increased access to information by greatly re-
ducing the time and costs of transferring it over distance and the costs
of sending information to many places simultaneously. Online job post-
ings expand the occupational opportunities and geographic scale of the
labour market for job seekers. Advertising jobs on the Internet can be a
strategy for extending job opportunities to all qualified workers and to
expand the social and geographic diversity of an employer’s applicant
pool. Furthermore, Niles and Hanson (2003) note that online job post-
ings transcend the constraints of grounded social relations, for both em-
ployees and employers, by giving people direct access to job informa-
tion that would not otherwise be available. The Internet has the poten-
tial to provide job seekers with information that may improve their
livelihoods by being able to access better jobs and providing employers
with information about better-qualified workers.
Table 15.1 shows the list of recruitment agencies listed on the ‘Singa-
pore oyakudachi jouhou’ Website, which means ‘Useful Singapore web
for Japanese’ http://www.singaweb.net/. This website is popular
amongst the Japanese community in Singapore, and many Japanese re-
sidents and visitors use the Website’s resources. The site’s main busi-
ness content is comprised of recruiting and advertisement of Japanese
and Japanese speakers. The recruitment business conducted pertains
primarily to temporary staffing. In spite of the presence of a lot of re-
cruitment agencies in Singapore, there are few domestic or foreign
agencies active on this site.
On the ‘Useful Singapore Web’, ten companies have postings on the
‘recruiting’ page. Among these, five companies are Japanese, two are lo-
cal Singapore recruitment agencies (one of these had a recruitment ser-
vice that specialised in Japanese and South Korean candidates), two for-
eign-affiliated companies, and one of Malaysian origin. A major for-
eign-affiliated recruitment agency – Adecco Personnel PTE Ltd. – has 15
branch offices in Singapore, one of which specialises in recruiting Japa-
nese personnel. Two other agencies – J-Power Consultancy and Y.N. Ca-
reer Consultants PTE Ltd. – are independent of any major Japanese re-
cruitment agencies. According to the founders of these two companies,
a recruitment agency can easily become independent if it possesses the
right information and recruitment know-how.
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Table 14.1 Recruitment Agencies in Singapore Offering Services to Japanese Com-
panies and Japanese Workers
Company name Capital base Business Services
PASONA SINGAPORE
PTE LTD
Japanese
(DM: Singaporean)
Recruiting Japanese and local hires
PEOPLESEARCH PTE LTD Singapore
(Biggest Singaporean
HR net group)
Recruiting Japanese and Koreans,
Japanese speakers and Korean
speakers, human resource scouting
JAC SINGAPORE PTE LTD Japanese Recruiting and manpower dispatching
of Japanese and local staff, human
resource consulting translation,
interpretation research, convention
service, visa application process
TEMPSTAFF(S) PTE LTD Japanese Recruiting and manpower dispatching
for Japanese and foreign companies
Human resource management service
KELLY SERVICE Singapore Recruiting and manpower dispatching
STAFF SERVICE
(SINGAPORE) PTE LTD
Japanese Recruiting and manpower dispatching
Y N CAREER
CONSULTANTS PTE LTD
Japanese
(self-funding)
Recruiting and manpower dispatching
human affairs outsource translation/
interpretation education training
ADECO PERSONNEL PTE
LTD
Foreign,
Multinational
At the Japanese branch, recruiting and
manpower dispatching Japanese and
Japanese speakers
J POWER CONSULTANCY Japanese
(self-funding)
Recruiting and manpower dispatching
for Japanese, in-service training for
local staff (business manner on-the-job
training, telephone skills training,
translation/interpretation business
consulting (integrated human resource
producing)
EXECUTIVE WORK PLACE
(S) PTE LTD
Japanese
(self-funding)
Recruiting and manpower dispatching
human affairs outsourcing
HRNET ONE OTE LTD Japanese
(self-funding)
Executive search (mainly for
administrative positions)
MERCER HUMAN
RESOURCES
CONSULTANTING
Japanese
(self-funding)
Recruiting and manpower dispatching
human resource outsourcing
RECRUIT ABLIC INC Japanese Recruiting and manpower dispatching
human affairs outsourcing.
N-QUEST PTE LTD Malaysian Recruiting, representative services
translation/interpretation account
representative services.
Source: http://www.singaweb.net/
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The agencies on the website maintained minimum registration re-
quirements in Singapore: a college degree, over 5 years working experi-
ence, OA skills, and English proficiency with TOEIC scores between
650-700. These requirements are the defined standards set by the Sin-
gapore government. It is easier to obtain a work visa in Singapore than
in other countries such as the US, UK or Australia, which are also at-
tractive to the Japanese. The Singapore government adopts an immigra-
tion policy that is conducive to the absorption of skilled, high-educated
and professional workers and managers in order to build up a highly
skilled and globalised workforce.
Many Japanese or major foreign recruitment agencies have their sub-
sidiaries in Singapore. The network of recruitment agencies is linked to
the areas of activity of Japanese companies via their respective websites.
Japanese recruitment agencies for Japanese personnel have discrimina-
tory networks. For example, ‘Pasona Singapore’ has offices in Japan,
Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, China, Taiwan, US, Canada and UK.
Two other recruitment agencies – JAC and ‘Tempstaff’ – have similar
networks. Japanese recruitment agencies have networks in Southeast
Asia and China, two economic regions where Japanese companies are
highly active. The result is a close relationship between Japanese re-
cruitment agencies and companies. Similar networks have also been es-
tablished by the foreign-affiliated agencies of these recruitment agen-
cies. These affiliated agencies have branches in America and Europe.
These networks leverage the human resource demands of Japanese
companies operating in foreign economic regions and are exclusive to
Japanese recruitment agencies. Foreign agencies, including Singapore’s
domestic agencies and other non-Japanese agencies, do not have similar
recruitment networks in Japan.
‘Space ALC’ (http://home.alc.co.jp/db/owa/cr_agency2_src) of the
ALC Press in Japan, posts the most substantial information on overseas
employment. The website includes nine recruitment agencies for Japa-
nese job seekers in Singapore. Most of them were Japanese recruitment
agencies. Japanese job seekers tend to use the websites of well-known
agencies because the reliability of recruitment agencies is important to
them. Reliability is especially important when foreign jobs are sought.
Most of these recruitment agencies have introduced more than half
of their clients to Japanese companies. The smaller the scale of opera-
tions of an agency, the higher the rate is of introductions to Japanese
companies. That is because the agencies’ profits depend on payments
for the procurement of high-wageworkers. The procurement of high-
wage Japanese personnel is more profitable than the successful place-
ment of local, or Singaporean, employees.
Moreover, on ‘HELLO SINGAPORE 2005’, the version of the Yellow
Pages used by many Japanese living in Singapore, an additional seven
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agencies, other than the ones mentioned thus far, are listed. These in-
clude Recruit Ablic, and two independent recruitment agencies. These
recruitment agencies also seek Japanese and Japanese-speaking Singa-
poreans through various advertisements.
Activity areas of recruitment agencies
‘Useful Singapore Web’ (http://www.singaweb.net/), an online recruit-
ment site used by many Japanese in Singapore, shows that major re-
cruitment agencies targeting mainly the Japanese have been cooperat-
ing and placing jobs throughout Asia through their branch networks.
The two independent recruitment agencies were recruiting on behalf of
Japanese companies in Southeast Asia, although their base of operation
was limited to Singapore.
Although most of the businesses were deployed in Southeast Asia
and China, recruiting in the US and the UK was partly connected by
networks. However, recruiting in these developed nations was, in many
cases, limited to engineering or managerial positions, and clerical posi-
tions, due to work visa requirements. Although many female Japanese
job seekers want to work abroad in order to use and improve their Eng-
lish skills, there are few countries which permit them to be issued with
work visas. Recruitment agencies have in turn turned this restriction to
their own advantage because they recommend female Japanese appli-
cants for positions in Singapore, where the language is English.
Furthermore, recruitment agencies are aware that female Japanese
job seekers are often compelled to leave Japan because of their disillu-
sionment with the Japanese workplace, as well as their willingness to
experience independent living overseas. Economic gain is not necessa-
rily the primary motivating factor for seeking employment abroad. Con-
sequently, many have been willing to take jobs at local wages, without
the luxury of housing and transportation allowances, and often live
modestly while abroad. They often earn lower incomes than they would
in Japan (Thang et al. 2004).
The employment information on the website of each recruitment
agency shows that there is a variety of industries and job descriptions
in Singapore for the female Japanese job seeker. Manufacturing, finance
and trade are typical job sectors found on the agencies’ websites. More-
over, the demand for sales, marketing and customer service positions is
increasing. The information on each agency’s website is similar, be-
cause most companies post their human resource requests with more
than one agency, a tactic that allows client companies to increase their
chances of fulfilling their human resource demands.
THE ROLE OF RECRUITMENT AGENCIES FOR JAPANESE WORKING WOMEN 279
Employment Information of Recruitment Agency
Employment information from the registration page of a major Japa-
nese recruitment agency website in Singapore is summarised in table
15.1. This agency reveals almost all of its employment information to
the public and recruits via the Internet. A number of agencies, however,
do not make any of this type of employment information available to
the public. It is apparent that there are many job offers in the IT-related,
electronic manufacturing, and financial industries.
Japanese recruitment agencies in Singapore were mainly recruiting lo-
cally hired Japanese employees on behalf of Japanese-owned firms as well
as foreign affiliates in Singapore and neighbouring countries; and locally
hired Japanese-speaking local employees (e.g., Japanese-speaking Singa-
poreans and Chinese-Malaysians) on behalf of Japanese-owned firms.
Most of the Japanese recruitment agencies in Singapore do not reveal
the details of their business dealings to the public and refused to re-
spond to my interview. This is probably because information itself is
the key to business success in the recruitment industry. However, one
Japanese company did offer some information on their recruitment ac-
tivities in Singapore. This company generated some 30% of its revenues
by recruiting Singaporeans for locally based positions, for which fluency
in the Japanese language was not necessary.
Recruiting Japanese workers is profitable because referral fees for Ja-
panese applicants are higher than those for locals. Although this section
accounted for 57.8% of all of the successful placements, lower referral
fees have made sales figures in this section of the agency’s business si-
milar to the placement of Japanese workers. The latter accounted for
only 22.8% of the total number of successful placements, and 32.8% of
total turnover. Referral fees are calculated at a percentage of the annual
income, and thus the approximately 10% higher referral fees for the
successful referral of Japanese workers suggests that Japanese salaries
are generally higher than those of Singaporeans.
Why is the role of recruitment agencies important for Japanese busi-
nesses and applicants in Singapore? Japanese companies operating in
Singapore continue to use the Japanese language in their business activ-
ities with other Japanese companies, which are often their key clients.
The Japanese business sector needs Japanese women to fill their lower-
end secretarial, clerical, reception and office worker positions. Japanese
companies need Japanese women who are able to provide administra-
tive support for the Japanese business culture. At the same time, Japa-
nese companies prefer temporary and flexible workers based in Singa-
pore to expatriates from Japan. Many Japanese companies thus depend
on recruitment agencies for the recruitment and job training of their
applicants in order to cut operating costs.
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Japanese companies offer most of the employment. Because sales
and marketing employees are required to be on the road for up to one-
third of every year, it has been necessary for the post to be filled in and
the work to be done while the marketing staff are away on business
trips. And because Japanese company headquarters in Tokyo are unable
to communicate with their branches abroad in English, there remains a
demand for Japanese-speaking personnel in Singapore.
Many of the business transactions are between Japanese companies
themselves, thus it is important to win contracts by entertaining Japa-
nese clients. Some Japanese companies use female employees as busi-
ness escorts. Thus it remains important for these business escorts to
speak Japanese and be familiar with Japanese business cultural prac-
tices. However, few Japanese females are employed in technical posi-
tions. In that sense, Japanese women are marginal as already noted by
Thang et al. (2002).
More recently, there have been more job offers in the financial sector.
Faced with a shortage of competent candidates, companies in this sector
have sought competent, experienced applicants from Japan. Female em-
ployees must be able to serve tea and have a polite disposition towards
customers. To some extent, these attributes have been regarded as more
important than the applicants’ academic backgrounds, because the Japa-
nese companies’ clients are other Japanese enterprises. Companies in
the financial sector, in particular, demand perfect Japanese language
skills.
Most of the female Japanese workers in Singapore enjoy their leisure
time. However, they are generally disappointed with their working con-
ditions. They want to use their English and sharpen their English skills.
However, there are few companies that offer the opportunity to use
English.
The phenomenon of increasing numbers of female Japanese working
abroad is one of the effects of an increasingly globalised world econo-
my, an economy that needs increasing numbers of workers at afford-
able local wages rather than at the costlier home rates. However, exist-
ing economic theories regarding labour supply and demand in a given
economic context cannot satisfactorily explain this labour phenomenon.
This phenomenon described here is not beholden to the traditional ar-
guments about a wage gap between countries that dispatch migrant
workers abroad (where wages are generally low) and countries that need
migrant workers (where wages are generally high). Instead, female Japa-
nese workers experience a decline in their incomes when they arrive in
Singapore.
It is important to remember that female Japanese workers decide to
work abroad because of the opportunity to experience a different lifestyle
from that in Japan. In other words, it is possible to argue that many fe-
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male Japanese workers are not primarily motivated by career or income.
Recruitment agencies, I believe, provide an excellent and affordable
source for Japanese workers seeking employment at Japanese companies
based in Singapore, and at the same time, provide Japanese women the
opportunities to experience another lifestyle. The agencies’ skills to sup-
ply skilled labour for Japanese companies abroad, which in turn, has
fuelled a demand amongst Japanese women to work abroad, has further
strengthened the agencies’ role in the Japanese labour market.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter has attempted to explain why Singapore is an attractive op-
erational location for recruitment agencies. As an economy and society
that experiences a high rate of job turnover, the workforce in Singapore,
both locals and foreigners (i.e., the Japanese, among others), often
change jobs. Moreover, many job seekers use recruitment agencies and
their websites to procure employment.
As Singapore develops into a globalised city, its demand for manage-
rial, professional entrepreneurial and highly skilled labour continues to
increase. These highly skilled workers are extremely mobile, and regard
Singapore as a steppingstone for their global business career. The im-
pact of this labour development and its rippling effects on the various
skill levels of the labour market, both within Singapore as well as
abroad, are significant. Female Japanese workers, who are attuned to
and familiar with Japanese business culture, are but one important
group within the international workforce, which has felt the effects of
this development.
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